# Daniels v. Rester

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · September 23, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10185926

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** September 23, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CLARENCE ANTOINE DANIELS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 18-5292

JUSTIN RESTER, ET AL. O RDER A ND RE ASONSSECTION: “S”(5)

Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment of the sole Defendant
remaining in this matter, Sergeant Justin Rester. (Rec. doc. 65). Plaintiff has filed no
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memorandum in opposition to Defendant’s motion. For the reasons that follow, it is
ordered that Defendant’s motion is granted and that Plaintiff’s suit is dismissed.
This is a 42 U.S.C. §1983 proceeding that comes before the Court upon the consent
of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). (Rec. doc. 39). Following earlier motion
practice in this case, all claims against all Defendants were dismissed except for Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim against Sergeant Rester in his individual capacity.
(Rec. docs. 29, 34, 45). In his complaint, Plaintiff, an inmate of the B.B. “Sixty” Rayburn
Correctional Center (“RCC”) in Angie, Louisiana, complained of an incident that occurred on
March 7, 2017 in which Rester allegedly yanked his arm through a “hatch tray” in his cell
door, causing swelling to his wrist area and multiple lacerations. (Rec. docs. 1, 7, 19).
Rester now moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining excessive force claim.
1 / Johnson v. Colvin
As Plaintiff has filed no memorandum in response to DBeefeannd va.n Bta’sr mnhoatriton, timely or otherwise, the Court
may proJpoenrelys va.s Lsaurmpeen thteart he has no opposition to it. , No. 14-CV-0401, 2014 WLa 4d1o8p6te7d90 at
*1 n. 1 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014)(citing Local Rule 7.5L auncda s v. Crowe , 473 F.Supp. 2d 739, 741 (E.D. Tex.
2007)); ad, oNpot.e 1d3-CV-0056, 2013 WL 1947243 at *1 n. 1 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 2013), ,
2013 WL 1947188 (E.D. La. May 10, 2013)(same); , No. 11B-rCaVly-2 v7. T5r2a, i2l013 WL 870514 at *1 n. 1
(E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2013), , 2013 WL 870437 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2013)(same). Of course, a motion like the
Before discussing the competent evidence supporting Defendant’s motion, the Court will
recall the well-established standards governing Rule 56 motions like the one at hand.
Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) when no genuine isCseuleo teoxf

mCoartpe.r iva.l Cfaactrt eetxtists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). Although all inferences drawn from
the evidence are to be resolved in theS pneolnlm-maonv va.n St’hs aflaavlaor, he may not rest on the mere
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allegations or denials in his pleadings. , 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5 Cir. 1993).
Rather, once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the burden
shifts to the non-movant, who bears the burden of proof at triaKl,a tnos as hRoewin wsuirtha n“c’sei gvn. ifCicoanngt.
pMroorbtagtaivgee’ Ceovripd.e onfc eT”e xtahsat there exists a triable factual issue. In re: Municipal Bond
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Reporting Antitrust Litig., 20 F.3d 1362, 1371 (5 Cir. 1994)(quoting
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, 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5 Cir. 1982)). That burden is not satisfied by
“… ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ … by ‘conclLuistotlrey v a. lLleiqguaitdio Anisr,’ C…o rbpy.
‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ … or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” ,
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37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5 Cir. 1994)(en banc)(citations omitted). Rather, the nonmovant “…
must adduce admissible evidence which creates a fact issue concerning the existence of
every essentiaMl caottmerp oonf eLnetw oifs vtihllaet Ppraorptyer’st iecsa,s eIn; cn.aked assertions of an actual dispute will
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not suffice.” , 849 F.2d 946, 950 (5 Cir. 1998). The
insufficiency of the proof must be suPchhil ltihpas t Oitil wCoou vld. OpKreCv eCnotr pa. rational finder of fact from
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findincge rfto. rd ethneie dnon-moving party. , 812 F.2d 265, 272-73 (5
Cir.), , 484 U.S. 851, 108 S.Ct. 152 (1987).
Among the arguments advanced by the Defendant in support of his motion for
summary judgment is his entitlement to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects
government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly establisLhyetlde svt. aBtuextoarry C oour nctoyn, Tsteitxuatsional rights of which a reasonable person
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would have known.” Gobert , v5.6 0C aFl.d3wd e4ll04, 409 (5 Cir. 2009)(citation
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and internal Aqnudoetartsioonn vm. aCrrkesig hotmointted); , 463 F.3d 339, 345 (5 Cir.
2006)(citing , 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038 (1987)). In
determining whether a governmental official is entitled to qualified immunity, the
appropriate inquiry is: (1) whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a violation of a clearly
established constitutional right and (2) whether the official’s actions vioIlda.ted that Hrioghpte tvo.
tPheelz eerxtent that an objectively reasonable person would have known. (citing
, 5P3e6a rUso.Sn. 7v3 0C,a 1ll2a2h aSn.Ct. 2508 (2002)). Those two prongs may be considered in either
order. , 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009). In the sBurmowmna rvy.
jCuadlglamheannt context, qualified immunity shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff.
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, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5 Cir. 2010). Thus, in order to rebut Sergeant Rester’s
qualified immunity defense here, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) the Defendant’s allegedly
wrongful conduct amounted to excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment and
(2) a genuIdin. e issue of material fact exists regarding the reasonableness of the Defendant’s
conduct.
It is well-established that the unnecessary and wanton inflictionH oufd spoanin v c. oMncsMtitilulatens
cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. ,
503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995, 998 (1992). In evaluating a claim of alleged use of excessive
force by a prison official, the Supreme Court has opined that “... the core judicial inquiry is
… whether force was applied in a good-faiItdh. effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” , 503 U.S. at 6-7, 112 S.Ct. at 999. In order to
prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must first prove up a subjective component by
establishing that “… the defendanMt oasclteeyd mv. alWicihoiutesly and sadistically in an ‘unnecessary and
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wanton inflictiHonu dsoofn pain.’” , 464 Fed.Appx. 206, 211-12 (5 Cir.
2010)(quoting , 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. at 1000). To make this determination, a
court should consider: (1) the extent of the injury suffered; (2) the need for the application
of force; (3) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat
reasonably perceived by the respoBnasilbdlwe ino ffvi.c iSatla; ladnedr (5) any efforts made to temper the
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sHeuvdesroitny v.o Mf caM filolarcneful response. , 137 F.3d 836, 839 (5 Cir. 1998);
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, 962 F.2d 522, 523 (5 Cir. 1992).
In addition to the subjective component, a plaintiff must also establish an objective
component, which requires that a prisoner demonstrate that the alleHguedds ownrongdoing was
objectively “harmful enough” to establish a constitutional violation. , 503 U.S. at 8,
112 S.Ct. at 999. Not every mIadle. volent touch, push, or shove by a prison official gives rise
to a federal dcea umsein oimf iasction. at 9, 112 S.Ct. at 1000. “Thusp, rai mpaar tfayc’si eclaim must allege
more than a uMsoe solef yphysical force in order to stateE aa son v. Holt case of an Eighth
Amendment violation.” de m, 4in6i4m Fised.Appx. at 212 (citing , 73 F.3d 600, 604
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n. 24 (5 Cir. 1996)). “The use of physical force is excluded from ‘coInds.titutional
rHeucdosgonnition,’ unless it is of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’’ (quoting
, 503 U.S. at 9-10, 112 S.Ct. at 1000). Although there is no categorical requirement
that the physical injury be sigLnaicfeicya vn.t G, saelvrieosutos,n o Cro munotrye Sthhearnif fm’s iDnoerp,t .“… it is clear that some
physical injury is required.” , No. 06-CV-0441, 2008
WL 624615 at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2008). If a prisoner fails to establish either the
sMuobsjelecytive or objective components, “… there is not a valid Eighth Amendment claim.”
, 464 Fed.Appx. at 212.
RCC Directive #3.1.13 provides that “… handcuffs will be applied to offenders

behind their back with the thumbs up, palms out, and the keyhole pointed out.” (Rec. doc.
65-6, p. 3). The Directive goes on as follows:
When applying handcuffs behind the back of cellblock offenders, the officer
will give the offender instructions to place his back to the cell door and place
his hands through the cell trap with his thumbs up and palms out. The officer
will place one cuff on one of the offender’s wrists with the double bar up and
the keyhole facing out. Control of the handcuffs will be maintained while the
other bracelet is applied in the same manner. The officer will ensure that the
handcuffs are not placed too tightly on the offender’s wrists by placing
his/her little finger between the handcuffs and the inside of the offenders’
wrist and then tightening the cuffs until snug. The handcuffs will then be
double locked.

Restraints will be removed in reverse order. Id.
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at p. 4.

The Court has carefully reviewed the central pieces of evidence supporting
Defendant’s motion, namely, two segments of video footage taken from surveillance
cameras situated within RCC which capture the incident in question and the events
immediately preceding and following it. In the first clip, Sergeant Rester can be seen first
restraining and then escorting Plaintiff from the shower area of Sleet 4L back to his cell
located on the same tier. In compliance with Directive #3.1.13 set forth above, Plaintiff
dutifully turned around and placed his back to the cell door of the shower area, placed his
hands through the trap in the cell door, and the handcuffs were successfully applied to his
wrists by Rester, at which point Plaintiff steps away, turns, and faces the cell door. The
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shower cell door is then opened and Rester begins escorting Plaintiff to his cell, cell
number 8. (Ex. B).
Once Plaintiff and Rester arrived at cell number 8, Plaintiff entered the cell and

Rester ordered the cell door to be closed. Plaintiff initially complied with the Directive by
turning around and placing his back and cuffed wrists to the cell door to allow Rester to
remove the handcuffs through the cell trap. After Rester had successfully removed the
handcuffs from Plaintiff’s left wrist, Plaintiff suddenly and without warning began to turn
around and attempted to pull his right handcuffed wrist from Rester’s control and into his
cell. At that point, in an effort to maintain control of the handcuffs, Rester immediately
pulled the handcuffs that remained attached to Plaintiff’s right wrist through the tray hatch
and attempted to go to a sitting position to use his body weight to counter the resistance

being offered by Plaintiff. Within mere seconds, Rester is able to gain control over
Plaintiff’s right arm and he stands up to begin his second attempt to remove the handcuffs.
Sergeant Nathaniel Graham arrives on the scene shortly thereafter and assists Rester by
gaining control of Plaintiff’s left arm and bringing it through the bars. Once that was
accomplished, Rester continues his attempt to remove the handcuff remaining on Plaintiff’s
right wrist only to discover that the key had broken due to Plaintiff’s resistance. Sergeant
Graham can then be seen using his cuff key to remove the remaining cuff from Plaintiff’s
right wrist. The handcuffs were fully removed from Plaintiff’s right wrist and all force

stopped immediately. Based upon a review of the video, it does not appear that Plaintiff
was in any apparent pain or distress. From the time that the door to Plaintiff’s cell was
closed until the handcuffs were fully removed from his wrists was less than one minute.
(Ex. C).
Following the incident, Plaintiff, Rester, and Sergeant Graham were all evaluated by
Nurse Luper for a post use of force exam. The records documenting that evaluation reveal
that Plaintiff suffered only abrasions/redness to his right upper arm with no injuries to his

wrist or multiple lacerations as alleged by Plaintiff in his complaint. (Rec. doc. 65-9, pp. 4-
5). Plaintiff was subsequently seen by medical personnel on MaIdrc.h 9 and 22, 2017 for
unknown pWaiilnk itnos hvis. rGiaghdtd yarm and was treated only with Motrin. ( at pp. 2, 3).
In , 559 U.S. 34,H 3u8d,s o1n30 S.Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010) the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in that courts evaluating Eighth Amendment
excess force claim must focus on the nature of the force applied rather than a certain
quantum of injury. Nevertheless, the “absence of sBearlidowusin injury,H” uthdes ofnirst of the five factors
identified by the Fifth Circuit in cases such as aWndi lkins , remains a relevant

consideration in evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim. , 559 U.S. at 3d7e- m38in, i1m3i0s
S.Ct. at 1178. The Fifth Circuit has thus found “straPirne”s ttoo na vp.r Hisiocnkesr’s arm to be a
injury excluded from constitutional recognition. , 721 Fed.Appx. 342, 344-
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45 (5 Cir. 2018). Injuries falling within this category also incluMdeo smleoymentary blindness,
cuts and abrasions in and around tLheee e vy.e ,W ainlsdo nan infected eye, , 464 Fed.Appx. at
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213; a “busted lip” and headaches, Siglar , v2. 3H7i gFhetdo.wAeprpx. 965, 966 (5 Cir. 2007);
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and, a sore, bruised ear lasting three days. , 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5 Cir.
1997). Other courts have similarly concluded that alledgea tmioinnsi moifs swBaenllginmg oann dv . pLaainn cteo the
hand which was treated with ice and painkillers were , , No.
18-CV-0019, 2019 WL 5653731 at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2019), and that for a particular
injury to be constitutionally significant and actionable, it would have to be more than a sore
muscle, an aching back, a scratch, an abrasion, or a bruise of the type which would not
Luong v. Hatt
otherwise force a free-world person tSoe es eaelks op rSopfievsesyio vn.a Wl milseodnical care. , 979
F.Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex. 1997). , No. 17-CV-0094, 2019 WL
5095629 at *9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 27d, e2 m01in9i)m(cisontusions and three small lacerations treated

with Dermabond and Tylenol were ).
The objective findings in the medical records supporting Defendant’s motion do not
evince injuries consistent with the alleWgaitlibounrsn sve.t Sfhoartnhe in Plaintiff’s complaint, which may
thus be considered to be Wimepsslaouns ivb. leO.g lesby , 193 F.3d 517, 1999 WL 706141 at
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*1 (5 Cir. 1999)(citing , 910 F.2d 278, 281-82 (5 Cir. 1990). Because
Plaintiff has failed to submit any summary judgment evidenced ec omnitnriomviesrting the
Defendant’s evidence and establishing that he suffered more than a physical
injury as a result of the March 7, 2017 incident (or that Rester’s use of force was repugnant
to the conscience Moof smleaynkind), summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is
warranted here. , 464 Fed.Appx. at 213 (in summary judgment context, PWlaiinlstoifnf
vb.e Tarasy leovridentiary burden to show that injurcieerst w. deernei eodbjectively “harmful enough”);
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, 100 Fed.Appx. 282, 283 (5 Cir), , 543 U.S. 965, 125 S.Ct. 413 (2004).
Having carefully viewed the video evidence, the Court is also left with the inescapable
conclusion that the brief use of force employed by Rester, which lasted less than one
minute, was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain and restore discipline and was not
done maliciously or Hsauddissotincally to cause harm and resulted in an unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain. , 503 U.S. at 6-8, 112 S.Ct. at 999-1000. For these reasons,
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted and Plaintiff’s suit is dismissed.
Judgment will be entered accordingly2. 3rd September
New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2020.
MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10185926. Public record. Not legal advice.