# Von Derhaar v. Stalbert

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · November 14, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10188580

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** November 14, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10188580

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting the officer was stressed, aggressive, and may have had a quick temper

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KARL VON DERHAAR CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 21-1653

MICHAEL STALBERT, ET AL. SECTION “B”(5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are defendants the City of New Orleans and
Shaun Ferguson’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and, in the
alternative, motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 74),
plaintiff’s opposition (Rec. Doc. 119), and defendants’ reply
(Rec. Doc. 172). For the following reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED (Rec. Doc. 74) and defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Rec. Doc. 74) is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff’s claims
against defendant the City of New Orleans and Shaun Ferguson are
DISMISSED with prejudice.
I. FACTS
This case arises from an alleged illegal search and seizure.
Plaintiff Karl Von Derhaar is an adult resident of Louisiana who
was employed as a criminalist at the New Orleans Police Department
(“NOPD”). Rec. Doc. 53 at 2-3. While working at the NOPD, plaintiff
became increasingly concerned about the efficacy, accuracy, and
safety of the crime lab’s drug tests. Id. at 4. Specifically,
plaintiff believed that the NOPD’s equipment and tests could not
differentiate between marijuana, an illicit substance in
Louisiana, and hemp, a legal one. Id. Plaintiff was also concerned
that criminalists were no longer performing confirmatory tests on
drug samples, which ensured that testing is accurate. Id. at 5.

Because these drug tests are routinely used as the basis for
criminal drug convictions in New Orleans, plaintiff feared that
inaccurate tests could lead to innocent persons being convicted of
marijuana drug crimes. Id.
Plaintiff voiced his concerns to his immediate supervisor,
Jamie Alexander, the QC Manager. Id. Thereafter, defendant
Sergeant Michael Stalbert, NOPD crime lab supervisor and drug
chemistry and crime technician, and defendant Kim Williams, NOPD
crime lab supervisor, learned of plaintiff’s concerns. Id. at 2,
5. The crime lab supervisors allegedly ignored plaintiff’s
concerns, and soon after, mandated that employees undergo drug

testing as a condition of employment, using the drug testing
methods plaintiff claims to be substandard. Id. at 5-6.
On September 2, 2020, plaintiff asked defendant Sergeant
Stalbert to be placed on leave without pay. Id. at 6. The next
day, defendants Stalbert, Williams, and Khalid Watson, an officer
of the Third District of the NOPD, arrived at plaintiff’s residence
purportedly to conduct a “wellness check,” claiming that plaintiff
had been “displaying erratic behavior” in the weeks prior. Id.
According to plaintiff, defendants Stalbert, Williams, and Watson
“forced their way inside [plaintiff’s] residence” dressed in full
NOPD uniform, in front of plaintiff’s child, while plaintiff was
in his underwear, and without a warrant or probable cause. Id.

Defendants told plaintiff that he must go with them to submit to
a drug test, even though allegedly he was on sick leave and not on
duty. Id.
Plaintiff told defendants he did not want to speak with them
nor go with them anywhere, but defendant Williams insisted
plaintiff must go to the Public Integrity Bureau (“PIB”), while
defendants maintained possession of his cell phone. Id. at 6-7.
Plaintiff inquired as to whether he was under arrest and defendants
admitted he was not, but that he still must go to the PIB with
them. Id. at 7. When plaintiff asked for his cell phone, defendant
Williams replied, “you not gonna need it.” Id. at 8. At one point,
plaintiff overheard defendant Williams’ phone call with Lieutenant

Darryl Watson, another supervisor of the NOPD crime lab, where
Darryl Watson stated “do a urinalysis test and he’s being ordered.
Put him on the clock, he’s being ordered to come into work and
take his test.” Id. Defendant Stalbert then said to plaintiff,
you are now on the clock, you’re getting paid, you’re
being ordered to take a drug test and
blood/alcohol/urinalysis test at PIB. The reason we are
doing this is because of your behavior and we are
concerned that you are harming yourself and your
behavior and the acts that you have been exhibiting have
been unique and not of your normal character.
Id. Plaintiff asked “if I quit right, now, do I have to come with
you sir?” and defendant Williams replied affirmatively stating
that plaintiff needed “to go up and sign the paperwork.” Id.

Plaintiff was then transported to the toxicology and drug analysis
laboratory at the PIB. Id. at 8-9.
While at P.I.B., plaintiff and defendant Jones entered a room
at the testing facility while defendants Williams and Watson sat
in the waiting area. Id. at 9. Plaintiff avers he informed
defendant Jones that he was taken illegally from his home and he
did not want to do a drug test. Rec. Doc. 119 at 5. However,
defendant Jones informed plaintiff that because he worked for the
city, plaintiff had to take the drug test and he could not refuse.
Id. plaintiff then asked defendant Jones if he would still be
required to submit to a drug test if he resigned from his position,
defendant Jones informed plaintiff he would not be required if he
resigned, and plaintiff submitted his resignation. Id. at 5-6.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges defendants violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 by conducting an unlawful arrest, search, and seizure. Rec.
Doc. 53 at 9. With respect to the City and Shaun Ferguson,
plaintiff avers defendants acted under color of the statutes,
ordinances, customs, and usage of the State of Louisiana, City of
New Orleans, and the New Orleans Police Department. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff also alleges defendants violated Louisiana Civil Code
Article 2315 and other Louisiana state laws related to kidnapping
and false arrest. Id. at 9. Accordingly, plaintiff claims
defendants are liable for general and special damages and
attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 10.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standards of Review
1. Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary
judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also TIG Ins. Co. v.
Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002). A

genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence would allow
a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The
court should view all facts and evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hixson
Bros. Inc., 453 F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2006). Mere conclusory
allegations are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Eason v.
Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996).
“Once the moving party has demonstrated the absence of a
material fact issue, the non-moving party must ‘go beyond the
pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’” McCarty v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., Inc.,
864 F.3d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Boudreaux v. Swift
Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005)). However, “where

the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may
merely point to an absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-
movant the burden of demonstrating by competent summary judgment
proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial.”
Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994).
“This court will not assume in the absence of any proof that the
nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts, and will
grant summary judgment in any case where critical evidence is so
weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a
judgment in favor of the non-movant.” McCarty 864 F.3d at 358

(internal quotations omitted).
2. Municipal Liability
To prevail against a municipality on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim,
a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the municipality had a
policy or custom, of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with
actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional
violation whose “moving force” is the policy or custom. Jackson v.
Valdez, 852 Fed. Appx. 129, 134-135 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)
(citing World Wide Street Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia,
591 F.3d 747, 753 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Monell v. Dept of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).

Concerning the first prong, “[t]he existence of a policy can
be shown through evidence of an actual policy, regulation, or
decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by lawmakers
or others with policymaking authority.” Valle v. City of Houston,
613 F.3d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Burge v. St. Tammany
Par., 336 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2003). An official policy can
also be demonstrated via “[a] persistent, widespread practice of
city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by
officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well
settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal
policy.” Id. (citing Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862
(5th Cir.1984) (per curiam)). Finally, “a single decision by a

policy maker may, under certain circumstances, constitute a policy
for which a [municipality] may be liable.” Brown v. Bryan
County, 219 F.3d 450, 462 (5th Cir. 2000). However, this “single
incident exception” is extremely narrow and gives rise to municipal
liability only if the municipal actor is a final
policymaker. Bolton v. City of Dallas, 541 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir.
2008) (citing Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348, 352 (5th
Cir.2005)).
Second, “[a]ctual or constructive knowledge of [a] custom
must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or
to an official to whom that body has delegated policy-making
authority. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th
Cir. 2001) (citing Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842

(5th Cir.1984) (en banc)). A municipal policymaker possesses “the
responsibility for making law or setting policy in any given area
of a local government's business.” City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 125 (1988). “Municipal liability
attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to
establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.”
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). “This
circuit has long distinguished between final decisionmaking
authority and final policymaking authority.” Valle, 613 F.3d at
542 (referring to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals). “The fact

that a particular official—even a policymaking official—has
discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not,
without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise
of that discretion.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-82. “[W]hether an
official had final policymaking authority is a question of state
law.” Id. at 482.
The third prong requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “moving
force” causation, “that a municipal decision reflects deliberate
indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular
constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision.”
Valle, 613 F.3d at 542 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty.,
Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997)). “Deliberate indifference
is a high standard.” Id. (citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston,

237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001)) (“[A] showing of simple or even
heightened negligence will not suffice.”).
Another theory of municipal liability under § 1983 applies if
the City fails to train the officers. City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). To state a cognizable failure-to-train
claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the municipality's
training procedures were inadequate; (2) the municipality was
deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy; and (3)
the inadequate training policy directly caused the constitutional
violations in question. Valdez, 852 Fed. Appx. At 135 (citing World
Wide, 591 F.3d at 756); see also Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls,
Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 170 (5th Cir. 2010).

B. Summary Judgment Analysis
Because plaintiff Von Derhaar fails to identify genuine
issues of material fact, defendants the City of New Orleans and
Shaun Ferguson are entitled to municipality immunity. Here,
plaintiff advances several theories of liability in his opposition
memorandum (Rec. Doc. 119-1): (1) The defendants have a practice,
or alternatively a custom, that led to his alleged constitutional
injuries, Rec. Doc. 119-1 at 9-10, 21-22, and (2) the defendants’
liability in plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is based in its failure to
have a wellness check policy or to train its employees in how to
conduct wellness checks. Rec. Doc. 119 at 10, 17. Each theory will

be handled in turn.
1. Municipal Liability
a. Policy and custom
There are generally three means to prove prong one of
municipality liability analysis: (1) “actual policy, regulation,
or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by lawmakers
or others with policymaking authority;” (2) “[a] persistent,
widespread practice of city officials or employees, which,
although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated
policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom
that fairly represents municipal policy;” or (3) “a single decision
by a policy maker may, under certain circumstances, constitute a
policy for which a [municipality] may be liable.” Valle, 613 F.3d
at 542; see also Bryan County, 219 F.3d at 462.

Plaintiff asserts defendants have a policy or custom through
a policy decision by an official to whom the lawmakers have
delegated policy-making authority. Rec. Doc. 119 at 9-10; Valdez,
852 Fed. Appx. at 135 (citing Pineda, 291 F.3d at 328, and quoting
Webster, 735 F.2d at 841). Plaintiff argues that Lieutenant Darryl
Watson, a supervisor of the NOPD crime lab, is an official to whom
the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority, and that his
decision to conduct the wellness check and allegedly decision to
mandate plaintiff to go to PIB to take a drug test is thus a policy
or custom of the city. Rec. Doc. 119 at 9-10.

“Where an action is directed by those who establish
governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible
whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken
repeatedly.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481
(1986). In Pembaur, the Court of Appeals concluded, and the Supreme
Court affirmed, that based upon its examination of Ohio law both
the County Sheriff and the County Prosecutor were officials with
policy-making authority because Ohio law gave them the power to
establish county policy under appropriate circumstances. Id. at
484-85. It is a stretch to suggest that Lieutenant Watson, a
supervisor of the NOPD crime lab, is an official whose acts or
edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy because

there does not appear to be any Louisiana law that indicating
defendant Watson, or someone in his position, possesses true
policymaking authority. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481; Monell, 436
U.S. at 694.
Next, plaintiff pivots and argues the city has a custom and
practice of conducting illegal stops, searches, and seizures that
is such a persistent, widespread practice that it fairly represents
municipal policy. See Rec. Doc. 119 at 20; see also Bennett, 735
F.2d at 862. Plaintiff cites as evidence the NOPD-Department of
Justice Consent Decree, approved on January 11, 2013, which
recognizes that the NOPD has systemic issues related to civil
rights violations. Rec. Doc. at 20-21; Allen v. City of New
Orleans, No. 13-422, 2015 WL 6738529, at *3 (E.D. La. 2015).

Plaintiff argues that the Department of Justice investigation
revealed that there was “reasonable cause to believe” that NOPD
officers had engaged in a pattern of Fourth Amendment violations,
and that recent reports indicated that the department was still
having similar systemic issues. Id.
This pattern theory for municipal liability requires
similarity, specificity, and “sufficiently numerous prior
incidents” as opposed to “isolated instances.” Valdez, 852 Fed.
Appx. at 135 (citing Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838,
851 (5th Cir. 2009), and quoting McConney v. City of Houston, 863
F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989)). However, there is no rigid rule

regarding numerosity to prove a widespread pattern of
unconstitutional acts. Id. Here, similar to Allen, plaintiff fails
to demonstrate how the Consent Decree establishes a pattern of
conduct related to the specific type of violation at issue in this
case. No. 13-422, 2015 WL 6738529, at *4. Accordingly, plaintiff
cannot sustain his burden on prong one.
b. Policymaker
Under the second municipal liability prong, plaintiff must
point to a policymaker who can be charged with actual or
constructive knowledge. Jackson v. Valdez, 852 Fed. Appx. 129,
134-135 (5th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, plaintiff urges the Court to
find that Daryl Watson was the decisionmaker who instructed the

defendant officers to bring plaintiff to P.I.B. for a drug test.
Rec. Doc. 119 at 9-10. Plaintiff is mistaken.
Recall, “[m]unicipal liability attaches only where the
decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal
policy with respect to the action ordered.” Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). However, “[t]his circuit has
long distinguished between final decisionmaking authority and
final policymaking authority.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 542. “The fact
that a particular official—even a policymaking official—has
discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not,
without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise
of that discretion.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-82.

As clarified above, plaintiff erroneously conflates decision-
making and policymaking authority. Rec. Doc. 119 at 9-10. That is,
plaintiff avers that Darryl Watson made an isolated decision but
never clarified how Darryl Watson possessed final policymaking
authority pursuant to state law. Id.; see also Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). Defendants clarify New
Orleans ordinances established the Superintendent of Police as the
head of the police department. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §
4-501. What’s more, Fifth Circuit authority has clarified that the
mayor, the city council, and the superintendent of police are
examples of permissible policymakers for Section 1983 municipal
liability. Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842 (5th
Cir.), on reh'g, 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting “[t]he court

further erred in allowing the jury to consider whether ‘some
similarly ranked official’ maintained a custom . . . that overrode
city policy” and “[t]here was no proof in this record whatsoever
that any police officer subordinate to the Chief even possibly
could have occupied the role of a city policymaker.”). This alone
is dispositive. Accordingly, plaintiff fails on the second prong.
c. Moving force
Having concluded that plaintiff failed to meet the first and
second requirement to establish municipal liability, the Court now
addresses why plaintiff also fails to prove moving force causation
in the interest of thoroughness.

Under the final prong, plaintiff must prove “that a municipal
decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a
violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will
follow the decision.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 542 (citing Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997)).
“Deliberate indifference is a high standard” Id. (citing
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001))
(“[A] showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not
suffice.”). Here, plaintiff fails to demonstrate how systemic
problems in NOPD were the necessary “moving force” behind the
alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations that occurred
to plaintiff on September 3, 2020.

There are several issues with plaintiff’s reliance of the
Consent Decree. Notably, the Consent Decree focused upon stops,
searches, and arrests as opposed to wellness checks. Rec. Doc. 119
at 20-22. The Court declines plaintiff’s invitation to make the
broad inference that “[i]f NOPD was not compliant with the policies
pertaining to the general public, it is not surprising that
officers were freely violating an off-duty employees
constitutional rights against unlawful search and seizure.” Id. at
22. Moreover, if the Court accepted plaintiff’s Consent Decree
argument, the City would be civilly liable for every civil rights
violation committed by NOPD officers in the line of duty, which
would provide the respondeat superior liability that § 1983 does
not allow. Allen, 2015 WL 6738529 at *4, *n.5. Plaintiff argues

the City also has a custom of violating its drug testing policies,
but cites to no additional examples of this violation to constitute
a pattern of moving force causation. Plaintiff, therefore, fails
to identify a disputed material fact as to a municipal policy or
custom that was the moving force of defendants allegedly violating
his constitutional rights.
2. Failure to train and failure to adopt policy
Plaintiff’s next line of argument for municipal
liability shifts to an alleged failure to train officers on how
to conduct wellness checks. Rec. Doc. 119 at 10, 17. To state a

cognizable failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that: (1) the municipality's training procedures were
inadequate; (2) the municipality was deliberately indifferent
in adopting its training policy; and (3) the inadequate training
policy directly caused the constitutional violations in question.
Valdez, 852 Fed. Appx. at 135 (citing World Wide, 591 F.3d at
756). Plaintiff argues that defendants’ failure to adopt a policy
or train officers on wellness checks is evidence of deliberate
indifference. Rec. Doc. 119 at 10, 17, 18.
Deliberate indifference may be proven in one of two ways.
Littell v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 624 (5th Cir.
2018). First, “municipal employees will violate constitutional

rights ‘so often’ that the factfinder can infer from the pattern
of violations that ‘the need for further training must have been
plainly obvious to the ... policymakers.’” Valdez, 852 Fed. Appx.
at 135 (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011), and
quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10)). Plaintiff does not cite to
a pattern (or even one other instance) of the NOPD violating
individuals’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during
wellness checks. Without more, deliberate indifference cannot be
shown in this way.
Second, absent proof of a pattern, deliberate indifference
can be inferred where “evidence of a single violation of federal
rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to

train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an
obvious potential for such a violation, [can] trigger municipal
liability.” Valdez, 852 Fed. Appx. at 135 (citing Bd. of the City
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997), and then citing Canton,
489 U.S. at 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197). This “single-incident exception”
exists “where the facts giving rise to the violation are such that
it should have been apparent to the policymaker that a
constitutional violation was the highly predictable consequence of
a particular policy or failure to train.” Westfall v. Luna, 903
F.3d 534, 552-553 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Burge v. St. Tammany
Par., 336 F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 2003)).
In Brown v. Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2000), the

Fifth Circuit found municipal liability on the single-incident
exception because it determined that the county was deliberately
indifferent when it had not trained or supervised the officer who
committed the allegedly unconstitutional action. Bryan County, 219
F.3d at 462. The sheriff had recently hired the officer and knew
the officer was young, inexperienced, had a personal record of
recklessness and questionable judgment, and that forcible arrests
were inevitable for an officer–and yet provided no training to
him. Id. at 462-463.
The undisputed facts in in this case do not provide the same
cause for concern the Fifth Circuit recognized in Bryan County. As
seen in Bryan County, evidence of the background and proclivities

of the particular officer involved in the constitutional violation
is important for the application of the single incident exception.
See Bryan County, 219 F.3d at 462-463; Davidson v. City of
Stafford, Texas, 848 F.3d 384, 398 (5th Cir. 2017) (looking at
evidence of backgrounds of officers involved); Snyder v.
Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting the officer
was stressed, aggressive, and may have had a quick temper); Roberts
v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 295-296 (5th Cir. 2005)
(lacking evidence of officer being involved in prior cases of
improper use of deadly force). By contrast, plaintiff provided no
evidence that defendants Stalbert, Williams, and Khalid Watson
have been involved in any cases involving constitutional

violations stemming from a wellness check or drug testing
protocols. Plaintiff therefore fails to identify a dispute of a
material fact as to defendants’ alleged deliberate indifference
in not adopting a wellness check policy or training officers on
wellness checks. See Davidson, 848 F.3d at 398.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 4th day of November, 2022

___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10188580. Public record. Not legal advice.