# Stansbury v. McCarty Corporation

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · June 16, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10187894

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** June 16, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10187894

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Canter when plaintiffs sued an Arcadian employee for his role in an explosion that occurred at a fertilizer plant owned by Arcadian
- finding Canter liability when employees testified that they had complained of safety issues to management, management refused to act, and management said “[s]ometimes you have to overlook safety to get the job done”
- stating that plaintiffs must prove “CTL delegated its duty to McLelland” when plaintiffs’ deceased husband/father worked for Delta Trailer, Inc., not CTL, and McLelland, was the CTL employee who plaintiff sued
- applying Canter to determine whether a management-level employee can be held personally liable for a plaintiff’s injury

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LENNARD H. STANSBURY CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 21-1909
MCCARTY CORPORATION, ET AL. SECTION “B”(3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are defendants Bertram C. Hopeman and Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company, as alleged insurer of Hopeman’s alleged
executive officers Albert Arendt Hopeman, Jr., Bertram C. Hopeman,
Charles Johnson, and Kenneth Wood’s motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim (Rec. Doc. 158), plaintiff’s response in
opposition (Rec. Doc. 167), and defendants’ reply in support of
their motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 172).
For the reasons discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) (Rec. Doc. 158) is GRANTED, dismissing plaintiff’s
claims against Bertram C. Hopeman and Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company, as the alleged insurer of Hopeman Brothers’s alleged
executive officers Albert Arendt Hopeman, Jr., Bertram C. Hopeman,
Charles Johnson, and Kenneth Wood, unless no later than July
8, 2022, plaintiff files an amended complaint correcting

deficiencies noted below.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Lennard H. Stansbury alleges exposure to asbestos
when he worked at various industrial and marine jobsites in the

greater New Orleans, Louisiana area from approximately 1966 to the
late 1970s. The jobsites included Avondale Shipyard and Dixie
Machine, Welding & Metal Works, Inc. Rec. Doc. 7-1 at 3; Rec. Doc.
1-1 at 2; Rec. Doc. 1-2 at 24. While plaintiff was an employee at
Avondale, defendant Hopeman Brothers, Inc. was a seller, user,
distributor, and/or supplier to Avondale Shipyard of asbestos-
containing products known as marinite/micarta “sandwich” boards.
Rec. Doc. 129 at 23. Plaintiff alleges that he was exposed to
asbestos fibers generated by Hopeman Brothers employees who were
cutting and manipulating Marinite/Micarta asbestos sandwich boards
while at Avondale. Id.; see also Rec. Doc. 167 at 3. Plaintiff
currently suffers from mesothelioma which he attributes to his

occupational exposure to asbestos. Rec. Doc. 7-1 at 3.
On November 20, 2020, plaintiff filed suit in state court
alleging negligence, product liability, and tort liability related
to asbestos exposure. Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 4. Employers Insurance
Company of Wausau filed a third-party demand on August 24, 2021,
naming Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (f/k/a Northrop Grumman
Ship Systems, Inc., f/k/a Avondale Industries, Inc.)
(“Huntington”) as a third-party defendant. Rec. Doc. 1-4 at 19.
Huntington then filed a notice of removal on October 19, 2021.
Rec. Doc. 1. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to remand (Rec.
Doc. 7), which was denied by this Court on January 6, 2022. Rec.
Doc. 98. On March 8, 2022, plaintiff filed a fourth amended

complaint. Rec. Doc. 129. Defendants Bertram C. Hopeman and Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company, as the alleged insurer of alleged
executive officers Albert Arendt Hopeman, Jr., Bertram C. Hopeman,
Charles Johnson, and Kenneth Wood (“Executive Officers”), filed
the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on May
5, 2022. Rec. Doc. 158.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint “must contain

‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Varela v. Gonzales, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In
other words, a plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 556 U.S. at 556).
When deciding whether a plaintiff has met its burden, a court

“accept[s] all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and
interpret[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, but ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements’ cannot
establish facial plausibility.” Snow Ingredients, Inc. v.
SnoWizard, Inc., 833 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678) (some internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Plaintiffs must “nudge[] their claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
B. Executive Officer Liability
Generally, Louisiana law does not provide third parties with
a cause of action against directors and officers for negligence.
See La. World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 239 (5th
Cir. 1988) (quoting Unimobil 84, Inc. v. Spurney, 797 F.2d 214,

215 (5th Cir. 1986)); see also Manning v. United Med. Corp. of New
Orleans, 2004-0035, p. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/05); 902 So. 2d
406, 410 (quoting Korson v. Indep. Mall I, Ltd., 595 So. 2d 1174,
1178 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992)) (“[T]he United States Fifth Circuit
has reaffirmed that Louisiana law does not provide third parties
with a cause of action against directors and officers for
negligence.”). However, in Canter v. Koehring Co., the Louisiana
Supreme Court established an exception to this rule. See 283 So.
2d 716, 721 (La. 1973), superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Walls v. Am. Optical Corp., 740 So.2d 1262, 1265 (La.
1999); Rolls on behalf of A.R. v. Packaging Corp. of Am. Inc., 34
F.4th 431, 437-438 (5th Cir. 2022) (applying Canter to determine

whether a management-level employee can be held personally liable
for a plaintiff’s injury).
A plaintiff can hold a director or officer personally liable
for an injury when the following four elements are met:
(1) the employer owed a duty of care to the third person,
breach of which caused the damage for which recovery is
sought; (2) that duty was delegated by the employer to
the defendant; (3) the defendant employee breached his
duty through personal (not technical or vicarious)
fault; and (4) the employee had a personal duty toward
the injured third party, the breach of which
specifically caused the third party’s damages . . . [and]
personal liability [is not] imposed upon the employee
simply because of his general administrative
responsibility for some function of employment.

Kling Realty Co., Inc. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 575 F.3d 510, 514
(5th Cir. 2009) (citing Canter, 283 So. 2d at 721); see also Rolls,
34 F.4th at 437-438. Canter liability to third persons for the
negligence of corporate officers and employees may only be imposed
for bodily injury claims. Kling, 575 F.3d at 515 (citing Unimobil,
797 F.2d at 217; Ford v. Elsbury, 32 F.3d 931, 935-36 (5th Cir.
1994)).
C. Whether Canter Applies
In defendants’ motion to dismiss, they rely on Canter as
“[t]he seminal authority in Louisiana for imposition of executive

officer liability.” Rec. Doc. 158-1 at 5. However, in their reply
they seem to suggest that “executive officer liability under Canter
was superseded by Act No. 147 when the 1976 legislature amended
La. R.S. 23:1032 to extend employer tort immunity to persons
previously considered third parties under the act.” Rec. Doc. 172
at 2.1 In making this suggestion, defendants nevertheless
misunderstand the effect of the 1976 amendment on Louisiana Revised
Statute 23:1032.
Defendants are correct that prior to the 1976 amendment,
§ 23:1032 provided that “workers’ compensation benefits were the
exclusive remedy of an employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or relations, against an employer for injuries arising
out of and in the course of his employment.” Walls, 740 So. 2d at
1265; see also Rec. Doc. 172 at 2. The law did not “expressly

confer immunity from tort suits on any person other than the
employer;” consequently, Canter held that although barred from
seeking recovery from their employer, injured workers were
“allowed to seek recovery in tort from negligent executive officers
and their liability insurers.” Walls, 740 So. 2d at 1265. Not long

1 Defendants last section of their reply entitled, “notwithstanding the above,
plaintiff still fails to satisfy the Canter factors,” also seems to indicate
that defendants believe Canter should not apply here. See Rec. Doc. 172 at 5.
after this ruling, the 1976 Louisiana legislature amended
§ 23:1032 to extend the employer’s tort immunity to “persons
previously considered third parties under the Act,” including “any

officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such
employer or principal.” See id.; see also La. Stat. Ann. § 23:1032
(2022). Nevertheless, contrary to defendants’ understanding, this
amendment did not completely foreclose Canter’s application.
Long after the 1976 amendment to § 23:1032, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed that “[i]n Louisiana, the legal framework with which to
conduct [an executive officer liability] examination is provided
by Canter.” See In re 1994 Exxon Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d 378, 385
(5th Cir. 2009). The Court specified that “[i]n Canter, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana approved a four-part test to determine whether
individual liability may be established against an employee for
breach of a duty imposed solely by reason of his employment or
agency relationship.” Id.; see also Rolls, 34 F.4th at 437-438.

“In cases where the suit is brought by a non-employee third-party,
as here, executive officer liability for negligence has not been
abrogated.” Kemp v. CTL Distrib., Inc., 440 F. App’x 240, 244 n.1
(5th Cir. 2011) (citing In re 1994 Exxon, 558 F.3d at 386)
(“Canter’s four-part test is used to determine whether an employee
is individually liable to third persons.
Here, plaintiff sues Hopeman Brothers’s executive officers
for negligence. See Rec. Doc. 129 at 1-2, 23-26. Plaintiff,
however, was never a Hopeman employee. See id. at 23-26 (alleging
that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos from Hopeman’s products and
employees while employed by Huntington). Consequently, when

plaintiff files suit against the Executive Officers, he does so as
a “non-employee third party,” not a Hopeman Brothers co-employee.
See Kemp, 440 F. App’x at 240. Meaning, plaintiff’s quest to hold
the Executive Officers liable for negligence “has not been
abrogated.” Id.; see also In re 1994 Exxon, 558 F.3d 378 (applying
Canter when non-Exxon employees sued a group of Exxon employees
for negligence related to a chemical fire); Ford, 32 F.3d at 936
(applying Canter when plaintiffs sued an Arcadian employee for his
role in an explosion that occurred at a fertilizer plant owned by
Arcadian). Thus, to the extent that defendants argue executive
officer liability under Canter was fully superseded by the 1976
amendment to § 23:1032, the Court finds the argument wanting, and

thus, applies Canter to determine whether plaintiff alleged
executive officer liability in the instant matter. See Rec. Doc.
172 at 2-3.
D. Whether Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against the
Executive Officers

1. Interpreting Canter
After determining that Canter applies here, the Court must
now decide which party applied Canter correctly. See generally
Rec. Docs. 158-1, 167. In defendants’ motion to dismiss, they argue
that if Canter applies, then plaintiff fails to satisfy the second
element of the Canter framework, which dictates that the duty of
care owed to the third party must be “delegated by the principal

or employer to the defendant.” Rec. Doc. 158-1 at 5, 9 (quoting
Canter, 283 So. 2d at 721). Defendants explain that “the Amended
Complaint are devoid of any reference to a duty delegated by
Plaintiff’s employer, Avondale, to Hopeman’s alleged executive
officers, an essential element of executive officer liability
under Louisiana law.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff, on the other hand,
implores the Court to interpret the second prong as requiring a
“look to the delegation of duty between defendant Hopeman and
Hopeman’s [Executive Officers]—not Avondale.” Rec. Doc. 167 at 9.
According to plaintiff, “[i]n a third-party claim where a non-
employee alleges liability on the part of a defendant’s executive
officers, the focus must be on the relationship, and the acts or

omissions, between the defendant tortfeasor and its executive
officers.” Id. After careful consideration, the Court finds that
plaintiff provides the correct interpretation.
In Canter, plaintiff was employed on a construction contract
between his employer, the Industrial Construction Company, and
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company to build a chemical plant. 283 So.
2d at 723. After dying from a workplace accident while helping to
build the plant, plaintiff’s widow brought a wrongful death action
against five Pittsburgh Plate engineers and their insurer. Id. In
determining whether plaintiff had a valid claim against
Pittsburgh’s employees, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not
evaluate whether plaintiff’s employer, the Industrial Construction

Company, had delegated a duty of care to the Pittsburgh Plate
engineers. See id. Instead, the court examined whether Pittsburgh
Plate, the corporate entity, had delegated the duty to the
engineers, employees of the corporation. See id. (finding that
Pittsburgh Plate “had delegated to these engineers whatever
responsibilities it had for furnishing engineering specifications,
services, and instructions under its contract with Industrial”).
Thus here, the Court need not analyze whether plaintiff
alleges his employer, Avondale, delegated a duty of care to Hopeman
Brothers’s executive officers. See id. To assess whether the
Executive Officers, not only Hopeman Brothers, are liable for
plaintiff’s injuries, the Court must determine whether plaintiff

alleged that Hopeman Brothers delegated a duty of care to its
Executive Officers—not Avondale. See id; see also Kemp, 440 F.
App’x at 245 (stating that plaintiffs must prove “CTL delegated
its duty to McLelland” when plaintiffs’ deceased husband/father
worked for Delta Trailer, Inc., not CTL, and McLelland, was the
CTL employee who plaintiff sued); Cambre v. Union Carbide Corp.,
No. 21-1067, 2022 WL 671655, at *1, 3 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2022)
(finding that “Dow and Union Carbide did not, as required under
Canter, delegate relevant safety duties to the employee
defendants” when non-employee plaintiffs sued Dow and Union
Carbide employees); Wright v. ANR Pipeline Co., 652 F. App’x 268,
270 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (finding non-employee plaintiffs

did not establish that pipeline companies delegated a duty of care
to Lucky, a pipeline company employee), vacating Ayers v. ANR
Pipeline Co., No. 10-925, 2011 WL 13359147 (W.D. La. June 4,
2011).2
2. Whether Plaintiff Alleged Facts Sufficient to State a Claim
Although the Court finds plaintiff interpreted Canter
correctly, it does not necessarily follow that plaintiff stated a
valid claim for executive officer liability. The Court must find
that plaintiff alleged Hopeman Brothers owed a duty of care to
plaintiff, that Hopeman Brothers delegated that duty to the
Executive Officers, that the Executive Officers breached that duty
through personal fault, and that the Executive Officers had a

personal duty toward plaintiff, and personal liability is not being
imposed simply because of the Executive Officers’ general
administrative responsibility. See Rolls, 34 F.4th at 437-438
(citing Canter, 283 So. 2d at 721). Defendants mainly argue that
plaintiff fails to allege that Hopeman Brothers delegated a duty

2 Because the Court finds that the relevant inquiry is not whether Avondale
delegated a duty of care to the Executive Officers, but rather whether Hopeman
Brothers delegated this duty, defendants’ arguments regarding whether Avondale
“had a non-delegable duty to provide and maintain a safe workplace safe from
asbestos exposure” are irrelevant and need not be addressed by the Court. See
Rec. Doc. 158-1 at 7-9; Rec. Doc. 167 at 5. Moreover, defendants seem to concede
that Hopeman Brothers did have a duty toward plaintiff. See Rec. Doc. 172 at 3.
of care to the Executive Officers. See Rec. Doc. 158-1 at 7-10;
Rec. Doc. 172 at 5. However, the Court must establish that
plaintiff pleaded all the Canter elements to find a cause of action
for executive officer liability. See Rolls, F. 4th at 437.

First, plaintiff did allege that Hopeman Brothers owed him a
duty of care. See Rec. Doc. 129 at 23. In his complaint, plaintiff
states, “Hopeman Brothers, Inc. negligently, recklessly, willfully
and/or because of gross and wanton negligence or fault, failed to
properly discharge their duties to the Complainant regarding the
asbestos products known as marinite/micarta “sandwich” boards,
sold, distributed, supplied and/or used by Hopeman Brothers, Inc.
at Avondale Shipyard.” Id.; see also id. at 16-17 (alleging that
defendants had a duty of care to plaintiff). He then describes
nine different ways that Hopeman Brothers failed to discharge their
duties to plaintiff. Id. at 23-24. Moreover, defendants

essentially concede in their reply memorandum that plaintiff has
a valid claim against Hopeman Brothers, implying that Hopeman
Brothers indeed had a duty toward plaintiff. See Rec. Doc. 172 at
3 (acknowledging that Hopeman Brothers can face liability for
injuries it caused to plaintiff). Accordingly, plaintiff has
alleged that Hopeman Brothers owes a duty of care to plaintiff,
the breach of which has caused the damage for which recovery is
sought. See Ford, 32 F.3d at 936 (citing Canter, 283 So. 2d at
721).
Regarding Canter’s second prong, plaintiff claims he alleges
that Hopeman Brothers delegated a duty of care to the Executive
Officers. See Rec. Doc. 167 at 11. In plaintiff’s complaint he

specifically states:
Albert Arendt Hopeman Jr., Bertram C. Hopeman, Charles
Johnson[,] and Kenneth Wood were Executive Officers of
Hopeman Brothers, Inc. (or its legal predecessors) with
the specific responsibility for the health and safety of
Complainant and his fellow employees during the time he
were exposed to substances which resulted in
Complainant’s mesothelioma and other ill effects related
thereto.

Rec. Doc. 129 at 24. Plaintiff argues that this allegation
represents “a specific delegation of responsibility to protect him
from the dangers of asbestos that Hopeman was negligently,
recklessly, and willfully creating.” Rec. Doc. 167 at 11. However,
rather than providing factual allegations, plaintiff merely offers
a conclusory statement. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Other than this one
allegation, plaintiff does not deliver any facts to support the
notion that Hopeman Brothers indeed delegated its duty of care to
the Executive Officers. See Rec. Doc. 129 at 23-26. Thus, plaintiff
does not seem to satisfy the second element of the Canter
framework.
Nevertheless, even if the Court were to assume that plaintiff
alleged a duty to delegate to the Executive Officers, plaintiff
has also failed to satisfy the third and fourth elements of the
Canter framework. See Rec. Doc. 158-1 at 10. The third prong
specifically requires that plaintiff allege the Executive Officers
“bear[] personal blame for” plaintiff’s injuries. Rolls, 34 F.4th

at 438. Furthermore, “for personal liability to attach under
Canter, the employee defendant must have had some personal contact
with and responsibility toward the injured plaintiff.” Cambre,
2022 WL 671655, at *4 (citing Kemp, 440 F. App’x at 246; Esco v.
Smith, 468 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1985)). Additionally, “[w]hether the
[executive officer] was aware or should have been aware of a risk
of harm and nevertheless failed to respond to the risk in the
manner in which a reasonably prudent [executive officer] would
respond in the same or similar circumstances” is a key issue in
determining executive officer liability. Kemp, 440 F. App’x at 246
(quoting Ford, 32 F.3d at 936). An executive officer’s “knowledge

of the dangers present could give rise to the personal duty
contemplated in Canter.” Cambre, 2022 WL 671655, at *5 (quoting
Ford, 32 F.3d at 936).
In his complaint, plaintiff does allege that the Executive
Officers “knew that there were specific engineering and industrial
hygiene procedures which should have been employed by Hopeman
Brothers, Inc.’s employees to reduce exposures, knew that those
exposed to asbestos on the job could bring home asbestos on their
clothes and thereby injuriously exposed those in the household.”
Rec. Doc. 129 at 25. Plaintiff claims that the Executive Officers
“consciously and intentionally chose not to inform Complainant of
this information or implement any meaningful safety precautions.”
Id. However, these generalized claims fall short of alleging that

the Executive Officers had actual knowledge of a discrete, imminent
risk, which ultimately led to plaintiff’s injuries. See Ford, 32
F.3d at 939 (finding Canter liability when employees testified
that they had complained of safety issues to management, management
refused to act, and management said “[s]ometimes you have to
overlook safety to get the job done”); Ellis v. Evonik Corp., No.
21-1089, 2021 WL 4862146, at *6 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2021) (finding
that a claim of “actual knowledge” of health risks “because [the
employees’] respective roles at the facility required them to be
aware of the health effects . . . which were widely known in their
industry to cause cancer” was “speculative” and “falls far short

of sufficiently alleging that these four employees had actual
knowledge of a particular health risk”). Importantly, plaintiff
never alleges that the Executive Officers had “some personal
contact with and responsibility toward the injured plaintiff,”
which Canter requires. See Kemp, 440 F. App’x at 246 (quoting Esco,
468 So. 2d at 1175) (“[T]he Louisiana Supreme Court has explained
that in order for personal liability to attach under Canter, ‘that
person must have some personal contact with and responsibility
towards the injured employee.’”).
Plaintiff does detail that there were reports and protocols
that could have alerted defendants of the need to mitigate health
risks associated with asbestos-containing products. Rec. Doc. 129

at 6-17. Additionally, plaintiff alleges that “Defendants were or
should have been aware of the deadly danger of asbestos dust to
workers using asbestos containing products or working around
others who were using asbestos containing products.” Id. at 6.
Nevertheless, plaintiff does not allege facts demonstrating
defendants “bear[] personal blame for” plaintiff’s injuries. See
generally Rec. Doc. 129; see also Rolls, 34 F.4th at 438.
Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for executive
officer liability, and this claim must be dismissed, unless
plaintiff effectively cures noted factual deficiencies in an
amended complaint no later than July 8, 2022.3
New Orleans, Louisiana this 15th day of June, 2022

___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3 Defendants also move to strike the exhibits attached to plaintiff’s opposition
memorandum, claiming that the Court may only rely on the Complaint in denying
a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rec. Doc.
172 at 1-2. When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
“must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments
thereto.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir.
2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). However, a district court may consider
documents “attached to the motion to dismiss” when the documents “are referred
to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim.”
Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003). The exhibits
attached to plaintiff’s opposition are neither referred to in plaintiff’s
complaint nor do they seem central to plaintiff’s claim that the Executive
Officers are liable for plaintiff’s injuries. See generally Rec. Doc. 129.
Accordingly, the Court does not rely on these exhibits in determining that
plaintiff failed to state a claim of executive officer liability.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10187894. Public record. Not legal advice.