# Okeke v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · June 26, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10186815

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** June 26, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10186815

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DR. OCHEOWELLE OKEKE, CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff

VERSUS NO. 20-450

ADMINISTRATORS OF THE SECTION: “E”
TULANE EDUCATIONAL FUND,
Defendant

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant The
Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund (“Tulane”) on Plaintiff’s disparate impact
race and sex discrimination claim.1
For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.
STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”2 “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.”3
When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the
evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”4 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.5
There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most

1 R. Doc. 70. Plaintiff filed an Opposition. R. Doc. 74. Tulane filed a reply. R. Doc. 76.
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
3 DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005).
4 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008); See also
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000).
5 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving
party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.6
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of
persuasion at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would
‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’”7 If the moving
party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be denied. If the moving party
successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving
party to direct the Court’s attention to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the

record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material
fact does indeed exist.8
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden
of persuasion at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of production by either (1)
submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmovant’s
claim, or (2) demonstrating there is no evidence in the record to establish an essential
element of the nonmovant’s claim.9 When proceeding under the first option, if the
nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to dispute the movant’s contention
that there are no disputed facts, a trial would be useless, and the moving party is entitled

6 Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002).
7 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263–64 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co.
v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)).
8 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–24.
9 Id. at 331–32 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also St. Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987)
(citing Justice Brennan’s statement of the summary judgment standard in Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–24, and
requiring the Movers to submit affirmative evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmovant’s
claim or, alternatively, demonstrate the nonmovant’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential
element); Fano v. O’Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1266 (citing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Celotex, and requiring
the movant to make an affirmative presentation to negate the nonmovant’s claims on summary judgment);
10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§2727.1 (2016) (“Although the Court issued a five-to-four decision, the majority and dissent both agreed as
to how the summary-judgment burden of proof operates; they disagreed as to how the standard was applied
to the facts of the case.” (internal citations omitted)).
to summary judgment as a matter of law.10 When, however, the movant is proceeding
under the second option and is seeking summary judgment on the ground that the
nonmovant has no evidence to establish an essential element of the claim, the nonmoving
party may defeat a motion for summary judgment by “calling the Court’s attention to
supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the moving
party.”11 Under either scenario, the burden then shifts back to the movant to demonstrate
the inadequacy of the evidence relied upon by the nonmovant.12 If the movant meets this
burden, “the burden of production shifts [back again] to the nonmoving party, who must

either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving party’s papers, (2) produce
additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial as provided in Rule
56(e), or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided
in Rule 56(f).”13 “Summary judgment should be granted if the nonmoving party fails to
respond in one or more of these ways, or if, after the nonmoving party responds, the court
determines that the moving party has met its ultimate burden of persuading the court that
there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial.”14
“[U]nsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence.
The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the
record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her

10 First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986).
11 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332–33.
12 Id.
13 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332–33, 333 n.3.
14 Id.; See also First National Bank of Arizona, 391 U.S. at 289.
claim. ‘Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record
in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.’”15
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
On November 11, 2019, Plaintiff received a notice of right to sue from the EEOC.16
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Tulane argues Plaintiff failed to administratively
exhaust her disparate impact claim related to hospital shift scheduling.17 Tulane argues
Plaintiff “waived this claim by not preserving it in an EEOC Charge.”18 Tulane states that

the “only possible disparate impact claim that Plaintiff administratively exhausted would
involve her Charge allegation that ‘Dr. Wiese used a program for recruiting people into
the Med-Peds program that created a disparate impact on minority students.’”19 Tulane
argues this claim of disparate impact in recruiting is “not remotely related to the hospital
shift scheduling process,” which Plaintiff now argues created a disparate impact.20 Tulane
argues Plaintiff’s claim regarding disparate impact in hospital shift scheduling is “a wholly
new disparate impact claim that [Plaintiff] never preserved at the EEOC stage.”21
Plaintiff argues she sufficiently exhausted her administrative remedies.22 In her
Opposition to Tulane’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff states the EEOC Charge
contains “both a factual basis and specifically alleges a disparate impact claim,” and that
“[t]he facts set forth in the EEOC Charge indicate more than one claim for disparate

15 Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Forsyth
v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) and quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915–
16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).
16 R. Doc. 30 at ¶ 9.
17 R. Doc. 70-1 at p. 10.
18 Id.
19 Id. at p. 11.
20 Id. R. Doc. 74 pp. 12–24.
21 R. Doc. 70-1 at p. 10.
22 R. Doc. 74 at p. 6.
impact.”23 Plaintiff argues her EEOC Charge set forth complaints “about the scheduling
practices of Tulane, which disproportionately negatively affected female and minority
residents.”24 Plaintiff argues
The Court need not look that far beyond the actual statements in the four
corners of the EEOC Charge as facts regarding the employment practices
including unfair schedules, disproportionate work schedules, interference
with graduation requirements, and the ATLAS recruiting tools and how they
disproportionately affect minorities are specifically stated in the EEOC
Charge and repeated in the Complaint and the Amended Complaint.
However, even assuming that the facts are not by themselves sufficient, the
facts given are sufficient to suggest a claim of disparate impact that can
“grow out” of those facts.25

Plaintiff specifically points to the following language in her EEOC Charge, which
she argues contains a factual basis for a claim of disparate impact in scheduling:
Dr. Wiese limited the Charging Parties' ability to complete the core program
requirements established by the Accreditation Council for Graduate
Medical Education (ACGME), by unfairly scheduling female and minority
residents, by giving them excessively high-service-demand rotations and by
then restricting their ability to make reasonable adjustments to those
schedules. Dr. Wiese unfairly scheduled the Charging Parties (minority
residents) to disproportionate and inflexible work schedules, compared to
their non-minority counterparts. Despite repeated and specific requests to
correct these schedules, the Internal Medicine Department continues to
violate the requirements of ACGME and the university's agreement to
provide adequate and appropriate residency training.

Further, Dr. Wiese responded to a Town Hall Meeting request in a
discriminatory manner; used a program for recruiting people into the Med-
Peds program that created a disparate impact on minority students; denied
a recruiting request to fill two vacant Med-Peds positions; and
demonstrates a trend of undermining the authority of female residents.

The Charging Parties assert that the leadership of the Internal Medicine
program has ignored their repeated requests to address the culture of
inappropriate behavior that has had a disparate impact on minority
students. Dr. Wiese, as head of the Internal Medicine Program, directly
fostered this unjust work environment for residents of color, relating to
meeting their core requirements for graduation, work schedules meeting

23 Id.
24 Id. at p. 2.
25 Id. at p. 8.
professional and personal needs, and receiving an educational and work
experience free of marginalization and explicit bias. Nonminority residents
are not subjected to these issues.26

A complainant must file a timely charge with the EEOC or other state or local
agency prior to commencing a civil action in federal court under Title VII.27 In deciding
whether an EEOC Charge exhausts a particular claim, the EEOC Charge is to be construed
broadly, as Title VII “was designed to protect the many who are unlettered and
unschooled in the nuances of literary draftsmanship.”28 While the Court may construe a
Charge broadly, the Court will only find that a Charge exhausts a claim when the claim
could “reasonably be expected to grow out of the Charge of discrimination.”29 An
employee may file a civil action “not only upon the specific complaints made by the
employee’s initial EEOC charge, but also upon any kind of discrimination like or related
to the Charge’s allegations, limited only by the scope of the EEOC investigation that could
reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial charges of discrimination.”30
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that, although she apparently was represented by
counsel at the time, her EEOC charge is interpreted broadly enough to exhaust her claim
of disparate impact in shift scheduling. First, the Charge specifically mentions that female
and Black residents have suffered disparate impacts as a result of work scheduling.31
Additionally, even if the language of the charge were not specific enough, a claim of
disparate impact in shift scheduling can reasonably be expected to grow out from the

26 Id. at p. 6; R. Doc. 74-2.
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012).
28 McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands,
Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 465 (5th Cir. 1970)).
29 Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 465 (5th Cir. 1970)
30 Fellows v. Universal Rests., Inc., 701 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1983).
31 R. Doc. 74 at p. 6; R. Doc. 74-4 at p. 2.
Charge’s factual assertions regarding disparities and unfairness in shift scheduling.32 The
EEOC Charge is sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.
Nevertheless, even though Plaintiff properly exhausted her administrative
remedies on her disparate impact claim relating to hospital shift scheduling, the Court
finds Plaintiff cannot succeed on her disparate impact claim. Plaintiff failed to specifically
identify a particular, facially neutral policy or practice that had a causal relationship to a
disparate impact on minority female residents.
II. Summary Judgment is Granted on Plaintiff’s Title VII Disparate
Impact Sex and Race Employment Discrimination Claims.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment,
including both disparate treatment discrimination and disparate impact discrimination.33
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of disparate impact employment
discrimination under Title VII only if she demonstrates that her employer uses “a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”34 In order to demonstrate that a particular

employment practice causes a disparate impact, the plaintiff must “demonstrate that each
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact.”35
Hence, to establish a prima facie disparate impact claim, the plaintiff must identify
the following three elements: (1) a specific, facially neutral policy or practice of the
employer; (2) a disparate, adverse effect on a protected group; and (3) a causal nexus
between the adverse effect and the policy or practice.36 “Plaintiffs alleging a Title VII

32 Id.
33 See id. § 2000e-2(a).
34 Id. § (k)(1)(A)(i). (emphasis added)
35 Id. § (k)(1)(B)(i).
36 Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 799–800 (5th Cir. 1982).
disparate impact claim must identify specific practices as being responsible for any
observed disparities,” and also must “conduct a systemic analysis of those employment
practices in order to establish their case.”37 The particularity requirement of the disparate
impact theory of liability imposes on a plaintiff an obligation to “isolate and identify,” a
specific employment practice allegedly responsible for the complained-of disparity.38 As
discussed below, Plaintiff has failed to isolate and identify a particular employment
practice responsible for the alleged disparity. As a result, Plaintiff cannot establish the
first element of her prima facie case of disparate impact employment discrimination, and

her claim must fail.
The basis of Plaintiff’s disparate impact claim is that Tulane’s hospital shift
scheduling for residents “disproportionately negatively affected female and minority”
resident physicians at Tulane.39 Plaintiff argues that Black female residents
disproportionately experienced “harder rotations, lack of important training required for
graduation, and changes in employment conditions while rotating through Internal
Medicine.”40 Plaintiff’s burden, however, goes beyond pointing to alleged disparities—
“[t]he plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employment practice that is
challenged.”41
In her Opposition, Plaintiff argues she identified employment practices in her
Complaint that caused disparate impacts on the protected group.42 Plaintiff points to the

allegations in her complaint that

37 Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 2000).
38 Johnson v. Uncle Ben’s, Inc., 965 F2d 1363, cert denied, 511 U.S. 1068.
39 R. Doc. 74 at p. 2.
40 Id. at p. 4.
41 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
42 R. Doc. 74 at p. 11.
[a]t the end of the academic year, residents in their second, third and fourth
years in the Pediatric and the Internal Medicine residency programs meet
and prepare a template for their proposed upcoming schedules for the
Pediatric part and the Internal Medicine part.

After the schedule template is prepared, the Chiefs and Program Director
for the Pediatric Program send the proposed Pediatric schedule to the Med-
Peds Program Director to approve and/or amend their schedule to meet the
ACGME requirements.

However, at all times relevant hereto, the Internal Medicine Program Chiefs
and Dr. Wiese refused to send the proposed Internal Medicine schedule to
Med-Peds Program Director Dr. Dennar to approve and/or amend the
internal medicine portion of the schedule.43

Additionally, in her Opposition, Plaintiff points to the following as examples of
employment practices or policies:
Dr. Wiese’s actions as DIO and Program Director of Internal Medicine,
regarding how he subjectively chose to modify the residents’ schedule which
ultimately impacted ‘other minority female residents.’ Further . . . practices
include decisions made regarding which residents get certain rotations and
electives[,] decisions regarding which residents get Emergency Department
rotations, and decisions regarding which rotations substituted for
Emergency Department rotations-all of which affected minority residents
disproportionately.44

Plaintiff also argues in her Opposition that
Dr. Dennar’s authority to approve Med-peds program schedules for
residents was taken [by Dr. Wiese and] . . . [w]hether this ‘subjective’
interference with Dr. Dennar’s scheduling authority and her management
of residents was actually neutral or ‘facially’ neutral (i.e. hidden
discrimination), the fact remains, these employment practices caused
disparate results on minority female residents.45

None of the above described acts, however, is a policy or practice for purposes of
establishing a prima facie disparate impact claim under Title VII. Examples of policies or
practices cited in past disparate impact cases include high school diploma requirements,46

43 R. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 28–30.
44 R. Doc. 74 at p. 12.
45 Id. at p. 14.
46 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
written aptitude tests,47 written test of verbal skills,48 a brief interview,49 nepotism,50 or
height and weight requirements.51 Rather than isolating identified and particular
employment practices, Plaintiff launches a broad-based claim against the cumulative
effect of Tulane’s hospital shift scheduling. Plaintiff’s claim must fail because the
disparate impact employment discrimination theory is not “the appropriate vehicle from
which to lodge a wide-ranging attack on the cumulative effect of a company’s employment
practices.”52
Plaintiff points to the exception in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(B)(i) which provides

“if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of [the
employer’s] decision making process are not capable of separation for analysis, the
decision making process may be analyzed as one employment practice.”53 Plaintiff argues
that “all of these various employment practices must be taken as one practice . . . [b]ecause
several decisions were made without objective criteria.”54 Plaintiff cannot rely on this
exception because she has not specifically identified particular, facially neutral policies or
practices and, as a result, has not “demonstrated to the [C]ourt that the elements of [the
employer’s] decision making process are not capable of separation for analysis.”55
Plaintiff argues a combination of “objective” and “subjective” practices are
responsible for the alleged disparities in scheduling experienced by the protected group.56
Prior to its decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, the Supreme Court applied

47 Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
48 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
49 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988).
50 Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 1477 (1987).
51 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1988).
52 Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 799–800 (5th Cir. 1982).
53 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(B)(i)).
54 R. Doc. 74 at pp. 15–16.
55 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(B)(i).
56 R. Doc. 74 at p. 12.
the disparate impact theory to review employment decisions based on the use of
standardized tests and other objective criteria,57 and applied the “conventional disparate
treatment theory . . . to review hiring and promotion decisions that were based on the
exercise of personal judgment or the application of inherently subjective criteria.”58 In
Watson, however, the Supreme Court held “subjective or discretionary employment
practices may be analyzed under the disparate impact approach in appropriate cases.”59
As the Supreme Court expressly recognized in Watson, however, “[e]specially in
cases where an employer combines subjective criteria with the use of [objective criteria],

the plaintiff is . . . responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.”60 The
problem remains that Plaintiff has failed to isolate and identify specific employment
practices, and labeling such practices as “subjective” and “objective,” without actually
identifying the practices, cannot save Plaintiff’s claim from its deficiencies. Plaintiff still
has not identified specific, particularized practices whether objective or subjective.
Furthermore, Plaintiff did not establish the existence of the other two elements
necessary to make out a prima facie disparate impact claim—namely, disparate effects
and causation.
In her opposition, Plaintiff argues a disparate effect on members of a protected
group existed because “Dr. Okeke and black women rotating through Internal Medicine

had harder rotation schedules than white males rotating through the Internal Medicine

57 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988). See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
58 Watson, 487 U.S. at 988. (emphasis added)
59 Id. at 991.
60 Id. at 994.
program as proven by the ‘AMION’ schedules and that they received more difficult
rotations . . . than whites and received less time to take electives.”61
Proving the disparate effect element of a prima facie disparate impact case
“typically requires establishing that the practice or policy had a statistically significant
adverse impact on the protected class.”62 In Munoz v. Orr, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal observed that “claims of disparate impact under Title VII must, of necessity, rely
heavily on statistical proof.”63
In her Opposition, as proof of a disparate effect, Plaintiff asks the Court to consider,

inter alia, “Dr. Dennar’s analysis of the schedules” of her Black female Med-Peds
residents compared with the schedules of white male Internal Medicine residents, as well
as Plaintiff’s own statistical calculations “regarding the schedules for all residents under
Dr. Wiese.”64 The evidence Plaintiff asks the Court to consider as proof of a disparate
effect is not competent summary judgment evidence for several reasons.
First, Plaintiff’s “statistical calculations” were untimely submitted.65 The
scheduling order provides that all discovery shall be completed in this matter by
December 15, 2020.66 This statistical calculations were first submitted into the record on
January 19, 2021, as part of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Tulane’s first motion for Summary
Judgment.67 In addition, Plaintiff did not list her statistical calculations as an exhibit on
her exhibit list or her amended exhibit list.68 There is no indication that this document

61 R. Doc. 74 at p. 17.
62 Canada v. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 766 F. App’x 74, 78 (5th Cir. 2019).
63 200 F.3d 291, 300 (5th Cir. 2000).
64 R. Doc. 74 at p. 20 (citing to R. Doc 74-9 for Dr. Dennar’s analysis and to R. Doc. 55-11 for Plaintiff’s
analysis and graphs).
65 See R. Doc. 55-11.
66 R. Doc. 17 at p. 9. See R. Doc. 17-1 at p. 3 (stating that “all discovery shall be completed not later than
December 15, 2020.”).
67 See R. Doc. 55-11.
68 See R. Docs. 37, 46.
was produced to Tulane before it was attached to her Opposition to Tulane’s first motion
for summary judgment.69 Dr. Dennar’s analysis was listed on Plaintiff’s amended exhibit
list.70 Although discovery was complete on December, 15, 2020, Dr. Dennar’s analysis was
produced on December 22, 2020; however, that delay is not material. Dr. Dennar was
listed on Plaintiff’s witness but there is no indication that Dr. Dennar would testify as an
expert statistician.71 Tulane’s statement of uncontested material facts reflects that
Plaintiff did not identify any expert witness,72 and Plaintiff did not deny or contest that
she did not identify any expert witness.73

Second, the analyses of the schedules relied upon by Plaintiff was conducted by
Plaintiff and by Dr. Dennar. These analyses are unreliable. Plaintiff did not retain an
expert statistician to analyze the schedules and identify and explain the alleged
disparities.74 Plaintiff instead attached the AMION schedules, analyzed them herself, and
made conclusory assertions about what the schedules prove—as she argues, that there
was a disparate effect on Black women.75 Similarly, Plaintiff relies on analysis conducted
by Dr. Dennar, who “compared the schedules of her black female residents on Internal
Medicine rotations with white male residents in Internal Medicine,” as measured against
the “standard amount of time” for inpatient wards, subspeciality time, and elective time
for both Med-Peds residents and categorical Internal Medicine residents.76 Dr. Dennar
analyzed this data herself and concludes female Med-Peds residents of color “received

higher than standard wards as compared to their white male counterparts,” and “received

69 R. Doc. 55-11.
70 R. Doc. 46 at p. 5.
71 See R. Doc. 37.
72 R. Doc. 70-2 at ¶ 12.
73 R. Doc. 74-1 at ¶ 12.
74 R. Doc. 37 (Plaintiff’s Witness List).
75 R. Doc. 74 at pp. 17-19.
76 See R. Doc. 74-9.
lower than the standard required weeks of subspeciality and elective time in comparison
to their white male counterparts.”77
It is not at all clear the data and the analyses of the data—conducted by Plaintiff
and Dr. Dennar—proves what Plaintiff and Dr. Dennar assert it proves.78 This is largely
because, as explained above, Plaintiff failed to retain an expert to conduct the analysis of
the schedules and draw the comparisons between the schedules of the female Med Peds
residents of color and the white male Internal Medicine residents. Plaintiff and Dr.
Dennar are physicians—not statisticians—and they are not qualified to make these data

analyses and data comparisons on their own. Plaintiff and Dr. Dennar “cannot draw
statistical inferences from data because [they are] not an expert[s].”79 The data analyses
conducted by Plaintiff and by Dr. Dennar are unreliable. Plaintiff has not shown that a
practice or policy had a statistically significant adverse impact on a protected class.
In order to establish the causation element a plaintiff typically “must offer
statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question
has caused the [disparate effect]” on members of a protected group.80 In her Opposition,
Plaintiff argues that “[b]ut for these employment practices, Dr. Okeke and minority
women residents would not have been impacted with less opportunities than white male
residents for elective and more ward rotations.”81 “[N]ormally a plaintiff must provide
comparative statistical evidence demonstrating a disparity in impact of a particular

77 Id.
78 See R. Doc. 74 at pp. 17–19; See also R. Doc. 74-9 at p. 4.
79 Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 2000).
80 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
81 R. Doc. 74 at p. 21.
policy” to show the policy predictably results in discrimination and does not “merely raise
an inference of discriminatory impact.”82
Plaintiff relies on Garcia v. Women’s Hospital of Texas, in which the Fifth Circuit
noted that a disparate impact plaintiff can prove causation without statistical evidence
when the plaintiff can show that the challenged practice would disproportionately impact
all or substantially all members of the protected class.83 In her Opposition, Plaintiff
focuses on the effects of the work schedules on black female Med-Peds residents rotating
through Internal Medicine. Plaintiff has focused on a small, selective group, and has

presented no evidence that all Black people or all women would be disparately impacted.84
Garcia does not apply.85 Accordingly, Plaintiff must rely on statistical evidence, and
statistical analyses and comparisons. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s statistical evidence
and statistical analyses are not admissible because they were, for the most past, untimely
produced and have not been shown to be reliable.
Even more fundamental is the fact that Plaintiff faces an insurmountable hurdle in
proving causation because “a disparate impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity
must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies that cause the
disparity.”86 Because Plaintiff failed to a identify a specific, particular facially neutral

82 Treece et al. v. Perrier Condo, Owners Assoc., Inc., et al., 2020 WL 759567 (E.D.La. Feb. 14, 2020)
83 97 F.3d 810, 813 (5th Cir. 1996).
84 R. Doc. 74 at pp. 16–17 (arguing that the ‘employment practices by Dr. Weise’ “disproportionately affected
black women who were . . . rotating through their Internal Medicines schedules within their Med-Peds
program . . . .”). See id. at pp. 17-19 (Plaintiff’s own statistical analyses of the schedules focusing solely on
black female Med-Peds residents rotating through Internal Medicine).
85 R. Doc. 74 at pp. 16–17 (arguing that the ‘employment practices by Dr. Weise’ “disproportionately affected
black women who were . . . rotating through their Internal Medicines schedules within their Med-Peds
program . . . .”). See id. at pp. 17-19 (Plaintiff’s own statistical analyses of the schedules focusing solely on
black female Med-Peds residents rotating through Internal Medicine).
86 Texas Dept. of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 542
(2015).
employment practice, and failed to provide evidence of a disparate effect, Plaintiff clearly
cannot prove a causal relationship between the two.87
Even considering the facts alleged by Plaintiff to be true, Defendants are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment by The
Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund is GRANTED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 26th day of June, 2021.

SUSIE oat
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

87 In fact, in her Opposition, Plaintiff states that a “racially motivated power struggle between program
directors caused disproportionately harder rotations.” R. Doc. 74 at pp. 4, 5, 14. This is not a facially neutral
employment policy or practice for purposes of a disparate impact claim.
16

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10186815. Public record. Not legal advice.