# Baqer v. St. Tammany Parish Government

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · April 23, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10186575

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** April 23, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10186575

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that grievance procedures were available where inmate “could have discovered” deadline for filing a formal complaint

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

AHMED BAQER, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 20-980-WBV-JCW

ST. TAMMANY PARISH GOVERNMENT, ET AL. SECTION: D (2)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion For Summary Judgment, filed by defendants,
Randy Smith, Lacey Kelly, Rodney J. Strain and Greg Longino.1 The Motion is
opposed,2 and Defendants have filed a Reply.3 After careful consideration of the
parties’ memoranda and the applicable law, the Motion is GRANTED and Klabert
Guillot, Jr.’s claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4
This is an action for declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief regarding
the conditions of pre-trial detention in the four holding cells at St. Tammany Parish
Jail. On March 22, 2020, Ahmed Baqer, Klabert Joseph Guillot, Jr. and Klabert
Joseph Guillot, Sr. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed a Complaint seeking damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that they were forced to endure prolonged pre-trial
detainment in dirty, cramped holding cells in St. Tammany Parish Jail (sometimes
referred to as “the jail”) in violation of their constitutional rights under the

1 R. Doc. 111.
2 R. Doc. 117.
3 R. Doc. 122.
4 The Court has set forth the factual and procedural background of this matter in great detail in several
prior Orders and, for the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here. See, R. Docs. 40, 149, 150.
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.5 Although Plaintiffs
named several entities and individuals as defendants in the Complaint,6 the only
remaining defendants are: (1) Randy Smith, in his individual and official capacity as

the Sheriff of St. Tammany Parish from July 1, 2016 to the present (“Sheriff Smith”);
and (2) Lacey Kelly, in her individual and official capacity as Warden of the St.
Tammany Parish Jail “[a]t all relevant times” (“Warden Kelly”).7
On October 7, 2020, Sheriff Smith, Warden Kelly, Strain and Longino
(collectively, “Defendants”), filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgement,
asserting that there is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff, Klabert Joseph

Guillot, Jr. (“Guillot, Jr.”), failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing
this suit.8 Defendants claim that during the April 10, 2020 hearing on Plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Guillot, Jr. testified that he had not exhausted his
administrative remedies at St. Tammany Parish Jail prior to filing this suit.9
Defendants point out that Warden Kelly has confirmed that Guillot, Jr. never
initiated any administrative remedies regarding any conditions of confinement prior
to filing this litigation.10 Defendants assert that, “No action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions . . . or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as

5 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 118-129.
6 Id. at Introductory Paragraph and ¶¶ 12-23.
7 Id. at ¶¶ 15-23. On March 22, 2021, the Court dismissed the claims asserted against defendants,
Rodney J. Strain and Greg Longino, in their individual and official capacities. See, R. Doc. 149.
8 R. Doc. 111.
9 R. Doc. 111-2 (citing R. Doc. 38; R. Doc. 40 at p. 25; R. Doc. 44 at pp. 83-84).
10 R. Doc. 111-2 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 37-1 at p. 4).
are available are exhausted.”11 Defendants claim that the requirement that a
prisoner exhaust all administrative remedies prior to suit is both mandatory and non-
discretionary.12 Defendants contend that this limitation is an attempt to eliminate

federal court interference in the running of the administration of prisons and to allow
the prisons an opportunity to deal with complaints before they proceed to court.13
Relying upon Guillot, Jr.’s testimony and the Affidavit previously submitted by
Warden Kelly, Defendants argue that no trier of fact could find a genuine dispute as
to any material facts regarding Guillot, Jr.’s failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies.14 As such, Defendants assert that Guillot, Jr.’s claims must be dismissed.

Plaintiffs oppose the Motion, asserting that it should be denied because
Defendants have failed to show that the administrative procedure was available to
Guillot, Jr.15 According to Plaintiffs, Defendants claim that the Administrative
Remedy Procedure (“ARP”) for the jail is included in an Inmate Handbook and made
available to inmates through each dormitory’s computer.16 Relying exclusively upon
a sworn declaration from Guillot, Jr., Plaintiffs assert that Guillot, Jr. was housed in
the holding cells at St. Tammany Parish Jail from December 18, 2019 through

January 3, 2020, during which time he was never advised that a computer existed or
that he had access to a computer.17 Plaintiffs point out that the grievance procedure

11 R. Doc. 111-2 at p. 4 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12 R. Doc. 111-2 at p. 4 (citing Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 2012)).
13 R. Doc. 111-2 at p. 4 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368
(2006)).
14 R. Doc. 111-2 at p. 4.
15 R. Doc. 117.
16 Id. at p. 1 (citing 117-2 at ¶ 9); See, R. Doc. 37-1 at ¶ 14.
17 R. Doc. 117 at pp. 1-2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 10).
is only available to an inmate for up to 90 days after an incident occurs and that
Guillot, Jr. testified during an April 2020 preliminary injunction hearing that he did
not know what a grievance was or that the jail had a grievance procedure.18

Plaintiffs assert that, “A short time after the preliminary injunction hearing,
Guillot, Jr. discovered a new orientation video that had been placed on the dormitory
computer (in his new housing unit) for inmates to review.”19 Plaintiffs claim that the
video discussed highlights from the Inmate Handbook, which first put Guillot, Jr. on
notice that the ARP existed.20 Plaintiffs further assert that Guillot, Jr. does not recall
anyone ever providing him with a copy of, or informing him of the existence of, an

Inmate Handbook and/or the existence of an ARP.21 Plaintiffs claim that while
Guillot, Jr. was housed in the holding cells, inmates were told to raise any complaints
about their living conditions to a supervisor, but that supervisors simply ignored their
complaints.22 Plaintiffs claim that no deputy or supervisor ever told Guillot, Jr. that
he needed to follow an administrative procedure to raise a complaint about the
condition of the holding cells.
Plaintiffs contend that by the time Guillot, Jr. learned of the existence of the

grievance procedure, over 90 days had passed since he had last been housed in the
holding cells.23 Plaintiffs assert that, as explained in the orientation video, a
grievance must be filed within 90 days, otherwise it will be rejected as untimely.24

18 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶¶ 12-14).
19 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 15).
20 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 16).
21 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 17).
22 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶¶ 18-19).
23 R. Doc. 117 at p. 3 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 21).
24 R. Doc. 117 at p. 3 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 22).
Plaintiffs claim that Guillot, Jr. never filed a grievance regarding the conditions of
the holding cells because it would have been untimely. Plaintiffs assert that if
Defendants had informed Guillot, Jr. of the grievance procedure before the 90 days

had passed, Guillot, Jr. would have filed a timely grievance.
Plaintiffs argue that although Defendants bear the burden of proof on their
summary judgment motion, Defendants have failed to provide any evidence that
Guillot, Jr.: (1) was informed that the ARP existed; (2) was provided with a copy of
the ARP; (3) was informed that the dormitory where he was housed had a kiosk/tablet
computer; (4) knew that the ARP could be located on the dormitory kiosk/tablet

computer; (5) knew that he had access to the dormitory kiosk/tablet computer; (6)
actually had access to the dormitory’s kiosk/tablet computer; or (7) notified of the ARP
and what it required through any other means.25 Plaintiffs contend that no such
evidence exists. Plaintiffs argue the Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied
because Defendants have failed to produce any evidence that the administrative
procedure was available to Guillot, Jr., and Plaintiffs have produced evidence that
the procedure was not available to him. Plaintiffs contend that by failing to inform

Guillot, Jr. of the administrative procedure until after the 90-day deadline had
expired, there was no way for Guillot, Jr. to properly exhaust his administrative
remedies.26

25 R. Doc. 117 at pp. 5-6.
26 R. Doc. 117 at p. 6.
In response, Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted because
the administrative procedure was available to Guillot, Jr.27 Relying upon several
Fifth Circuit opinions, Defendants argue that a grievance procedure is not

unavailable merely because the prisoner did not know about it if the prisoner has a
“fair, reasonable” opportunity to learn about its existence, and that ignorance of the
law does not excuse a prisoner of his obligation to exhaust his administrative
remedies.28 Defendants argue that the grievance procedures of the St. Tammany
Parish Jail were available to Guillot, Jr. because they are contained in the Inmate
Handbook, which is available to all inmates through kiosks or tablet computers.29

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to put forth any evidence that the
kiosks and/or tablet computers either did not contain the Inmate Handbook or that
the kiosks and/or tablet computers were not functioning property. Defendants point
out that Guillot, Jr. readily admits that he had access to a working computer during
his incarceration and that he knew how to use it.30 Defendants claim that Guillot,
Jr. had full access to all of the information he needed to learn about the grievance
process and, therefore, the grievance process was available to him. Defendants assert

that the statements in Guillot, Jr.’s declaration regarding his lack of knowledge about

27 R. Doc. 122.
28 Id. at pp. 1-2 (quoting Davis v. Hernandez, 798 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 2015)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See, Thomas v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Civ. A. No. CV05-1222, 2006 WL 3861962
(W.D. La. Dec. 13, 2006); Castro v. Crawfoot, 102 Fed.Appx. 852 (5th Cir. 2004); Gonzalez v. Crawford,
419 Fed.Appx. 522 (5th Cir. 2011); Huff v. Neal, 555 Fed.Appx. 289 (5th Cir. 2014).
29 R. Doc. 122 at p. 2 (citing R.Doc. 37-1 at ¶ 14).
30 R. Doc. 122 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 12).
the grievance procedure amount to an unsupported denial and should not be relied
upon to defeat summary judgment.31
Defendants further point out that Guillot, Jr. was booked into the St.

Tammany Parish Jail on December 18, 2019, and filed the Complaint in this case on
March 22, 2020, just 95 days later.32 Defendants contend that the holding cell
conditions complained about in the Complaint – overcrowding, denial of recreational
activity, denial of proper hygiene, being held in intake in excess of 48 hours – would
not have been apparent until at least a few days into Plaintiff’s time at the jail. Thus,
Defendants argue that unless Guillot, Jr. retained counsel only two or three days

prior to filing the Complaint, he would have had the further benefit of counsel within
the 90-day time period within which to file his grievance to advise him of any such
administrative procedures.33 Defendants note that plaintiff, Klabert Joseph Guillot,
Sr. (Guillot, Jr.’s father), initiated and completed the grievance process during his
pretrial detainment at the jail.34 Finally, Defendants point out that the Fifth Circuit
has consistently held that district courts have no discretion to excuse a prisoner’s
failure to properly exhaust the prison grievance process before filing their complaint,

and that a case must be dismissed if available administrative remedies were not
exhausted.35 Defendants argue that because Guillot, Jr. never attempted to initiate
the grievance process, his suit is barred and summary judgment is warranted.

31 R. Doc. 122 at p. 4.
32 R. Doc. 122 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 100).
33 R. Doc. 122 at p. 3.
34 Id.
35 Id. at p. 4 (quoting Ates v. St. Tammany Parish, Civ. A. No. 13-5732, 2014 WL 1457777 (E.D. La.
April 15, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine disputed issue as

to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.36 A party moving for summary judgment must inform the Court of the basis for
the motion and identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, that show that
there is no such genuine issue of material fact.37
If the moving party carries its burden of proof under Rule 56, the opposing

party must direct the Court’s attention to specific evidence in the record which
demonstrates that the non-moving party can satisfy a reasonable jury that it is
entitled to a verdict in its favor.38 This burden is not satisfied by some metaphysical
doubt as to alleged material facts, by unsworn and unsubstantiated assertions, by
conclusory allegations, or by a mere scintilla of evidence.39 Rather, Rule 56 mandates
that summary judgment be entered against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.40 In resolving a motion for
summary judgment, the Court must review the facts and inferences in the light most

36 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986).
37 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.
38 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
39 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
40 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.
favorable to the non-moving party, and the Court may not evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes.41
III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Guillot, Jr.’s
claims because he failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies.

The parties in this case do not dispute the existence of an administrative
grievance process at St. Tammany Parish Jail, or that Guillot, Jr. never initiated a
grievance regarding the conditions of his confinement in the holding cells of the jail
prior to filing this suit. In fact, Plaintiffs readily acknowledge that Guillot, Jr. did
not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the conditions of his pretrial
confinement in the holding cells at St. Tammany Parish Jail. Plaintiffs, however,
argue that Guillot, Jr.’s suit should proceed because the jail’s administrative
remedies were not available to him.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PLRA”), provides that, “No
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”42 The Fifth Circuit has clarified that, “Inmates need not exhaust all
administrative remedies, however, but only those that are ‘available’ to them.”43

41 International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991).
42 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
43 Davis v. Fernandez, 798 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268 (5th
Cir. 2010); Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111
(3d Cir. 2002); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001)).
Further, “Whenever defendants claim a failure to exhaust, they have the burden to
prove that the plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies that were actually
available to him.”44 According to the Fifth Circuit, whether administrative remedies

are “available” is a question of law, but the resolution of that question sometimes
turns on questions of fact.45
The Fifth Circuit has developed “an extensive body of law addressing the
various circumstances that render grievance procedures unavailable within the
meaning of the [PLRA].”46 For instance, the Fifth Circuit has held that grievance
procedures were not “available” to a prisoner when prison authorities refused to

provide the prisoner with the grievance forms needed to exhaust administrative
remedies,47 and where an inmate did not discover his injuries until after he left the
jail.48 The Fifth Circuit has also held that an administrative remedy may be
unavailable if: (1) despite what regulations or materials may promise, prison officials
are unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates; (2) an
administrative scheme is so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable
of use by an ordinary prisoner; or (3) prison administrators thwart inmates from

taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or
intimidation.49

44 Davis, 798 F.3d at 294-95 (citing Cantwell v. Sterling, 788 F.3d 507, 507 (5th Cir. 2015); Dillon,
596 F.3d at 266).
45 Leggett v. Lafayette, 608 Fed.Appx. 187, 190 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Dillon, 596 F.3d at 266).
46 Davis, 798 F.3d at 295.
47 Aceves v. Swanson, 75 Fed.Appx. 295, 295 (5th Cir. 2003)
48 Allard v. Anderson, 260 Fed.Appx. 711, 714 (5th Cir. 2007).
49 Brantner v. Freestone County Sheriffs Office, 776 Fed.Appx. 829, 833 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ross
v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1859-60, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that an inmate’s ignorance of a prison’s
grievance procedures does not excuse his noncompliance.”50 In Leggett v. Lafayette,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, finding, “The

summary-judgment evidence establishes that Leggett had ‘avenues for discovering
the procedural rules governing [his] grievances.’ Thus, even if Leggett was
subjectively unaware of the procedures, the record sets out the substance of those
procedures and indicates that the information was available to Leggett.” 51
Subsequently, in Davis v. Fernandez, the Fifth Circuit held that there are “two oft-
applied and well-established rules of unavailability” that were applicable to the facts

of that case.52 “First, courts may not deem grievance procedures unavailable merely
because an inmate was ignorant of them, so long as the inmate had a fair, reasonable
opportunity to apprise himself of the procedures.”53 The Davis court held that the
undisputed evidence showed that the jail’s grievance procedures were published in
an inmate handbook, which was in the record, and explained on jail television, and
that the inmate did not contend that any circumstances precluded him from accessing
either source. 54 The court concluded that, “[H]is ignorance of the grievance

50 Pratt v. Deville, Civ. A. No. 2016 WL 1602948, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 23, 2016) (citing Aguirre v. Dyer,
233 Fed.Appx. 365 (5th Cir. 2007); Simkins v. Bridges, 350 Fed.Appx. 952, 953-54 (5th Cir. 2009);
Plaisance v. Cain, 374 Fed.Appx. 560, 561 (5th Cir. 2010)). See¸ Davis, 798 F.3d 290; Fisher v. Johnson,
174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999) (“First, ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se
petitioner, generally does not exclude prompt filing.”) (citation omitted).
51608 Fed.Appx. 187, 191 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2010))
(internal citation omitted).
52 798 F.3d at 295.
53 Id. (citing Leggett v. Lafayette, 608 Fed.Appx. 187, 191 (5th Cir. 2015).Plaisance, 374 Fed.Appx. at
561 (“Plaisance’s ignorance of the law does not relieve him of his obligation to comply with procedural
requirements.”)) (emphasis in original).
54 Davis, 798 F.3d at 295.
procedures, without more, is no basis to deem them unavailable.”55 The Davis court
further found the second relevant rule applicable, which is that, “Grievance
procedures are unavailable to an inmate if the correctional facility’s staff misled the

inmate as to the existence or rules of the grievance process so as to cause the inmate
to fail to exhaust such process.”56 Based on the record before it, which included
testimony from the inmate that the jail staff told him the grievance process includes
only a single step and that he did not file an appeal based on that misrepresentation,
the Fifth Circuit held that, “we see no reason that Davis should not be entitled to rely
on the representations of his jailers.”57 As such, the Fifth Circuit held that the second

step of the jail’s grievance process was unavailable to the inmate, that he was not
required to exhaust the unavailable second step, and that the defendants were not
entitled to summary judgment on their exhaustion defense.58
Applying the foregoing authority to the facts of this case, the Court finds that
Defendants have put forth evidence showing that the St. Tammany Parish Jail’s
grievance procedure was available to Guillot, Jr. through kiosks/tablet computers. In
an Affidavit previously filed into the record, Warden Kelly states that the jail’s

grievance process was available to Guillot, Jr. because it was included in the Inmate
Handbook, which “is made available to all inmates through each dormitory’s
kiosk/tablet computer.”59 Warden Kelly further stated in her Affidavit that Guillot,

55 Id.
56 Id. at 295-95 (citing authority) (emphasis in original).
57 Id. at 296.
58 Id.
59 R. Doc. 122 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 37-1 at ¶ 14).
Jr. was removed from the jail’s holding cells on January 3, 2020, and has been
assigned to the C800 housing unit since January 10, 2020.60 Thus, Warden Kelly’s
Affidavit indicates that Guillot, Jr. has had access to a dormitory kiosk/tablet

computer since at least January 20, 2020. Plaintiffs do not dispute this evidence,
other than to assert that when Guillot, Jr. was housed in the holding cells, he was
never advised that a computer existed or that he had access to a computer.61
Plaintiffs, however, fail to direct the Court to any evidence or Fifth Circuit authority
indicating that Guillot, Jr.’s ignorance of the grievance procedure establishes that the
procedure was unavailable to him.

As in Davis, the undisputed evidence before the Court shows that the St.
Tammany Parish Jail’s grievance procedure is included in an Inmate Handbook, a
copy of which is in the record, and is made available to all inmates through each
dormitory’s kiosk/tablet computer. 62 Plaintiffs have not argued that the
kiosks/computers were not available to Guillot, Jr. or that they were not functioning
properly. In fact, the Court finds that the evidence relied upon by Plaintiffs – Guillot,
Jr.’s sworn declaration – shows just the opposite, as Guillot, Jr. confirms that he not

only had access to a dormitory computer during his incarceration, he also knew how
to use it and was able to review an orientation video that discussed highlights from
the Inmate Handbook.63 Further, there is no suggestion that anyone ever misled
Guillot, Jr. about the grievance process or attempted to dissuade him from making

60 R. Doc. 37-1 at ¶ 11.
61 R. Doc. 117 at pp. 1-2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 10) (emphasis added).
62 R. Doc. 37-1 at ¶ 14 & at pp. 17-22.
63 R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 12.
use of it. Plaintiffs allege, generally, that “if inmates had a complaint about the
inhumane living conditions in the holding cells, they were told to take it to ‘rank;’
meaning a supervisor,” and that, “when the complaints were communicated to the

supervisors, the complaints were simply ignored.”64 These allegations, however, do
not suggest that Guillot, Jr. was ever misled by jail officials regarding the existence
or rules of the grievance process or that jail officials “thwarted” his efforts to take
advantage of the grievance process. The Court therefore finds that Guillot, Jr. had a
“fair, reasonable opportunity to apprise himself” of the jail’s grievance process.65
The Court further finds that several unpublished Fifth Circuit opinions

indicate that even if Guillot, Jr. did not receive a hard copy of the Inmate Handbook,
that fact, alone, does not render the St. Tammany Parish Jail’s administrative
grievance procedures unavailable to him.66 In Manemann v. Garrett, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff-prisoner was unaware of the jail’s grievance
policy, but affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies because the record indicated that the jail had a grievance policy and there
was no evidence in the record that the plaintiff “ever asked for information about

filing a grievance and was refused such information or was given incorrect

64 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶¶ 18-19).
65 Davis, 798 F.3d at 295.
66 Leggett v. Lafayette, 608 Fed.Appx. 187, 191 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Manemann v. Garrett, 484
Fed.Appx. 857, 858 (5th Cir. 2012); Huff v. Neal, 555 Fed.Appx. 289, 296 n.5 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding
that grievance procedures were available where inmate “could have discovered” deadline for filing a
formal complaint); Gonzalez v. Crawford, 419 Fed.Appx. 522, 523 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[P]laintiff
prisoner’s] alleged ignorance of the exhaustion requirement, or the fact that he might have
misconstrued the language in the handbook, does not excuse his failure to exhaust.”); Palermo v.
Miller, 196 Fed.Appx. 234, 235 (5th Cir. 2006) (upholding dismissal of prisoner’s § 1983 claim for
failure to exhaust where prisoner mistakenly believed it was unnecessary to file a Step 2 grievance).
information.”67 As such, the Manemann court held that the defendants had met their
burden of showing that a grievance policy existed and that it was accessible to the
plaintiff-prisoner.68 The Fifth Circuit concluded that, “By failing to even inquire

about filing a grievance regarding the denial of his special footwear, Manemann failed
to exhaust his remedies with respect to any claims related to that denial, and those
claims were subject to dismissal.”69 District courts in this Circuit have likewise held
that a prisoner plaintiff must, at the very least, inquire about filing a grievance and
be denied to properly assert that administrative remedies are unavailable.70 Here,
there is no evidence before the Court indicating that Guillot, Jr. ever inquired about

a grievance policy at St. Tammany Parish Jail, or that he was ever refused such
information or given incorrect information by jail staff.
Finally, the Court would be remiss if it did not address Guillot, Jr.’s assertion
that he did not learn about the existence of St. Tammany Parish Jail’s grievance
procedure until after the April 10, 2020 preliminary injunction hearing. In their
Opposition brief, Plaintiffs assert that, “A short time after the preliminary injunction
hearing, Guillot, Jr. discovered a new orientation video that had been placed on the

dormitory computer (in his new housing unit) for inmates to review. The orientation

67 Id. (citing Manemann, 484 Fed.Appx. 857, 858 (5th Cir. 2012)).
68 484 Fed.Appx. at 858.
69 Id. (citing 72 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). See also, Garcia v. Spotts, Civ. A. No. 1:17cv26-LG-RHW, 2019 WL
4454508, at *5 (S.D. Miss. July 30, 2019) (citing Manemann and finding that lack of a copy of the
inmate handbook does not render the ARP process unavailable to an inmate).
70 Davis v. Butler, Civ. A. No. 2:12cv210-MTP, 2014 WL 5502421, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 30, 2014) (citing
Manemann, 484 Fed. Appx. at 858); See also, Bailey v. Anderson, Civ. A. No. 4:13-CV-663-O, 2014 WL
4327917 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2014) (concluding that administrative remedies were available where
plaintiff offered no explanation as to why he could not pursue the remedies while in the prison
hospital).
video discusses highlights from the Inmate Handbook, and for the first time, put
Guillot, Jr. on notice that the Administrative Remedy Procedure existed.”71 Plaintiffs
further assert that, “Prior to discovering the aforementioned orientation video on the

computer, Guillot, Jr. does not recall anyone ever providing him with a copy of, or
informing him of the existence of an Inmate Handbook and/or the existence of an
Administrative Remedy Procedure.”72
The Court finds these assertions suspect in light of the fact that Guillot, Jr.
retained counsel prior to filing the Complaint in this case on March 22, 2021, a mere
95 days after he entered the holding cells at St. Tammany Parish Jail on December

18, 2019.73 However, several of the holding cell conditions complained of in the
Complaint would not have been apparent to Guillot, Jr. for several days. In fact,
Plaintiffs have specifically alleged in the Complaint that, “The Defendants to this
action forced pre-trial detainees to endure days to weeks of prolonged pretrial
detainment in dirty, cramped holding cells, with as many as twenty-four (24)
detainees confined within a ten-foot by twenty-foot space.”74 Thus, unless Guillot, Jr.
did not retain counsel until just a few days before the Complaint was filed, he likely

had the benefit of counsel within the 90-day period for filing a grievance and his
counsel could have advised him of the jail’s grievance procedure. Plaintiffs’ counsel
was no doubt aware of the PLRA’s requirement that a prisoner must exhaust

71 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶¶ 15-16) (emphasis added). See, R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 12-
13.
72 R. Doc. 117 at p. 2 (citing R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 17); See, R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 14.
73 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 100, 104, 107.
74 Id. at ¶ 2 (emphasis added).
administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court when counsel filed the
Complaint in this case. Presumably, counsel would have consulted with Guillot, Jr.
before filing this lawsuit. Further, Guillot, Jr. was expressly asked about St.

Tammany Parish Jail’s grievance procedure during the April 10, 2020 preliminary
injunction hearing. Although Guillot, Jr. testified that he did not know what a
grievance was or that the jail had a grievance process, when Plaintiffs’ counsel
objected to defense counsel’s line of questioning regarding the grievance procedure,
defense counsel explained, “Mr. Guillot, there is testimony in the record already from
the warden that there is an administrative review process for dealing with grievances

filed by inmates.”75 Plaintiffs offer no explanation as to why this line of questioning
did not suffice to make Guillot, Jr. aware of the existence of St. Tammany Parish
Jail’s grievance procedure. As such, the Court questions the veracity of Guillot, Jr.’s
assertion in his Declaration that he first learned about the jail’s grievance procedure
“A short time after the preliminary injunction hearing,” when he accessed a new
orientation video on a dormitory computer.76
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment as to Guillot, Jr.’s claims, which must be dismissed for his
failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion For Summary
Judgment filed by defendants, Randy Smith, Lacey Kelly, Rodney J. Strain and Greg

75 R. Doc. 44 at pp. 83-84.
76 R. Doc. 117-2 at ¶ 12.
Longino,’?7is GRANTED and Klabert Joseph Guillot, Jr.’s claims are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, April 23, 2021.

Ojos iB Vetter
WENDY B./VITTER
United States District Judge

Doe. 111.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10186575. Public record. Not legal advice.