# Pigott v. Heath

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · April 14, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10186552

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** April 14, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10186552

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KENNETH PIGOTT, JR., ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 18-9438

KAYLA HEATH, ET AL. SECTION "F"

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Dehendric Bickham’s motion for partial
summary judgment on causation. For the reasons that follow, the
motion is DENIED.
Background
This personal injury case arises out of a sideswipe collision
between an 18-wheeler and a Buick sedan. The Buick’s driver and
passenger both allege that they suffered injuries due to the
collision.
The collision occurred in the evening on November 5, 2017.
Kayla Heath was driving an 18-wheeler tractor-trailer in the left
lane of Highway 21 in Bogalusa, Louisiana. She was working for
Swift Transportation Company, hauling Wal-Mart grocery products on
1
her regular route from Swift’s Robert, Louisiana terminal. Kenneth
Pigott was driving a 1997 Buick sedan in the right lane, and
Dehendric Bickham was riding along. When Heath changed lanes, she
moved the 18-wheeler into the right lane and struck the Buick.1

At the scene immediately following the accident, Pigott and Bickham
apparently told the police and emergency responders that they were
uninjured and did not need EMT services. Later, however, both
visited the emergency room claiming claim that they had neck and
back pain. This litigation followed.
Pigott and Bickham sued Heath and Swift in state court,
alleging that Heath’s negligence in failing to keep a proper
lookout, improper lane change, and careless operation caused the
collision and that Swift was vicariously liable under a theory of
respondeat superior. Pigott and Bickam allege (and Swift has
stipulated in its answer) that Heath was operating the tractor

trailer in the course and scope of her employment with Swift at
the time of the collision. Heath and Swift timely removed the
case to this Court, invoking the Court’s diversity jurisdiction.2

1 Liability is no longer disputed. The defendants continue to
submit that there was only minor damage to each vehicle from the
sideswipe and both Pigott and Bickham refused medical care at the
scene because they said they were uninjured, whereas the plaintiffs
submit that their car was forced from the roadway and they both
sustained injuries valued at millions of dollars.
2 Pigott and Bickham are citizens of Louisiana. Heath is a citizen
of Mississippi. Swift is a limited liability company with one
2
Pigott and Bickham later amended their complaint.3 The defendants
have since stipulated to liability and motions in limine are
pending for a jury trial recently continued due to the COVID-19

pandemic. The passenger-plaintiff, Dehendric Bickham, claims that
he injured his neck, back, and right rib as a result of the
incident. He now seeks partial summary judgment that his right
rib fracture was caused by the vehicular accident that is the
subject of this lawsuit.

member: a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business
in Arizona.
3 When they moved to amend their complaint, the plaintiffs also
added a claim for punitive damages under Arizona law. But when
Swift appealed the magistrate judge’s ruling permitting the
amendment and moved for partial summary judgment on the punitive
damages claim, the Court granted Swift’s motion for partial summary
judgment (dismissing the punitive damages claim with prejudice),
which mooted the appeal of the magistrate judge’s order allowing
the amendment. See Order and Reasons dtd. 12/16/19. The plaintiffs
also amended their complaint to add claims of direct negligence
against Swift (including claims for negligent hiring, training,
supervision, and entrustment). The Court granted Swift’s motion
for partial summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims
that Swift negligently hired, trained, supervised, and entrusted
Heath. See Order and Reasons dtd. 2/5/20 (joining other federal
district courts making an Erie guess and siding with employer-
defendants and granting the employer-defendant’s motion for
partial summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ direct
negligence claims against because a plaintiff cannot
simultaneously pursue negligence under a theory of respondeat
superior and a direct negligence theory against an employer for
the same incident where, as here, the employer stipulates that the
employee acted in the course and scope of her employment).
3
I.
Summary judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it “might
affect the outcome of the suit.” Id.
The Court emphasizes that the mere argued existence of a
factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion. See id. Nor do “[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable
inferences, and unsupported speculation[.]” Brown v. City of
Houston, Tex., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003); Hathaway v.

Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007)("[T]he nonmoving party
cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations,
unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.").
Therefore, "[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
Summary judgment is also proper if the party opposing the
motion fails to establish an essential element of his case. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also In
re La. Crawfish Producers, 852 F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir.
4
2017)(citation omitted)(If the non-movant will bear the burden of
proof at trial, “the movant may merely point to an absence of
evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of

demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an
issue of material fact warranting trial.”). In this regard, the
non-moving party must do more than simply deny the allegations
raised by the moving party. See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992). Rather, he
must come forward with competent evidence, such as affidavits or
depositions, to buttress his claims. Id. Hearsay evidence and
unsworn documents that cannot be presented in a form that would be
admissible in evidence at trial do not qualify as competent
opposing evidence. Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc.,
819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).
Ultimately, to avoid summary judgment, the non-movant “must go

beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts
indicating a genuine issue for trial.” LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of
Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2007).
In deciding whether a fact issue exists, the Court must view
the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
378 (2007); Midwest Feeders, Inc. v. Bank of Franklin, 886 F.3d
507, 513 (5th Cir. 2018). Although the Court must "resolve factual
5
controversies in favor of the nonmoving party," it must do so "only
where there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties
have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Antoine v. First

Student, Inc., 713 F.3d 824, 830 (5th Cir. 2013)(internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
II.
A.
Where, as here, jurisdiction is based on diversity, the Court
applies the substantive law of the forum, Louisiana. See Boyett v.
Redland Ins. Co., 741 F.3d 604, 607 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Erie

R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
Civil Code Article 2315, Louisiana’s source of negligence
liability, instructs that “[e]very act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315. Taking into account the conduct of
each party and the circumstances of each case, courts employ a
duty-risk analysis to determine whether to impose negligence
liability. Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., 2005-1095, p. 7
(La. 3/10/06); 923 So. 2d 627, 632.
To recover under the duty-risk approach, the plaintiffs must

prove five elements: (1) the defendants had a duty to conform their
conduct to a specific standard; (2) the defendants' conduct failed
6
to conform to the appropriate standard; (3) the defendants'
substandard conduct was cause in fact of the plaintiffs’ injuries;
(4) the defendants' substandard conduct was a legal cause of the

plaintiffs’ injuries; and (5) actual damages. Audler v. CBC
Innovis, Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 249 (5th Cir. 2008)(citation omitted).
If the plaintiffs fail to prove one of these elements, then the
defendants are not liable. Here, the defendants have admitted
that they are 100% at fault for the sideswipe collision. Thus,
only causation and damages remain for trial.
Louisiana law places the burden on the plaintiff to prove
medical causation by a preponderance of the evidence; the test is:
“[w]hether the plaintiff proved through medical testimony that it
is more probable than not that the subsequent injuries were caused

by the accident.” See Maranto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 94-
2603 (La. 2/20/95), 650 So. 2d 757, 759. When the determination
regarding medical causation is not within common knowledge, expert
medical testimony is required. See Pfiffner v. Correa, 94-0924
(La. 10/17/94), 643 So. 2d 1228, 1234-35. A plaintiff who proves
these three elements benefits from a presumption of medical
causation: (1) he was in “good health” before the accident; (2)
his symptoms manifested “continuously” after the accident; and (3)
there is a “reasonable probability” of causation between the

7
accident and alleged injury. See Housley v. Cerise, 579 So. 2d
973, 980 (La. 1991)(citation omitted).

B.
Dehendric Bickham seeks partial summary judgment that the

11/5/17 sideswipe collision caused his right rib fracture. The
defendants counter that partial summary judgment should be denied
because (a) Bickham’s reliance on the opinion testimony of a
chiropractor (not a physician) is insufficient to prove medical
causation; and (b) that Bickham had no complaints or symptoms of
a fractured rib at the time of the accident and thus he fails to
show that his rib fracture symptoms manifested continuously from
the time of the collision. Although the Court is not persuaded by
the defendants’ legal arguments, the defendants’ evidentiary
submission creates a genuine dispute precluding summary judgment
on medical causation, specifically, whether Bickham’s rib fracture

was caused by the 11/5/17 accident.
There is some support in the record for the passenger-
plaintiff’s contention that he suffered a rib fracture caused by
the 11/5/17 collision. First, Bickham submits that there is
nothing in his pre-accident medical records to indicate he had
suffered a right rib fracture. And Bickham testified on May 22,

2019 that, since the accident, he has had “a lot of problems with
8
[his] right rib and [his] back[.] That’s about it. My rib bothers
me a lot. Like, a lot, lot[.]” Second, Bickham’s treating
chiropractor, Dr. Harvey Nicaud, D.O., whom had referred Bickham

for the MRI, testified on July 25, 2019 that, in his opinion, the
treatment he provided to both plaintiffs post-accident “was ...
treatment causally related by the wreck that occurred in November
of 2017[.]”4 Third, when questioned by plaintiffs’ counsel, Dr.
Nejeeb Thomas, the defendants’ independent medical examiner,
offered this testimony respecting Bickham’s MRI results:

Q. If Mr. Bickham testified that the right-rib pain was
a result of the wreck that occurred on November 5th,
2017, and given the ... objective information just
provided, would you agree that his broken right rib was
a result of the wreck that occurred on November 5th,
2017?
A. Yes. To make sure I understand everything. He has
an MRI which shows a subacute right-rib fracture. Mr.
Bickham only complained of right-rib pain subsequent to
the accident, and that was the only trauma that he had,
and the pain began after the trauma, so with all three
of those assumptions, which I think is what you are
trying to get at, the answer is, yes.

4 Ten days post-accident, Bickham was first examined by
chiropractor, Dr. Nicaud. Later on January 26, 2018, Bickham
underwent an MRI, which indicated “suspicious for a subacute,
nondisplaced fracture of the lateral right 10th rib.”
9
But the defendants submit evidence which creates a triable
issue concerning medical causation. Countering the plaintiff’s
evidence, the defendants submit that disputed issues of material

fact preclude partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the
sideswipe collision caused Bickham’s alleged rib fracture; the
defendants take issue with whether Bickham’s symptoms of a rib
fracture manifest continuously from the November 5, 2017 accident
until he first reported them to a healthcare provider, his
chiropractor, Dr. Harvey Nicaud, considering that Bickham failed
to report rib-fracture symptoms to either emergency responders or
to medical professionals at the emergency room within hours of the
accident, when he first reported symptoms allegedly manifesting
from the sideswipe collision.

Most notably, when presented with the emergency room records
the day of the accident showing no complaints or symptoms of rib
fracture, Dr. Thomas opined that Bickham’s rib fracture was not
caused by the sideswipe collision. In an unsworn declaration, Dr.
Thomas states that he reviewed the emergency room records for
Bickham the day of the accident and notes that there is no
complaint or reported symptoms of a rib fracture, whereas “[a] rib
fracture, like Mr. Bickham has, is an injury for which an

individual has significant rib pain immediately upon the rib being
10
fractured and continuous pain and symptoms from the fractured rib,
especially the day the fracture occurs.” Given the absence of
complaints or symptoms from the day of the accident, Dr. Thomas

opines that “Mr. Bickham’s rib fracture was not caused by or
related to the motor vehicle accident he was involved in on
November 5, 2017.” Dr. Thomas further opines: “[i]f Mr. Bickham
had sustained a rib fracture in that accident, he would have had
immediate, continuous pain and symptoms from his rib fracture when
the accident happened and in the ER that day of the accident.”

The parties have presented evidence of contradictory facts.
On the one hand, Bickham (albeit implicitly) attributes his rib
pain to the accident at issue, there is a post-accident MRI
indicating a rib fracture, and Bickham’s chiropractor opines that
the rib fracture likely resulted from the accident. On the other
hand, it is undisputed that Bickham refused medical treatment at
the scene, did not report rib pain to medical professionals at the
emergency room later that day when reporting other symptoms had
manifested, and the defendants’ independent medical expert opines
“to a reasonable degree of medical probability that Mr. Bickham’s
rib fracture was not caused in the accident of November 5, 2017.”
A patent factual controversy concerning medical causation

precludes partial summary judgment.
11
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED: that
the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, April 14, 2021

MARTIN . Cy BRLDMAN
UNITED STATHS DISTRICT JUDGE

12

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10186552. Public record. Not legal advice.