# Dunn v. Apache Industrial Services, Inc.

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · August 12, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10185773

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** August 12, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10185773

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting female plaintiff “must show that her job requirements and performance were substantially equal, though not necessarily identical, to those of a male employee”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

GERALDINE DUNN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 17-12777

APACHE INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, SECTION: “B”(1)
ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are: (1) defendant Apache Industrial
Services, Inc.’s (“Apache”) motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc.
78); (2) plaintiff Geraldine Dunn’s response in opposition (Rec.
Doc. 82); (3) Apache’s reply in support of their motion for summary
judgment (Rec. Doc. 99); and (4) plaintiff’s supplemental
memorandum in opposition (Rec. Doc. 100). For the reasons discussed
below,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant Apache’s motion for summary
judgment (Rec. Doc. 78) is GRANTED IN PART as to the hostile work
environment and retaliation claims; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is DENIED IN PART with respect to all other remaining
claims in this litigation.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Geraldine Dunn is a resident of the parish of East
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 1 at 2. In June 2016, she was
employed as a bus driver and painter for Apache Industrial
Services, Inc. (“Apache”), a foreign corporation with its
principal place of business in Texas and subcontractor for
Defendant Phillips 66 Company (“Phillips”). Id. at 3. Plaintiff
alleges that Apache, along with Phillips, discriminated against
her, retaliated against her, and wrongly terminated her. Id.
On or around August 8, 2016, Plaintiff began working a
“turnaround job” for Apache. Id. Plaintiff claims she has
approximately 15 years of experience and alleges that she was
earning $19.00 per hour while her male counterparts were earning

$23.00 per hour. Id. Plaintiff further alleges she spoke with
management, specifically Tim Robichaux, about raising her hourly
pay to $23.00 on more than one occasion. Id. She was told her
hourly pay would be increased to $23.00, yet complains she never
received an increase. Id. She asserts she was subsequently
subjected to harassment and discrimination. Id. Specifically, she
contends she was forced to perform additional duties that other
male employees were not required to perform and was yelled at by
her supervisor, Marlow, in front of other male employees.1 Id. at
4.
In her complaint, plaintiff notes that she filed an Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Charge, alleging unfair

1 Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that on or around September 28, 2016, a
supervisor, Marlow, brought paint to the work area for male employees only.
Plaintiff was told to get her own paint and contends that when she asked why,
See
treatment on October 13, 2016. . at 4. On October 24, 2016,
Plaintiff claims she attended a meeting with safety management to
discuss her complaints of knee pain. Id. She was given two days
off from work and when she Returned on October 27, she had been
terminated. Apache notes plaintiff was informed by Phillips 66
that it was exercising its right under the contract between
Phillips 66 and Apache, and Phillips 66 no longer wanted plaintiff
assigned to its project. Rec. Doc. 78-2 at 4. Further, defendant
contends that Apache Coatings Operations Manager, Robbie Hunter,
“instructed plaintiff to go to Apache’s hiring center, as it was
not Apache that ended plaintiff’s assignment at Phillips 66.” Id.

Plaintiff contends that she was terminated in retaliation, and as
a result of her filing the EEOC charge of discrimination. Rec.
Doc. 1 at 4.
On November 28, 2016, Plaintiff claims to have filed another
EEOC Charge of Discrimination (the “November 2016 Charge”)
alleging gender discrimination, retaliation, and unequal pay. Id.
at 5. On January 4, 2017, Plaintiff claims to have filed yet
another EEOC Charge of Discrimination (the “January 2017 Charge”)
alleging retaliatory wrongful termination. Id. at 13-14.
On August 20, 2017, Plaintiff received a “Dismissal and Notice

of Rights” for “both of her aforementioned Charges of
Discrimination2.” Rec. Doc. 1 at 5. On November 20, 2017, exactly

2 There is ambiguity in the phrase “both of her aforementioned Charges of
Discrimination.” Defendant notes in their motion for summary judgment that
three months after receiving her Notice of Right to Sue letter
from the EEOC, plaintiff filed her Complaint. Rec. Doc. 1 Plaintiff
brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
The Equal Pay Act of 1963; (3) the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967; (4) La. Civ. Code. Art. 2315; and (5) the Louisiana
Whistleblower Statute, La. Rev. Stat. § 23:967. Plaintiff also
seeks damages pursuant to Equal Rights Under the Law, 42 U.S.C. §
1981(a); Retaliation, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3); and Reasonable
Attorney Fees, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b). Rec. Doc. 1 at 4-10.3 On April
03, 2018, Apache filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim in lieu of an answer. See Rec. Doc. 15. Subsequently, on

December 26, 2018, this Court dismissed plaintiff’s claims
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the ADEA, and her state law claims
against Apache, preserving only her gender discrimination claims
and retaliation claims under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Rec.
Doc. 54.
LAW AND FINDINGS
a. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is
appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

No. 461-2017-00119) and the January 4, 2017 Charge (EEOC Charge No 461-2017-
00319.)” Rec. Doc. 78-2 at 2. Defendant further notes that plaintiff likely
initiated the process for filing a charge in October of 2016, as Apache received
a Notice of Charge for EEOC Charge No. 461-2017-00119 on October 21, 2016.
Therefore, plaintiff likely notified the EEOC of her intent to file a charge of
discrimination, and thereafter perfected that charge on November 28, 2016.
3 Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Team Industrial Services, Inc., were
dismissed on May 29, 2018. Rec. Doc. 54. Plaintiff’s claims against Phillips
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). See also TIG Ins. Co. v.
Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002). “As to
materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are
material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists if
the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for
the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The court should
view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hixson Bros. Inc., 453
F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2006). Mere conclusory allegations are
insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d
1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996).
The movant must point to “portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If and when the movant carries this
burden, the non-movant must then go beyond the pleadings and
present other evidence to establish a genuine issue. Matsushita
, 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). However, “where the non-movant bears the burden of proof
at trial, the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence,
thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating by
competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material
fact warranting trial.” Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d
616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994). “This court will not assume in the
absence of any proof that the nonmoving party could or would prove
the necessary facts, and will grant summary judgment in any case
where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact

that it could not support a judgment in favor of the [non-movant].”
McCarty v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., 864 F.3d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 2017).
b. Plaintiff’s Claims under the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”)
The EPA states in pertinent part:
No employer . . . shall discriminate . . .between
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees in such establishment at a rate less than
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions . . .

29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
To establish a prima facie case for disparate pay under the
EPA, a plaintiff must show: “1. her employer is subject to the
Act; 2. she performed work in a position requiring equal skill,
effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions; and
3. she was paid less than the employee of the opposite sex
providing the basis of comparison.” ., 984 F.2d
151, 153 (5th Cir. 1993); Wiley v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp.,
287 F. App'x 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2008).
An essential element of a prima facie case under the Equal
Pay Act requires a showing that the plaintiff “performed work in
a position requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under
similar working conditions” as an employee of the opposite sex.
Id. at 153. Because Congress amended the Equal Pay Act to
substitute the word “equal” for “comparable,” the statute has been
narrowly construed to be applied “only to jobs that are
substantially identical or equal.” Brennan v. City Stores, Inc.,

479 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Golden Isles
Convalescent Homes, Inc., 548 F.2d 1256, 1258 (5th Cir. 1972) (“It
is not merely comparable skill and responsibility that Congress
sought to address, but a substantial identity of job functions.”);
see also Reznick v. Associated Orthopedics & Sports Med., P.A.,
104 F. App'x 387, 390 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting female plaintiff
“must show that her job requirements and performance were
substantially equal, though not necessarily identical, to those
of a male employee”) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(e)).
In determining whether the positions require substantially

equal work, a court conducts a case-by-case analysis in the context
of the employer’s particular practices. Hodgson, 468 F.2d at 1258;
see, e.g., Parr v. Nicholls State Univ., 2011 WL 838903, at *4-5
(E.D. La. Mar. 3, 2011) (considering varying roles, experience,
and terms of employment for each position).
Apache contends that plaintiff is unable to establish a prima
facie case for violation of the EPA, because plaintiff cannot
adequately identify a comparator whom Apache paid more money. Rec.
Doc. 78-2 at 6. Plaintiff was assigned to the Phillips 66 project,
where she admitted that she engaged in painting, flagging, and bus
driving activities. Rec. Doc. 78-6 at 8-9, Deposition of Plaintiff.
In the morning, plaintiff would drive a bus, transporting workers
to and from a specific work site. Id. While at the site, plaintiff

engaged in painting. Rec. Doc. 78-6 at 9. Apache states in their
motion that it, “denies that it ever assigned plaintiff to work
as a painter. For purposes of this motion, however, defendant will
accept plaintiff’s statement that she performed painting work.”
Rec. Doc. 78-2 at 4, n.15. Plaintiff alternatively asserts that
she “was assigned as a painter who was paid $19/hr., while her
other male co-workers (who were also painters) were paid $22/hr.”
Rec. Doc. 100 at 4.
As clearly shown by parties’ different evidentiary
presentations, there are material factual disputes as to whether
plaintiff’s job requirements were substantially equal to those of

a male employee and even whether she was assigned to the same job
as male employees, i.e. painter. Further, the responsibilities,
skills, and assignment of painter, bus driver, or flagger are not
clearly delineated by either side. Thus, a case-by-case analysis
of the employer’s practices in that regard cannot be conducted
without clear and undisputed evidence. Hodgson, 468 F.2d at 1258.
If, as plaintiff attests, her pay for work involved painting and
other ancillary duties that male painters were not required to
perform4, she would arguably have a prima facie case for disparate
pay based on the higher pay given to male painters. Summary
disposition of the EPA claim is not proper currently due to
existing disputed issues of material facts.
c. Plaintiff’s Claims Under Title VII

i. Gender Discrimination

Title VII states that it is unlawful “to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation ... because of
such individual's sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). When a plaintiff
seeks to prove discrimination using circumstantial evidence, the
plaintiff must prove that (1) plaintiff is a member of a protected
class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position at issue,
(3) the plaintiff was the subject of an adverse employment action,
and (4) the plaintiff was treated less favorably because of
membership in that protected class than were other similarly
situated employees who were not members of the protected class,
under nearly identical circumstances. Paske v. Fitzgerald, 785
F.3d 977, 984-85 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).

4 Plaintiff notes in her affidavit that she was the only Apache Employee to
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and thus creates
a presumption of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant
to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision.
Then finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the defendant’s reasons are pretextual. However, the “ultimate
burden” of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at “all times.”
Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 468 (5th Cir.
2002) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 143 (2000)).
Apache contends that plaintiff’s claims of gender

discrimination pursuant to Title VII fail, similar to her claims
under the EPA, as plaintiff is unable to identify an individual
who performed the same or substantially similar function, whom
Apache paid more than plaintiff. Rec. Doc. 78-2 at 6. As stated
previously, factual discrepancies exist between the parties and
preclude summary judgment on these grounds. Although Apache
contends that plaintiff was not assigned to work as a painter, and
that her ancillary duties of driving and flagging differentiate
her from the comparator male painters she cites, plaintiff alleges
that she was in fact assigned as a painter, and that her primary
duties consisted of painting. Accordingly, summary judgment is not

proper at this juncture.
Apache also contends that plaintiff is unable to show
discriminatory intent on the part of Apache, as she was given the
opportunity to advance to a higher paid position, and in addition
had received a rating of five out of ten on a performance review
conducted by CF industries. Rec. Doc. 78-2 at 7. Apache contends
that as a result of these facts, plaintiff cannot prove
discriminatory intent on the part of Apache related to her
compensation. Id. Plaintiff contends that she had asked for payment
increases, yet she never received them. Rec. Doc. 100 at 6.
Further, plaintiff alleges that the evaluation conducted by CF
industries is “fabricated” and that no evaluation on her
performance was ever conducted. Id. at 7. Again, the current
existence of material factual disputes prevents summary judgment

on this issue.
ii. Harassment & Hostile Work Environment

Apache contends that plaintiff cannot sustain her claim for
harassment or hostile work environment pursuant to Title VII. The
United States Supreme Court has noted that “not all workplace
conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term,
condition, or privilege’ of employment within the meaning of Title
VII.” Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67
(1986)(citations omitted). “Title VII was only meant to bar
conduct that is so severe and pervasive that it destroys a
protected class member's opportunity to succeed in the workplace.”
Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public Accounts of State of Texas, 168
F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir.) (internal quotations omitted)(emphasis
added).
In order to establish a claim for hostile environment, a
plaintiff must show that the complained-of conduct was “severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21,
(1993). A comment that merely causes offense “does not sufficiently
affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII,” and
“is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Id. The determination of whether
conduct is severe or pervasive enough to subject an employer to
Title VII liability is an objective determination that is made by
looking to all the circumstances, including “the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance.” Green v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund,
284 F.3d 642, 655–56 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds
by, Basarge v. Cheramie Marine, L.L.C., 675 Fed. App’x 417, 419
(5th Cir. 2017). “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated
incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to
discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.”
Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874.
Apache contends that Marlow Williams’ demeanor was loud and

abrasive, however not harassing in nature. Rec. Doc. 78- 2 at 7-
8. In plaintiff’s complaint, she alleges that during an incident
involving scaffolding that:
“[Plaintiff’s] supervisor [Williams] informed the
employees to go to the work area and get on the
scaffold to paint. [Williams] brought paint over for
the male employees; however, [plaintiff] was informed
that she had to get down off of the scaffold and get
her own paint. When [plaintiff] asked why she had to
go get her own paint, [William] began yelling at her.”

Rec. Doc. 1 at 4. Further, a passage from plaintiff’s deposition
reads as follows:

Q. I’m just trying to figure out going to look at your
first charge what you mean about you were subjected to
harassment about your work and yelled at by
[Williams]. Was there any incident other than the
scaffolding incident where [Williams] yelled at you?

A. Yeah. [Williams], yeah. You’d have to know
[Williams]. But, yes, [Williams’] yell (sic) at me,
but I would tune him out. [Williams] didn’t really
know how to communicate as a supervisor. He didn’t
know how to explain himself how he – what he wanted
done and he would get upset when you didn’t understand
what he wanted.

Q. So this was his personality?

A. Yes. Because he kind of stutter (sic) a little bit
when he speaks. And he never would make himself clear.
He just gave orders and you were supposed to know what
he was talking about.

Q. When you said he would get upset, how did you know
he was upset?

A. His tone of voice.

Rec. Doc. 78-6 at 10. The above cited instances do not elevate
Williams’ actions to the level of harassment required under Title
VII. William’s comments to plaintiff do not appear to be frequent,
nor do they appear to be sufficiently pervasive or severe as to
result in plaintiff feeling more than slightly offended. Further,
from the evidence presented, it appears that Williams engaged in
this abrasive behavior as to everyone on the jobsite and did not
specifically direct his activities at plaintiff. Accordingly,
Apache is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of
hostile work environment under Title VII, and that claim should
be dismissed.
Apache also claims that an employer who takes effective steps
to prevent harassment and has an employee who fails to follow the
preventative procedures, is not liable for any ensuing harassment.
Rec. Doc. 78-2 at 8. In support of their contention, Apache cites
Farragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). In Farragher,

the United States Supreme court noted that “[a]n employer may, for
example, have provided a proven, effective mechanism for reporting
and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, available to the
employee without undue risk or expense. If the plaintiff
unreasonably failed to avail herself of the employer's preventive
or remedial apparatus, she should not recover damages that could
have been avoided if she had done so. If the victim could have
avoided harm, no liability should be found against the employer
who had taken reasonable care . . .” Id. at 806-07.
Here, it appears that plaintiff did not follow Apache’s
preventative procedures. The EEO statement reads in pertinent

part: “If you feel that you have been discriminated against you
should report the incident to your supervisor immediately. If you
feel like you cannot go to your supervisor contact the EEO Officer
direct at (713) 450-9307. Id. at 78-9. Plaintiff argues that she
“effectively followed” the procedures, as she was only required
to go to the EEO Officer if she felt she could not go to her
supervisor. Plaintiff notes that she reported the discrimination
to her supervisor, Tim Robichaux, and stated: “Well, I approached
[Robichaux] and I explained to him that they hired me as a bus
driver and bus drivers make top pay. And when I got there, they
assigned me to be a painter, which is two crafts. And he said I
was correct. And I explained to him about my pay rate that I was
supposed to have been making. They were supposed to be changing
my pay rate back to $23. And he said that he would call the office

and talk with someone in the office and he would let me know. Rec.
Doc. 100 at 8; see also Rec. Doc. 100-2 at 8. Apache contends that
requesting a change in pay is not sufficient to qualify as a report
of discrimination. We agree.
Although plaintiff did note that there was a pay discrepancy,
this one-time interaction with Tim Robichaux likely does not rise
to the level of a complaint of harassment under Title VII. Rather,
it appears to be a conversation about the pay discrepancy, and not
an outright complaint that she was being treated unfairly by anyone
at Apache. However, this contention by Apache is likely moot, as
the “harassment” activities complained of by plaintiff do not rise

to the requisite severe or pervasive level to sustain a claim
under Title VII.
d. Retaliation Claims
Under both Title VII and the EPA, an employer may not
retaliate against an employee who opposes a discriminatory
practice prohibited by the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(Title VII) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because
he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice
by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”); 29 U.S.C. §
215(a)(3) (EPA) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . to

discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this
chapter.”). “To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a
plaintiff must show that “(1) he engaged in conduct protected by
Title VII; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) a
causal connection exists between the protected activity and the
adverse action.” Cabral v. Brennan, 853 F.3d 763, 766–67 (5th Cir.
2017); see also Thibodeaux-Woody v. Houston Cmty. Coll., 593 Fed.
App’x 280, 285 (5th Cir. 2014) (stating the same standard for
retaliation claims pursuant to the Equal Pay Act).

Apache challenges plaintiff’s ability to make a prima facie
showing for her claim of retaliation, as to both Title VII and the
EPA, as to the third prong of the retaliation analysis. Rec. Doc.
78-2 at 9. Apache contends that plaintiff is unable to show a
causal connection between her complaints and any alleged
retaliation. Id. Specifically, Apache contends that there is no
evidence that Williams was aware of plaintiff’s complaints or
charge of discrimination, and “admits [that] Williams’
‘personality’ was to speak loudly and brusquely,” and did not
suggest that Williams was harsher with her than other individuals
on the same job site. Id. (citing Rec. Doc. 78-6 at 10-11,
Plaintiff’s Deposition). Further, Apache claims that it took no
adverse action against plaintiff, that Apache played no part in
the decision to remove plaintiff from the Phillips 66 worksite,

and that Apache was willing to place plaintiff on another
assignment; however, Apache contends that plaintiff took no steps
to follow up with Apache. Rec. Doc. 78-2 at 9.
Plaintiff contends that: (1) although Williams’ personality
was “hard-hitting” she nevertheless asserts that her treatment was
different from other male employees after she made an inquiry about
her pay; (2) the mere fact that she was treated differently by
Williams’, after her inquiry, suggests that he had knowledge of
her complaints; and (3) the close proximity of her termination and
Apache’s receipt of the EEOC notice, all support her claim for
retaliatory discharge. Rec. Doc. 100 at 9-10.

As stated above, the hostile work environment claims
submitted by plaintiff are without merit. Marlow Williams’
activities and behavior towards plaintiff do not rise to the
requisite severe and pervasive level that is required under Title
VII. Therefore, any claim that Williams’ actions towards plaintiff
were retaliatory in nature is inapposite. Additionally, there is
no countervailing evidence that plaintiff’s removal from her last
assignment was precipitated by Phillips 66, not Apache. Rec. Doc.
78-2 at 4. Notably, plaintiff does not expressly raise this issue
in her opposition memorandum.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 12th day of August 2020

___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10185773. Public record. Not legal advice.