# Becnel v. Lamorak Insurance Company

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · August 16, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10188174

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** August 16, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10188174

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating the court should view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
- stating that the Fifth Circuit would subscribe to a “but for” analysis

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JAMES BECNEL ET AL CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 19-14536

LAMORAK INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL SECTION “B”(5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are Defendant National Automotive Parts
Association LLC’s (“NAPA”) motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc.
360), Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion (Rec. Doc. 521),
Defendant Huntington Ingalls Incorporated’s (“Avondale”)
opposition to NAPA’s motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc 527),
and NAPA’s reply in support (Rec. Doc. 597). For the following
reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts of this case have been laid out in greater detail
in previously issued Orders and Reasons and are adopted by
reference herein.
On September 12, 2019, National Auto Parts Association
(“NAPA”) filed a Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction in state court prior to this matter being removed.
See Rec. Doc. 360-3 (NAPA Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction). The Exception was overruled. See Rec. Doc. 360-4
(Judgment on NAPA Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction).
On April 26, 2022, NAPA filed a motion for summary judgment

asserting similar, if not identical, arguments from its previously
denied declinatory exception. Rec. Doc. 360-1. Plaintiff filed an
opposition to NAPA’s motion on May 17, 2022. Rec. Doc. 521. On May
17, 2022, Defendant Avondale also filed an opposition to NAPA’s
motion for summary judgment. Rec. Doc. 527. Subsequently, on May
25, 2022, NAPA filed a reply to both Plaintiff and Avondale’s
oppositions. Rec. Doc. 597.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary
judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A genuine issue of
material fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable
jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). As such, the court
should view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hixon Bros. Inc.,
453 F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2006).
When the movant bears the burden of proof, it must

“demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact”
using competent summary judgment evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323. However, “where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at
trial, the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence.”
Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994).
Should the movant meet its burden, the burden shifts to the non-
movant, who must show by “competent summary judgment evidence”
that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986); Lindsey, 16 F.3d at 618. However, “a party cannot defeat
summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated
assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” See Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Arcturus Corp., 912 F.3d 786, 792 (5th Cir. 2019).
B. Whether NAPA is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Grounds
of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

NAPA contends its motion for summary judgment should be
granted because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction. Rec. Doc.
360. NAPA cites the Louisiana Long-Arm statute, an affidavit from
a corporate witness, as well as several cases in support of its
claim. NAPA’s main assertion is it lacks sufficient contacts with
the state of Louisiana to justify this Court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs rebut NAPA’s argument that it did not
transact business in the state and assert that it is indeed a
manufacturer under Louisiana law and has conducted sufficient

business transactions within Louisiana to be hauled into court in
this state.
In two seminal decisions, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2847, 2853-54 (2011), and Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 757 (2014), the United States Supreme Court
held that the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over a
corporation is justified when the corporation is either
incorporated in the forum state or has its principal place of
business there. The decisions in Daimler and Goodyear also apply
equally to limited liability corporations. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct.
at 761 (looking to MBUSA’s place of incorporation and principal
place of business to determine whether general jurisdiction

existed, even though MBUSA was an LLC.)
Here, defendant NAPA is a limited liability company with its
principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. Rec. Doc. 360.
Thus, NAPA is a citizen of Atlanta and its place of incorporation.
NAPA was not incorporated in Louisiana, nor does it have any
corporate offices in this state. Therefore, this corporation is
not at home in Louisiana for this Court to exercise general
personal jurisdiction over this defendant. Given NAPA is a non-
resident defendant, the Court must go further to determine whether
we can nevertheless exercise personal jurisdiction over it as a
non-resident defendant.
A court has specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant when: (1) the forum state's long-arm statute confers
personal jurisdiction over that defendant; and (2) the forum
state's exercise of jurisdiction complies with the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gross v. RSJ Int'l, LLC, No.
CIV.A. 11-73, 2012 WL 729955 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012) (citing
Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir.1999)). Because
Louisiana's long-arm statute, La. R.S. § 13:3201, et seq., extends
jurisdiction to the full limits of due process, the Court's focus
is solely on whether the exercise of its jurisdiction in this case
satisfies federal due process requirements. Dickson Marine Inc. v.
Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir.1999) (citing La. R.S.
§ 13:3201(B)).

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant satisfies due process when (1) the defendant has
purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of
the forum state by establishing “minimum contacts” with that state,
and (2) exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant does
not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash.,
326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). This Circuit
follows a three-step analysis for specific jurisdiction. Seiferth
v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 274–75 (5th
Cir.2006).
First, the Court must determine “whether the defendant has
minimum contacts with the forum state, i.e., whether it purposely

directed its activities toward the forum state or purposefully
availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there.”
Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841 (5th
Cir.2000). Second, the Court considers “whether the plaintiff's
cause of action arises out of or results from the defendant's
forum-related contacts.” First Inv. Corp. of the Marshall Islands
v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd. of People's Republic of China,
858 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. La.), aff'd sub nom. First Inv. Corp. of
Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742
(5th Cir. 2012), as revised (Jan. 17, 2013). The proper focus of
the personal jurisdiction analysis is on the “relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Stroman Realty,
Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir.2008). Lastly, “[i]f

the plaintiff successfully satisfies the first two prongs, the
burden shifts to the defendant to defeat jurisdiction by showing
that its exercise of jurisdiction would be unfair or unreasonable.”
Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 271 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985)).
i. NAPA Purposefully directed activities at the
forum state

Here, Plaintiffs and Avondale have offered substantial
evidence that NAPA’s activity satisfies the requirement of minimum
contacts with Louisiana. Plaintiffs point to the deposition
testimony of the decedent who testified that while working in the
Becnel Garage from 1958 to 1963, and again from 1967 to 2008, he
obtained replacement parts, and specifically Rayloc brakes, from
Pope’s Parts in Thibodeaux, Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 521-6 (Discovery
Deposition of James Becnel at pp. 336, 461, 465-66, 491, 555-56).
The decedent also testified that Pope’s Parts was a NAPA-branded
distributor, and the brakes and clutches he ordered came in in
boxes brandishing the NAPA logo. Id. Plaintiffs also attached a
printout of the NAPA website, confirming and identifying Pope’s
Parts as a NAPA store. Rec. Doc. 521-11 (NAPA Website Printout).
The decedent further testified that he obtained parts from the
NAPA store located in New Orleans, Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 521-6
(Discovery Deposition of James Becnel at pp. 414); Rec. Doc. 521-
5 (Perpetuation Deposition of James Becnel at p. 98). Mr. Becnel
also testified that he attended mechanic classes once a year that
were held by NAPA in Thibodaux, Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 521-6

(Discovery Deposition of James Becnel at pp. 334-35, 428-29).
Plaintiffs also point to the testimony of Thomas L. D’Aquin,
Jr. (“D’Aquin”), a former employee of Genuine Parts Company
(“GPC”), who confirmed that the parts the decedent claimed to have
purchased from the New Orleans, LA distribution center would have
been obtained from that location. Rec. Doc. 521-12 (Deposition of

Thomas L. D’Aquin, Jr. at pp. 48-49). D’Aquin also testified that
the various NAPA stores in the area would be serviced by the New
Orleans distribution center. Id. at p. 52.
Plaintiffs also offered testimony from Byron Frantz
(“Frantz”), a corporate representative of GPC. Rec. Doc. 521-10
(Deposition of Byron Frantz). Frantz testified that NAPA owned the
Rayloc trademark and licensed it to GPC, and that Rayloc brakes
were marketed under the NAPA name. Id. at pp. 273-75. He also
confirmed that GPC only sold Rayloc products through NAPA
distribution centers from 1960 through the 1990s and that the NAPA
name was on the Rayloc product boxes. Id.
Plaintiffs also offered testimony from Gaylord Spencer

(“Spencer”), a NAPA corporate representative. Rec. Doc. 521-8
(Deposition of Gaylord Spencer). Spencer provided testimony about
the relationship between Pope’s Parts and NAPA. See Id. He
testified that NAPA maintains at least sixty distribution centers
around the country and that NAPA branded stores, like Pope’s Parts,
have access to parts from distribution centers. Id. at pp. 7-8,
32-33. He also stated that NAPA provides marketing and advertising
services to member companies like GPC and Pope’s Parts. Id. at pp.
28.
Similarly, Avondale points to the deposition testimony of
Pope’s Parts corporate representative, Gregory Diez. Diez
testified that to use the NAPA logo, sell NAPA products, and

participate in NAPA’s national advertising campaign, Pope’s was
required to pay an annual fee to NAPA. Rec. Doc. 527-8 (Deposition
of Gregory Diez at pp. 41-44). Diez also confirmed that the
products sold by Pope’s Parts contained the “NAPA Quality of
Assurance” logo and the NAPA logo appeared on product boxes, in
the store, on the building itself, and on employee uniforms. Rec.
Doc. 521-13 (Deposition of Gregory Diez at pp. 34-35, 78-79).
NAPA argues that it merely allows its members to operate
automotive part distribution centers with the NAPA logo and
trademark. Rec. Doc. 360. Additionally, defendant contends that it
does not operate wholesale or retail businesses, nor does it
manufacture, sell, or distribute any automotive parts. NAPA points

to the affidavit of its former Director of Loyalty, Whitney
Swingle, for support. Rec. Doc. 360-8 (Affidavit of Whitney
Swingle). Swingle stated that “NAPA does not manufacture, design,
distribute, supply, or sell automotive parts or otherwise place
automotive parts into the stream of commerce.” Id. She further
asserted that NAPA does not distribute parts; instead, it functions
as a trade association for its members, who are themselves
distributors. Id.
Nonetheless, this Court finds that plaintiffs and Avondale
have presented significant evidence to the contrary, including
evidence showing that NAPA distributed Rayloc brakes and other

automotive parts through its distribution centers in this state.
Considering the evidence presented in its entirety, not only does
it seem that NAPA is distributing products in Louisiana by having
local distribution centers brandishing its logo, but it also
provided services in this state by conducting mechanic classes.
Viewing this in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, they have
made a showing that NAPA: (1) distributed, supplied, marketed, and
benefitted from the sale of its Rayloc brakes; (2) expressly aimed
at, marketed, sold, and distributed in Louisiana, and (3) caused
harm that it knew was likely to be suffered in Louisiana. See
United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hixon Bros. Inc., 453 F.3d 283, 285 (5th
Cir. 2006) (stating the court should view all facts and evidence

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party). Accordingly,
they have provided sufficient support that NAPA purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in
Louisiana, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.
ii. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of NAPA’s activity

Having determined that the defendant has the requisite
minimum contacts required to exercise personal jurisdiction, this
Court must now consider whether the plaintiffs’ cause of action
arises out of or results from NAPA's forum-related contacts. To
determine whether a suit arises out of or relates to a defendant's
specific contacts with the forum state, this Courts will utilize
a “but for” test. See Benson v. Rosenthal, 116 F. Supp. 3d 702

(E.D. La. 2015) (stating that the Fifth Circuit would subscribe to
a “but for” analysis); Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Myers & Associates,
Ltd., 41 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.1995) (utilizing “but for” test and
finding that plaintiff’s claims arose out of defendant’s contacts
with Texas).
Therefore, the issue here is: but for NAPA's contacts with
Louisiana, would plaintiffs’ claims against NAPA have arisen? NAPA
argues that they cannot satisfy the but for test because it “does
not manufacture, sell, supply, or hold itself out to be the
manufacturer of any automotive products.” Rec. Doc. 360 at 3.
Plaintiffs, however, have offered sufficient evidence that their

claims against NAPA would not have arisen but for NAPA's contacts
in Louisiana, and specifically, NAPA’s distribution, marketing,
and sale of automotive parts and alleged asbestos containing Rayloc
brakes. See Section B(i), supra. In essence, plaintiffs provide
that but for NAPA’s distribution, marketing, sale, and quality
assurance of Rayloc brakes in Louisiana, the decedent would not
have purchased the brakes and thereby would not have been exposed
to asbestos from that product. See Rec. Doc. 521. Therefore,
plaintiffs have provided sufficient support that their claims
arise out of NAPA's Louisiana-related activities.
iii. This Court’s exercise of jurisdiction is
reasonable

Finally, this Court must consider whether the exercise of
jurisdiction over Defendant would be fair and reasonable.
In determining whether or not exercise of jurisdiction
is fair and reasonable, defendants bear the burden of
proof and it is rare to say the assertion [of
jurisdiction] is unfair after minimum contacts have been
shown. In this inquiry we examine five factors: (1) the
burden on the nonresident defendant, (2) the forum
state's interests, (3) the plaintiff's interest in
securing relief, (4) the interest of the interstate
judicial system in the efficient administration of
justice, and (5) the shared interest of the several
states in furthering fundamental social policies.

McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 759–60 (5th Cir.2009) (internal
quotations omitted); Benson v. Rosenthal, 116 F. Supp. 3d 702, 713
(E.D. La. 2015).
The exercise of jurisdiction here would be reasonable. NAPA
did not assert in its motion that it would be a great burden to be
hauled into court in Louisiana. Defendant simply maintained that
this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction is inappropriate due to it
being a membership organization, lacking minimum contacts with
this state. Although the burden on NAPA would be high given its
out of state citizenship, the interest of the plaintiffs and the
forum state outweigh it. Plaintiffs have a greater interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief. Likewise, the forum
state has a high level of interest in this case because the alleged
asbestos exposure occurred in this jurisdiction. Furthermore, the
products that caused the decedent’s alleged injury were

distributed and sold in Louisiana. Thus, the exercise of
jurisdiction over this defendant does not violate the traditional
notions of fair play or substantial justice. Accordingly, NAPA’s
motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 16th day of August, 2022

___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10188174. Public record. Not legal advice.