# Gaddy v. Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · March 4, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10185316

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** March 4, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JAMES LEOMA GADDY ET AL CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 19-12926

TAYLOR SEIDENBACH, INC. ET AL SECTION "L" (2)

ORDER & REASONS
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for New Trial and/or Remittitur and
Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, R. Doc. 58-1. Plaintiffs oppose the Motion. R.
Doc. 84. Oral argument was heard on February 19, 2020. Having considered the parties’ arguments
and the applicable law, the Court now rules as follows.
I. BACKGROUND
Decedent, James Leoma Gaddy, filed a Petition for Damages against various defendants
on September 21, 2018 in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 3. The
petition generally alleges that Gaddy was exposed to asbestos while working at International Paper
from 1948–1950 and in 1952, and while working as a chemical engineer at Ethyl Corporation’s
facility from 1955–1960. R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 4. Gaddy filed suit against a number of defendants,
including Taylor-Seidenbach, which is domiciled in Louisiana. R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 5. Gaddy is an
Arkansas resident. After Gaddy passed away in January 2018, his children were substituted as
Plaintiffs. R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 6.
On September 25, 2019, Plaintiffs informed Ethyl that they had reached a settlement
agreement with Taylor-Seidenbach, the only remaining Louisiana defendant in the matter. R. Doc.
1 at ¶ 12. Accordingly, Ethyl Corporation, the only remaining defendant, filed a notice of removal
on diversity jurisdiction grounds, as Plaintiffs are citizens of Arkansas and Ethyl Corporation is a
citizen of Virginia. R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 14–15. Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to remand on
October 3, 2019, which the Court denied on October 4, 2019. R. Doc. 7.
A jury trial began on November 4, 2019. Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief involved the testimony

of the decedent, James Leoma Gaddy; Eugene Ponti, the corporate representative of Ethyl
Corporation; Susan Raterman, an expert in the field of industrial hygiene, Dr. Richard Kradin, an
expert in the field of internal medicine, pulmonology, pathology, and asbestos diseases; Dr. Ted
Fish, Dr. Gaddy’s treating cardiologist; and James Courtney Gaddy, Dr. Gaddy’s son.
After Plaintiffs rested, Ethyl Corporation presented its case, calling Nemore Rayne, a
former Ethyl employee; Wallace Armstrong, a former Ethyl employee; James Hamilton, a former
Ethyl employee; Dr. James Rock, an expert in the field of industrial hygiene; and Dr. William
Breall, an expert in the field of cardiology.
At the close of evidence, both parties made Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of
law regarding certain aspects of the case. Both motions were denied. Both sides gave closing

arguments on the morning of November 8, 2020, and the jury began deliberating. Later that day,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs, finding Ethyl Corporation both negligent and
strictly liable, and awarding Plaintiffs $7,500,000.00 in general damages.1 The jury also awarded
$250,661.45 in medical expenses. R. Doc. 50. The jury also found International Paper negligent
and strictly liable, and Owens-Illinois liable as a manufacturer of an unreasonably dangerous
product. Final judgment was entered on November 20, 2020 in favor of Plaintiffs against Ethyl
Corporation for $2,583,553.82, plus legal interest, which represented Ethyl’s share of liability after
accounting for the virile shares of International Paper and Owens-Illinois. R. Doc. 53.

1 This award was comprised of $2,500,000.00 for physical pain and suffering, $2,500,000.00 for mental
anguish, and $2,500,000.00 for loss of enjoyment of life. R. Doc. 50.
II. PENDING MOTION
Defendant Ethyl timely filed a motion for a new trial or, alternatively, for remittitur. R.
Doc. 58. Defendant argues it is entitled to a new trial for the following four reasons: (1) the jury
verdict is against the great weight of the evidence; (2) the court committed legal error in permitting

inadmissible expert testimony; (3) the jury verdict followed improper conduct by the jury; and (4)
the amount of the verdict is so excessive as to shock the conscience.
Defendant also renews its motion for judgment as a matter of law made at trial, arguing
Ethyl cannot be held strictly liable for Dr. Gaddy’s mesothelioma because any asbestos exposure
he experienced at Ethyl was the result of temporary maintenance activities that do not rise to the
level of a “defect,” as a matter of law, under article 2317.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the trial was fair, the evidence was reliable, and the
witnesses were trustworthy and convincing. R. Doc. 80-2 at 9.
III. LAW
A. Rule 59(a)(1) Motion for a New Trial or a Remittitur

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 provides that “[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new
trial on all or some of the issues—and to any party—as follows: after a jury trial, for any reason
for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(a)(1)(A).
Under Rule 59, a new trial may be granted if “the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was
committed in its course.” Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted); see also McFadden v. Wal–Mart Stores, No. 04-2547, 2006 WL 3087164, at
*2 (E.D. La. Oct. 27, 2006). “A district court, however, should attempt to avoid substituting its
judgment for the jury’s considered verdict, so as to not violate the parties’ Seventh Amendment
rights.” Sorina v. Avis Rent–A–Car Sys., Inc., 1992 WL 40840, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 20, 1992); see
also Wright v. Nat'l Interstate Ins. Co., No. CV 16-16214, 2018 WL 2017567, at *3 (E.D. La. May
1, 2018), aff'd, 762 F. App'x 201 (5th Cir. 2019). If the jury’s verdict is “clearly within the universe

of possible awards which are supported by the evidence,” the district court should not grant a new
trial. Narcisse v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co., 620 F.2d 544, 547 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Bonura v.
Sea Land Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1974)). A district court should not interfere
with the factfinder’s award of damages unless it is in an amount that “shock[s] the judicial
conscience and . . . raise[s] an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other
improper cause invaded the trial.” Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 569, 578 (5th Cir. 1991).
Because the matter is before the Court on diversity jurisdiction, the new trial and remittitur
standards of Louisiana law are applicable. See Fair v. Allen, 669 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 2012);
Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 498 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court in Gasperini . . . held
that, in an action based on state law but tried in federal court by reason of diversity of citizenship,

a district court must apply a new trial or remittitur standard according to the state's law controlling
jury awards for excessiveness or inadequacy . . . .”).
Under Louisiana law, “[a] new trial shall be granted ... [w]hen the verdict or judgment
appears clearly contrary to the law and evidence.” La. Code Civ. P. 1972(1). “The trial court’s
discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial is great, and its decision will not be disturbed on
appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.” Davis v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 774 So. 2d 84, 93 (La.
2000). “Whether to grant a new trial requires a discretionary balancing of many factors.” Id. (citing
Gibson v. Bossier City Gen. Hosp., 594 So. 2d 1332 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1991)). The Louisiana
Supreme Court has explained the trial court’s discretion as follows:
The fact that a determination on a motion for new trial involves judicial discretion,
however, does not imply that the trial court can freely interfere with any verdict
with which it disagrees. The discretionary power to grant a new trial must be
exercised with considerable caution . . . . Fact finding is the province of the jury,
and the trial court must not overstep its duty in overseeing the administration of
justice and unnecessarily usurp the jury’s responsibility. A motion for new trial
solely on the basis of being contrary to the evidence is directed squarely at the
accuracy of the jury’s factual determinations and must be viewed in that light. Thus,
the jury’s verdict should not be set aside if it is supportable by any fair interpretation
of the evidence.

Id. (citing Gibson, 594 So. 2d 1332).
In making this determination, the trial court must balance the great deference given to the
jury as the factfinder and the discretion bestowed upon the court in reviewing the motion, but the
scales are “clearly tilted in favor of the survival of the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 93–94. The trial court’s
decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is to be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 94.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that “the decision to grant or deny a
motion for new trial generally is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
disturbed unless there is an abuse of that discretion or a misapprehension of the law.” Dixon v.
International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 586 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd.
v. General Star Indemnity Co., 179 F.3d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1999); Mitchell v. Lone Star
Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 252 (5th Cir. 1990); Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d
927, 930 (5th Cir. 1982); Evers v. Equifax, Inc., 650 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. 1981). Moreover,
modifying or setting aside a judgment under Rule 59 is an extraordinary remedy; motions for new
trial or to alter or amend a judgment should not be avenues for relitigating old matters, raising new
arguments, or submitting evidence that could have been presented before. See Theriot v. Parish of
Jefferson, 66 F. Supp. 1435, 1452 (E.D. La. 1997); Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School Board,
No. 98-2605, 1999 WL 777720, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 1999). “It is well settled that a jury’s
damages award should not be disturbed unless it is ‘entirely disproportionate to the injury
sustained.’” Simeon v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1426 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983)). Further, “pain and
suffering is, to a large degree, not susceptible to monetary quantification, and the jury thus
necessarily has especially broad leeway,” but still, “[t]he sky is simply not the limit.” Id. at 1427

(5th Cir. 1988) (citations and quotations omitted).
B. Rule 50 – Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
After the close of evidence, Ethyl filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law on Plaintiff’s strict liability claim. R. Doc. 43. The Court denied the
motion. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), the movant may file a renewed motion
for judgment as a matter of law within 28 days after entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). A
Rule 50(b) motion in a jury trial case is a “challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury’s verdict.” Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 367 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir. 1995)). The Fifth Circuit has noted that in deciding
a Rule 50(b) motion, the trial court “consider[s] all of the evidence, drawing all reasonable

inferences and resolving all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.” Brown v. Bryan County, OK, 219 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2000). A judgment as a
matter of law should only be granted when “the evidence at trial points so strongly and
overwhelming in the movant’s favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion.”
Omnitech Int'l Inc. v. Clorox Co. Inc., 11 F.3d 1316, 1323 (5th Cir. 1994).
In Apache Deepwater, L.L.C. v. W&T Offshore, Inc., the Fifth Circuit discussed the
standard for a Rule 50(b) motion after a jury verdict:
[O]ur standard of review with respect to a jury verdict is especially deferential. A
party is only entitled to judgment as a matter of law on an issue where no reasonable
jury would have had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find otherwise. In
evaluating the evidence, this court credit[s] the non-moving party’s evidence and
disregard[s] all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required
to believe.
930 F.3d 647, 653 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations and quotations omitted). Thus, the Fifth Circuit has
made it clear that when a jury has rendered its verdict, that verdict should not be disturbed absent
strong, overwhelming evidence that shows a reasonable jury could not reach the opposite
conclusion. The Court will discuss each issue in turn.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that Ethyl
was negligent
Pursuant to Louisiana’s general negligence statute, article 2315, a plaintiff must prove five

elements to establish that liability exists under the facts of a particular case: “(1) the defendant had
a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific standard of care; (2) the defendant failed to
conform his or her conduct to the appropriate standard of care; (3) the defendant’s substandard
conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries; (4) the defendant’s substandard conduct was
a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and (5) actual damages.” S.J. v. Lafayette Parish Sch. Bd.,
2009-2195 (La. 7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1119, 1125 (citing Pinsonneault v. Merchants & Farmers Bank
& Trust Co., 01–2217, p. 6 (La. 4/3/02), 816 So.2d 270, 275–76).
Ethyl challenges the breach and causation elements of Plaintiffs’ negligence claim.
Specifically, Ethyl contends the jury erroneously found that Ethyl “breached the degree of care
reasonabl[y] expected from a corporation acting under the same or similar circumstances of Dr.

Gaddy’s employment between 1955 and 1959.” R. Doc. 58-1 at 3. Ethyl argues that to make such
a finding, the jury needed “proof that Ethyl knew, or should have known about the dangers of
asbestos at the time of Dr. Gaddy’s employment.” R. Doc. 58-1 at 3. According to Ethyl, the
evidence presented at trial overwhelming indicated that the link between asbestos exposure and
mesothelioma was not known to the medical community until 1960 at the very earliest. R. Doc.
58-1 at 5. Moreover, Ethyl contends it presented evidence that the connection between
mesothelioma and low levels of exposure was not known to the medical community until the mid-
1970s, over a decade after Dr. Gaddy’s employment at Ethyl ended. R. Doc. 58-1 at 5. Ethyl argues

that “it defies reason that Ethyl somehow should have known more about the hazards of asbestos
than doctors who are publishing medical articles in the Journal of the American Medical
Association in 1958.” R. Doc. 58-1 at 6.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the evidence at trial clearly demonstrated that Dr. Gaddy
was exposed to asbestos in the pilot plant and in the sodium plant during his time at Ethyl. R. Doc.
80-2 at 3. Plaintiffs further argue that the evidence showed that Dr. Gaddy was not provided with
any warnings about asbestos while employed there, and that in failing to do so, Ethyl breached its
duty of care to Dr. Gaddy. R. Doc. 80-2 at 13. In particular, Plaintiffs point to the testimony of
industrial hygiene expert Susan Raterman and medical expert Dr. Richard Kradin, who both
testified that a number of scientific studies had associated asbestos exposure with asbestosis in the

1930s and lung cancer in the 1950s. R. Doc. 80-2 at 13.
“Under traditional negligence concepts, the knowledge (actual or constructive) gives rise
to the duty to take reasonable steps to protect against injurious consequences resulting from the
risk and no responsibility is placed on the owner who acted reasonably but nevertheless failed to
discover that the thing presented an unreasonable risk of harm.” Watts v. Georgia-Pac. Corp.,
2012-0620 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/16/13), 135 So. 3d 53, 59. Accordingly, the jury’s finding of
negligence depends in part on whether it reasonably concluded that Ethyl knew, or should have
known, about the dangers of asbestos exposure between 1955 and 1959.
There was evidence presented at trial suggesting that companies in Ethyl’s position knew,
or at least should have known that asbestos exposure was linked to serious illnesses. While the
link between asbestos and mesothelioma specifically may not have been discovered and
disseminated until the mid-1960s, after Dr. Gaddy left Ethyl, Susan Raterman testified that medical

studies published as early as the 1930s demonstrated a link between asbestos exposure and
asbestosis and identified exposure controls that could be implemented to minimize exposure. Trial
trans. at 345:16–22.
The jury was told that from the 1930s onwards, the National Safety Council and the
Industrial Hygiene Foundation published literature about asbestos hazards and that a company with
knowledge of these publications should have known that asbestos was a dangerous product in the
1950s. Trial trans. 364:17–20; 365:6–18; 366:6–9. Dr. Kradin bolstered Susan Raterman’s
testimony, explaining to the jury that not only was asbestos linked to asbestosis in the 1930s, but
that the link between asbestos exposure and lung cancer was identified in a 1955 epidemiological
study. Trial trans. 491:1–8; 492:4–7; 512:19–21. Even Defendant’s expert industrial hygienist, Dr.

James Rock, confirmed that “asbestosis” first appeared in medical peer-reviewed literature in 1927
and that the link to lung cancer was demonstrated in 1955. Trial trans. 775:2–5, 20–25. The jury
also heard testimony about a variety of state and federal laws that recognized the link between
asbestos exposure and serious illnesses. Susan Raterman informed the jury about the Walsh Healey
Act of 1951, which set maximum allowable concentrations of asbestos fibers for government
contractors, and the Louisiana Worker’s Compensation law that included asbestosis in the 1950s.
Trial trans. 360:3-17; 362:19-21.
Based on the foregoing, the jury could reasonably find that Ethyl should have known of
the risk of asbestos exposure during the time of Dr. Gaddy’s employment. The medical community
recognized the link between asbestos and other occupational illnesses, like asbestosis, as early as
the 1930s, and lung cancer, as early as 1955. The fact that Ethyl did not recognize the risk of
mesothelioma specifically is not dispositive here because a jury could reasonably find that Ethyl
was on notice that its practices did indeed create a serious risk of future physical injury for its

employees. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the jury’s finding with respect to this element
of negligence should not be displaced.
Ethyl further argues that there is no evidence that any alleged exposure that occurred at
Ethyl was a substantial contributing factor of Dr. Gaddy’s mesothelioma. R. Doc. 58-1 at 9. In
particular, Ethyl argues the evidence at trial demonstrated that Dr. Gaddy was exposed to high
levels of asbestos fibers while employed by International Paper in Springfield, Louisiana. R. Doc.
58-1 at 9. Ethyl further explains that Dr. Gaddy’s exposure to asbestos at the Baton Rouge facility
could not be a substantial contributing cause because he worked primarily out of on office, was
rarely in contact with asbestos-containing products, and “never disturbed asbestos containing
materials at Ethyl himself.” R. Doc. 58-1 at 10. Ethyl notes that the testimony of Mr. Ponti, Ethyl’s

corporate representative, disputes much of Dr. Gaddy’s testimony about the presence and
disturbance of asbestos in the sodium plant and proves that asbestos could not feasibly have been
disturbed in the manner Plaintiffs argue. R. Doc. 58-1 at 12.
“To determine whether a particular source of exposure to asbestos was a cause-in-fact of a
plaintiff's asbestos-related disease, Louisiana courts employ a “substantial factor” test. Simply
stated, the particular exposure must be a substantial contributing factor to the plaintiff's disease.”
Palermo v. Port of New Orleans, 2004-1804 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/15/06), 933 So. 2d 168, 181. In
other words, “[w]hen multiple causes of injury are present, a defendant's conduct is a cause in fact
if it is a substantial factor generating plaintiff's harm. There can be more than one cause in fact of
an accident as long as each cause bears a proximate relation to the harm that occurs and it is
substantial in nature.” Vodanovich v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc., 03–1079, pp. 3–4 (La. App. 4
Cir. 3/3/04), 869 So.2d 930, 932–33 (citation omitted). Accordingly, exposure to asbestos while
employed at Ethyl need not be the sole contributing cause of Dr. Gaddy’s disease.

In this case, there was significant testimony and evidence at trial to support a finding that
Dr. Gaddy’s exposure to asbestos at Ethyl was a substantial contributing factor to his
mesothelioma. Dr. Gaddy explained that he was employed at Ethyl’s Baton Rouge, Louisiana
facility from 1955 to 1959 as chemical engineer both in the pilot plant and the sodium plant. Trial
trans. at 160:16–18. His work in the pilot plant involved the use of insulated pipes, about two or
three times a week. Id. at 161:2. Removing the insulation on the pipes was “not a routine thing . .
. [i]t was an infrequent activity.” Id. at 161:20–21. However, he testified that repairing the pipe
was a “routine activity” and that he worked in proximity to pipes being repaired. Id. at 162:1–7.
He could not specify a particular time he worked in proximity to pipe repair work but said “there’s
pipework going on continuously in the plant, so very likely.” Id. at 164:3–7.

Further, for the majority of his employment at Ethyl, Dr. Gaddy worked in the technical
services department of the sodium plant. Id. at 150:2–3. In this capacity, Dr. Gaddy often visited
and/or observe the sodium cell operators in the sodium cell house. Id. at 150:7–10. Work in the
sodium plant involved large sodium cells insulated with asbestos spray-on insulation. Dr. Gaddy
testified that sodium cells were three or four feet apart and that every one or two years, a cell would
have to be refurbished. Id. at 151:15–19; 152:3–7. The jury heard Dr. Gaddy explain that a cell
was rebuilt by “taking it offline and stripping the brick and the insulation and replacing it.” Id. at
152:3–7. Dr. Gaddy also testified that the stripping of these cells occurred in the sodium cell house,
where he worked as a technical service assistant. Id. at 152:1–7; 22–25. Dr. Gaddy also testified
that hot, liquid sodium was carried away from the sodium cells in insulated pipes. These pipes, Dr.
Gaddy explained, were often being repaired in the cell house, although he could not recall a
specific instance where he personally observed these repairs. Id. at 157:22–158:5.
The jury also heard Plaintiffs’ industrial hygiene expert, Ms. Raterman, testify that the

asbestos fibers would have been disturbed when the sodium cells were being worked on, and that
asbestos would have been introduced into the air. She said this “definitely [would be] considered
occupational exposure.” Id. at 377:15–18. Dr. Gaddy also testified that fans were frequently used
in the cell house, id. at 247:19–248:19, and that employees used brooms to sweep the dust and
fibers that accumulated on the concrete floors. Id. at 250:17–19. Ms. Raterman testified that this
practice would reintroduce asbestos fibers into the air, where employees could inhale them. Id. at
378:3-5.
Eugene Ponti, the corporate representative for Ethyl, contradicted Dr. Gaddy’s testimony.
Mr. Ponti conceded that pipe and sodium cells were often torn out, replaced, and refurbished in
the sodium plant, but that this activity did not occur in the cell room. Id. at 277:21–22. Unlike Dr.

Gaddy, who testified that the sodium cells were three or four feet apart, Mr. Ponti testified that
they were only one or two feet apart, making it unfeasible to strip and refurbish them in the sodium
cell house. Id. at 304:20–305:1. He explained that the sodium cells were insulated with limpet, an
asbestos-containing product that was applied to the cells in a brick shed located twenty feet from
the sodium cell house. Mr. Ponti testified that the brick house was “an open building on two sides”
completely isolated from the sodium cell room. Id. at 251:2–22; 302:8–10. Additionally, Mr. Ponti
contradicted Dr. Gaddy’s testimony regarding the use of insulated pipes in the sodium cell room,
testifying that molten sodium was carried from each cell by forklift at the end of the day. Id. at
308:17–25.
Nevertheless, considering all of the testimony and evidence presented at trial with respect
to negligence, the Court concludes that the jury's verdict does not lack a “legally sufficient
evidentiary basis.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). The jury simply believed Plaintiffs’ version of the facts
and rejected Defendant’s version. The Court further concludes that not one of the jury's findings

with respect to negligence is against the weight of the evidence.
B. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that Ethyl
was strictly liable
Defendant argues that the jury erroneously found Ethyl strictly liable for Dr. Gaddy’s
mesothelioma and the Court erroneously denied its motion for judgment as a matter of law on the
issue made at trial. Ethyl argues that under Louisiana law, undisturbed asbestos does not constitute
an unreasonably dangerous defect, and that there was no evidence that Dr. Gaddy was ever exposed
to disturbed asbestos. Further, Defendant argues, “Louisiana law recognizes that temporary
conditions arising from construction or maintenance activities are not unreasonable risks of harm
that can render a premises unreasonably dangerous for purposes of imposing liability on the owner

of the site.” R. Doc. 43-1 at 3 (citing Barron v. Webb, 698 So. 2d 727, 730 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1997)).
In Ethyl’s view, because the evidence at trial demonstrated that Dr. Gaddy’s exposure to asbestos
fibers, if any, occurred during impermanent maintenance activities (such as during the stripping
and rebuilding of sodium cells), his exposure did not rise to the level required to impose strict
liability on Ethyl. R. Doc. 43-1 at 4. In support of this argument, Ethyl relies heavily on Palermo
v. Port of New Orleans, 2004-1804 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/15/06), 933 So. 2d 168, 180, in which the
court held that a boiler insulated with asbestos did not constitute a vice or defect absent evidence
that the asbestos was disturbed, and Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., No. Civ.A. 13-6323, 2014 WL
4930457, at *7 (E.D. La. 2014), in which the court held that the dusty conditions created by
construction and maintenance activities did not constitute a defect under article 2317 because they
were temporary in nature.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the jury’s findings with respect to strict liability were
justified. R. Doc. 80-2 at 16. With respect to Defendant’s argument that a temporary condition is

insufficient to establish a strict liability defect, Plaintiffs distinguish a number of cases in which
the temporary condition causing harm did not involve asbestos exposure. R. Doc. 80-2 at 18.
In cases involving long-latency occupational diseases such as mesothelioma, the court must
apply the law in effect at the time of the exposure. Watts, 135 So. 3d at 59 (citing Cole v. Celotex
Corp., 599 So.2d 1058, 1066 (La. 1992)). Accordingly, the Court will consider the language of
article 2317 in effect between 1955 and 1959. Under this version of article 2317, a plaintiff can
succeed on a strict liability claim by proving that 1) the injury-causing thing was in the care,
custody, and control of the defendant; 2) the thing had a vice or defect that created an unreasonable
risk of harm; and 3) the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the vice or defect. Palermo, 933 So. 2d
at 179. “A defect for the purposes of article 2317 is a flaw or condition of relative permanence

inherent in the thing as one of its qualities.” Crane v. Exxon Corp., U.S.A., 613 So. 2d 214, 219
(La. Ct. App. 1992). Unlike with a negligence claim, in a strict liability case under this version of
article 2317, the plaintiff is relieved of having to prove that the owner knew or should have known
of the risk. Watts, 135 So. 3d at 60. “Under strict liability concepts, the mere fact of the owner's
relationship with and responsibility for the damage-causing thing gives rise to an absolute duty to
discover the risks presented by the thing in custody.” Id.
The parties do not dispute that the asbestos fibers were in the care, custody, and control of
Ethyl. Further, as discussed above, the jury’s finding that asbestos exposure at Ethyl substantially
contributed to Dr. Gaddy’s diagnosis was reasonable. The main dispute involving strict liability
turns on whether the asbestos exposure constitutes a “defect” under the version of article 2317 in
effect between 1955 and 1959.
“A temporary condition may constitute a hazard, but it does not constitute a defect as
contemplated by article 2317.” Dauzat v. Thompson Const. Co., 02-989 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/28/03),

839 So. 2d 319, 323 (holding that a hole in a concrete slab was a temporary condition that
precluded strict liability under article 2317). Ethyl argues that Dr. Gaddy’s asbestos exposure, if
any, resulted from asbestos dust created by temporary maintenance activities. In support of this
argument, Ethyl relies heavily on Smith, in which the court held that the dusty conditions created
by construction and maintenance were “temporary in nature” and therefore did not constitute an
article 2317 defect. 2014 WL 4930457, at *7. The plaintiff in Smith was a pipe insulator who was
contracted to work on various job sites for short periods of time doing construction work. His work
involved cutting pipes, insulating pipes, and mixing asbestos cement. Smith, 2014 WL 4930457,
at *1. Similarly here, it is not the asbestos itself that presents an unreasonable risk of harm but the
dusty conditions created by the disturbance of the material. Unlike the plaintiff in Smith, however,

Dr. Gaddy was a permanent employee of Ethyl. Further, he testified that the tear-out and
reconstruction of sodium cells was a constant activity. Trial trans. at 159:4–7. Even Mr. Ponti,
Ethyl’s corporate representative, testified that of the seventy-seven sodium cells, one or two were
continuously being taken off line and refurbished on a weekly basis. Id. at 246:7–9. Considering
the fact that the stripping and refurbishment of sodium cells was a constant and necessary activity
to keep the plant operational, the Court concludes that the asbestos dust was not a “temporary
condition” arising from construction and maintenance. The continuing refurbishment was indeed
a standard operating procedure at the facility.
The other cases cited by Defendant do not involve asbestos exposure and are not applicable
here because they involve much more obviously temporary defects. For example, in Crane v.
Exxon Corporation, U.S.A., the court held that an open chute in a concrete slab was not an article
2317 defect because it was meant to be filled with electric conduit and covered with a grating. 613

So. 2d 214, 219. Similarly in Dauzat v. Thompson Const. Co., Inc., a hole in the middle of a
concrete slab did not trigger strict liability because it “was not going to be left in the middle of the
store when construction was completed.” 839 So. 2d at 323. In Hammons v. Forest Oil Corp,
slippery conditions caused by the discharge of fluid and sludge from a pipe was a temporary
condition precluding strict liability because it occurred during a construction project. Further, the
sludge was periodically cleared from the deck and was an obvious hazard. 2008 WL 348765 (E.D.
La. 2008). Unlike these cases, the asbestos dust created by the continuous refurbishment of sodium
cells was not a temporary construction activity because, as Dr. Gaddy and Mr. Ponti testified, it
happened all the time. It was part and parcel of the Baton Rouge facility’s operation. Without the
constant cycle of refurbishment, the sodium cell plant would cease to operate. Accordingly, Ethyl’s

motion regarding strict liability is denied.
C. Whether the Court committed legal error in allowing the testimony of Dr. Susan
Raterman
Ethyl contends the Court committed legal error by allowing Plaintiffs’ expert, Susan
Raterman, to testify that “the ventilation in the sodium cell building ‘pulled’ asbestos fibers from
the sodium cell refurbishment area located at an area isolated from the sodium cell buildings.” R.
Doc. 58-1 at 17. Ethyl characterizes this argument a “a hodgepodge of unproven assumptions, not
the result of any scientific analysis or any analysis whatsoever.” R. Doc. 58-1 at 17. Ethyl argues
that Ms. Raterman’s testimony regarding “fiber drift” is inadmissible because she did not disclose
the methodology with which she formed the opinion in her expert report, nor did she perform any
calculations of models to predict air flow in the space. R. Doc. 58-1 at 20. Further, Ethyl argues
her testimony is unreliable because she has never authored a peer reviewed article about asbestos
exposure assessment and her fiber drift theory was not corroborated or validated by any scientific

literature. R. Doc. 58-1 at 20. Lastly, Ethyl explains that Ms. Raterman’s theory is wholly
untestable and accordingly is “of no practical value in the courtroom.” R. Doc. 58-1 at 21.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Raterman’s testimony was admissible. R. Doc. 80-
2 at 18. Plaintiffs characterize Defendant’s attack as requesting that this Court “require an expert
to base her opinions on something more than her observations and experience.” R. Doc. 80-2 at
19.
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 of the Federal Rule of
Evidence, which provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based on
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. This rule codifies the Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharma., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
The Court must act as a “gate-keeper” to ensure the proffered expert testimony is “both
reliable and relevant.” Wells v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 601 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2010).
“This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue.” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93). With respect to reliability,
the Court's focus “must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
When the admissibility of expert testimony is challenged under Daubert, the proponent of
the evidence bears the burden of proving that the testimony is reliable and relevant. Moore v.

Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc). To meet this burden, a party
cannot simply rely on its expert’s assurances that he or she has utilized generally accepted
scientific methodology. Id. Rather, some objective, independent validation of the expert’s
methodology is required. Id. In this regard, however, for purposes of Rule 702, it is not necessary
for the proponent of the evidence to prove that “the testimony is factually correct.” Paz v. Brush
Engineered Materials, Inc., 555 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2009).
Ultimately, a court’s role as a gatekeeper does not replace the adversary system. Daubert,
509 U.S. at 596. “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.” Id. Proper deference is to be accorded to the jury’s role “as the arbiter of

disputes between conflicting opinions.” United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1077
(5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987)). “As a
general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an expert’s opinion affect the weight to
be assigned that opinion rather than its admissibility and should be left for the jury's consideration.”
Id. (quoting Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 422).
Susan Raterman was qualified and testified as an expert in the field of industrial hygiene.
It is undisputed that the theory she posited regarding how asbestos fibers could have drifted from
one area of the plant to another through the ventilation systems was not corroborated by
mathematical modeling using air sampling data from the time of Dr. Gaddy’s employment at Ethyl.
However, Ms. Raterman explained that scientific modeling to prove this theory would be
impossible because there was no air sampling data collected at Ethyl between 1955 and 1959. Trial
trans. at 424:19–23; 425:4–7. For this reason, Ms. Raterman explained that she conducted her
analysis and formulated her opinion by looking at other literature that described fiber movement

in similar conditions. In particular, she looked at “air sampling that’s been done in various different
settings to demonstrate the movement of fibers from one area to another . . . over the course of 20
feet, 30 feet, and more.” Id. at 425:8–9, 426:7–17. She explained that while the conditions she
studied were not the exact conditions at Ethyl, “they constitute a similar group. They can’t replicate
the exact conditions because we don’t know the exact conditions.” Id. at 427:21-23. The jury was
informed that this fiber drift theory was not the product of precise calculations of scientific
modeling and Ms. Raterman explained to the jury the scientific literature she relied upon in
forming her conclusion.
Moreover, the Court notes that the allegedly improper “fiber drift” theory is only one theory
of exposure proposed by Ms. Raterman. In addition to this theory, Ms. Raterman testified that Dr.

Gaddy was exposed by his own work in the sodium cell house. Ms. Raterman explained that she
listened to Dr. Gaddy’s testimony and concluded that asbestos was disturbed in his direct work
area by the stripping and refurbishment of sodium cells. Id. at 374:17–21; 424:2–12. As noted
above, the jury’s conclusion that Dr. Gaddy worked in proximity to sodium cells being stripped
and refurbished in the sodium cell house was not against the great weight of the evidence. She
specifically testified, “Assuming the limpet was stripped from sodium cells in Dr. Gaddy’s work
area, it indicates to me that substantial concentrations of asbestos had the opportunity to become
airborne and breathed in by the individuals in the vicinity.” Id. at 374:17–21 (emphasis added).
This practice, she explained, would easily cause the re-entrainment of asbestos fibers into the air
in the sodium cell house. Id. at 376:22–377:7. Accordingly, the jury was presented with ample
expert testimony discussing the ways in which Dr. Gaddy was exposed. Further, Defendants had
the opportunity and incentive to vigorously cross-examine Ms. Raterman at trial, suggesting that
deference should be granted to the jury’s decision to believe her testimony. Accordingly,

Defendant’s motion with respect to Ms. Raterman’s testimony is denied.
D. Whether the jury partook in improper conduct
“It is well settled that a district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a
new trial for juror misconduct.” Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 580 (5th Cir. 1982). “Because the
context in which alleged juror misconduct arises is different in every case, whether a new trial
should be granted must be decided on an ad hoc basis.” Garcia v. Murphy Pac. Marine Salvaging
Co., 476 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1973). “In this circuit, a defendant seeking a new trial based on
juror misconduct must prove (1) misconduct by at least one juror that (2) prejudiced the defendant
to the extent that it undermined the fairness of the trial.” United States v. Villalobos, 601 F. App'x
274, 277 (5th Cir. 2015). A presumption of prejudice arises when the jury is “tainted by outside

influence,” but not when “jurors themselves have violated an instruction of the court.” Id.
Ethyl contends a new trial is warranted because a juror appeared to be sleeping at multiple
instances during the trial. R. Doc. 58-1 at 22. In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that any instances of
juror inattention were addressed by the Court during trial and effectively dealt with whether in
open court or in a private meeting with the jury in chambers. R. Doc. 80-2 at 21.
A motion for a new trial may be granted when there is evidence that jury misconduct
prejudices or contaminates their deliberative process. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Southeast
Floating Docks, Inc., 934 F.2d 1211, 1215 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1991). While sleeping may amount to
juror misconduct, see United States v. Rivera, 295 F.3d 461, 470 (5th Cir. 2002), the Court does
not find that the brief moments of apparent inattention by one juror prejudiced Ethyl’s right to a
fair trial in this case. The Court was apprised of a juror’s apparent dosing and responded promptly
to the problem. Frequent breaks were taken, coffee was provided, and the Court even met with the
jury in chambers to remind them of their duty and implore them to pay attention. The record

supports the conclusion that the entire jury engaged in a thoughtful deliberation that lasted several
hours. Accordingly, the Court concludes that a new trial is not warranted for jury misconduct.
E. Whether the jury’s damage award was excessive and contrary to the law and evidence
Rule 59(a)(1)(A) permits a court to grant a new trial when the jury’s award is excessive
and against the great weight of the evidence in a manner that suggests bias or prejudice. See
Brunnemann v. Terra Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1992). However, remittitur, not a new
trial, is the appropriate remedy when the award is “so large as to appear contrary to right reason.”
Id.
The Fifth Circuit has held numerous times that an assessment of damages is a factual
finding reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Hernandez v. M/V Rajaan, 841 F.2d 582,

587 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Sosa v. M/V LAGO IZABAL, 736 F.2d 1028, 1035 (5th Cir. 1984)).
“This court will not overturn a damage award unless the trier of fact abused its discretion.” Id.
(citing Bartholomew v. CNG Producing Co., 832 F.2d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1987)). “An award is
excessive only if it is greater than the maximum amount the trier of fact could properly have
awarded.” Moore v. M/V ANGELA, 353 F.3d 376, 384 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Sosa, 736 F.2d at
1035).
Courts in the Fifth Circuit apply the “maximum recovery rule” to determine whether an
award is excessive. Puga v. RCX Sols., Inc., 922 F.3d 285, 297 (5th Cir. 2019). Under the
maximum recovery rule, “the verdict must be reduced to the maximum amount the jury could
properly have awarded.” Brunnemann v. Terra Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Hansen v. Johns–Manville Products Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.1984)). However,
courts “will decline to reduce damages where the amount awarded is not disproportionate to at
least one factually similar case from the relevant jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Lebron v. United States,

279 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2002)). For purposes of the maximum recovery rule, the “relevant
jurisdiction” in a diversity case is the forum state. Longoria v. Hunter Express, Ltd., 932 F.3d 360,
365 (5th Cir. 2019); see also Puga v. RCX Sols., Inc., 922 F.3d 285, 297 (5th Cir. 2019) (“The
relevant jurisdiction for purposes of the maximum recovery rule ‘is the state providing the
substantive law for the claim.’” (quoting Vogler, 352 F.3d at 156)). Nevertheless, “[b]ecause the
facts of each case are different, prior damages awards are not always controlling; a departure from
prior awards is merited ‘if unique facts are present that are not reflected within the controlling
caselaw.’” Lebron, 279 F.3d at 326 (quoting Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 1336,
1339 (5th Cir. 1990)).
A jury’s award of general damages is entitled to great discretion, in part because general

damages are “inherently speculative in nature and cannot be fixed with mathematical certainty.”
Bouquet v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 2008-0309 (La. 4/4/08), 979 So. 2d 456, 458. Because a jury is
in the “best position to evaluate witness credibility and see the evidence firsthand,” Romano v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2016-0954 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/24/17), 221 So. 3d 176, 183, its decision will
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Whether a jury abused its discretion in awarding a
particular measure of general damages is a sensitive fact-specific inquiry, in large part because
“[r]easonable persons frequently disagree about the measure of general damages in a particular
case.” Youn v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 623 So. 2d 1257, 1261 (La. 1993). Nevertheless, a jury abuses
its discretion when it awards damages “beyond that which a reasonable trier of fact could assess
for the effects of the particular injury to the particular plaintiff.” Id.
Ethyl argues that the general damages awarded were grossly disproportionate to the special
damages awarded in this matter and disparate from the typical measure of general damages

awarded in similar cases. R. Doc. 58-1 at 23. The Court agrees. Although Dr. Gaddy suffered from
what one expert testified was “one of the worst cancers in the whole world,” Trial trans. at 886:13–
17, he suffered from a variety of afflictions that contributed to his loss of enjoyment of life and
mental anguish. Further, Dr. Gaddy himself testified that he did not suffer physical pain as a result
of his disease. Records from his frequent medical appointments reveal that he was never treated
for pain stemming from mesothelioma. The Court recognizes that the jury was presumably
influenced by Dr. Gaddy’s video testimony, in which he spoke slowly through labored breaths,
and the medical testimony discussing the effects of mesothelioma on human lungs. Further, Dr.
Gaddy’s son testified that his father was not a man to complain of physical discomfort. This
testimony was powerful, and the jury was justified to rely on it. Nevertheless, the plain evidence

presented at trial does not justify an award as large as that granted by the jury, particularly for an
eighty-six-year-old man who testified to experiencing little plain and passed away six months after
receiving his diagnosis. Considering this particular plaintiff and the particular circumstances of
this case, the general damages awarded here simply are not within the range that a reasonable jury
could have appropriately awarded based on the evidence.
Jury awards in comparable cases support this finding. The most factually similar case the
Court discovered is White v. Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, L.L.C., 2013-1608 (La. App. 1 Cir.
11/10/14), 167 So. 3d 764, 772. In that case, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal upheld a
$3,800,000.00 general damage award to compensate the survivors of a seventy-nine-year-old
mesothelioma victim. The White plaintiff began hospice care shortly after his diagnosis and died
just over one month later. 167 So. 3d at 767. Although the plaintiff was described as a “stoic man”
with a “tough nature” who never complained about pain, testimony at trial revealed that he was
frail, suffered from fluid retention and mouth sores, could not chew or eat his food, and lost weight.

Id. at 771–72. In other cases, Louisiana juries awarded lesser sums for pain and suffering even in
light of evidence that the plaintiff’s suffering was a “ten out of ten,” Roberts v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 2003-0248 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/2/04), 878 So. 2d 631, 644, or required large
amounts of pain medication, Hennegan v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 2002-0282 (La. App.
4 Cir. 12/30/02), 837 So. 2d 96, 101. In the present case, the jury awarded almost twice the award
upheld in White, and considering the factual similarities between those cases, this award was
clearly excessive.
Having found that the jury’s award was excessive, the Court must now determine the
highest amount the jury could have awarded based on the evidence without abusing its discretion.
In applying the maximum recovery rule, the Court must consider comparable cases from the

relevant jurisdiction. See Puga, 922 F.3d at 297. A review of factually similar cases reveals that
juries in this jurisdiction typically award between $1,500,000.00 and $3,000,000.00 for the types
of injuries Dr. Gaddy sustained. The Court reviews a number of these cases below.
For example, in Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., the court upheld an award of
$1,416,580.54 in survival damages for the death of a pipefitter’s wife who developed
mesothelioma after being exposed to fibers on her husband’s clothes when he returned home from
work. 2005-1511 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/06), 947 So. 2d 171, 179. The court did not provide much
commentary on the decedent’s pain and suffering but noted that one of the plaintiff’s children
testified to knowing that her mother was in pain from her facial expressions. See id. at 199.
In Torrejon v. Mobil Oil Co., the court upheld an award of $1,800,000.00 million where
the mesothelioma victim experienced great pain and suffering. The evidence showed that he lost
40 pounds, could not bath himself, developed bed sores, and was prescribed a large amount of pain
medication. 2003-1426 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/2/04), 876 So. 2d 877, 895.

In Hennegan, the Court found that an award of $2,500,000.00 in general damages was not
an abuse of discretion in a case involving a seaman who died of malignant mesothelioma. 837 So.
2d at 101. The court held similarly in Zimko v. American Cyanamid, upholding an award of
$2,500,000.00 in general damages for a survival action. 2003–0658 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/8/05), 905
So.2d 465.
In Roberts, the court found that a $3,000,000.00 general damage award was not an abuse
of discretion when the plaintiff, who suffered from mesothelioma, told his doctors his pain was a
“ten out of ten.” His doctor testified that mesothelioma is incredibly painful, and the record
demonstrated that his morphine pump could only alleviate so much suffering. The court noted that
the plaintiff died a year after his diagnosis after suffering much despondency and humiliation. 878

So. 2d 631.
However, a general damage award of $3,000,000.00 does not appear to be a hard and fast
limit. As described above, the survivors of a seventy-nine-year-old mesothelioma victim in White
were awarded $3,800,000.00. 167 So. 3d at 772. In White, the plaintiff died just one month after
his diagnosis, although evidence at trial demonstrated that he had symptoms of asbestos related
diseases as early as 2005. Id. at 771. The plaintiff’s daughter described her father as a “stoic man”
who never complained about pain, and his son testified that due to his father’s “tough nature,” his
father never honestly admitted to feeing pain. Id. Nevertheless, his family testified that the plaintiff
suffered, both physically and mentally, and that he was frail, suffered from fluid retention and
mouth sores, could not chew or eat his food, and lost weight. Id. at 772. Furthermore, the plaintiff
was treated with morphine at the end of his life. Id. at 771. His doctor testified that at the end of
his life, the plaintiff was miserable and in pain. Id.
Additionally, in Terrance v. Dow Chemical Company, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of

Appeal upheld a $5,000,000.00 general damage award to a mesothelioma victim who “suffered
incredible pain and numerous hospitalizations, painful procedures, nausea, severe weight loss, and
fatigue,” and used “powerful pain medication” in the months leading up to his death. 2006-2234
(La. App. 1 Cir. 9/14/07), 971 So. 2d 1058, 1071. This award, the Court concluded was “arguably
on the high end,” but not an abuse of discretion. Id.
In contrast to most of these plaintiffs, Dr. Gaddy testified at the time of his deposition some
three month before his demise that he did not experience much pain from his disease. Trial trans.
at 126: 1–3. Like the plaintiff in White, Dr. Gaddy’s medical records reveal that he did not report
pain to his treating physicians. However, Dr. Gaddy’s son testified that Dr. Gaddy was a stoic man
who never complained of pain. Id. at 609:10–24; 610:13–24. Photographs and videos taken shortly

before his death clearly show a feeble, emaciated man, hooked up to a breathing machine in
apparent discomfort. Additionally, like in White, the trial involved convincing medical testimony.
Dr. Breal, Defendant’s medical expert, called mesothelioma “one of the worst cancers in the
world.” Id. at 884:19–20. Dr. Fish, Dr. Gaddy’s treating physician, explained that mesothelioma
made Dr. Gaddy weak and listless, reduced his energy, caused him to suffer from depression and
lack of appetite. Id. at 599:13-22. Dr. Gaddy himself testified that he had sores in mouth and on
his arms that made eating difficult. Id. at 127:8–12. Dr. Gaddy underwent several medical
procedures related to mesothelioma and procedures to drain the fluid from his lungs. Id. at 127:5–
7; 128:18–20; 129:10–12. However, unlike the Plaintiff in White, who likely suffered the
symptoms of mesothelioma for at least six years, there was no suggestion that Dr. Gaddy suffered
from mesothelioma-like symptoms long before his diagnosis. Additionally, there was evidence
presented that Dr. Gaddy suffered from unrelated heart problems that caused him discomfort
before his diagnosis and were exacerbated by his mesothelioma. Id. at 566:11–18, 602:12–603:9.

Accordingly, while factual similar, White is not entirely analogous. Therefore, the Court is inclined
to follow White’s lead to the extent it authorizes a larger general damage award than the majority
of cases but declines to apply the very same award.
Considering the foregoing, the Court concludes that the jury’s general damage award of
$7,500,000.00 was excessive. Most survival actions involving mesothelioma have generated
recoveries ranging from $1,500,000.00 to $3,000,000.00.2 Furthermore, the majority of these cases
involve more evidence of obvious and extreme pain and suffering. Nevertheless, White suggests
that there is some support for a large general damage award even when the evidence of pain and
suffering comes primarily from the testimony of medical experts and the plaintiff’s family.
However, the Court recognizes that the award in White was “arguably on the high end” and

involved at least marginally more evidence of pain and suffering than the instant matter. After
reviewing all of the evidence in the record and recalling the testimony of the witnesses, the Court,
applying the maximum recovery rule, concludes that an appropriate award in this case is
$3,000,000.00 in general damages in addition to medical expenses of $250,661.45, for a total
award of $3,250,661.45. In the event Plaintiffs refuse to remit, the Court will order a new trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Considering the foregoing,

2 While there are some cases involving much larger recoveries, see e.g., Terrance, 971 So. 2d 1058, these
cases seem like outliers and are factually distinguishable.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for New Trial and/or Remittitur and Renewed
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
It is GRANTED to the extent Defendant seeks remittitur. The damage award is remitted
to $3,250,661.45, which constitutes $3,000,000.00 in general damages and $250,661.45 in medical
expenses. Plaintiffs must file either an acceptance of the remittitur or notice of intent to retry the
case within twenty-one days of this Order’s issuance.
It is DENIED to the extent Defendant seeks judgment as a matter of law.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 4th day of March, 2020.
Alle CR
Eldon E. Fallon
United States District Judge

28

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10185316. Public record. Not legal advice.