# Phoenix v. Lafourche Parish Government

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · June 17, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10185598

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** June 17, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10185598

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting the two-prong test plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed; and (2) the defendant actually drew that inference
- noting that “[t]he standard is the same as that for a prisoner under the Eighth Amendment”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DEANNA PHOENIX, on behalf of CIVIL ACTION
her minor daughter, S.W.

v. NO. 19-13004

LAFOURCHE PARISH GOVERNMENT, ET AL. SECTION "F"

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss by CorrectHealth
Lafource, LLC, David Jennings, Kendra Patrick, Patricia Guidry,
Katasha Morris, Aysa Every, Shanta Sherman, Sara Armond, and
Chelsea Nolan. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part.
Background
This civil rights lawsuit arises from a mentally ill pretrial
detainee’s suicide by hanging in his jail cell days after being
removed from suicide watch.
Sometime between 12:37 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. on October 7, 2018,
36-year-old Samuel June Williams hanged himself in a jail cell in
the E Block at the Lafourche Parish Detention Center. Nineteen
days after he told a correctional officer he was suicidal and five
days after being removed from suicide watch. This civil rights
litigation on behalf of his minor daughter followed.
The Court takes as true the allegations in the complaint.
Samuel Williams suffered from schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder. Arrested on unspecified charges, on September 15, 2018,

Williams was transported to the Lafourche Parish Detention Center,
which is operated and administered by Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s
Office. Sheriff Craig Webre is a policymaker for the LPSO and
detention center; he was responsible for staffing the detention
center and contracting with medical providers. Major Jeremy
Graniere and Captain Cortell Davis were Corrections Directors of
the LPSO; both were policymakers responsible for training and
supervising staff that supervised the detainees in LPSO custody.
The LPSO contracted with CorrectHealth Lafourche LLC (CHL) to
provide and manage medical and mental health services for detainees
in LPSO custody at LPDC; CHL provided staff, training, and policies
for all medical and mental health personnel it employed at LPDC,

including David Jennings (a social worker), Kendra Patrick (a nurse
practitioner), and a number of licensed practical nurses, Patricia
Guidry, Katasha Morris, Aysa Every, Shanta Sherman, Sarah Armond,
and Chelsea Nolan.
Detainees are screened on arrival at LPDC. In the intake
screening form for Williams, CHL nurse Aysa Every indicated that
Williams denied thoughts of self-harm, denied mental health
history, and denied a history of suicide attempts or ideation.
From a holding cell, Williams was placed in F Block; the next day
he was transferred to G Block. That same day, Williams informed
a correctional officer that he was suicidal.1 By 8:05 a.m. on
September 18, 2018, Williams was placed on suicide watch and

watched by CHL licensed practical nurses Patricia Guidry or Shanta
Sherman.
Williams remained on suicide watch from September 18 until
12:14 p.m. on October 2, 2018. During the two-week suicide watch
period, the Custom Flow Chart kept by the CHL medical providers
indicates that the following individuals monitored Williams: David
Jennings (social worker); Kendra Patrick (nurse practitioner); and
Patricia Guidry, Aysa Every, Shanta Sherman, Sarah Armond, Chelsea
Nolan, and Katasha Morris (licensed practical nurses).
Seven days after being placed on suicide watch, Williams was
interviewed about his suicidal ideations; he informed either
Armond or Jennings that he felt depressed and suicidal, that he

had mental health history of bipolar and schizophrenia diagnoses,
and that he had been prescribed medications to treat his mental
illnesses. The mental health note (taken by either Armond or
Jennings) on September 25, 2018 recommends “continue on suicide
watch, verify meds, psych appointment upon verification.” That
same day, Williams signed a release authorizing JeffCare (of

1 A Chart Note by Shanta Sherman at 6:27 a.m. on September 18, 2018
states, “Nurse on duty advised by Lt. Jones inmate told security
personnel that he wanted to kill himself inmate placed on suicide
watch per protocol.”
Jefferson Parish Human Services Authority) to release his mental
health records to LPDC; Williams had been treated at JeffCare since
September 2017. Williams’s JeffCare records were either received
that same day, or CHL failed to obtain them.2 The JeffCare records

essentially confirmed with more specificity what Williams reported
to CHL. The records indicate that Williams had been diagnosed
with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder and that his treatment
regimen in January 2018 at JeffCare included three medications: a
mood stabilizer, to be taken twice daily; a schizoaffective/
schizophrenia medication to be taken once each month; and an anti-
depressive to be taken once daily. CHL did not provide Williams
with these or any medications. Nor did CHL schedule an appointment
for a psychiatrist or psychologist to examine Williams.
Two days later on September 27, 2018, in the Subjective
Interview Form in CHL’s record, Patrick noted that Williams was on

suicide watch (but erroneously noted the suicide watch time period
spanned three, rather than nine, days), that Williams had reported
that he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia a
few months ago, that Williams “states he is not taking medication,”
and that he reports depression and suicidal thoughts. Patrick

2 It is alleged, the medical records were received by CHL and saved
by Nolan It is alternatively alleged that CHL failed to obtain the
records.
also noted “keep on suicide watch obtain records from Jeff Carrol
rtc 1 week.”
Five days later on October 2, 2018, Williams was examined by

Jennings, CHL social worker, who noted in the Subjective Interview
Form that Williams

said he is feeling ‘good.’ He denied [suicidal
ideation]. He denied past attempts at suicide.
[Williams] said he was getting Invega shot from
JeffCare...up till a couple months ago.... He
verbalized having support from family and hope for his
future. He was definitive in his denial of [suicidal
ideation] or wanting to hurt himself.

Jennings discontinued Williams’s suicide watch: in a mental health
note and provider order that same day, Jennings stated “Discontinue
suicide watch, house per security, verify meds, psych appointment,
f/u in one week by social worker.” In accordance with Jennings’s
order, Williams was removed from suicide watch on October 2 and
placed on D Block. After a problem with another inmate a few days
later, Williams was moved to E Block.
The same day he was moved to E Block, the Exam Forms portion
of the CHL record reflects that Nolan noted: “Appointment with
Appt: MenHlth SickCall-Prov for 10-09-2018: f/u social worker in
one week Appointment with Appt: Mental Health Provider (NP_PA) for
10-11-18: VERIFY MEDS. PSYCH APPOINTMENT UPON VERIFICATION.”
Whether Nolan examined or spoke to Williams, or ascertained whether
he was experiencing suicidal ideation, is not reflected in the
note. “Although Williams advised all the CorrectHealth Lafourche
defendant employees that he had been receiving medications for his
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and the JPSHA records verified

as much,” it is alleged, Williams “was never prescribed any
medications by [CHL] or examined by a psychiatrist.”
Nineteen days after threatening suicide -- unmedicated and
before being examined or treated by a psychiatrist or physician -
- on October 7, 2018, Williams hanged himself in his cell. He was
last seen alive at 12:36 a.m.; his body was found at 4:30 a.m.
His medical “treatment” at the jail consisted of being placed on
suicide watch for 14 days, one visit with a nurse practitioner,
and one or two visits with a social worker.
On October 7, 2019, Deanna Phoenix, on behalf of Phoenix’s
(and Williams’s) minor daughter, S.W., sued Lafourche Parish
Government, Sheriff Craig Webre (in his individual and official

capacity as the Sheriff of Lafourche Parish), Major Jeremy Graniere
(in his individual and official capacity as the Corrections
Director of LPSO), Lieutenant Craig Denison (“in his individual
capacity as Shift Supervisor at the LPSO”), Deputy Stephen Waldrop
(in his individual capacity), Deputy Sal Marcello (in his
individual capacity), CorrectHealth Lafourche LLC, and CHL
employees David Jennings, Kendra Patrick, Patricia Guidry, Katasha
Morris, Aysa Every, Shanta Sherman, Sarah Armond, and Chelsea Nolan
(each in their individual capacities). The plaintiff dismissed
her claims against Lafourche Parish.
The plaintiff alleges seven claims. In Count 1, the plaintiff

alleges 42 U.S.C. § 1983 official capacity claims against the law
enforcement and corrections officer defendants, Webre, Davis, and
Graniere; the plaintiff alleges due process, equal protection, and
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment violations based on a
system in which prisoners are denied appropriate protection from
harm due to inappropriate supervision, contracting with CHL for
inadequate medical health care resulting in deliberate
indifference to prisoners’ mental health conditions. In Count 2,
the plaintiff alleges § 1983 individual and official capacity
claims, specifically based on certain defendants’ (Webre, Davis,
Graniere, and CHL’s) failure to supervise and train other
defendants to ensure patients received appropriate care and

supervision to protect patients from harm; by failing to train or
supervise their employees (who failed to monitor Williams or refer
him for treatment), she alleges that the defendants deliberately
disregarded her father’s serious medical needs. The plaintiff
alleges that her father’s death would have been prevented with
appropriate patient monitoring and supervision. In Count 3, the
plaintiff alleges § 1983 claims for violations of Williams’s right
to due process, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment based on deliberate indifference to Williams’s
constitutional right to protection from harm; the plaintiff names
as defendants Webre, Davis, Graniere, CHL, Lt. Denison, Deputies
Waldrop and Marchello, Jennings, Patrick, Guidry, Morris, Every,

Sherman, Armond, and Nolan. In Count 4, the plaintiff alleges
that Sheriff Webre violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by discriminating against
and failing to accommodate Williams’s disabilities of
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. In Count 5, the plaintiff
alleges a § 1983 Monell violation based on defendants Webre, Davis,
Graniere, and CHL, in their official capacities, maintaining
policies that denied access to appropriate medical care and
prevention from harm, which the defendants knew would deprive
detainees with serious mental health disorders of treatment. In
Count 6, the plaintiff alleges medical malpractice by CHL and CHL
employees Jennings, Patrick, Guidry, Morris, Every, Sherman,

Armond, and Nolan. In Count 7, the plaintiff alleges state law
torts of negligent or intentional conduct (including negligent
retention of unqualified employees, negligent supervision and
training) resulting in injury against all defendants. The
plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as
attorney’s fees and costs. The law enforcement and corrections
officer defendants answered the complaint, invoked qualified
immunity, and asserted various defenses.
Focusing on the allegations directed to the health care
provider defendants, the plaintiff alleges that Lafourche Parish
contracted with CorrectHealth Lafourche (CHL) to provide medical

and mental health care services, that constitutionally inadequate
care was provided, and that CHL is liable directly and under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for the constitutional torts of
its employees. The medical care provider defendants (CHL and its
employees) failed to review Williams’s medical records despite
receiving them on September 25, 2018 and they failed to verify,
obtain, or administer Williams’s medications. Notwithstanding
Sheriff Webre’s policy requiring inmates suspected of suicide
ideation to be screened by on-duty medical personal and referred
for a psychiatric evaluation after necessary interventions, it is
alleged, the medical care defendants failed to follow this policy.
Alternatively, the plaintiff alleges, there was no such policy.

The plaintiff also alleges that the medical provider defendants
were deliberately indifferent:
•
By failing to refer Williams to the emergency room, a
physician, or psychiatrist after he presented with suicidal
ideation on September 18 and after receiving his medical
records on September 25;
•
By deciding to remove Williams from suicide watch on October
2, given that Williams had previously misrepresented to
Intake that he had no history of mental health issues; Patrick
had ordered him to be on suicide watch; and Jennings was
ignorant of the contents of Williams’s mental health records;
•
By failing to read the JeffCare records reflecting Williams’s
mental health and medication history;
•
Alternatively, by failing to obtain the JeffCare records
after they learned from Williams that he had been diagnosed
as schizophrenic and bipolar;
•
By conducting only two mental health examinations (one by
Patrick and one by Jennings) between the date Williams
expressed suicidal ideations and the date of his suicide;
•
By failing to have a policy in place for monitoring inmates
removed from suicide watch;
•
By failing to instruct the LPSO to place Williams on regular
monitoring (observation) or in a two-person cell given his
mental health history;
•
By failing to follow protocols set out in the NCCHC Standards
of Health Services in Jails 2018 and Standards for Mental
Health Services in Correctional Facilities 2015 and 2018
Standards for Health Services in Jails;
•
By failing to place Williams on the medications he had been
prescribed at JPHSA, given the severity of his condition;
•
By failing to prescribe medications;
•
By failing to closely monitor Williams after he was removed
from suicide watch given his earlier suicidal ideation and
his mental health history; and
•
By failing to verify Williams’s medications and prior mental
health treatment and failing to have in place safeguards to
ensure that the mental health experts (Patrick and Jennings)
were aware of the contents of the JPHSA records.

The plaintiff also alleges that CHL was deliberately indifferent
given its policy of failing to adequately monitor, train, and
supervise its employees, especially Jennings, to review outside
mental health records, to discuss patient care, or to create a
system to monitor daily inmates expressing suicidal ideation or
inmates recently removed from suicide watch. The absence of these
policies, the plaintiff alleges, reflects CHL’s deliberate
indifference to the medical care and needs of inmates under their
care and has led to self-harm or suicide of multiple inmates
including: (1) An inmate under Jennings’s care at a different
institution, JPCC, in 2016; the inmate had previously attempted to
gouge out his own eyes, was placed on suicide watch but Jennings

failed to prescribed a particular medication to the inmate despite
prior medical records available to Jennings indicating that the
inmate must be kept on the medication; as a result, the inmate
gouged his eye. (2) Another inmate under Jennings’s care at JPCC,
J.B., who expressed suicidal ideations; Jennings cleared him from
suicide watch and, two days later, J.B. hanged himself. (3) In
September 2018, Jennings placed inmate J.E. on suicide watch at
JPCC; 21 days after Jennings removed J.E. from suicide watch, J.E.
hanged himself at JPCC. Although CHL and CorrectHealth Jefferson
are different entities, it is alleged that Jennings was working
for both entities in 2017 and 2018, both were aware of Jennings’s
involvement in the self-harm and suicide cases at JPCC, and both

had identical policies on monitoring, training, and supervising
employees like Jennings as it relates to suicidal prisoners. CHL
failed to staff the LPDC with sufficient mental health care
providers: no psychiatrists were employed there and Williams was
only seen once by a nurse practitioner and twice by a social
worker; this policy of inadequate staffing, which allowed Jennings
to remove Williams from suicide watch without consulting with
others, reflects deliberate indifference.
The medical care provider defendants (CHL and its employees)
now move to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a
claim.

I.

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a motion is rarely
granted because it is viewed with disfavor. See Lowrey v. Tex. A
& M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d
1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8).
"[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require
'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. at
678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s]
all well-pleaded facts as true and view[s] all facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” See Thompson v. City of Waco,
Texas, 764 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2014)(citing Doe ex rel. Magee
v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th
Cir. 2012)(en banc)). But, in deciding whether dismissal is
warranted, the Court will not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true. Id. at 502-03 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
To survive dismissal, “‘a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603
(5th Cir. 2009)(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)(internal quotation
marks omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption
that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and
footnote omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.”). This is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. at 679. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are
merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’”, thus, “requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Finally, “[w]hen reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district
court ‘must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as
other sources ordinarily examined when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take
judicial notice.” Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th
Cir. 2011)(quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)). If the Court considers materials
outside of the pleadings, the motion to dismiss must be treated as
a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. See Causey v. Sewell

Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
II.
Only the healthcare provider defendants, CHL and its
employees sued in their individual capacities, move to dismiss the
plaintiff’s claims at this time. The plaintiff alleges that CHL

and its employees violated Williams’s Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to medical care and protection from harm while he
was detained at Lafourche Parish Detention Center. The plaintiff
pursues a Monell claim against CHL and episodic-act (deliberate
indifference) claims against the individual CHL employee-

defendants. In addition to the federal civil rights claims, the
plaintiff also seeks to recover for intentional torts as well as
medical malpractice (and, as to CHL, vicarious liability) under
state law; the medical malpractice claims, which arise from the
same factual predicate underlying the federal civil rights claims,
have been submitted to a state medical review panel, as state law
requires.
CHL and its employees move to dismiss the plaintiff’s civil
rights claims for failure to state a claim and move to dismiss
without prejudice the medical malpractice claims pending
exhaustion by the state medical panel review. The Court summarizes
the applicable federal civil rights law to determine whether the

plaintiff has stated civil rights claims against the healthcare
defendants before turning to address the defendants’ (undisputed)
contention that the state law medical malpractice claims are
premature.
A.
Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 creates a damages
remedy for the violation of federal constitutional or statutory
rights under color of state law; it provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured.

“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using
their badge of authority to deprive individuals of their federally
guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such
deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
Because § 1983 merely provides a remedy for designated rights,
rather than creating any substantive rights, “an underlying
constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to
liability.” Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir.
1997)(citation omitted). To establish § 1983 liability, the
plaintiff must satisfy three elements:
(1) deprivation of a right secured by the U.S.
Constitution or federal law,
(2) that occurred under color of state law, and
(3) was caused by a state actor.
Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted).
B.
Navigating the § 1983 legal framework applicable to a
plaintiff’s allegations that custodial medical officials failed to
render medical care or provide protection from harm is dictated by
the nature of the complainant (convicted prisoner or pretrial
detainee?), the nature of the challenged conduct (condition-of-
confinement or episodic-act-or-omission?), and the sort of
defendant sued (individual official or municipality?). In this

custodial suicide case, a pretrial detainee’s daughter challenges
episodic acts or omissions of both individual defendants and a
“municipal” defendant (the municipality’s contractual medical
service provider).
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment is the constitutional source of liability where an
official demonstrates deliberate indifference to a convicted
prisoner’s serious medical needs, whereas pretrial detainees whom
have not yet been convicted of a crime and therefore may not be
punished “look to the procedural and substantive due process
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure provision of these
same basic needs.” See Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff’s Dep’t,

228 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Baughman v. Hickman,
935 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2019)(“the Fourteenth Amendment case
law concerning pretrial detainees [is based] on the Supreme Court’s
Eighth Amendment precedent concerning prisoners.”); Cadena v. El
Paso County, 946 F.3d 717, 727 (5th Cir. 2020)(noting that “[t]he
standard is the same as that for a prisoner under the Eighth
Amendment”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)(observing
that pretrial detainees have not been convicted of a crime such
that no punishment of any kind is permitted).3 “The Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees pretrial detainees a right ‘not to have their
serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part

of the confining officials.’” Dyer v. Houston, 955 F.3d 501, 506
(5th Cir. 2020)(quoting Thompson v. Upshur Cty., Tex., 245 F.3d
447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001)). Among the Fourteenth Amendment rights
guaranteed to pretrial detainees are the right to medical care and
the right to protection from harm, including medical care for and
protection from known suicidal tendencies. See Garza v. City of
Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 632 (5th Cir. 2019)(citations omitted);
Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of City of Houston, Tex.,
791 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986)(“A serious medical need may
exist for psychological or psychiatric treatment, just as it may
exist for physical ills. A psychological or psychiatric condition
can be as serious as any physical pathology or injury, especially

when it results in suicidal tendencies.”).
As to the second classification (the nature of the challenged
conduct) dictating how to analyze a § 1983 deliberate indifference
claim, “[a] pretrial detainee may prove a constitutional violation

3 That the plaintiff alleges Eighth Amendment violations and the
parties brief the applicability of the Eighth Amendment is of no
moment, considering that the plaintiff also correctly invokes the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment case literature
concerning pretrial detainees is based on the Supreme Court’s
Eighth Amendment precedent concerning prisoners. Any § 1983 claims
based on the Eighth Amendment must be dismissed.
either by demonstrating an unconstitutional condition of
confinement or by demonstrating an unconstitutional episodic act
or omission.” Cadena, 946 F.3d at 727 (citation omitted). When

a plaintiff pursues an episodic-acts-or-omissions theory, she
seeks to redress harms arising from “the particular act or omission
of one or more officials,” rather than conditions-of-confinement
harms, which result directly from an institution’s pervasive
unconstitutional policy or practice (such as overcrowding,
excessive heat, the use of disciplinary segregation). See Garza,
922 F.3d at 632 (citations omitted). Most frequently, jail suicide
cases proceed on an episodic-act, rather than conditions-of-
confinement, theory; however, custodial-suicide plaintiffs may
pursue both as alternative theories. See id. at 633 and n.3.
The plaintiff’s theory here appears limited to challenging
CHL’s and its employee’s episodic act or omission in treating (or

failing to treat) Williams’s mental health and their failure to
protect him from the harm presented by his suicidal ideation. In
considering such a theory, the Court must “employ different
standards depending on whether the liability of the individual
defendant or the municipal defendant is at issue.” Baughman, 935
F.3d at 307 (citation omitted). Regardless of whether municipal
or individual liability is at stake, the plaintiff must show that
officials acted with deliberate indifference; “an extremely high
standard to meet.” Id. (citation omitted). This “wanton” or
“recklessness” showing requires that “(1) the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and (2) he must also draw

the inference.” Id. (citations omitted); Dyer, 955 F.3d at 506.
Municipal “as opposed to individual liability has the additional
requirement that the ‘violation resulted from a [municipal] policy
or custom adopted and maintained with objective deliberate
indifference.’” Baughman, 935 F.3d at 307 (quoting Garza, 922
F.3d at 634).4
As for the “substantial risk of serious harm” component of
the first element, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that
pretrial detainees have a right “not to have their serious medical

4 Although there is some confusion in the case literature, the
Fifth Circuit has recently clarified that -- no matter whether
official or municipal liability is at issue -- there is no third
requirement that the official subjectively intend the particular
harm to occur. Dyer, 955 F.3d at 507; Garza, 922 F.3d at 635-36.
The Court observes that there is another area of disagreement or
confusion concerning the standard for deliberate indifference of
pretrial detainees: whether the standard is subjective (the
defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm) or
objective (the defendants knew or should have known of the risk of
harm). Compare Alderson v. Concordia Parish Correctional
Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419-20 (5th Cir. 2017)(pretrial detainees
must show subjective deliberate indifference) with Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015)(holding that an objective
standard applied to whether force used against a pretrial detainee
was excessive). The Court is bound to follow Alderson and other
recent Fifth Circuit case literature specific to the serious
medical needs context. See, e.g., Baughman, 935 F.3d at 307
(applying subjective deliberate indifference test to pretrial
detainee’s claim that certain medical and other officials acted
with deliberate indifference towards his serious medical needs).
needs met with deliberate indifference.” Dyer, 955 F.3d at 506.
A serious medical condition or need is equivalent to objective
exposure to a substantial risk of harm; such a condition or need

is “one for which treatment has been recommended or for which the
need is so apparent that even laymen would recognize that care is
required.” Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 538-40 (5th Cir.
2018)(quoting Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345 n.12 (5th Cir.
2006)); Cadena, 946 F.3d at 727-28. “Medical treatment that is
merely unsuccessful or negligent does not constitute deliberate
indifference, ‘nor does a prisoner’s disagreement with his medical
treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.’” See Arenas v.
Calhoun, 922 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 2019)(citations
omitted)(analogous Eighth Amendment convicted prisoner context).
Thus, a plaintiff “must show that the officials refused to treat
him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him

incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly
evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’” See
id. at 620-21 (citations omitted). To be sure, “[p]rison officials
who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety
may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to
the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994)(considering analogous Eighth
Amendment context).
As to the defendant’s challenged conduct, it must be
egregious: “[d]eliberate indifference is an extremely high
standard to meet.” Dyer, 955 F.3d at 506. It “cannot be inferred

merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a
substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (citations omitted).
Deliberate indifference “requires that the defendant act with
‘something more than negligence’ but ‘less than acts or omissions
for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm
will result.’” Cadena, 946 F.3d at 728 (citation omitted). For
example, “the decision whether to provide additional treatment ‘is
a classic example of a matter for medical judgment,’ which fails
to give rise to a deliberate-indifference claim.” Dyer, 955 F.3d
at 507 (citation omitted). Similarly, “mere disagreement with
one’s medical treatment” and “[u]nsuccessful medical treatment,
acts of negligence, or medical malpractice” fall short of

deliberate indifference. See id. To act with deliberate
indifference, an official must “know[] of and disregard an
excessive risk to inmate safety.” Garza, 922 F.3d at 635 (“It is,
indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner
is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.”)
(citations omitted).
III.
A.
Before reaching the substantive heart of the defendants’

motion to dismiss, the Court takes up several preliminary issues.
First, the parties appear to concede that the state action and
under color of law elements of the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim are
sufficiently alleged. That is, notwithstanding their ostensible
private actor status, the parties agree that CHL and CHL employees
are potentially liable for their own acts and omissions as state
actors under color of state law by reason of CHL’s contract with
the LPDC. The Court foregoes a public-function analysis to resolve
the state-actor inquiry because there is no dispute that the
plaintiff plausibly alleges that the state (through the LPSO or
LPDC) must provide adequate medical care to pretrial detainees and
that function was delegated to CHL and its employees, which assumed

the LPDC’s obligation by contract. In other words, if the
plaintiff alleges a constitutional deprivation by the private
medical care defendants, the deprivation occurred at the hands of
state actors under color of state law because CHL’s policies and
its employees’ actions are fairly attributable to the state. It
is settled that “[p]rivate actors may, under some circumstances,
be liable under § 1983[.]” Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 251
(5th Cir. 2018)(citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988)(“We
now make explicit what was implicit in our holding in Estelle: ...
a physician employed by [the state] to provide medical services to
state prison inmates, act[s] under color of state law for purposes
of § 1983 when undertaking his duties in treating [a state

inmate’s] injury. Such conduct is fairly attributable to the
State.”)). When a state or municipality contracts with a private
party to administer healthcare to inmates or detainees, the private
party and its employees administer the medical services under color
of state law (because they perform a public function by providing
medical care to individuals in state custody) and therefore may be
sued as state actors. See West, 487 U.S. at 55-56. These
principles apply to CHL and its employees. For these reasons, the
CHL defendants do not appear to dispute that the state action and
under color of law requirements are not a basis for dismissal.
Second, the plaintiff concedes in her opposition papers that
there is no vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Indeed,

§ 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior
liability. See Connick v. Thompson, 536 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); Monell
v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 692-
94 (1978). Insofar as the plaintiff attempts to hold CHL
vicariously liable for its employees’ alleged constitutional
violations, as alleged as part of Count 3 of the complaint, any
such claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.5

5 The parties agree that Monell liability may be extended to private
entities acting under color of state law. Assuming it may, see,
Third, the plaintiff concedes that the defendants’ motion to
dismiss should be granted as to Aysa Every. Accordingly, the Court
need not independently examine the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s

allegations against this defendant; the defendants’ motion is
granted as unopposed as to Aysa Every.
Finally, the defendants urge the Court to consider Williams’s
medical records in determining whether the plaintiff states a
claim. Even assuming that the Court may consider the contents of
the medical records as “central to the plaintiff’s claims” without
converting the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, the
Court declines the defendants’ invitation to resolve certain
alleged ambiguities in the records in favor of the defendants.
That the defendants invoke cases resolving deliberate indifference
claims on summary judgment are not helpful to the Court’s task
here. Now is not the time to resolve factual disputes; the test

at the pleadings stage juncture is whether a claim has been stated,
not proved.

e.g., Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrs., 746 F.3d 782, 786 (7th
Cir. 2014), Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th
Cir. 2012), and Lyons v. Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc., 30 F.3d 240,
246 (1st Cir. 1994), the Court considers below whether the
plaintiff states a plausible Monell claim against CHL.
B.
The Court addresses the sufficiency of the allegations of the
medical defendant officials’ individual liability before assessing

the allegations concerning CHL’s Monell liability.
CHL employees David Jennings, Kendra Patrick, Patricia
Guidry, Katasha Morris, Shanta Sherman, Sarah Armond, and Chelsea
Nolan are sued in their individual capacities. In moving to
dismiss the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims, they
advance three main arguments. First, the defendants contend that
conclusory collective pleading fails to state any claim as to each
individual defendant. Second, they contend that certain
allegations are contradicted by the medical records. And, third,
they contend that they provided care to Williams and the plaintiff
simply disagrees over the type of care provided. The plaintiff
counters that the complaint adequately individualizes claims

against each defendant, the medical records support the
alternatively theories advanced in the complaint, and the
plaintiff sufficiently alleges that the individual CHL defendants
documented Williams’s mental health status, but failed to treat
him.
As previously summarized, pretrial detainees like Williams
have a Fourteenth Amendment right to be protected from
impermissible punishment like denials of, or delays in, providing
medical care for serious medical needs. As put plainly by the
Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, to recover damages for
such a violation, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that: (1) the plaintiff was exposed to a substantial

risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant displayed deliberate
indifference to that risk; and (3) the deliberate indifference
harmed the plaintiff. If a reasonable person would view Williams’s
alleged mental illnesses and suicidal ideation as sufficiently
serious based on all of the alleged circumstances, then the first
requirement is met. See id. Proof of egregious conduct is
required to meet the second element: the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
Williams’s mental health or safety (risk of self-harm from
suicide). See id. (noting the two-prong test plaintiff must
prove: (1) the defendant was aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

existed; and (2) the defendant actually drew that inference). Mere
disagreement with the type, amount, or timing of medical treatment
is insufficient. Id. For an episodic-act-or-omission claim
“relying on an alleged denial or delay of medical care,” the
plaintiff may prove “deliberate indifference by demonstrating that
an official ‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in similar
conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any
serious medical needs.’” Baughman, 935 F.3d at 309 (quoting
Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 258 (5th Cir. 2018)). Each
defendant’s alleged conduct is examined individually. Id.
(citation omitted).

“Suicide is an objectively serious harm implicating the
state’s duty to provide adequate medical care” and protection from
harm. See Arenas v. Calhoun, 922 F.3d 616, 621 (5th Cir.
2019)(citation omitted). Although it is established that “jailers
must take measures to prevent inmate suicides once they know of
the risk,” the Fifth Circuit has observed that there is a lack of
“clarity as to what those measures must be.” See Hyatt v. Thomas,
843 F.3d 172, 177-78 (5th Cir. 2016). If an officer or medical
provider responds without the due care a reasonable person would
use, the officer acted merely negligently and no liability
attaches. See id. Given that “suicide is inherently difficult
... to predict, particularly in the depressing prison setting[,]

an incorrect diagnosis regarding the genuineness of a suicide
threat does not amount to deliberate indifference.” Young v.
McCain, 760 Fed.Appx. 251, 256 (5th Cir. 2019)(citing Domino v.
Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir.
2001)).
The defendants do not appear to dispute that the plaintiff
alleges facts that, if proved, indicate that certain individuals
were aware that Williams had serious medical needs (insofar as he
indicated to some that he suffered from mental illness and as
manifested in suicide risk and express suicidal ideation) and knew
that he was a known suicide risk. Certain allegations
differentiate individual CHL defendants: it is alleged that either

Sherman or Guidry originally placed Williams on suicide watch on
September 18, 2018 because he stated he wanted to kill himself.
Seven days later, Williams was interviewed by Armond or Jennings
at which time he reported feeling suicidal, depressed, hopeless,
having been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, and
having previously been prescribed medications to treat his mental
health issues. It is alleged that that same day (September 25)
Nolan either requested (with Williams’s authorization) or
alternatively requested and also received Williams’s prior mental
health treatment records from a facility where Williams had been
treated, which confirmed his mental health history, diagnoses,
treatment, and medications. Two days later, it is alleged that

Patrick noted that Williams -- who had by then been on suicide
watch for 9 days -- reports being depressed and suicidal as well
as bipolar and schizophrenic and unmedicated; Patrick made a Mental
Health Note to “keep [Williams] on suicide watch obtain records
from Jeff Carrol [sic] rtc 1 week.” Five days later on the morning
of October 2, Williams was examined by Jennings, who noted in the
interview form that Williams “was definitive in his denial of
[suicide ideation] or wanting to hurt himself,” that Williams
reported his diagnostic history of bipolar disorder and
schizophrenia and that he was receiving an Invega shot until a few
months ago, and that Williams stated that he had “support from
family and hope for his future.” Jennings made the decision to

discontinue suicide watch; he made a Mental Health Note and
Provider Order stating “[d]iscontinue suicide watch, house per
security, verify meds, psych appointment, f/u in one week by social
worker[.]” Williams was removed from suicide watch and placed in
D Block then moved to E Block on October 5 after a problem with
another inmate. In the afternoon of October 5, Nolan indicated
“SUICIDAL IDEATIONS MENTAL HEALTH” in Williams’s chart next to
“Medical Problems,” including “current,” “extended,” and “all”
medical problems. Nolan also indicated “NONE” for medications and
as to “Outstanding Appts[,]” she indicated “Appointment with Appt:
MenHlth Sick Call-Prov for 10-09-2018: f/u social worker in one
week Appointment with Appt: Mental Health Provider (NP_PA) for 10-

11-2018: VERIFY MEDS, PSYCH APPOINTMENT UPON VERIFICATION.” But
none of the defendants verified Williams’s medications or stated
diagnoses, prescribed or administered medications he had
previously received, and no psychologist or psychiatrist ever
evaluated Williams before he killed himself on October 7, 2018.
Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, Williams presented a serious mental health need and
need for protection from self-harm. Satisfying the plausibility
standard as to the first element. Williams reported to more than
one CHL defendant (Sherman, Guidry, Armond, Jennings, and Patrick)
that he was bipolar and schizophrenic, off his meds, depressed,
and suicidal. Whether because treatment was previously

recommended for Williams (as he indicated to some CHL medical
staff, even if they failed to confirm it) or because even laymen
would recognize mental health care was indicated, the plaintiff
has alleged facts indicating that Williams had a serious medical
condition or objective exposure to a substantial risk of harm.
See Carlucci, 884 F.3d at 538-40; Cadena, 946 F.3d at 727-28.
The plaintiff alleges a constitutional deprivation under §
1983 if facts are alleged indicating that Williams’s serious
medical needs were met with deliberate indifference. With the
exception of Jennings, the defendants contend that the plaintiff
fails to allege facts attributing deliberately indifferent conduct
to specific defendants. Jennings contends that the plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference allegations concerning his conduct sound
merely in negligence. The Court agrees that the plaintiff fails
to allege facts indicating deliberate indifference on the part of
Kendra Patrick, Patricia Guidry, Katasha Morris, Shanta Sherman,
Sarah Armond, and Chelsea Nolan. But the Court disagrees that the
plaintiff alleges merely unactionable negligence against Jennings.
Most of the plaintiff’s allegations improperly lump the
defendants together and fail to allege which defendants knew of
the substantial risk to Williams and which defendants failed to
take reasonable measures to respond to the substantial risk of
suicide. For example, as to Morris, the plaintiff merely alleges
that she was one of several CHL employees charged with observing

Williams while he was on suicide watch. What’s missing are facts
specific to Morris as to how she exhibited deliberate indifference
to Williams. Similarly, the plaintiff’s allegations as to the
other CHL individual defendants fail to offer an alleged factual
predicate of deliberately indifferent conduct. Shanta Sherman is
alleged to have placed Williams on suicide watch; Kendra Patrick
is alleged to have kept Williams on suicide watch after Williams
stated he was still suicidal and she also noted the need to obtain
mental health records; Patricia Guidry is alleged to have placed
Williams on suicide watch; Sarah Armond is alleged to have
interviewed Williams about suicidal ideation; and Chelsea Nolan is
alleged to have originally requested JeffCare records and, after

suicide watch was discontinued, she allegedly noted outstanding
appointments and mental health issues in chart. Without concrete
facts indicating how each exhibited deliberate indifferene to
Williams, these allegations are merely part of the chronology
contextualizing Jennings’s alleged constitutional violation. The
plaintiff concludes that the defendants “documented Williams’s
mental status but didn’t treat him.” But the plaintiff fails to
allege facts indicating how each of the CHL defendants (except
Jennings) recklessly disregarded Williams’s suicide risk or
recklessly failed to treat his serious mental health issues.
Allegations that the defendants (collectively) should have
obtained his mental health history records, should have had

Williams evaluated by a mental health professional such as a
psychologist or psychiatrist, should have administered prescribed
medications are conclusory group allegations, which fail to state
plausible individual capacity claims.
In spite of Williams’s self-reported mental health issues,
plaintiff alleges that the CHL defendants either confirmed or
failed to confirm his diagnoses by promptly obtaining his medical
records; failed to have him promptly examined by a mental health
expert such as a psychologist or psychiatrist; failed to have his
medication evaluated; and took an unmedicated mentally ill
pretrial detainee’s word for it when he stated (after weeks of
depression and suicidal ideation) that he was no longer

contemplating suicide. This, the plaintiff contends, constitutes
a failure to treat known mental health issues. To be sure, “just
as a failure to act to save a detainee from suffering from gangrene
might violate the duty to provide reasonable medical care ...
failure to take any steps to save a suicidal detainee from injuring
himself may also [violate] due process[.]” Partridge v. Two
Unknown Police Officers of City of Houston, Tex., 791 F.2d 1182,
1187 (5th Cir. 1986). If some individuals denied or delayed a
psychological or psychiatric evaluation or delayed in confirming
Williams’s diagnoses, or delayed in providing him with treatment
(including prescription medications previously prescribed to
ameliorate his bipolar and schizophrenic symptoms) such conduct

may constitute deliberate indifference. Carlucci, 884 F.3d at 538
(“A delay in medical treatment that results in substantial harm
[may] constitute deliberate indifference.”). However, because
the plaintiff fails to allege which CHL individuals disregarded
known risks, refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, or
engaged in similar conduct evincing a wanton disregard for
Williams’s serious mental health needs, the plaintiff’s claims
against Kendra Patrick, Patricia Guidry, Katasha Morris, Shanta
Sherman, Sarah Armond, and Chelsea Nolan must be dismissed; the
Court will permit an amendment to the complaint within fourteen
days if the plaintiff in good faith believes that it is possible
to cure the pleading deficiencies as to these defendants.

The plaintiff’s allegations pertaining to Jennings are the
exception; his alleged deliberate indifference is specific to his
cumulative knowledge and conduct. By discontinuing suicide watch
for Williams, notwithstanding the circumstances indicating a
suicide threat, it is alleged that he was deliberately indifferent
to Williams’s serious medical need. Jennings frames his conduct
in a limited fashion: making one decision concerning Williams’s
mental health treatment. But the plaintiff’s narrative sweeps
more broadly, framing Jennings’s conduct as a culmination of
failures in the context of Jennings’s specific knowledge regarding
Williams’s mental illness and vulnerability to suicide. Viewed
collectively, and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

the plaintiff alleges that Jennings disregarded a known risk and
was deliberately indifferent to Williams’s serious medical needs.6
It is alleged that Jennings knew that Williams self-reported
as schizophrenic, bipolar, depressed, suicidal, and being off his
medications (after he self-reported as not being suicidal and

6 Jennings contends that he did not know that Williams posed a
substantial risk of suicide because Williams told Jennings he was
no longer suicidal. Again, the Court reminds the defendants that
this is the pleadings stage: it suffices that the plaintiff alleges
circumstantial facts that permit an inference of subjective
knowledge; here, the plaintiff alleges that Jennings knew that
Williams had reported feeling suicidal and depressed (indeed, it
is alleged Williams so reported to Jennings), that Williams was
unmedicated, had not been evaluated by a mental health professional
for weeks while on suicide watch at LPDC, and that he reported
having a mental health history including diagnoses of bipolar
disorder and schizophrenia. These allegations indicate that
Jennings knew that Williams indeed posed a substantial risk of
suicide even if Williams equivocated as to suicidal ideation and
ultimately told Jennings he felt hopeful. The defendants’ singular
focus on Jennings’s decision and their characterization that a
wrong decision may merely be negligent disregards the plaintiff’s
other allegations indicating (Jennings’s specific knowledge
regarding) an absence (or denial) of treatment or reasoned
evaluation of Williams’s suicide risk: the plaintiff alleges that
Jennings merely spoke briefly with Williams and cleared him of
suicidal ideation based on Williams’s self-serving statement that
he was no longer feeling suicidal, without corroborative
information or investigation; that is, it is alleged, Jennings
failed to confirm his serious mental health diagnoses, failed to
confirm (let alone prescribe) medications taken for mood disorder
and schizophrenia, and knew that Williams was unmedicated and had
not been seen by a mental health professional like a psychologist.
having no mental health history on intake). In spite of this
alleged knowledge and the knowledge that Williams had not yet been
examined by a mental health professional despite being on suicide

watch for weeks, had not had his alleged serious mental health
diagnoses confirmed by a prior facility, had not been prescribed
mood stabilizing or other medication since arriving at LPDC,
Jennings elected to discontinue suicide watch based solely on
Williams’s indication that he was no longer suicidal. Cumulating
the plaintiff’s factual allegations and considering the
chronology, this was not merely a medical professional wrongly
accepting the genuineness of Williams’s suicidal ideation; rather,
it is an allegation that Jennings acted with deliberate
indifference to the substantial risk of suicide posed by Williams.
The Court recognizes that the plaintiff’s complaint is far
from exemplary, and at times provides conclusory statements or

invokes the technically incorrect governing constitutional law
(Eighth Amendment versus Fourteenth Amendment). However, given
the alleged facts, taken as true, which plausibly indicate that
Williams was essentially untreated in spite of the serious risk of
self-harm this lack of treatment posed to an unmedicated person
suffering from bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, the
determination of whether the defendants acted with deliberate
indifference is a factual matter best assessed when the parties
have had the opportunity to develop their claims and submit
evidence. Cf. Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir.
1995)(citation omitted)(“Medical records of sick calls,
examinations, diagnoses, and medications may rebut an inmate’s

allegations of deliberate indifference.”). The Court is satisfied
that the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts that state a
plausible claim to survive this motion to dismiss as to Jennings
and that an opportunity for the plaintiff to timely amend the
complaint is warranted as to other CHL defendants.
C.
CHL moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim against it as an
entity. Whether the plaintiff states a § 1983 claim against CHL
is analyzed in accordance with the Monell framework.
The Court has already observed (and the plaintiff does not
dispute) that there is no respondeat superior liability under §
1983; no entity may be liable simply because it employs a person

who has violated the plaintiff’s rights. As a private entity that
acts under color of state law in contracting with the municipality
to provide medical services to detainees, CHL is treated as a
municipality for the purposes of § 1983 claims.7

7 The Circuits to have considered the issue agree that, where
private entities act in the place of a municipality, Monell
applies. See, e.g., Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrs., 746 F.3d
782, 786 (7th Cir. 2014); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d
1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012); Lyons v. Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc.,
30 F.3d 240, 246 (1st Cir. 1994); Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450,
452 (11th Cir. 1997).
Municipalities (or private entities acting in their places)
are “persons” for purposes of § 1983 and may be liable where “the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or

executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”
Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
663, 690 (1978). Imposition of § 1983 liability against a
municipality under Monell is appropriate in the limited
circumstance of when a constitutional tort is caused through the
execution of a policy or custom of the municipality. See Bowen v.
Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 989 (5th Cir. 1982)(citation omitted).
Municipalities or such private entities may also be sued for
“constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental
‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval
through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Monell, 436

U.S. at 690-91. A municipality is not liable for injuries
“inflicted solely by its employees or agents[; rather] it is when
execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government
as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694.
The test for establishing municipal liability in an episodic-
act-or-omission case is settled:
[A] plaintiff must show (1) that the municipal employee
violated [the pretrial detainee’s] clearly established
constitutional rights with subjective deliberate
indifference; ... (2) that this violation resulted from
a municipal policy or custom adopted and maintained with
objective deliberate indifference[; and (3)] either
written policy statements, ordinances, or regulations or
a widespread practice that is so...well-settled as
to...fairly represent[] municipal policy that was the
moving force behind the violation.

Cadena, 946 F.3d at 727 (citations, internal quotations omitted);
Garza, 922 F.3d at 637 (“[T]o establish municipal liability based
on an employee’s episodic act or omission, a plaintiff must show
the violation ‘resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted
and maintained with objective deliberate indifference.’”).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must describe
the policy and its relationship to the underlying constitutional
violation with specific facts. Balle v. Nueces County, 952
Fed.Appx. 552, 559 (5th Cir. 2017)(unpublished)(quoting Spiller v.
City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t., 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir.
1997). “Thus, pleadings are sufficient when they make specific
factual allegations that allow a court to reasonably infer that
a policy or practice exists and that the alleged policy or
practice was the moving force behind municipal employees'
deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs.”
Id.8

8 The Fifth Circuit does not necessarily require a complaint to
state an unconstitutional policy. The court has found a complaint
sufficient if it identifies a rule requiring the jails to provide
CHL contends that the plaintiff’s Monell claim fails to state
a claim because the plaintiff cannot establish deliberate
indifference to Williams’s medical needs; the plaintiff’s

allegations regarding failure to monitor, train, or supervise are
merely conclusory; and alleged incidents at other jails have no
bearing on CHL’s Monell liability in this case. The Court agrees
that the plaintiff’s failure to train allegations fall short of
the substantive legal requirements and that the plaintiff’s

efficient medical treatment and describes a pattern of behavior
where the reasonable inference is that the municipality violated
that rule. For example, in Balle, the Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint sufficiently pled facts supporting a
municipality liability claim. Id. at 559-60. The plaintiff was
injured by an officer during arrest, and during his six-day
detention received little medical attention despite his multiple
requests for medical treatment, his apparent inability to control
his bodily functions, and frequent muscle spasms. Id. at 560. After
he was finally transported to the hospital, he was diagnosed with
various back injuries, underwent surgery, but was still unable to
walk. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the county had failed to
enforce jailing policies mandated by a Texas Commission that
requires jails to implement procedures for prompt and efficient
care in acute situations. Id. at 559. The complaint alleged that
when the plaintiff soiled himself from not being able to control
his bodily functions the staff cleaned him and gave him a change
of clothes without providing him medical attention. Id. at 560.
Similarly, when he complained that he was paralyzed and could not
walk, he was not given medical attention until the following day
and even then, he was cleared with little follow-up. Id. The Fifth
Circuit held that these incidences evidence a “pattern of failure
[that] defied state law requiring that [the] county implement
procedures to efficiently and promptly treat inmates.” Id. From
the complaint’s allegations of consistent wrongdoing, the court
determined that “[r]easonable inferences can be drawn that [the]
county had an unwritten policy . . . that fairly represents
municipal policy of consistent noncompliance with required state
medical standards and that this policy or practice of noncompliance
was the moving force behind the constitutional injuries[.]” Id.
reliance on other private entities’ actions at other detention
facilities does not assist the plaintiff in attempting to state a
Monell claim. However, the Court has already rejected the

defendants’ argument that the plaintiff fails to state a predicate
individual deliberate indifference claim. The plaintiff has
stated a deliberate indifference claim against Jennings and the
plaintiff will be afforded the opportunity to repair the
deficiencies as to the other CHL individual defendants. The
plaintiff shall have the same opportunity to state a plausible
Monell claim against CHL.
The plaintiff contends that the Monell claim is sufficiently
pled; the plaintiff has alleged facts showing a pattern of sloppy,
deliberately indifferent treatment of Williams by all of the CHL
defendants. The deliberately indifferent conduct began as soon as
Williams advised that he was suicidal. CHL failed to obtain his

prior medical records, failed to follow jail protocol to have
Williams examined by a psychiatrist after he advised that he was
suicidal, limited his exam to one interview by a nurse practitioner
before his interview by social worker Jennings, failed to medicate
Williams, failed to refer him back to suicide watch, failed to
refer him to a psychiatrist or the ER on October 5 when he
reiterated his suicidal ideation, and there is a lack of post-
suicide-watch monitoring and insufficient staffing. These
deficiencies, the plaintiff contends, demonstrate CHL’s
unconstitutional policies related to training, supervision,
staffing, and monitoring.
To assess the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s Monell claim,

the Court considers the plaintiff’s allegations pertaining to
Monell liability. The plaintiff alleges that the following
“policies and practices” were established and maintained knowing
they would deprive Williams of treatment for his serious mental
health disorders: “failing to provide a qualified mental health
staff; failing to provide a sufficient number of qualified mental
health providers; failing to ensure that psychiatrists cleared
patients off of suicide watch; failing to properly supervise and
train its employees; failing to provide supportive therapy and
interaction to patients on suicide watch; failing to provide
appropriate suicide step-down and follow up plans; failing to have
a policy in place to monitor its staff to ensure quality control

and ensure prior health care records are shared and read on a daily
basis to ensure that the staff knows a patient’s prior mental
health history and medication needs.”
Because the plaintiff fails to allege a formal policy
statement announced by a policymaker, any Monell liability must be
anchored to a persistent widespread practice so common and well-
settled that it fairly represents CHL policy. Given that the prior
incidents the plaintiff invokes in the complaint to indicate CHL
policy did not occur on CHL’s watch at LPDC, the plaintiff is left
with conclusory allegations of a policy based solely on Williams’s
experience with CHL. This undermines the plaintiff’s ability to
allege a pattern, which not only requires “sufficiently numerous

prior incidents[,]” McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180,
1184 (5th Cir. 1989), but also “requires similarity; prior
indications cannot simply be for any and all bad or unwise acts,
but rather must point to the specific violation in question.” See
Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 850-51 (5th Cir.
2009)(citation, internal quotations omitted). Similarly, the
plaintiff’s allegations that CHL failed to adopt certain policies,
without concrete facts in support, are insufficient to indicate
the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claim that CHL failed to adopt
the needed policy or that it did so with deliberate indifference.
Finally, the plaintiff’s failure to train theory fails the
plausibility test where, as here, the plaintiff fails to identify

a particular deficiency in the training program that is related to
Williams’s constitutional injury. “In limited circumstances, a
local government’s decision not to train certain employees about
their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to
the level of an official government policy[.]” Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). But, “[a] municipality’s culpability for
a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns
on a failure to train.” Id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff
must allege a pattern of violations in addition to how a particular
training program is defective. See Estate of Davis v. City of N.
Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005). Absent notice
that a training course is insufficient, it cannot be said that an

entity has deliberately chosen a particular training program;
thus, it is the entity’s “policy of inaction in light of notice
that its program will cause constitutional violations [that] is
the functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to
violate the constitution.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61-62 (citing
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 395 (1989)).
To be sure, the plaintiff’s allegations imply that cumulative
errors and failures contributed to Williams’s suicide and evince
a concern that CHL may escape liability by diffusing responsibility
across its employees. Because the plaintiff alleges that at least
one CHL employee was deliberately indifferent to Williams’s
serious medical needs and the plaintiff further alleges (albeit

broadly) that systemic deficits and inadequate training in CHL’s
mental healthcare treatment program harmed Williams’s mental
health and led to his death, the plaintiff will have the
opportunity to amend its deficient policy-or-custom allegations.
IV.
Finally, CHL and its employees move to dismiss without
prejudice the plaintiff’s state-law negligence claims.
Alternatively, they seek to stay this case pending the outcome of
the medical review panel currently pending in the state agency.
The plaintiff concedes that the medical malpractice and vicarious
liability claims (Counts 6 and 7) require exhaustion before the
state medical review panel; a process that is underway but not

final. The plaintiff also concedes that the medical malpractice
claims arise from the same set of facts giving rise to the
plaintiff’s constitutional claims. Nevertheless, the plaintiff
worries that dismissal of only the medical malpractice claims would
result in two suits in two courts regarding the same underlying
facts. The plaintiff urges the Court to either (a) stay only the
medical malpractice portion of the case pending completion of the
medical review panel or (b) dismiss without prejudice to allow for
the rejoinder of the medical malpractice claims after completion
of the medical review panel. Only a partial stay is warranted
here, the plaintiff suggests, because a complete stay would
prejudice the parties by impeding discovery and timely resolution

of the claims.
In Evans v. Lopinto, No. 18-8972, the plaintiffs allege that
various law enforcement and medical defendants’ deliberate
indifference led to a pretrial detainee’s death by suicide. There,
another Section of Court determined that a stay of the entire
litigation pending the conclusion of the medical review panel
furthered the interest of judicial economy. See 2019 WL 2995870,
at * (E.D. La. July 8, 2019)(Brown, C.J.). So, too, here.
Each of the plaintiff’s claims, including the state-law
medical malpractice claims, arise out of Williams’s suicide while
he was detained at LPDC under the defendants’ supervision and in

the defendants’ care. Discovery will apply to all interrelated
claims. Additionally, the medical review panel’s determination
may be admissible (though not conclusive) evidence at any trial of
this matter. See Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d
146, 149 (5th Cir. 1981). A stay of this case pending the outcome
of the medical review panel is warranted. However, the Court shall
entertain the implementation of the stay pending timely submission
of any amended complaint and completion of the pleadings stage.
***
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED: that
the medical defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part (the
plaintiff’s § 1983 claims based on the Eighth Amendment are

dismissed; the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Aysa Every is
dismissed; the plaintiff’s claim that CHL is vicariously liable
under § 1983 is dismissed; the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against
Kendra Patrick, Patricia Guidry, Katasha Morris, Shanta Sherman,
Sara Armond, and Chelsea Nolan are dismissed without prejudice to
the plaintiff’s effort to timely cure the pleading deficiencies;
the plaintiffs Monell claim against CHL is dismissed without
prejudice to the plaintiff’s effort to timely cure the pleading
deficiencies) and DENIED in part (the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim
against David Jennings in his individual capacity remains
pending). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: that, within 14 days, the
plaintiff shall have the opportunity to file an amended complaint
to address the pleading deficiencies identified in this Order and
Reasons, if it can be done in good faith.
New Orleans, Louisiana, June 17, 2020

MARTIN . C. ELDMAN
UNITED STAKES DISTRICT JUDGE

47

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10185598. Public record. Not legal advice.