# Williams v. Magnolia Community Services, Inc.

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · July 12, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10187974

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** July 12, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ANGELA WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 21-2200
MAGNOLIA COMMUNITY SERVICES SECTION “B”(5)
INC., ET AL
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are plaintiff’s Complaint (Rec. Doc. 1-1),
defendant’s motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 9), plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint (Rec. Doc. 18), defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 21), plaintiff’s second
amended complaint (Rec. Doc. 26), and defendant’s supplemental
memorandum (Rec. Doc. 29). For the following reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc.
9) is DENIED, retaining plaintiff’s claims for hostile work
environment, disparate treatment, wrongful termination,

retaliatory discharge, and interference under the Family Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Rec. Doc. 21) is DISMISSED as moot.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This lawsuit arises from Magnolia Community Services’
(“Magnolia” or “Defendant”) alleged wrongful termination of Angela
Williams (“Williams” or “Plaintiff”) because of her race and sex.
Rec. Doc. 26 (Second Amended Complaint). Williams, a fifty-eight-
year-old African American woman, began working at Magnolia on or
about September 18, 2013. Id. Between that date and April 16, 2021,
when she was allegedly wrongfully terminated, plaintiff worked as
a direct service personnel worker and/or a staff worker. Id.

During her employment at Magnolia, plaintiff asserts that she
was subjected to disparate treatment, a hostile work environment,
racial and sexual harassment, and retaliation. Id. According to
plaintiff, all the above-alleged treatment was due to her status
as an African American, a woman, and a person over the age of
forty. Id. Williams alleges she suffered disparate treatment from
defendant when it utilized certain “employment practices” which
disproportionately impacted her ability to succeed as an employee.
Rec. Doc. 26. Specifically, she asserts she suffered disparate
treatment at the hands of defendant’s employees Ricky Hebert, Donna
Lowey, and Jennifer Hebert. Id. She claims that she was highly

scrutinized on a regular basis because of her race. Id.
Additionally, plaintiff presents that Magnolia did not allow her
to take breaks like similarly situated Caucasian co-workers
because of her race. Id.
Williams also alleges that she was subjected to a hostile
work environment on numerous occasions when she was frequently
called the “n-word” by her fellow co-workers. Id. The atmosphere
at Magnolia allegedly became even more aggressive and
discriminatory when plaintiff was informed that she was not allowed
to use the workplace restroom because of her race. Rec. Doc. 26.
Williams claims she felt humiliated on several occasions when she
was forced to use the bathroom on herself because she was denied
access to a restroom or a break to relieve herself. Id. Williams

alleges she was also subjected to numerous physical assaults, and
verbal abuse because of her race. Id.
Additionally, plaintiff alleges that Magnolia violated the
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) when it required her to return
to work during her designated FMLA leave period. Id. According to
Williams, she followed all policies and protocols established by
Magnolia to be entitled to FMLA leave. Id. Plaintiff also presents
that her unpaid leave was set to commence on March 20, 2021 and

cease on April 30, 2021. Rec. Doc. 26. Nonetheless, defendant
allegedly interfered with plaintiff’s designated leave time and
forced her to return to work on April 16, 2021. Id. Defendant
then allegedly preceded to terminate her employment on that date.
Id.
Williams alleges she reported her co-worker’s behavior to
defendant along with her oppositions to defendant’s discriminatory
practices, but Magnolia ignored her; and instead, choose to
retaliate against her by terminating her employment. Id. Plaintiff

filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) and received her right to sue letter on August 11, 2021.
Id.
On or about November 22, 2021, plaintiff filed suit in the

24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson, alleging
both state and federal causes of action. Rec. Doc. 1. On November
30, 2021, Magnolia filed a notice of removal, asserting this Court
has federal question jurisdiction because plaintiff asserted
claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1981, and the FMLA. Id.

On December 28, 2021, defendant filed the instant motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. Rec. Doc. 9. Subsequently,
plaintiff filed an unopposed motion requesting an extension of
time to file her response to defendant’s motion. Rec. Doc. 13. The
Court granted her motion, extending plaintiff’s deadline to file
a responsive pleading to February 3, 2022. Rec. Doc. 15. Plaintiff
did not file an opposition by the previously mentioned deadline.
Instead, on February 7, 2022, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint
realleging several assertions from her original complaint. Rec.
Doc. 20. On February 21, 2022, defendant filed a motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, raising the same arguments from its
previously filed motion to dismiss. Rec. Doc. 21.

On March 29, 2022, the Court received oral argument on
defendant Magnolia community Services, Inc.’s motions to dismiss
(Rec. Docs. 9, 21). See Rec. Doc. 25. After consideration of the
parties’ arguments, and for orally assigned reasons, the motions
were taken under advisement. Id. Plaintiff was instructed to file

a second amended and supplemental complaint, articulating in very
specific terms her factual allegations. Id. On April 19, 2022,
plaintiff filed the requisite second amending and supplemental
complaint. Rec. Doc. 26. Defendant was also instructed to provide
supplemental briefing after receiving plaintiff’s newly filed
complaint. Rec. Doc. 25. On May 26, 2022, the defendant filed its
reply in support of dismissal. Rec. Doc. 29.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. 12(b)(6) Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint “must contain enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Varela v. Gonzalez, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
(internal quotes omitted)). A claim is facially plausible when the
plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. A court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true
and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th
Cir. 2009); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
However, the Court is not bound to accept as true legal
conclusions couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[C]onclusory allegations or legal

conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice
to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Taylor v. Books A Million,
Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). A fortiori, a complaint
may be dismissed when it appears “beyond a doubt that plaintiff
can prove no set of facts” that would entitle him to prevail.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560–61, 127 S.Ct. 1955; First Am. Bankcard,
Inc. v. Smart Bus. Tech., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 390, 399 (E.D. La.
2016). However, the Fifth Circuit has stated that motions to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) are “viewed
with disfavor and [are]...rarely granted.” Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir.2009).
B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is Applicable to Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint
In discerning whether a motion to dismiss is applicable to an
amended complaint, the question is whether the amended complaint
is so different from the original complaint as to make the motion
to dismiss moot. See In re R.E. Loans, L.L.C., 553 Fed. App'x 453,
456 (5th Cir.2014); Cousin v. St. Tammany Par. Jail, No. CIV.A.
14-1514, 2015 WL 5017113 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2015). A motion to
dismiss need not be denied as moot when it attacks the original

complaint for deficiencies that persist in the amended complaint.
Williams’ Second Amended Complaint is not so far removed from
her initial complaint as to prevent the court from applying
Defendant’s first motion to dismiss to the present complaint.

First, plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not raise any new
causes of action; instead, she merely reasserts may of the same
allegations and claims she raised in her initial complaint. Second,
defendant contends in its supplemental memorandum that the
deficiencies previously raised in its motion to dismiss persist in
plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court will
apply the arguments raised by defendant’s motion and supplemental
memorandum to the plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Rountree
v. Dyson, 892 F.3d 681, 683–84 (5th Cir. 2018) (The court may
consider a motion to dismiss “as being addressed to the amended
pleading”); Greene v. DeMoss, No. 3:20-CV-00578, 2020 WL 7755690
(W.D. La. Dec. 11, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No.

3:20-CV-00578, 2020 WL 7755655 (W.D. La. Dec. 29, 2020) (applying
defendants’ motions to dismiss to plaintiff’s amended complaint.)
C. Whether Plaintiff’s Claims Should be Dismissed
In Magnolia’s supplemental briefing, it admitted that
plaintiff has “likely alleged sufficient facts to state a claim
for retaliatory discharge under Title VII and Section 1981, as
well as a claim for interference under the FMLA.” Rec. Doc. 29 at
p. 3. Because this Court agrees with the defendant’s assessment,
we will focus on the plaintiff’s remaining claims still in dispute.
i. Disparate treatment in violation of Title VII
Title VII creates a federal cause of action for two largely
separate theories of discrimination: (1) disparate treatment; and
(2) disparate impact. Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 787 (5th
Cir. 2006). Disparate-treatment discrimination addresses

employment actions that treat an employee worse than others based
on the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. For purposes of surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, there are
two ultimate elements the plaintiff must plead to support her
disparate treatment claims: (1) an adverse employment action; and
(2) that it was taken against plaintiff “because of her protected
status.” See Raj v. Louisiana State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th
Cir. 2013); Cicalese v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762,
767 (5th Cir. 2019) (“there are two ultimate elements a plaintiff
must plead to support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII:
(1) an ‘adverse employment action,’ (2) taken against a plaintiff
“because of her protected status.”)

“In such disparate-treatment cases, proof and finding of
discriminatory motive is required.” Cicalese v. University of
Texas Medical Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 2006)). A plaintiff
can prove discriminatory motive through either direct or
circumstantial evidence. Id. (citing Portis v. First Nat'l Bank of
New Albany, Miss., 34 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1994)). When a
plaintiff builds a case on circumstantial evidence, a court
analyzes the plaintiff's claim under the McDonnell Douglas
framework. See Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir.

2003). “Under this framework, the plaintiff must first create a
presumption of discrimination by making out a prima facie case of
discrimination.” Id. “The plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case that the defendant made an employment decision that was
motivated by a protected factor. A plaintiff can establish a prima
facie claim by showing that:
(1) [s]he is a member of a protected class, (2) [s]he
was qualified for the position at issue, (3) [s]he was
the subject of an adverse employment action, and (4)
[s]he was treated less favorably because of his
membership in that protected class than were other
similarly situated employees who were not members of the
protected class, under nearly identical circumstances.

Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir.2009)
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973),
holding modified by Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113
S. Ct. 1701, 123 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1993)).
Once established, the defendant bears the burden of producing
evidence that its employment decision was based on a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason. Keller v. DeJoy, No. CV 19-13191, 2022
WL 93577, *7 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2022) (quoting Mayberry v. Vought
Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1995)). The burden then
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination. Id.
Williams has alleged sufficient facts to support her

disparate treatment claim. She satisfied the first element of her
claim when she asserted that Magnolia constructively terminated
her employment. Rec. Doc. 26. Additionally, she provided
sufficient factual allegations for this Court to infer that
Magnolia’s termination of her employment was done “because of her
protected status.” Plaintiff was required to plead facts
sufficient to establish discriminatory motive on the part of
Magnolia, and she satisfied that requirement when she pled the
necessary facts under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Williams
alleged that she suffered disparate treatment from Magnolia based
on her status as a member of a protected class, an African
American. Rec. Doc. 26. Plaintiff also alleged that she was

qualified for her job when she stated that she maintained
impeccable “credentials and work history.” Id.
Lastly, plaintiff asserted that on several occasions she was
treated less favorably that other similarly situated non-protected
employees. See id. For example, Williams alleged she suffered
disparate treatment at the hands of defendant’s employees Ricky
Hebert, Donna Lowey, and Jennifer Hebert. Rec. Doc. 26 at p. 2.
She asserted that she was not allowed to take breaks or use the
restroom facilities like similarly situated employees who were not
members of her protected class. Id. at p. 4. Plaintiff further
claimed that she was highly scrutinized on a regular basis because
of her race, unlike her similarly situated co-workers. Id. Because

plaintiff adequately pled all the elements required for her
disparate treatment claim based on these facts, this claim must be
maintained.
ii. Hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and
Section 1981

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers
from discriminating “against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Under Title VII,
plaintiff must prove the following five elements in order to
establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment based
on racial harassment or discrimination: “(1) the employee belongs
to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome
harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on race;
(4) the harassment complained of affected a term[,] condition or
policy of employment; [and] (5) the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt
remedial action. Dimiceli v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.C., No.
CIV.A. 09-7344, 2011 WL 1671332 (E.D. La. May 3, 2011); Young v.
Delta Towing, L.L.C., No. CIV.A. 03-518, 2004 WL 439896 (E.D. La.
Mar. 8, 2004).
Additionally, plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged
harassment was severe or pervasive. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc.,

302 F.3d 474, 482 (5th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must show that the
environment was both “objectively and subjectively offensive, one
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one
that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” Calmes v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, 943 F. Supp. 2d 666 (E.D. La. 2013), see also Butler
v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir.1998)). To
determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or
abusive, courts must look at “all the circumstances, including the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee's work performance.” Calmes, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
“Occasional racial comments do not rise to the level of severe or
pervasive harassment.” Numa v. Cannizzaro, No. CIV.A. 13-515, 2014
WL 1329829, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2014) (quoting Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
Here, Magnolia challenges plaintiff’s ability to satisfy any
element of her hostile work environment claim. Rec. Doc. 29.
Specifically, defendant argues that plaintiff’s claims are
conclusory, and she failed to establish that she was subjected to
severe and pervasive harassment. Id. Magnolia also contends that
plaintiff alleged she was subjected to verbal abuse and derogatory
racial slurs, but she did not allege which of her working
conditions were impacted. Id. By contrast, plaintiff alleges that

she suffered a hostile work environment because she was called
racial slurs at work and was not allowed to use the restroom
facilities. Rec. Doc. 26. Each allegation will be taken in turn.
Derogatory Racial Slurs
Plaintiff’s claim based on alleged derogatory racial slurs
must be maintained because she pled all the required elements.
Plaintiff satisfied the first three elements when she pled that
she is an African American, she was subjected to unwelcome
harassment in the form of racial slurs (the “n-word”), and the
harassment she suffered was due to her race. Rec. Doc. 26.
Additionally, taking the complaint in its entirety, plaintiff has

satisfied the fourth element given she asserted that the employment
practices at Magnolia “disproportionately impacted her ability to
succeed as an employee.” Id. Williams also satisfied the fifth and
final element of her claim when she alleged that she informed
Magnolia of her co-workers’ frequent harassing conduct, and
Magnolia allegedly failed to act. Id. Therefore, plaintiff has
successfully alleged a claim for hostile work environment based on
these facts, and this claim must be maintained.
Banned from Utilizing Restroom or Taking breaks
Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim based on
Magnolia’s alleged denial of access to restrooms and breaks must

be maintained. Plaintiff satisfied the first three elements when
she pled that she is an African American, she was denied access to
restrooms and denied break time, and that this conduct was because
of her race. Rec. Doc. 26. Additionally, Magnolia’s alleged conduct
of not allowing Williams to use the restroom at work because of
her race is objectively and subjectively offensive, which
satisfies the fourth element. Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub.
Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir.1999) (stating the challenged
conduct must be both objectively and subjectively offensive.) The
defendant’s alleged actions also clearly impacted a condition of
plaintiff’s employment given her claims that she was humiliated by
being forced to use the restroom on herself. Rec. Doc. 26 at p.3.

Additionally, Williams’ employment conditions were impacted
because she was allegedly prohibited from taking legally mandated
breaks like similarly situated Caucasian employees. Id. at p. 4.
Plaintiff also properly pled the last element of her claim when
she stated that she reported these discriminatory practices to
Magnolia, and instead of rectifying the issue, Magnolia allegedly
ignored her and terminated her employment. Id. Because plaintiff
adequately pled all the elements required for her hostile work
environment claim based on these facts, this claim must be
maintained.
iii. Wrongful termination in violation of Title VII, Section
1981, and the LEDL
In a Title VII discriminatory termination case, plaintiff has
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In order to meet this initial
burden, plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she was a member of
a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the position in
question; (3) that she was discharged from that position; and (4)

that she was either replaced by someone outside the protected class
or otherwise discharged because of the protected trait. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Cooper v. Cornerstone
Chem. Co., No. CV 20-1454, 2022 WL 19354 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2022)
(stating Louisiana courts apply the same McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework when analyzing claims of discrimination under
the LEDL); Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957
(5th Cir.1993).
Once the plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to produce a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.
Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir.1994).

“This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve
no credibility assessment.’” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000)
(quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113

S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)).
In Berry v. Texas Woman's Univ., plaintiff Berry, a black
employee at defendant University, sued alleging among other things
that defendant violated Title VII when it wrongfully terminated
his employment. 528 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Tex. 2021).
Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
claim, arguing that Berry failed to properly plead his cause of
action. Id. at 588. Defendant contended that Berry did not properly
plead the fourth element of his claim, that he was replaced by
someone outside of his protected class. Id. at 612-13. The Eastern
District of Texas court began its analysis by articulating the
four-prong test plaintiff was required to establish for his prima
facie case. Id. In essence, plaintiff was required to demonstrate

that he “(1) [was] a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified
for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some
adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by
someone outside his protected group or was treated less favorably
than other similarly situated employees outside the protected
group.” Id. (quoting Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 320 (5th
Cir. 2014)).
After review, the Court ruled to deny defendant’s motion to
dismiss, finding Berry pled sufficient facts to give rise to a
reasonable inference that he was treated less favorably than
similarly situated white employees. Berry, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 612-

13. The Court noted that although plaintiff did not allege that he
was replaced by someone outside his protected group, he did however
allege that he was treated less favorably. Id. In his complaint,
plaintiff alleged he was “terminated solely because of the
discriminatory actions of Defendants in treating him differently
from other non-Black co-workers, because of the ethnic animus
manifested by [defendant’s employee] on several prior occasions
and in retaliation for prosecuting Title VII and FMLA claims.” Id.
Plaintiff further alleged that he was treated “differently from
other non-Black co-workers” because “[n]o other similarly situated
employees within the facility were required to comply with the

Central Plant Vacation Leave Policy, made to fill out separate
blue slips for each day of requested leave or find their own fill-
in replacements when taking leave.” Id. Taking plaintiff’s well-
pleaded allegations in the light most favorable to him, the Court
held plaintiff plausibly alleged that similarly situated employees
outside [his] protected class were treated more favorably. Id.
Williams’ wrongful termination claim must also be maintained.
Plaintiff satisfied the first prong when she alleged that she was
a member of multiple protected classes, an African American and a
woman. Likewise, she properly alleged that she suffered an adverse
employment action when she stated that Magnolia allegedly
constructively terminated her employment. Rec. Doc. 26. Williams

also alleged that she was qualified when she asserted that her
“credentials and work history were impeccable.” Rec. Doc. 26 at p.
3. Plaintiff also put forth any facts that she was treated less
favorably than persons outside of her protected class. She asserts
that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated
Caucasian employees, when she was denied breaks, denied access to
restrooms, and subject to the frequent use of the “n-word.” See
Rec. Doc. 26. Like the plaintiff in Berry, who provided specific
instances of how similarly situated white employees were treated
more favorably, Williams also provided such information. Because
plaintiff has adequately alleged all the elements of her prima
facie case, her wrongful termination claim is maintained.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 12th day of July, 2022

___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10187974. Public record. Not legal advice.