# In Re: Diamond B Industries, L.L.C.

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · March 22, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189142

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** March 22, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189142

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “it is the ‘extent of the employee’s responsibility, not his title, that determines whether limitation is foreclosed.” (quoting Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d at 1377 n.16)
- explaining that a corporate shipowner is entitled to limitation if it overcomes the “presumption[s] . . . that” (1) “its officers and managers had actual knowledge,” and (2) “that they should have known of the unseaworthy or negligent condition that caused the injury”
- holding that “a Jones Act seaman, who possesses the full range of traditional seamen’s rights and remedies, cannot maintain a Sieracki seaworthiness action against a vessel on which he is not a crew member”
- explaining that while the standard for summary judgment ordinarily mirrors the standard for directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), “in nonjury cases it mirrors the standards . . . provided by Rule [52(c)].”
- explaining that a corporate shipowner is entitled to limitation if it overcomes the “presumption[s] . . . that” (1) “its officers and managers had actual knowledge,” and (2

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL ACTION
COMPLAINT OF DIAMOND B.
INDUSTRIES, LLC, AS OWNER AND NO. 22-127
OPERATOR OF THE M/V RIVER c/w 22-574
DIAMOND FOR EXONERATION
FROM AND/OR LIMITATION OF SECTION “R” (4)
LIABILITY

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the court is the motion for summary judgment of
petitioner Diamond B. Industries, LLC (“Diamond”).1 Claimant Ridge
Guidry, petitioner Rigid Constructors, LLC (“Rigid”), and third-party
defendant CBF Welding, Inc. (“CBF”) oppose the motion.2 For the
following reasons, the Court grants Diamond’s motion in part and
denies it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Based on the undisputed facts in the record, this case arises from
an accident on the Mississippi River, which occurred on September 8,
2021. Ridge Guidry, the sole personal-injury claimant, was employed

1 R. Doc. 47
2 R. Docs. 52, 56 & 60.
by Rigid, a maritime construction company.3 Guidry worked as a
deckhand aboard the TIDEMAR, a construction barge owned by

Rigid.4 He was injured when a steel shaft, or “spud,” cracked and fell
on him.5 At the time, the TIDEMAR was performing construction work
repairing a jetty on the riverbank in Iberville Parish.6 The job involved
laying rocks and fabric along the riverbank.7 There were two spuds on

the TIDEMAR that were utilized to keep the barge in place at different
times during the project.8 They were lowered into the river as a means
of keeping the vessel stationery, and they were raised whenever the

vessel was moved.9 As the TIDEMAR was used as a work platform and
did not have a means of self-propulsion, Rigid engaged Diamond to
provide tug services to move the barge from site to site on the project.10

3 R. Doc. 1¶ 10.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 R. Doc. 47-2 at 1 (Diamond’s Statement of Uncontested
Material Facts ¶ 3).
7 Id. (Diamond’s Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ¶ 4).
8 Id. at 2 (Diamond’s Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ¶
9).
9 Id. at 2 (Diamond’s Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ¶
14).
10 R. Doc. 47-2 at 3 (Diamond’s Statement of Uncontested
Material Facts ¶ 20).
Rigid instructed Diamond’s tugboat, the M/V RIVER DIAMOND,
when and where to move the TIDEMAR.11

On August 31, 2021, one of the spuds required repair.12 Rigid
temporarily halted the work and asked CBF to repair the spud.13 Riley
Tallent-Gary, the welder for CBF who worked on the spud, testified
that the spud at issue had required repair multiple times in the past.14

He also testified that previous repairs were performed on the same area
of the spud where the crack giving rise to this case formed.15 CBF
performed the welding work on the spud, and—although disputed by

Rigid—Tallent-Gary testified that he told multiple Rigid employees
onsite, including Guidry, that the spud was a hazard and would require
more permanent repairs.16 Tallent-Gary testified that he warned the
deckhands not to stand near the spud because “it might fall and kill

someone.”17 Guidry later testified that he knew the spud was not “safe
to use” after the August 31 repair.18

11 R. Doc. 47-7 at 18 (Deposition of Mike Schexnayder at 76:7-10).
12 R. Doc. 67-3 at 3 (Deposition of Zachary Ackal at 48:9-16).
13 Id.
14 R. Doc. 47-17 at 11 (Deposition of Riley Tallent-Gary at 86:7-19).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 8 (Deposition of Riley Tallent-Gary at 76:1-10).
17 Id.
18 R. Doc. 47-5 at 9 (Deposition of Ridge Guidry at 176:9-25).
The facts surrounding the morning of September 8, 2021 are in
dispute. It is not disputed that Robert Peterson, a Rigid deckhand, saw

a crack in the recently repaired spud on the morning of the accident.19
As is relevant to this motion, the parties dispute what Donald Taylor,
the captain of the M/V RIVER DIAMOND, knew about the condition
of the spud before undertaking to move the TIDEMAR to the site of the

accident. But is not disputed that either immediately after the M/V
RIVER DIAMOND moved the TIDEMAR, or while the barge was in the
process of being moved, the spud cracked and fell on Guidry.20 The

parties further dispute whether Captain Taylor navigated the barge in
tow in a negligent manner such that the recently repaired spud
collapsed and injured Guidry.
Following the incident, Guidry filed a personal injury action in

state court against Rigid and Diamond B Marine Services, Inc.
(presumably a mistake, as Diamond B. Industries, LLC is the owner of
the M/V RIVER DIAMOND).21 In response, Diamond and Rigid each
filed actions for limitation of liability,22 which were later consolidated

19 R. Doc. 60-6 at 32-33, 70-71 (Deposition of Robert Peterson at
30:17-31:1, 69:13-70:19).
20 R. Doc. 47-1 at 8.
21 See id. at 4 ¶ 15.
22 See R. Doc. 1 (Case No. 22-127); R. Doc. 1 (Case No. 22-574).
before this Court.23 The Court entered a restraining order in each
action, enjoining proceedings outside this one.24 Guidry responded to

both complaints for limitation in a timely manner and re-asserted his
claims. CBF was sued by both limitation petitioners and subsequently
asserted its own claims for indemnity and contribution against Rigid
and Diamond. This Court then bifurcated the consolidated action,

ordering that liability and limitation be tried in a bench trial, while
reserving Guidry’s right to try personal-injury damages in state court
after the limitation proceeding concludes.25

Now, Diamond seeks summary judgment on its claims of
exoneration and limitation of liability.26 Guidry, Rigid, and CBF
oppose the motion.27

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also

23 See R. Doc. 31.
24 See R. Doc. 3 (Case No. 22-127); R. Doc. 4 (Case No. 22-574).
25 R. Doc. 36.
26 R. Doc. 8.
27 R. Docs. 16 & 17.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid
Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether

a dispute as to any material fact exists, the Court considers “all of the
evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility
determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v.
Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir.

2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate
or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either

support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v.
Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Little,
37 F.3d at 1075. “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-

moving party.” EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir.
2014).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jones Act Claims Against Diamond
Guidry asserts multiple Jones Act claims against Diamond. “A
seaman may bring suit under the Jones Act only against his
employers.” Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 391 F.3d 660, 667 (5th
Cir. 2004). And, “a third person who borrows a worker may become

his employer if the borrowing employer assumes enough control over
the worker.” Guidry v. S. Louisiana Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 447,
452 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Ruiz v. Shell Oil Co., 413 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.
1969)). Here, it is not disputed that Guidry was not formally employed

by Diamond. But in Guidry’s state-court complaint, he alleged that he
was a borrowed employee of Diamond. Whether an individual is a
borrowed employee is a “matter of law” determined by making “nine

separate factual inquiries”:
1. Who has control over the employee and the work he is
performing, beyond mere suggestion of details or
cooperation?
2. Whose work is being performed?
3. Was there an agreement, understanding or meeting of
the minds between the original and the borrowing
employer?
4. Did the employee acquiesce in the new work situation?
5. Did the original employer terminate his relationship
with the employee?
6. Who furnished tools and place for performance?
7. Was the new employment over a considerable length of
time?
8. Who had the right to discharge the employee?
9. Who had the obligation to pay the employee?
Melancon v. Amoco Prod. Co., 834 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir. 1988)

(citing Ruiz, 413 F.2d at 310); Brown v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 984 F.2d
674, 676 (5th Cir. 1993). No single factor or set of factors is
determinative in establishing a “borrowed employee” relationship.
Brown, 984 F.2d at 676. The central factor is that of control. Id.;

Melancon, 834 F.2d at 1244–45 (same); Ruiz, 413 F.2d at 312 (same).
The party asserting the existence of a borrowed employee relationship
bears the burden of proof. Franks v. Assoc’d Air Center, Inc., 663 F.2d
583, 587 (5th Cir. 1981).

The Court need not engage in extensive analysis here because no
party opposing summary judgment has pointed to any evidence
suggesting that Guidry was a borrowed employee of Diamond. Indeed,

the parties do not contest Diamond’s assertions on this issue, and
nothing in the record indicates that Diamond exerted any control over
Guidry or his work. Accordingly, Diamond’s motion is granted as to
the Jones Act claims against it.

B. Sieracki Seaworthiness Claim
Further, Diamond moves to dismiss any Sieracki seaworthiness
claim that Guidry alleges. To the extent Guidry has asserted an

unseaworthiness claim based on Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328
U.S. 85 (1946), that claim is dismissed. It is not disputed that Guidry
is a Jones Act seaman, that he was employed by Rigid at the time of the
accident, and that he was not a crew member of the M/V RIVER

DIAMOND.28 Indeed, no party has opposed this portion of Diamond’s
motion. Guidry therefore cannot assert a Sieracki seaworthiness claim
against Diamond. See Smith v. Harbor Towing & Fleeting, Inc., 910

F.2d 312, 315 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that “a Jones Act seaman, who
possesses the full range of traditional seamen’s rights and remedies,
cannot maintain a Sieracki seaworthiness action against a vessel on
which he is not a crew member”). Diamond’s motion is granted as to

Guidry’s Siearcki seaworthiness claim.

C. General Maritime Negligence

The elements of a maritime negligence claim are essentially “the
same as land-based negligence under the common law.” Withhart v.

28 R. Doc. 47-2 at 1 (Diamond’s Statement of Uncontested
Material Facts ¶ 1-2).
Otto Candies, LLC, 431 F.3d 840, 842 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Kermarec
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959)).

To sustain a claim for maritime negligence, “the plaintiff must
demonstrate that there was a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff, breach of that duty, injury sustained by the plaintiff, and a
causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s

injury.” In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 211
(5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and modifications omitted).
Diamond moves for summary judgment based on the contentions that

it did not breach any duty owed to Guidry, and if it did, its actions were
not the cause of Guidry’s injury.

1. Duty and Breach

“Under maritime law, a plaintiff is owed a duty of ordinary care
under the circumstances.” In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC,
624 F.3d 201, 211 (5th Cir. 2010). “The determination of the existence
and scope of a duty involves a number of factors, including most

notably the foreseeability of the harm suffered by the complaining
party.” Id. (quoting Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. C.F. Bean Corp., 833
F.2d 65, 67 (5th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotations omitted). A duty may
be owed “only with respect to the interest that is foreseeably
jeopardized by the negligent conduct.” Id. A breach of the duty of

ordinary care can be found when defendant acts negligently, i.e.,
without such care. See, e.g., Movible Offshore, Inc. v. M/V Wilken A.
Falgout, 471 F.2d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 1973) (“It is enough that the vessel
sought to be charged had at its disposal safe means to avoid the

collision and negligently failed to do so.” (emphasis in original)). In
general, a tug owner, such as Diamond, is not responsible for accidents
that occur because of the unseaworthiness of its tow. See Zurich Ins.

Co. v. Crosby Tugs, L.L.C., 46 F. App’x 732 (5th Cir. 2002); see also
Ryan Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. James Marine Service, 557 F. Supp.
457, 460 (E.D. La. 1983), aff’d, 729 F.2d 1457 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Tug
Beverly, Inc., No. 92-99, 1994 WL 194891, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 13,

1994). Indeed, when a contract is made to tow a vessel, the owner of
the tow warrants the seaworthiness of his vessel, and the owner of the
tug is responsible for its safe navigation. See Houma Well Serv., Inc. v.
Tug Capt. O’Brien, 312 F. Supp. 257, 259 (E.D. La. 1970); see also 2

Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 12:5 (6th ed.
2020). But a tug may owe a duty of care to its tow if “it had actual
knowledge of the tow’s unseaworthiness or the unseaworthiness was
so apparent that it would be negligent to proceed with the tow.” Zurich,
46 F. App’x at 732 (citing King Fisher Marine Serv., Inc. v. The NP

Sunbonnet, 724 F.2d 1181, 1184 (5th Cir. 1984)).
Diamond contends that it is entitled to summary judgment
because there is no evidence that it owed a duty with respect to Guidry,
that it breached any duty owed, or that it caused the underlying

accident. First, Diamond contends that it did not owe Guidry a duty of
care because it had no knowledge of the crack in the spud prior to
moving the TIDEMAR, nor did it have knowledge of the spud’s

previous damage and repairs.29 The issue of whether Diamond knew
about the spud’s condition or whether it was apparent turns on the
state of knowledge of Captain Taylor, the only Diamond crew member
identified by the non-movants. Diamond is correct that there is no

evidence that Captain Taylor or other Diamond employees were
directly informed that the spud had previously been damaged and
repaired, or that a crack had formed on the spud on the morning of the
accident. But the non-movants have nonetheless created an issue of

fact on whether Taylor was aware of the dangerous condition of the
spud on the morning of the accident—which, if true, should have

29 R. Doc. 47-1 at 15.
prevented the M/V RIVER DIAMOND from moving the TIDEMAR.
Zurich, 46 F. App’x at 732.

In opposing Diamond’s motion, the non-movants point to
evidence that the crews of the M/V RIVER DIAMOND and the
TIDEMAR had access to, and utilized, a common radio channel.30
Indeed, Captain Taylor admitted that the radio was used to

communicate with the TIDEMAR crew,31 and that he overheard radio
discussions concerning the dangerous condition of the spud
immediately after the accident occurred.32 Guidry and CBF also point

to Robert Peterson’s testimony that he noticed a crack on the spud on
the morning of the accident.33 Peterson also testified that he informed
Mike Schexnayder, the operator of the excavator aboard the
TIDEMAR, about the crack.34 Lastly, Peterson testified that he heard

Schexnayder issue a warning over the common radio channel that the

30 R. Doc. 60-6 at 70-71 (Deposition of Robert Peterson at 69:13-
70:19); R. Doc. 60-3 at 45 (Deposition of Ridge Guidry at
174:15-175:7).
31 R. Doc. 60-4 at 20, 21 (Deposition of Donald Taylor at 76:7-14,
79:20-24).
32 Id.
33 R. Doc. 60-6 at 32-33, 70-71 (Deposition of Robert Peterson at
30:17-31:1, 69:13-70:19).
34 Id.
spud had cracked.35 Guidry also points to Captain Taylor’s statement
made to Guidry after the accident that Taylor “had a feeling something

was going to happen with that spud.”36 Lastly, Guidry points to
evidence that Taylor admitted he would have exercised his stop work
authority if he knew about the crack in the spud.37 This evidence, taken
together, precludes summary judgment. Taylor’s admission that he

“had a feeling something was going to happen” to the spud is indicative
that he had knowledge of the spud’s dangerous condition before the
accident, which could give rise to a duty to protect against the risks

posed by the spud. Further, the circumstantial evidence regarding
Taylor’s regular use of the common radio channel and the information
conveyed on that channel adds to this conclusion. There is also an issue
of fact regarding whether Taylor breached his duty by moving the

TIDEMAR immediately before the accident and not exercising stop
work authority. Taylor’s acknowledgement that he would have stopped
work if he had known about the spud’s condition reflects his awareness
of the action that would have been required of him.

35 R. Doc. 60-6 at 32-33, 70-71 (Deposition of Robert Peterson at
30:17-31:1, 69:13-70:19).
36 R. Doc. 60-3 at 45 (Deposition of Ridge Guidry at 174:15-175:7).
37 R. Doc. 60 at 7; see also R. Doc. 60-4 at 21 (Deposition of
Donald Taylor 78:18-79:2).
2. Causation

The non-movants have also created a material fact issue on
causation. In maritime negligence cases, the purported negligence
must be the proximate, or legal, cause of the damage, which is
something more than “but for” causation—“the negligence must be a

substantial factor in causing the injuries.” In re Great Lakes, 624 F.3d
at 213–14 (citation and quotations omitted); see Dixie Marine, Inc. v.
Q Jake M/V, No. 16-12415, 2017 WL 3600574, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 22,

2017). The non-moving parties have created a fact issue on causation
by pointing to Taylor’s testimony that he would have exercised stop
work authority if he knew about the spud’s dangerous condition.
Evidence of Taylor’s knowledge plus evidence that he could have

stopped the work create an issue of fact as to whether Taylor could have
prevented the accident if he had not breached a duty of care.
Accordingly, Diamond’s motion is denied as to Guidry’s general
maritime negligence claim.
D. Limitation of Liability
Lastly, Diamond moves for summary judgment on its claim for

limitation of liability on the basis that it had no “privity or knowledge”
of the alleged negligent acts or unseaworthy conditions that caused the
accident.38 A vessel owner who seeks limitation must show that it
lacked privity or knowledge of the negligence. Kristie Leigh

Enterprises, Inc., v. American Commercial Lines, Inc., 72 F.3d 479,
481 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth Circuit has explained that “privity or
knowledge, which is sometimes described as ‘complicity in the fault,’

extends beyond actual knowledge to knowledge that the ship owner
would have obtained by reasonable investigation.” Cupit v.
McClanahan Contractors, Inc., 1 F.3d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 1993). When
the limitation plaintiff is a corporation, “privity or knowledge” means

the privity or knowledge of its officers as well as high-level managers
in the corporate hierarchy. See Cont’l Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706
F.2d 1365, 1377 n.16 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Whether a corporation has
‘privity or knowledge’ of a negligent act may be determined on the basis

of whether the negligent employee is sufficiently high in the corporate
hierarchy to make his awareness that of the corporation.” (citing

38 R. Doc. 47-1 at 19-20.
Spencer Kellogg & Sons v. Hicks, 285 U.S. 502 (1932))); see also
Brister v. A.W.I., Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining

that a corporate shipowner is entitled to limitation if it overcomes the
“presumption[s] . . . that” (1) “its officers and managers had actual
knowledge,” and (2) “that they should have known of the unseaworthy
or negligent condition that caused the injury”); 2 Thomas J.

Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 15:8 (6th ed. 2020).
As the moving party with the burden of proof on this issue, to be
entitled to summary judgment, Diamond must put forth evidence

which, if uncontroverted at trial, could result in a judgment on partial
findings in its favor. Cf. Pro. Managers, Inc. v. Fawer, Brian, Hardy
& Zatzkis, 799 F.2d 218, 223 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that while the
standard for summary judgment ordinarily mirrors the standard for

directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), “in
nonjury cases it mirrors the standards . . . provided by Rule [52(c)].”);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (requiring that a movant makes a showing
“that it entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). Here, Diamond

points to a lack of evidence that it was directly informed of the spud’s
condition or that the spud had recently been repaired. As noted in
Section III.C, supra, the non-moving parties have created a fact issue
on Taylor’s knowledge regarding the spud’s condition. The issue of
privity or knowledge thus turns on whether Taylor is a sufficiently

high-ranking employee of Diamond that the Court may impute the
Captain’s knowledge on Diamond. The non-moving parties allude to
46 U.S.C. § 30506, which provides that “the privity or knowledge of the
master [of a vessel] . . . at or before the beginning of each voyage, is

imputed to the owner.” But the statute is not applicable here, as it also
states that:
(a) Application.—
This section applies only to seagoing vessels, but does not
apply to pleasure yachts, tugs, towboats, towing vessels,
tank vessels, fishing vessels, fish tender vessels, canal
boats, scows, car floats, barges, lighters, or nondescript
vessels.
Id. (emphasis added). The relevant vessel in this case, the M/V
RIVER DIAMOND, is an inland tugboat, rendering the imputation
clause of the statute facially inapplicable. See Matter of Dredge Big
Bear, 525 F. Supp. 3d 731, 739 (M.D. La. 2021) (holding that
imputation of privity or knowledge to owner based on what a captain
knew is not warranted when the vessel was an inland tugboat and not

a “seagoing vessel”). But this does not end the inquiry on whether
Taylor is sufficiently high up in Diamond’s corporate ladder. Cf. In re
Hellenic Inc., 252 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that “it is the
‘extent of the employee’s responsibility, not his title, that determines
whether limitation is foreclosed.” (quoting Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d at

1377 n.16)). The Fifth Circuit has explained that:
Although this determination is case-specific, courts have
looked to a number of factors: (1) the scope of the agent’s
authority over day-to-day activity in the relevant field of
operations; (2) the relative significance of this field of
operations to the business of the corporation; (3) the
agent’s ability to hire or fire other employees; (4) his power
to negotiate and enter into contracts on behalf of the
company; (5) his authority to set prices; (6) the agent’s
authority over the payment of expenses; (7) whether the
agent’s salary is fixed or contingent; and (8) the duration
of his authority (i.e., full-time or restricted to a specific
shift). These factors are non-exhaustive and merely
indicate the array of considerations that are potentially
relevant to the managing agent inquiry.
In re Hellenic Inc., 252 F.3d 391, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted).
Diamond has put forth no evidence on any of these factors. The
non-moving parties have submitted evidence on the first factor by
pointing to Taylor’s admitted stop work authority, and his role as
master of the M/V RIVER DIAMOND, the only Diamond tugboat
identified with respect to the Iberville project. Because Diamond bears
the burden of showing it did not have privity or knowledge, Kristie
Leigh Enterprises, 72 F.3d at 481, and it has failed to submit evidence
that could, if uncontroverted at trial, result in a judgment on partial
findings, the Court must deny its motion for summary judgment on
limitation.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and
DENIES IN PART Diamond’s motion for summary judgment. The
Court GRANTS the motion as to the Jones Act and Sieracki
seaworthiness claims, and those claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. The Court DENIES the motion as to Guidry’s general
maritime negligence claim and Diamond’s limitation claim.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this _22nc__ day of March, 2023.
Aornk VG1+42_
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189142. Public record. Not legal advice.