# Willison v. Noble Drilling Exploration Company

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · February 14, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10187495

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** February 14, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10187495

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that “Jones Act claims are not subject to removal, even if the parties are diverse.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DALE WILLISON, CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff

VERSUS NO. 21-1520

NOBLE DRILLING EXPLORATION SECTION: “E”(1)
COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendants

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion to remand1 filed by Plaintiff Dale Willison
(“Plaintiff”). Defendant Kongsberg Maritime, Inc. (“Kongsberg”) filed an opposition.2
Plaintiff filed a reply.3
On November 29, 2021, the Court issued an Order and Reasons deciding issues
relating to the motion to remand and holding that discharge of Plaintiff’s claim against
the Noble Defendants in bankruptcy does not bar him from asserting the same claims
solely to recover from Kongsberg through indemnity, and that Plaintiff’s Jones Act claim
had not been fraudulently pleaded for failure to sue his employer.4 The Court deferred its
ruling on the motion to remand and instructed the parties to file supplemental
memorandums.5

1 R. Doc. 6.
2 R. Doc. 8.
3 R. Doc. 12.
4 R. Doc. 17. The Court did not reach the merits of Plaintiff’s argument that he “is a third party beneficiary
of the indemnity provision, [and is] entitled to pursue all claims that Plaintiff has against the Noble
Defendants against the indemnitors of the Noble Defendants, specifically, Kongsberg.” R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 60,
at p. 6.
5 R. Doc. 17. On December 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed his supplemental memorandum in support of his motion
to remand. R. Doc. 20. On December 22, 2021, Kongsberg filed its supplemental memorandum in
opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand. R Doc. 21.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that, at all relevant times, he was employed as a field engineer for
Kongsberg.6 Plaintiff alleges he was assigned by Kongsberg to perform repair services on
dynamic positioning equipment on a “vessel and fleet of vessels owned and operated by
Defendants, Noble Drilling Exploration Company, Noble Drilling (U.S.), LLC, Noble

Drilling (U.S.), Inc., and Paragon Offshore Drilling, LLC” (collectively, the “Noble
Defendants”).7 According to Plaintiff, he travelled by airplane from New Orleans,
Louisiana, to Guyana, South America, on or about December 25, 2019, to provide services
for the Noble Defendants on behalf of Kongsberg pursuant to the Master Service Contract
between Kongsberg and the Noble Defendants.8 The Noble Defendants were responsible
for transporting Plaintiff from the airport to the vessel he would board to perform his
work.9 When Plaintiff arrived at the airport in Guyana, he was greeted by an agent with a
placard bearing the name “Noble.”10 The Noble Defendants provided Plaintiff
transportation through a company known as Knight Rider Transportation.11 The Knight
Rider Transportation driver drove at a high rate of speed down a two-lane road, frequently
swerving in and out of traffic during the trip.12 At some point during the trip, the driver of

the vehicle took evasive action to avoid a washing machine in the lane of travel and, in so
doing, swerved into the oncoming lane of travel, causing a head-on collision with a taxi.
As a result of the collision, Plaintiff sustained injuries.13

6 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 8, p. 21.
7 Id. at ¶ 10, p. 21.
8 Id. at ¶ 13, p. 22.
9 Id. at ¶ 14, p. 22.
10 Id. at ¶ 15, p. 22.
11 Id. at ¶ 16, p. 22.
12 Id. at ¶ 18, p. 22.
13 Id. at ¶¶ 20-22, pp. 22-23.
On December 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed a petition for damages in the Civil District
Court for the Parish of Orleans invoking the savings to suitors clause.14 Plaintiff sued the
Noble Defendants for unseaworthiness under the general maritime law, and for
negligence under the Jones Act, the general maritime law, and Louisiana law.15 Plaintiff
alleges the Noble Defendants are his borrowing Jones Act employer.16 On May 20, 2021,

Plaintiff filed a first amended petition for damages in state court, adding Kongsberg as a
defendant and alleging Kongsberg is liable for Plaintiff’s claims against the Noble
Defendants because of the indemnity provision in the October 21, 2003 Master Service
Contract entered into between Kongsberg and the Noble Defendants.17 Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges Kongsberg agreed to indemnify the Noble Defendants and that Plaintiff
is a third party beneficiary of the indemnity agreement between them.18 Plaintiff alleges
the indemnity agreement gives him the right “to pursue all claims that Plaintiff has
against the Noble Defendants against” Kongsberg.19
On June 14, 2021, Plaintiff and the Noble Defendants reached a stipulation in the
Noble Defendants’ Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, pending in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.20 The stipulation provides for the

discharge of Plaintiff’s claims against the Noble Defendants, and for the partial lifting of

14 See R. Doc. 1-1 at p. 20–26; see also id. at ¶ 3, at p. 21 (alleging that “Plaintiff is entitled to bring said suit
in Louisiana state court pursuant to the ‘savings to suitors clause’ in 28 U.S.C. 1333.”). Plaintiff also filed
two workers compensation claims against his employer, Kongsberg, within a year of the accident. Id. at ¶
23, p. 23.
15 Id. at ¶¶ 25–44, pp. 23–25.
16 Id. ¶¶ 8–12, pp. 21–22.
17 Id. at pp. 4–7. Plaintiff attached the Master Service Contract as an exhibit to his first amended petition.
Id. at pp. 9-18. The indemnity provisions are found in section 7 of the Master Service Contract. Id. at pp.
12–14.
18 Id. at ¶¶ 47–60, pp. 4–6.
19 Id. at ¶ 60, p. 6.
20 The Noble Defendants’ bankruptcy proceedings are styled as follows: In re Noble Corp. PLC, No. 20-
33826 (S.D. Tex. Bankr. July 31, 2020); In re Noble Drilling (U.S.) LLC, No. 20-33851 (S.D. Tex. Bankr.
July 31, 2020); In re Noble Drilling Exploration Co., No. 20-33854 (S.D. Tex. Bankr. July 31, 2020).
the bankruptcy stay to allow Plaintiff to pursue his claims against the Noble Defendants
but only to the extent he recovers from Kongsberg based on indemnity.21
On August 11, 2021, Kongsberg filed a Notice of Removal, invoking this Court’s
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).22 In its Notice of Removal, Kongsberg
acknowledges “Plaintiff asserts claims against the Noble Defendants pursuant to the

Jones Act,” and that “[s]uch claims are generally nonremovable,” but asserts that “this
case is removable notwithstanding Plaintiff’s alleged assertion of a Jones Act claim for
two reasons.”23 Kongsberg argues, first, that Plaintiff is not a seaman and “his Jones Act
claim was fraudulently pled to prevent removal,”24 and, second, that Plaintiff’s Jones Act
claim “may be severed and remanded to state court.”25 On September 27, 2021, Plaintiff
filed a motion to remand, arguing all his claims are nonremovable because they are
brought pursuant to the Jones Act, and Jones Act claims are not removable from state
court.26
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction, and they possess
only the power authorized by the Constitution and by statute.27 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a

defendant may remove an action from state court to federal court if the plaintiff could
have originally brought the action in federal court.28 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a
federal court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction “where the matter in controversy

21 R. Doc. 1-2; see also In re Noble Corp. PLC, No. 20-33826, R. Doc. 1187.
22 R. Doc. 1.
23 Id. at ¶ 22.
24 Id. at ¶ 23.
25 Id. at ¶ 24.
26 R. Doc. 6.
27 See Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002).
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs,” and where there is
complete diversity of citizenship.29 The parties are completely diverse where no plaintiff
is a “citizen of the same State as any defendant.”30
Section 1441(b)(2) permits a defendant to “remove a case from state court to
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction so long as none ‘of the parties in interest

properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.’”31 However, “[i]t is axiomatic that Jones Act claims may not be removed from
state court” because the Jones Act incorporates the general provisions of the Federal
Employer Liability Act (“FELA”), including 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a), which bars removal of
FELA claims.32 This bar to removal of Jones Act claims applies even when complete
diversity exists.33
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In its Notice of Removal, Kongsberg invokes this Court’s diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).34 Kongsberg asserts, and Plaintiff does not disagree, there
is complete diversity among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds

29 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
30 Flagg v. Stryker Corp., 819 F.3d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 2016).
31 Wolf v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. for Am. Home Mortg. Inv. Tr. 2007-1, 745 F. App'x 205, 207 (5th
Cir. 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2)).
32 Lackey v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1993). 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) provides that “[a]
civil action in any State court against a railroad or its receivers or trustees, arising under sections 1–4 and
5–10 of the Act of April 22, 1908 (45 U.S.C. 51–54, 55–60), may not be removed to any district court of the
United States.” Section 1445(a) directly references FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq., and the Jones Act expressly
incorporates the provisions of FELA in stating the “[l]aws of the United States regulating recovery for
personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section.” 46 U.S.C. § 30104.
33 See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. 531 U.S. 438, 455 (2001) (stating that “a Jones Act claim . . . is
not subject to removal to federal court even in the event of diversity of the parties.”); see also Gregoire v.
Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 765 (E.D. La. 2014) (recognizing that “Jones Act claims are
not subject to removal, even if the parties are diverse.”)
34 R. Doc. 1.
$75,000.00, exclusive of interests and costs.35 The complete diversity and amount in
controversy requirements are met in this case.
The Court must determine whether this lawsuit—which involves claims under the
Jones Act, general maritime law, and Louisiana law—was properly removed in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which authorizes removal of cases “of which the district courts of

the United States have original jurisdiction.”36
In Romero v. International Terminal Operating Company, the Supreme Court
held that general maritime law claims do not arise under the Constitution, treaties, or
laws of the United States for purposes of federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.37
Instead, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over general maritime law claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1333.38
In In re Dutile, the Fifth Circuit held that general maritime law claims brought in
state court pursuant to the savings to suitors clause are not removable under the pre-2011
version of § 1441.39 The pre-2011 version of § 1441 provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending. For purposes of
removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under
fictitious names shall be disregarded.

(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if

35 Id. at ¶ 5.
36 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
37 358 U.S. 354, 378 (1959).
38 See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (providing that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”
39 935 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1991).
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which such action is brought.40

The Fifth Circuit in Dutile reasoned that, because general maritime law claims do not arise
under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States for purposes of federal
question jurisdiction, they do not fall within the category of cases referenced in the first
sentence of subsection (b).41 Rather, the court found that general maritime law claims fall
within the second sentence of subsection (b)—the “any other such action,” category—and
construed this language as an “Act of Congress” expressly providing that general maritime
law claims are not removable under subsection (a).42 In Dutile, the Fifth Circuit held that
because general maritime law claims do not arise under the Constitution, treaties, or laws
of the United States for purposes of federal question jurisdiction, such claims are not
removable absent some other independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction.43
In 2011, Congress amended § 1441, which now states, in pertinent part,
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.

(b) (1) In determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the
jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title, the citizenship of defendants
sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.

(b)(2) A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the
jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of
the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought.44

40 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1990).
41 Dutile, 935 F.2d at 62–63.
42 Id. at 63.
43 Id.
44 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b) (2012).
Most notably, Congress removed the “[a]ny other such action” language from the pre-
2011 version of §1441(b), which the Dutile court relied on in finding that general maritime
claims are excluded from § 1441(a)’s grant of removal jurisdiction for claims over which
federal courts have original jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit has yet to address whether, in light of Congress’s December 2011

amendment to the removal statute, the savings to suitors clause of § 1333(1) prohibits
removal of general maritime law claims absent an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction. District courts within the Fifth Circuit have sharply divided on this question.
Certain district courts have held that the retention of the provision permitting removal
over cases in which district courts have original jurisdiction, combined with the deletion
of the “any other such action” language from the current version of § 1441(b), means that
§ 1441 no longer prohibits removal of general maritime law claims brought in state court,
and that such claims are removable even in the absence of an independent basis of
jurisdiction, such as complete diversity.45 As observed by the Fifth Circuit, however, the
“vast majority of district courts considering this question have maintained that such
lawsuits are not removable.”46 Significantly, all sections within the Eastern District of

Louisiana to consider the issue have concluded that Congress’s 2011 amendments to §
1441 do not alter the traditional rule that general maritime law claims are not removable
absent an independent basis of federal jurisdiction.47

45 See Ryan v. Hercules, 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 778-80 (S.D. Tex. 2013); see also Langlois v. Kirby Inland
Marine, LP, 139 F. Supp. 3d 804, 809 (M.D. La. 2015) (collecting cases).
46 Sangha v. Navig8 ShipManagement Priv. Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 100 (5th Cir. 2018).
47 See Finney v. Bd. of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans, No. CV 21-1186, 2021 WL 5905642, at *7 n.
96 (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2021) (collecting cases); see also Alexis v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 493 F. Supp. 3d 497,
505 (E.D. La. 2020) (collecting cases).
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Company enunciates two
fundamental principles of admiralty jurisdiction: “(1) that saving [to suitors] clause cases
were not freely cognizable on the law side of federal courts under 28 U.S.C. 1333, and (2)
that saving [to suitors] clause cases were not removable based on the court's original
admiralty jurisdiction alone.”48 Inherent in Romero’s principles are the concepts that §

1333 does not vest the district courts with subject matter jurisdiction to hear general
maritime claims brought at law, and that general maritime claims brought in state court
are necessarily brought at law because suits in admiralty cannot be brought in state
court.49 It thus follows that general maritime claims brought in state court require an
independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction to be removable. As aptly
explained by Judge Duval in Gregoire v. Enterprise Marine Services, LLC,
Maritime claims initiated in state court are, by definition, brought at
common law under the saving to suitors clause as an “exception” to the
original jurisdiction of the federal courts. If state court maritime cases were
removable under Section 1333, the effect would be tantamount to
considering all maritime law claims as part of federal question jurisdiction
under Section 1331, eviscerating the saving to suitors clause and
undermining the holding and policies discussed at length in Romero.50

The Gregoire court concluded that Congress’s 2011 amendments to § 1441 do not alter
the long-standing rule that general maritime law claims are not removable absent some
other, independent basis for federal jurisdiction.51
In the recent case of Alexis v. Hilcorp Energy Co., Judge Ashe considered the 2011
amendments to the removal statute in light of the savings to suitors clause, the history of
maritime removal jurisdiction, and the reasoning employed by other Eastern District of

48 Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
49 See id.
50 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 764 (E.D. La. 2014).
51 Id.
Louisiana judges, and agreed that “the 2011 amendments to § 1441 did not change the
traditional non-removability of general maritime law claims initiated in state court and
that such claims are not removable without an independent basis of subject-matter
jurisdiction.”52 This Court agrees. General maritime law claims brought in state court are
not removable without some other, independent basis for federal subject matter

jurisdiction.
In this case, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under the general maritime law for negligence and
unseaworthiness ordinarily would be removable. In addition, because of the existence of
diversity jurisdiction under § 1332, Plaintiff’s state law claims also would be removable to
federal court under § 1441.53
Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s Jones Act claims are not removable. As mentioned above,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a), Jones Act claims filed in state court are non-removable even
when the parties are completely diverse.54 Kongsberg argues first that the Plaintiff’s Jones
Act claim should be dismissed and the remaining claims should continue in this Court
because Plaintiff is not a seaman and “his Jones Act claim was fraudulently pled to

prevent removal.”55 Ordinarily, the contention by a defendant that a claim or party has
been included in the plaintiff’s complaint merely to frustrate federal jurisdiction arises in
the context of the improper joinder of a non-diverse defendant. In that event, if the non-
diverse defendant is dismissed as improperly joined, complete diversity is restored, and

52 493 F. Supp. 3d 497, 506 (E.D. La. 2020).
53 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
54 See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. 531 U.S. 438, 455 (2001) (stating that “a Jones Act claim . . . is
not subject to removal to federal court even in the event of diversity of the parties.”); see also Gregoire v.
Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 765 (E.D. La. 2014) (recognizing that “Jones Act claims are
not subject to removal, even if the parties are diverse.”)
55 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 23.
the lawsuit may proceed in federal court. But “[t]he improper joinder doctrine is a ‘narrow
exception to the rule of complete diversity, and the burden of persuasion on a party
claiming improper joinder is a heavy one.’”56 This exception is not applicable in this case
as there is complete diversity among the parties, even with the claim against the Jones
Act defendant pending. Furthermore, the exception is inapplicable in this case because

the Jones Act claim is not removable even if there is diversity jurisdiction.57 In reality,
what Kongsberg is asking is for the Court to dismiss the Jones Act claim, even though it
has no effect on the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, and then deny the motion to remand on
the grounds that there is no pending Jones Act claim. This, the Court is not prepared to
do, particularly in light of the early stage of these proceedings. The Court cannot conclude
on the current record that there is no there is no reasonable possibility Plaintiff can
establish he is a seaman.58 The issues regarding Plaintiff’s seaman status are more
properly raised before the state court judge, after the relevant facts have been more fully
explored.
Kongsberg’s second argument is that the Jones Act claim should be severed and
remanded to state court, leaving the general maritime law and state law claims to be

56 Alexis v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 493 F. Supp. 3d 497, 507 (E.D. La. 2020) (citing Campbell v. Stone Ins.,
Inc., 509 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2007)).
57 See Lewis, 531 U.S. at 455; see also Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 765.
58 Kongsberg presents the affidavits of Michael Corso, regional director of Kongsberg, and Bjørn Sjølund,
regional finance and business support manager for Kongsberg’s Americas region, and argues that Plaintiff
spent between 1% and 2% of his overall working time aboard vessels owned or controlled by the Noble
Defendants. See R. Doc. 21 at p. 4. Plaintiff presents his own affidavit and the affidavit of Kenneth Miller, a
former manager at Kongsberg who served as Plaintiff’s supervisor from 2012 to 2019, and argues that
Plaintiff spent a majority of his working time aboard vessels generally. See R. Doc. 20. Neither party
addresses “whether 30% or more of [Plaintiff’s] time was spent on vessels under ownership or control of
ONE common entity,” even if that entity was not one of the Noble Defendants, in light of the “‘long-standing
Fifth Circuit jurisprudence holding that the employer need not be the owner or operator of the group of
vessels.’” Philip v. Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C., 137 F. Supp. 3d 936, 944 (E.D. La. 2015) (quoting
Jenkins v. Aries Marine Corp., 554 F.Supp.2d 635, 640–41 (E.D. La. 2008)). See Alex v. Wild Well Control,
Inc., 2009 WL 1507359 (E.D. La. May 28, 2009); see also Parker v. Jackup Boat Service, LLC, 542
F.Supp.2d 481, 491 (E.D. La. 2008). This, and other factual issues, will be developed in the state court
proceedings.
decided here.59 When the sole basis of the federal district court’s subject matter
jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction, the district court cannot engage in a partial remand.
Under § 1441(c), when a civil action includes “a claim arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States (within the meaning of section 1331 of [title 28])”60 and “a
claim not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the district court or a claim

that has been made nonremovable by statute,”61 the district court must sever from the
action all non-removable claims and remand them to state court, while retaining the
federal question claims.62 While section 1441(c) “provides for a procedure by which
actions including both a Jones Act claim and a federal question claim may be removed,
subject to severance and remand of the Jones Act claim,” this statute “appl[ies] only
where the otherwise removable claim is one that falls within the federal question
jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”63 Accordingly, because district courts may
undertake a piecemeal remand of certain claims only when removal jurisdiction is based
upon § 1331, courts “cannot resort to a partial remand of an action that is properly before
the court on diversity jurisdiction.”64
In this case, although diversity jurisdiction exists, the Plaintiff’s state court petition

includes a Jones Act claim, which has been made nonremovable by statute. Accordingly,
as the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is based on complete diversity, the Court cannot
sever and remand the Jones Act claim while retaining the general maritime law and state

59 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 24.
60 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(1)(A).
61 Id. § 1441(c)(1)(B).
62 Id. § 1441(c)(1)–(2).
63 Rawls v. Phillips 66 Co., No. CIV.A. 14-602, 2014 WL 2003104, at *1 (E.D. La. May 15, 2014).
64 Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 43 F.Supp.2d 734, 743–44 (E.D.Tex.1999). See also
Taylor v. L&P Bldg. Supply of Las Cruces, Inc., No. CIV 14-0989 JB/CG, 2015 WL 7803614, at *12 (D.N.M.
Oct. 27, 2015); Bohanna v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 848 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1013 (W.D.Mo.2012);
RK Dixon Co. v. Dealer Mktg. Servs., 284 F.Supp.2d 1204, 1212–13 (S.D.Iowa 2003).
law claims. With respect to remanding claims in diversity cases, the proposition is all or
nothing—and in this case, the Court must remand the entire action and all claims asserted
therein.
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Dale Willison’s motion to remand® is
GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th day of February, 2022.
ett AUR
SUSIE MOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

65 R. Doc. 6.
13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10187495. Public record. Not legal advice.