# Hawkins v. Sanders

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · March 16, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189107

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** March 16, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189107

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating suits against state supreme courts are barred by the Eleventh Amdnment
- stating that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

GERALYN HAWKINS, ET AL., CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiffs

VERSUS NO. 19-13323

SHELLY SANDERS, ET AL., SECTION: “E” (1)
Defendants

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is Defendants’, Franz Zibilich, Dawn Plaisance, Jan Schmidt, and
the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Rules of Court Committee, Motion to Dismiss.1
Plaintiffs oppose the motion.2 Defendants have filed a reply.3 With leave of the Court,4
Plaintiffs have filed a supplemental opposition.5 Having reviewed the pleadings and the
case law, the Court rules as follows.
I. Background6
Plaintiffs Geralyn Hawkins, Nichole Thompson, and Chad Lightfoot (sometimes
collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”) sue numerous Defendants, captioning their
complaint as a “Civil Rights Complaint 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; 1985; and 1986.” Plaintiffs’
claims stem from a pending criminal proceeding against Lightfoot for perjury, RICO theft,
and RICO identity fraud in Louisiana state criminal court.7 Lightfoot has a criminal and
civil history in Louisiana federal and state courts dating back to 1996.8

1 R. Doc. 63.
2 R. Doc. 97.
3 R. Doc. 104.
4 R. Doc. 136.
5 R. Doc. 137.
6 The following allegations are based on the third amended complaint. R. Doc. 57.
7 R. Doc. 57, ¶ 56.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Lightfoot, Civ. A. No. 17-00274, 2018 WL 5269827 (W.D. La. Oct. 22, 2018)
(“Lightfoot is charged in the Indictment [Doc. No. 1] with one count of Fraud Scheme in Connection with
Hawkins, Thompson, and Lightfoot obtained personal loans in 2010 from
Defendant Greater New Orleans Federal Credit Union (“the Union”).9 To apply for the
loans, Plaintiffs submitted personal and/or private information to the Union, such as
their places of employment, social security numbers, and drivers’ license information.10
In 2012, the Union conducted an internal investigation of numerous loans when it became

suspicious because many of the loan applicants had the same information, such as
addresses or job information.11 Plaintiffs’ loans were among those investigated.12
Defendants Shelly Sanders, Heather Rodgers, and Gerry Kish, employees of the Union,
assisted with the investigation.13 Ultimately, Louisiana authorities accused Plaintiffs of
participating in an “auto loan shopping scam” and fraud against the Union, and Lightfoot
was arrested on October 15, 2015 and later charged with one count of perjury, one count
of RICO identity theft, and one count of fraud.14
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in October 2019.15 Plaintiff Lightfoot alone sues
Defendants former Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Judge Franz Zibilich; Dawn

Plaisance and Jan Schmidt, two court reporters in Judge Zibilich’s section of the court;
and the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Rules of Court Committee (collectively,
“Defendants”) for “deny[ing] the plaintiff of [sic] evidence necessary to determine if he is

Major Disaster or Emergency Benefits, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1040(a)(2).”), affirmed, 809 F. App’x. 246
(5th Cir. 2020); Lightfoot v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 101 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1996), 1996 WL 661267, at *1
(barring Lightfoot from filing any civil lawsuit as a pauper within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit).
9 R. Doc. 57 ¶¶ 20-21, 23.
10 Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.
11 Id. ¶ 26.
12 Id. ¶ 27-29.
13 Id. ¶¶ 26-28.
14 Id. ¶ 25, 32-33. In the third amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that multiple grand juries were
convened, multiple indictments issued against Lightfoot on various charges that were later dismissed when
the later grand jury superseded those charges, and Lightfoot was arrested no fewer than four times. Id. at
pp. 4-5. It appears that the three charges noted above are now the only charges pending as of the date of
filing the third amended complaint.
15 R. Doc. 1.
being afforded a fair trial to which he is entitled.” This allegation stems from Lightfoot’s
state charges, in which Lightfoot requested Judge Zibilich recuse himself from his case.16
This request was heard before another judge, Judge Hunter.17 Judge Hunter issued several
subpoenas for audio recordings of all proceedings in Lightfoot’s case before Judge
Zibilich, but each time Judge Zibilich allegedly instructed his court reporters not to

comply with the subpoenas because the recordings were not public records.18 Judge
Zibilich allegedly submitted the question of whether the recordings were public record to
the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Rules of Court Committee (the “Rules
Committee”), which opined:
After considering the law and facts, it is the opinion of the Rules of the Court
Committee, based on the showing made, that the audio recordings in
question are not required to be released by the Court based on the law (see
R.S. 44:4(45)). The proper procedural vehicle to secure these materials is
by formal transcript request to the court reporter to produce a certified
official transcript of the proceedings associated with this case subject to the
normal rules of the court.19
An en banc meeting of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court accepted this opinion.20
After reviewing only the transcripts, because he was unable to obtain the audio
recordings, Judge Hunter ruled that Judge Zibilich was not required to recuse himself.21
Plaintiff Lightfoot alleges that Defendants Zibilich, Plaisance, and Schmidt
“conspired to deny Plaintiff Lightfoot of rights entitled to him through due process in a
state law proceeding causing injury to his person or property.”22 Because this Court must

16 R. Doc. 57 ¶¶ 62-63.
17 Id. ¶ 64.
18 Id. ¶¶ 72-78.
19 Id. ¶ 79. As Judge Hunter noted, however, the Rules Committee cited the incorrect provision; the correct
provision is La. Rev. Stat. § 44:4(47). Louisiana v. Lightfoot, No. 526-754, slip op. at 3 n.7 (La. Crim. Dist.
Ct. Orleans Par. Dec. 20, 2019) (Hunter, J.), provided in R. Doc. 97-1, at pp. 12-15.
20 R. Doc. 57 ¶ 81.
21 Id. ¶ 83; see also Lightfoot, slip op. at 4.
22 R. Doc. 57 ¶ 73.
“give pro se briefs a liberal construction,” the Court construes this claim as one under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.23 Plaintiff Lightfoot also alleges that Zibilich and the Rules Committee
violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process as well as the “Ex Post
Facto Laws of the United States . . . Constitution.”24 Because Plaintiff Lightfoot seeks
damages, the Court construes these claims as arising under Section 1983. Plaintiff sues

Zibilich, Plaisance, and Schmidt in their official and individual capacities.25 Lightfoot also
alleges Defendants violated Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 673 and Article
I, Section 23 of the Louisiana Constitution.26
Plaintiff Lightfoot seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants Zibilich and the
Rules Committee violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights as well as the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution for
allegedly denying Lightfoot the audio recordings.27 Lightfoot also asks for a preliminary
injunction requiring Zibilich and the Rules Committee to turn over the audio recordings.28
All Plaintiffs, including Hawkins and Thompson, allege against all Defendants
nebulous violations of their Eight Amendment rights.29 All Plaintiffs seek damages from
Defendants for all violations. 30 Finally, Plaintiffs ask this Court to charge Defendants

Zibilich, Plaisance, and Schmidt with criminal violations of various Louisiana statutes
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiffs also sue former District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro, Jr. and Assistant
District Attorney Andre Gaudin for allegedly fabricating evidence to support the criminal

23 Brown v. Sudduth, 675 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2012).
24 R. Doc. 57 ¶ 89.
25 Id. ¶¶ 9, 13-14.
26 Id. at p. 1, ¶¶ 84, 113.
27 Id. ¶¶ 84, 113.
28 Id. ¶ 84.
29 Id. ¶ 125.
30 Id. ¶¶ 115-22.
allegations against Plaintiffs and for bad faith prosecution.31 Plaintiffs also sue the Union,
Sanders, Rodgers, and Kish for allegedly improperly turning their private bank records
over to the Gaudin.
Defendants Zibilich, Plaisance, Schmidt, and the Rules Committee now move to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against them under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6).32
II. Legal Standard
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by
statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims.”33 A motion to dismiss under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.34
Under Rule 12(b)(1), “[a] case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”35 “Lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction may be found in the complaint alone, the complaint
supplemented by the undisputed facts as evidenced in the record, or the complaint
supplemented by the undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of the disputed facts.”36

“When, as here, grounds for dismissal may exist under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule

31 R. Doc. 57 ¶¶ 32-44.
32 R. Doc. 67. Defendant Plaisance also moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against her under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process; however, Plaisance has since accepted service.
R. Doc. 85.
33 In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liab. Litig. (Mississippi Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th
Cir. 2012).
34 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
35 Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
36 In re FEMA, 668 F.3d at 287.
12(b)(6), the Court should, if necessary, dismiss only under the former without reaching
the question of failure to state a claim.”37
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss
a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

if the plaintiff has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle
him to relief.38 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”39
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”40 The court, however, does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere
conclusory statements, and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as
factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.”41 “[T]hreadbare
recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” or
“naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” are not sufficient.42
In summary, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.”43 “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not

37 Valdery v. Louisiana Workforce Comm’n, No. CIV.A. 15-01547, 2015 WL 5307390, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept.
10, 2015).
38 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2007).
39 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
40 Id.
41 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).
42 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 678 (citations omitted).
43 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”44 “Dismissal is appropriate when the
complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’”45
III. Legal Analysis
A. Claims Against “All Defendants” Are Dismissed Without
Prejudice.

In numerous paragraphs of the third amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that “all
named Defendants,” “all Defendants,” or “named Defendants” violated their
constitutional or statutory rights.46 Mere “conclusory allegations against [d]efendants as
a group” that “fail[ ] to allege the personal involvement of any defendant” are insufficient
to put Defendants on notice of their alleged wrongdoing.47 A plaintiff must allege facts
that “establish each individual [d]efendant’s liability for the misconduct alleged.”48 When
a number of defendants are named in a complaint, a plaintiff cannot refer to all
defendants “who occupied different positions and presumably had distinct roles in the
alleged misconduct” without specifying “which defendants engaged in what wrongful
conduct.”49 A complaint that contains “impermissibly vague group pleading” will be
dismissed.50
Accordingly, the claims against “all named Defendants,” “all Defendants,” or
“named Defendants,” including Zibilich, Plaisance, Schmidt, and the Rules Committee,

44 Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
45 Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 F. App’x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quotations omitted).
46 See, e.g, R. Doc. 57, ¶¶ 18, 85-88, 90, 92, 95, 125.
47 Galicki v. New Jersey, No. 14-169, 2015 WL 3970297, at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015) (dismissing plaintiffs’
claims without prejudice for failure to provide each defendant with notice of its alleged participation in the
racketeering enterprise).
48 Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (finding that a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution);
Aruanno v. Main, 467 F. App'x 134, 137-38 (3d Cir. 2012) (dismissal of § 1983 action was appropriate where
Defendants were collectively sued as “[government] personnel” and failed to allege the personal
involvement of the individual Defendants).
49 Falat v. County of Hunterdon, No. 12-6804, 2013 WL 1163751, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013).
50 Id.
are dismissed without prejudice for impermissible group pleading and failing to specify
how Zibilich, Plaisance, Schmidt, and the Rules Committee violated Plaintiffs’ rights.51
However, to the extent the Plaintiffs referenced any of these claims elsewhere in their
third amended complaint against specific Defendants, these claims are addressed below.
B. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Request Criminal Charges Against
Defendants.

Plaintiffs request the Court invoke its “pendent/supervisory jurisdiction” under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to charge Defendants Zibilich, Plaisance, and Schmidt with criminal
violations of various Louisiana statutes.52 As the Court has stated before, this is beyond
its authority and jurisdiction.53 “Section 1983 and Bivens actions are available to seek
damages and injunctive relief. They are not avenues for private citizens to bring criminal
charges.”54 “[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
non-prosecution of another.”55 Because Plaintiffs lack standing to bring criminal charges
against Defendants, these claims must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of
standing.
C. The Federal Law Claims by Hawkins and Sanders Against
Defendants Are Dismissed.

In their motion to dismiss and reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Hawkins and
Sanders have no standing to assert claims against Defendants because they have suffered
no injury from any of the alleged misconduct in Lightfoot’s prosecution; only Lightfoot
has suffered an alleged injury to establish standing. Defendants also argue the Rules

51 These claims are dismissed as to all Defendants in this lawsuit for the same reasons, notwithstanding that
this Order and Reasons addresses only Ziblich, Plaisance, Schmidt, and the Rules Committee’s motion to
dismiss.
52 R. Doc. 57, ¶¶ 96-111.
53 R. Doc. 148.
54 Banks v. Gillie, No. 03-3098, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5413, at *20 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2004).
55 See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
Committee is not a juridical entity capable of being sued. They argue that Lightfoot’s
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against Zibilich and the Rules Committee are
moot because Judge Zibilich is no longer on the bench. Alternatively, they argue that the
Court must abstain from deciding Lightfoot’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
against Defendants under the Younger56 and Rooker-Feldman57 doctrines. Finally,

Defendants argue that any claims for damages against Plaisance and Schmidt in their
official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and any claims against them in
their individual capacities are barred by qualified immunity.
Plaintiffs argue in their opposition and supplemental opposition that Hawkins and
Sanders have standing to bring claims because they have an interest in the outcome of
Lightfoot’s prosecution due to their relationship with him and Defendants’ conduct has
caused them mental, emotional, and financial suffering. They alternatively argue
Hawkins and Sanders have third-party standing. Plaintiffs admit the Rules Committee is
not an entity capable of being sued but argue they should be allowed to identify the correct
entity through discovery. Plaintiffs argue the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
are not moot because they still dispute the legality of the Defendants’ actions. They argue

Younger abstention is not applicable because Lightfoot’s prosecution is in bad faith and
because the alleged misconduct by Defendants in this case is an exceptional circumstance
that the Court must address. Plaintiffs argue the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable
because they do not seek Judge Zibilich’s recusal. They admit that any claims for damages
against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
However, Plaintiffs maintain they have the right to request damages from Defendants in

56 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
57 Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
their individual capacities. They argue Zibilich does not have absolute immunity for his
actions because he lacked jurisdiction at that time since the motion to recuse had been
transferred to Judge Hunter. Finally, Plaintiffs argue Plaisance and Schmidt are not
entitled to qualified immunity because they violated rights guaranteed to Plaintiffs by the
Louisiana Constitution and Louisiana statutes.

1. Plaintiffs Hawkins and Sanders Lack Standing to Sue for
Injuries Allegedly Sustained by Lightfoot.

Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or
controversy.58 The doctrine developed to ensure federal courts do not exceed their
authority as it has been traditionally understood.59 The doctrine limits the category of
litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal
wrong.60
The Supreme Court has established that the “irreducible constitutional minimum”
of standing consists of three elements.61 The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in
fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.62 Injury in fact is a constitutional
requirement and cannot be erased.63 To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that
he or she suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”64 For an injury

58 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 856 (2016).
59 See id. at 820.
60 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 473 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-499 (1975).
61 Lujan v, Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
62 Id. at 560–561.
63 See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (“In no event . . . may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima”).
64 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
to be “particularized,” it “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”65 A
“concrete” injury must be “de facto”; that is, it must actually exist.66 “Concrete” is not,
however, necessarily synonymous with “tangible.”67
“[E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the ‘case or
controversy’ requirement, [the Supreme] Court has held that the plaintiff generally must

assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal
rights or interests of third parties.”68 In other words, “injury alone is not sufficient to
establish standing”; rather, a person can generally only pursue claims “to vindicat[e] that
person’s own rights.”69 For example, in Danos v. Jones, the secretary of a federal judge
sued the Judicial Council of the United States for allegedly unconstitutionally suspending
the judge from employing staff, which resulted in the secretary’s termination of
employment.70 The secretary claimed she had standing because she “suffered an injury-
in-fact by losing her job.”71 However, the Fifth Circuit held the “alleged rights at issue— .
. . to employ a secretary under § 752—are rights of the judge, not of the secretary.”72
Accordingly, even though the secretary was injured, she “lack[ed] standing to pursue this
constitutional claim, because she [could ]not assert the rights of [the judge].”73

Nevertheless, “there may be circumstances where it is necessary to grant a third
party standing to assert the rights of another.”74 In order for a third party to have third-

65 Id. at n.1.
66 Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
67 Id. at 1549.
68 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also Danos v. Jones, 721 F. Supp. 2d 491, 498 (E.D. La.
July 8, 2010) (citing Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004)) (“[P]rudential standing considerations
generally limit a person to vindicating that person's own rights.”), aff’d, 652 F.3d 577 (5th Cir. 2011).
69 Danos, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
70 Danos, 625 F.3d at 580.
71 Danos, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
72 Danos, 625 F.3d at 580.
73 Id.
74 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129-30.
party standing, the third party must “make two additional showings”: 1) the third party
must have a “’close’ relationship with the person who possesses the right,” and 2) there
must be a “’hindrance’ to the possessor’s ability to protect his own interests.”75
In this case, Plaintiffs’ claims stem solely from Lightfoot’s pending prosecution,
namely his motion to recuse Judge Zibilich. Hawkins and Sanders have never been

arrested or charged in connection with the case against Lightfoot.76 Hawkins and Sanders
do not assert that Defendants violated their own constitutional rights; rather, they rest
their claims on alleged violations of Lightfoot’s constitutional rights. Although they argue
that Defendants’ alleged misconduct against Lightfoot has caused them mental,
emotional, and financial suffering, injury alone is not sufficient to assert the rights of
others.77 Like the plaintiff in Danos, Hawkins and Sanders have failed to assert a violation
of their own rights.78 Moreover, Hawkins and Sanders cannot assert third-party standing
to bring Lightfoot’s claims because there is no hindrance to his ability to protect his own
interests. It is undisputed that Lightfoot is a party in this very litigation and is asserting
his rights against Defendants.
For these reasons, Hawkins and Sanders lack standing to bring the asserted claims

against Defendants. Accordingly, any claims by Hawkins and Sanders against Defendants
must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing.

75 Id. at 130 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)).
76 R. Doc. 57, at p. 10.
77 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499; Danos, 625 F.3d at 580; Danos, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
78 Hawkins and Sanders also point to their claims against the other Defendants in this case, Gaudin,
Cannizzaro, the Union, Sanders, Rodgers, and Kish, to assert that they have an interest in Lightfoot’s
prosecution sufficient to establish standing against Zibilich, Plaisance, Schmidt, and the Rules Committee.
However, the claims against the other Defendants relate to their use of Hawkins and Sanders’s financial
information in Lightfoot’s prosecution, which in no way relate to their claims against Zibilich, Plaisance,
Schmidt, and the Rules Committee for allegedly denying Lightfoot certain evidence in Zibilich’s recusal
hearing. Hawkins and Sanders cannot use their standing to sue some defendants as standing to sue others
when they assert no personal cognizable interest against those other defendants.
2. The Rules Committee is not an Entity Capable of Being
Sued.

Under Louisiana law, “[a]n entity must qualify as a juridical person to have the
capacity to be sued.”79 “A juridical person is an entity to which the law attributes
personality, such as a corporation or a partnership.”80 The Louisiana Supreme Court has
adopted a “functional approach” for determining whether a political subdivision is a
separate and distinct juridical person.81 In this case, numerous courts have recognized
that Louisiana district courts are not juridical entities capable of being sued,82 and nothing
about the Rules Committee, an internal committee of judges organized by the Orleans
Parish Criminal District Court, makes the outcome any different.83 Lightfoot admits the
Rules Committee is not a juridical entity: “The plaintiffs are in agreement with the
defendants, Section 1983 DOES NOT permit the plaintiffs to take action against the Rules
Committee named herein . . . in their [sic] official capacities [sic].”84 Accordingly, an
analysis of whether the Rules Committee is a juridical person is not necessary. For these
reasons, Lightfoot’s claims against the Rules Committee must be dismissed with
prejudice.85

79 Dejoie v. Medley, No. 41,333, at p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/20/06); 945 So. 2d 968, 972.
80 La. Civ. Code art. 24 (2021).
81 Roberts v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, No. 92-2048 (La. 3/21/94); 634 So. 2d 341, 346-47.
82 See, e.g., Griffith v. Louisiana, 808 F. Supp. 2d 926 933-34 (E.D. La. 2011) (collecting cases); Durden v.
Bryson, No. 5:17-cv-214, 2017 WL 4855437, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 26, 2017) (same).
83 R. Doc. 57 at 15.
84 R. Doc. 97, at p. 5.
85 Plaintiffs ask the Court to permit discovery so that they can identify the members of the Rules Committee
and add them to this case. However, discovery is currently stayed. R. Doc. 85. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a) provides the Court should grant leave to amend freely when justice so requires. Leave to
amend is not “automatic,” but the Court must possess a “substantial reason” to deny leave to amend. Jones
v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir.2005). A court possesses a “substantial reason”
when, for instance, a plaintiff has acted with “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive” in seeking leave to
amend, the plaintiff has made “repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,”
“undue prejudice [will result] to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,” or the
amendment would be completely futile. Id. The Court finds any amendment in this case would be futile.
For the reasons stated in this Order, Plaintiffs’ claims against the Rules Committee fail, and adding the
individual members as defendants would not change that. The Court also notes that most of the acts giving
rise to Plaintiffs’ complaint occurred between 2010 and 2014; a few acts occurred in 2018 and 2019.
3. Lightfoot’s Claims for Damages Against Zibilich, Plaisance,
and Schmidt in Their Official Capacities Are Barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.

“A foundational premise of the federal system is that States, as sovereigns, are
immune from suits for damages, save as they elect to waive that defense.”86 “As an
exception to this principle, Congress may abrogate the States' immunity from suit
pursuant to its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”87 “Congress has not
expressly waived sovereign immunity for § 1983 suits.”88 “While Louisiana may have
waived sovereign immunity with respect to some claims [in tort and contract], La. Const.
art. 1 § 26 makes it clear the State has not waived its sovereignty within the federal
system.”89 “Suits against state officials in their official capacity . . . should be treated as
suits against the State.”90 For this reason, suits against Louisiana district judges in their
official capacity have been found to be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.91
In this case, Lightfoot’s claims for damages under Section 1983 against Zibilich,
Plaisance, and Schmidt in their official capacities are treated as claims against the State

Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in 2019. The Court will not now, in 2023, after Plaintiffs have already filed four
complaints, give leave for Plaintiffs to file yet another amended complaint. Accordingly, to the extent
Plaintiffs are requesting leave from the Court to file an amended complaint in order to add the individual
members of the Rules Committee as defendants, that request is denied.
86 Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 35 (2012).
87 Id.
88 Richardson v. S. Univ., 118 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 1997) (first citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-
45 (1979); and then citing Voisin’s Oyster House Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1986)).
89 Holliday v. Bd. Of Supervisors of LSU Agric. & Mech. Coll., No. 2014-0585, at pp. 2-3 (La. 10/15/14);
149 So. 3d 227, 228-29.
90 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
91 See, e.g., Sampay v. Terrebonne Par. 32nd Jud. Ct., No. 22-1173, 2022 WL 2712873, at *5 (E.D. La. June
9, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-1173, 2022 WL 2704573 (E.D. La. July 12, 2022);
see also Greathouse v. 32nd J.D.C. of Terrebonne Par., No. 22-1939, 2022 WL 2721349, at *2 (E.D. La.
June 28, 2022) (finding a case brought against a Louisiana district court barred by the Eleventh
Amendment), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-1939, 2022 WL 2713411 (E.D. La. July 13,
2022); Henderson v. 32nd Jud. Dist. Of Terrebonne Par., No. 18-7683, 2018 WL 6380793, at *2 n.5 (E.D.
La. Nov. 2, 2018) (same), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-7683, 2018 WL 6335773 (E.D. La.
Dec. 5, 2018); Jefferson v. La. State Sup. Ct., 46 Fed. App’x 732 (5th Cir. 2002), 2002 WL 1973897, at *1
(unpublished) (finding a suit against the Louisiana Supreme Court barred by the Eleventh Amendment); S.
Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 782 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating suits
against state supreme courts are barred by the Eleventh Amdnment).
of Louisiana. Because Congress has not waived the states’ sovereign immunity with
respect to Section 1983 claims and because Louisiana has not waived its sovereign
immunity either, Lightfoot’s claims for damages against Zibilich, Plaisance, and Schmidt
in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly,
Lightfoot’s claims for damages under Section 1983 against Zibilich, Plaisance, and

Schmidt in their official capacities must be dismissed without prejudice.
4. Lightfoot’s Claims for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
Against Zibilich Are Moot.

Article III grants federal courts jurisdiction over only cases and controversies.92
“[A]n ‘actual controversy’ must exist not only ‘at the time the complaint is filed,’ but
through ‘all stages’ of the litigation.”93 “A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a
‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—'when the issues presented are no
longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’”94 “No matter
how vehemently the parties continue to dispute the lawfulness of the conduct that
precipitated the lawsuit, the case is moot if the dispute ‘is no longer embedded in any
actual controversy about the plaintiffs' particular legal rights.’”95 “The mootness doctrine
applies to equitable relief but will not bar any claim for damages, including nominal
damages.”96
However, “a defendant cannot automatically moot a case simply by ending its
unlawful conduct once sued.”97 “Otherwise, a defendant could engage in unlawful
conduct, stop when sued to have the case declared moot, then pick up where he left off,

92 Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90 (2013).
93 Id. at 91 (quoting Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 92 (2009)).
94 Id. (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982)).
95 Id. (quoting Alvarez, 558 U.S. at 93).
96 Brinsdon v. McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist., 863 F.3d 338, 345 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Morgan v. Plano Indep.
Sch. Dist., 589 F.3d 740, 748 n.32 (5th Cir. 2009)).
97 Already, 568 U.S. at 90.
repeating this cycle until he achieves all his unlawful ends.”98 A defendant claiming
mootness because he cannot or will not perform the alleged wrongful activity again “bears
the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”99
In this case, Lightfoot seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to require Zibilich to

turn over the audio recordings of the proceedings before him in Lightfoot’s case to
determine whether Zibilich would afford him a fair trial. However, since the third
amended complaint was filed, Zibilich was not reelected to the Orleans Parish Criminal
District Court.100 Accordingly, Zibilich no longer has the authority to deny Lightfoot access
to the audio recordings. Moreover, Zibilich is no longer presiding over Lightfoot’s case, so
there is no danger that Zibilich would deny Lightfoot a fair trial. Because Zibilich is no
longer on the bench and is no longer involved in Lightfoot’s case, Defendants have met
their formidable burden that the alleged wrongful conduct cannot recur. For these
reasons, Lightfoot’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against Zibilich must be
dismissed without prejudice as moot.
5. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars Consideration of
Lightfoot’s Constitutional Claims for Damages Against
Zibilich, Plaisance, and Schmidt in Their Individual
Capacities.

In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.101 and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman102 the Supreme Court held that “federal district courts lack jurisdiction to
entertain collateral attacks on state court judgments” and orders.103 “[S]tate courts must

98 Id.
99 Id. (quoting Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000)).
100 R. Doc. 104, at p. 3.
101 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
102 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
103 Liedtke v. State Barof Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994).
resolve constitutional questions that arise during proceedings.”104 “If the state trial court
errs in deciding the constitutional issues, the judgment is not void, but the appropriate
state appellate court must correct it.”105 “Any subsequent recourse to federal court is
limited to an application for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.”106
Thus, the doctrine “is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”107
Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “usually applies only when a plaintiff
explicitly attacks the validity of a state court’s judgment, though it can also apply if the
plaintiff’s federal claims are so inextricably intertwined with a state judgment that the
federal court ‘is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision.’”108
The Fifth Circuit “has determined that issues are ‘inextricably intertwined’ when a
plaintiff casts a complaint in the form of a civil rights action simply to circumvent the
Rooker–Feldman rule.”109 This rule extends to “suits for equitable relief and damages as
attempts to attack collaterally the validity of state court judgments.”110 For example, in
Eitel v. Holland, the plaintiff filed suit in federal court under Section 1983 against the

state court judge who was presiding over his tort case and the two defense attorneys in
that state court case for allegedly conspiring to deprive the plaintiff of his due process
rights.111 Several preliminary motions in the state court case, including one for the recusal

104 Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Grp., Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 2003).
105 Id. (citing Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416).
106 Id. (citing Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416).
107 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
108 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (quoting Feldman, 460
U.S. at 483 n.16) (citing Weaver v. Tex. Cap. Bank N.A., 660 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 2011)).
109 Richard, 355 F.3d at 351.
110 Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 318 n.12; see, e.g., Chrissy F. v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 995 F.2d 595, 598-600
(5th Cir. 1993); Eitel v. Holland, 798 F.2d 815, 817-18; Reed v. Terrell, 759 F.2d 472, 473-74 (5th Cir. 1985).
111 Eitel, 798 F.2d at 816.
of the state court judge, were decided adversely to the plaintiff.112 Citing Feldman, the
Fifth Circuit held that because the plaintiff sought “a judgment for damages . . . that would
be tantamount to reversing the state court orders unfavorable to him,” these issues were
“inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s orders, and the federal lower courts
lacked jurisdiction to hear them.113

In this case, Lightfoot alleges he—and in turn Judge Hunter—was entitled to the
audio recordings of the proceedings in his case before Judge Zibilich to determine
whether or not Zibilich’s recusal was warranted. Lightfoot seeks damages under Section
1983 from Zibilich for allegedly instructing Plaisance and Schmidt not to turn over the
recordings and from Plaisance and Schmidt for not turning over the recordings. The
question whether Lightfoot was entitled to the audio recordings was submitted to the
Rules Committee, which opined that the recordings were not public records under
Louisiana law and could not be produced; Judge Hunter was to render his opinion in the
recusal matter based on the transcripts of the proceedings before Zibilich. Sitting en banc
the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court adopted this opinion and ruled the court,
through Zibilich, Plaisance, and Schmidt, could not produce the recordings. Complying

with the en banc order and based on the transcripts of proceedings before Zibilich, Judge
Hunter then ruled Zibilich did not have to recuse himself.114
Lightfoot’s claims for damages against Zibilich, Plaisance, and Schmidt

112 Id.
113 Id. at 818; see also Chrissy F., 995 F.2d at 597-600 (holding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred
plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief against state court
officials and other state officials for alleged depriving a minor of constitutional rights in court because the
relief were inextricably intertwined with the state court custody ruling and would essentially reverse it);
Reed, 759 F.2d at 472-74 (holding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claims for injunctive,
declaratory, and compensatory relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 against the judge and court
clerk, among others, for denying his claim for attorney’s fees in divorce proceedings because the claims
were inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment and would essentially reverse it).
114 Lightfoot, slip op. at 4.
individually essentially seek to reverse the en banc court’s ruling and, ultimately, Judge
Hunter’s ruling applying it. The state court orders held that Lightfoot could not obtain the
recordings, but still, in spite of these rulings, he now maintains he can. Lightfoot
challenges the actions of the “Rules of Court Committee, Judge Franz Zibilich, and/or the
En Banc Members of the Court of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court” as “improper

and unconstitutional.”115 He alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive him of the
recordings, resulting in the Rules Committee’s opinion, but these allegations, while veiled
as a civil rights complaint, really seek to discredit the en banc court and Judge Hunter’s
unfavorable orders. As in Eitel, the Court cannot entertain claims “for damages . . . that
would be tantamount to reversing the state court orders unfavorable to” Lightfoot.116
Accordingly, Lightfoot’s claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the orders of the en
banc court and Judge Hunter.117 “A ‘state court loser’ cannot invite a federal district court
to ‘sit in direct review of state court decisions’ by asserting constitutional claims that the
state court had not directly addressed.”118 The proper avenue to challenge these orders is
the appropriate state appellate court; only afterward can Lightfoot bring these claims into
the federal judicial system through an application for a writ of certiorari to the U.S.

Supreme Court.119
For these reasons, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear Lightfoot’s claims for damages against Zibilich, Plaisance, and
Schmidt individually. Accordingly, Lightfoot’s claims for damages against Zibilich,

115 R. Doc. 57 ¶ 84.
116 Eitel, 798 F.2d at 818.
117 See id.
118 Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 385 (5th Cir. 2013) (first citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 286
n.1; and then citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16).
119 Richard, 355 F.3d at 350.
Plaisance, and Schmidt individually must be dismissed without prejudice.120
D. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims Are Dismissed Without Prejudice
Plaintiffs also assert various state law claims against Defendants. Having dismissed
each of Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ state law claims. District courts have discretion not to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim when all claims over which the court had original jurisdiction have
been dismissed.121 Although the “‘general rule’ is to decline to exercise jurisdiction over
pendent state-law claims” under such circumstances, the “rule is neither mandatory nor
absolute.”122 Rather, a court must consider “both the statutory provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c) and the balance of the relevant factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity.”123 Having considered the applicable law, the complexity of Plaintiffs’ remaining
state law claims, and the fact that the trial of this matter has not yet been set, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims and dismisses Plaintiff’s
remaining state law claims without prejudice.124

120 Because the Court dismisses the remaining federal claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it does
not reach Defendants’ arguments for Younger abstention or qualified immunity.
121 42 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 42 U.S.C. § 1367(c) reads:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates
over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances,
there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
122 Batiste v. Island Records Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 227 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155
F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1998)).
123 Id. (citations omitted).
124 See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (stating that “in the usual case in
which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims”); Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 227 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing the district
court for declining to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims that remained following the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on all of the plaintiff’s federal claims because “the remaining
[state law] claims d[id] not involve any ‘novel or complex’ issues of state law,” and “[t]he case had been
pending in the district court for almost three years”). The Court dismisses without prejudice all of Plaintiffs’
remaining state law claims against each Defendant in this case.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Franz Zibilich, Dawn Plaisance, Jan Schmidt,
and the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Rules of Court Committee’s Motion to
Dismiss125 is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiffs’ claims against “all Defendants” are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as the claims are impermissibly vague.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring criminal
charges under Louisiana statutes against Zibilich, Dawn Plaisance, and Jan Schmidt and
these claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR LACK OF
STANDING.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hawkins and Sanders federal law claims
based on the violation of Lightfoot’s constitutional rights are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE FOR LACK OF STANDING.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims against the Orleans Parish Criminal
District Court Rules of Court Committee are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS

THE COURT RULES COMMITTEE IS NOT AN ENTITY CAPABLE OF BEING
SUED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiffs’ claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Defendants in their official capacities are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE AS BARRED BY THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Lightfoot’s claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief against Zibilich ordering him to turn over the audio recordings of the

125 R. Doc. 63.
proceedings before him are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Lightfoot’s constitutional claims under 42 USC
1983 for damages against Franz Zibilich, Dawn Plaisance, and Jan Schmidt in their
individual capacities are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as barred for lack of
jurisdiction by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.126
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Franz Zibilich,
Dawn Plaisance, and Jan Schmidt are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as the
Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 16th day of March, 2023.

SUSIE on
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Clerk to Notify via Mail:
Geralyn Hawkins
500 South Starrett Road
New Orleans, LA 70123
Chad Lightfoot #301162
Orleans Parish Justice Center
I.D. #2516543
300 Perdido Street
New Orleans, LA 70119
Nicole Thompson
P.O. Box 1472
Kenner, LA 70063

Clerk to Notify via E-Mail:
Geralyn Hawkins
geralynhawkins@yahoo.com

126 To the extent claims are made by Hawkins and Sanders based on the violation of Lightfoot’s
constitutional rights, those claims are dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing.
22

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189107. Public record. Not legal advice.