# Galloway v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., Inc.

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · June 28, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10184620

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** June 28, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10184620

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CASEY GALLOWAY CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 18-14038

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD SECTION “B”(5)
COMPANY, INC.

ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant Illinois Central Railroad Company, Inc. filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Rec. Doc. 8.
Plaintiff Casey Galloway filed a response in opposition. Rec. Doc.
12. Defendant then sought, and was granted, leave to file a reply.
Rec. Doc. 20.
For the reasons discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED
and plaintiff’s claims against defendant are DISMISSED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Casey Galloway filed a complaint against Illinois
Central Railroad Company, Inc. for violation of the Federal
Employers Liability Act. Rec. Doc. 1 at 3. Plaintiff was employed
as a trackman by Defendant. Id. On March 9, 2017, plaintiff alleges
that his left foot was injured when a crane operator who was
holding up a rail suddenly moved the crane without warning, causing
the rail to come down onto plaintiff’s left foot. Id. Plaintiff
asserts that his injuries include a non-displaced fracture in his
left foot and a left foot sprain that became Complex Regional Pain
Syndrome in his left lower extremity. Id. Plaintiff also states
that he had a spinal cord stimulator permanently implanted in his
body, and that the injuries have caused him to become medically
disqualified from his railroad job. Id. Consequently, plaintiff
brought the instant case under the FELA claiming that defendant
and its agents negligently conducted themselves in failing to

provide a reasonably safe work place, train and supervise the swing
crane operator, and enact and enforce safety regulations, amongst
other things, all leading to plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 4.
Accordingly, plaintiff seeks damages for physical pain and
suffering, mental anguish, lost wages, medical expenses, and
additional categories of damages. Id. at 5.
Defendant subsequently filed the instant motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Rec. Doc. 8.
THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
Defendant argues that this Court cannot exercise personal
jurisdiction over defendant. Rec. Doc. 8. Defendant asserts that

specific personal jurisdiction does not exist in this action
because plaintiff does not allege sustaining any injury in
Louisiana and the underlying facts and circumstances giving rise
to the action did not occur within Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 8-2 at 1-
2. Regarding general personal jurisdiction, defendant argues that
its operations in Louisiana, as compared to the entirety of its
operations, are not of such a substantial nature as to render it
essentially at home here. Rec. Doc. 8-2 at 6. Defendant avers that
it only operated 10.52% of its total track mileage, employed 9.57%
of its total railroader workers, spent 14% of its total capital
investments, and paid 8.77% of its total cash taxes in Louisiana.
Id. at 6-7. In comparison, defendant operated 55% of its total
track mileage, employed 59.5% of its total employees, made 58.6%

of its total capital investments, and paid 61.43% of its total
cash taxes in Illinois. Id. at 7.
On the other hand, plaintiff argues that this Court has both
specific and general personal jurisdiction over defendant. Rec.
Doc. 12. Plaintiff asserts that this Court has general jurisdiction
over defendant in light of defendant’s decades-long systematic and
continuous contacts with the state of Louisiana, including
spending millions annually on infrastructure, training employees,
and paying taxes in Louisiana to reap financial benefits from the
state as well as the fact that Louisiana is one of only six (6)
states in which defendant operates. Id. at 2, 5-6. Plaintiff

further notes that he has continuously been a resident of Louisiana
since 1988 and that his employment with defendant was the result
of an online advertisement he viewed from his home in Louisiana.
Id. at 2. Plaintiff claims that when he interviewed for the
position he was told he could continue to live in Louisiana to
receive his job assignments and eventually be headquartered in
Louisiana with a few months of seniority, and was offered the job
by a phone call to his home in Louisiana. Id. Plaintiff further
states that he received his paychecks in Louisiana, paid a portion
of his state income taxes to Louisiana, was based in Louisiana
during his employment with defendant despite travel occurring
outside of Louisiana, and had annual safety trainings in Louisiana.
Id. at 3. Plaintiff asserts that he performed work in various

railroad yards operated by defendant in Louisiana during his
employment and was required to maintain a commercial drivers
license and drivers license, both of which he had issued to him by
the State of Louisiana. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff also states that
although he initially went to an emergency room in Mississippi
after his injury, all follow-up care has occurred in Louisiana.
Id. at 4. Additionally, plaintiff argues that this Court may
exercise specific personal jurisdiction over defendant. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff states that defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privileges of conducting activities in Louisiana because it
solicited plaintiff’s interest in the job while plaintiff was in

Louisiana, conducted plaintiff’s training in Louisiana, and made
all work-related payments in Louisiana. Id. at 8. Plaintiff avers
that he was provided all his safety training materials and training
in Louisiana, and this training led him to expect that the crane
operator would not to move until directed to, which ultimately
caused plaintiff’s injury. Id. Plaintiff also asserts that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant is fair and
reasonable and any outsider would expect defendant to be a regular
participant in court proceedings in Louisiana. Id. at 9.
Furthermore, plaintiff asserts that although plaintiff’s injuries
occurred in Mississippi, his employment with defendant is in
Louisiana and the injury occurred on a job that originated and
ended in Louisiana. Id. at 10.

In its reply, defendant argues that plaintiff does not show
that defendant’s business in Louisiana is so continuous and
systematic as to render it essentially at home here. Rec. Doc. 20.
Defendant asserts that the Supreme Court has made clear that the
general jurisdiction inquiry focuses not just on the magnitude of
the defendant’s in state contacts, but rather calls for an
appraisal of a corporation’s activities in its entirety. Id. at 2.
Therefore, defendant states that even accepting plaintiff’s
allegations of its systematic and continuous contacts in
Louisiana, these activities do not render it essentially at home
in Louisiana when they are compared to its activities overall. Id.

Defendant asserts that because the “exceptional case” warranting
the exercise of general jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
must meet a high standard, the Supreme Court has only found a
sufficient basis in one modern case and this case does not present
an opportunity to expand that number. Id. Defendant further notes
that plaintiff improperly details contacts between plaintiff and
defendant or plaintiff and Louisiana rather than between defendant
and Louisiana in support of his argument for specific jurisdiction.
Id. at 3. Defendant avers that the specific jurisdiction inquiry
must be focused on the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation which arises out of contacts the defendant
himself creates with the forum state. Id. at 4. Therefore,
defendant argues that plaintiff’s unilateral activities and

contacts with Louisiana are irrelevant to establishing defendants’
purposeful contacts with Louisiana. Id. at 5. Additionally,
defendant states that claims of defendant’s contacts with
plaintiff personally are also not sufficient to establish specific
jurisdiction, because the Supreme Court has stated that the focus
should be on defendant’s contacts with the forum state itself, not
on contacts with an individual located in the forum state. Id. at
5-6. Defendant argues that plaintiff has not alleged any of
defendant’s suit-related contacts as is required for the exercise
of specific jurisdiction. Id. at 10. Rather, plaintiff has only
shown evidence of his own contacts with defendant, and his own

contacts with Louisiana. Id. The only evidence plaintiff provides
regarding defendant’s contacts with Louisiana, such as maintaining
yards and facilities in the state, address contacts that are not
related to the incident from which this case arises. Id. Therefore,
defendant argues that this Court cannot exercise personal
jurisdiction over it and this case should be dismissed. Id.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant if (1) the long-arm statute of the
forum state creates personal jurisdiction over the defendant and
(2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the
due process guarantees of the United States Constitution. See
Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2010) The limits

of Louisiana’s long-arm statute are co-extensive with the limits
of constitutional due process, so the inquiry is whether this
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction would offend due process. See Luv
N' Care, Ltd., v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir.
2006). Due process is satisfied if the defendant purposefully
established “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that
maintenance of a lawsuit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. See Clark v. Moran Towing &
Transp. Co., 738 F. Supp. 1023, 1026 (E.D. La. 1990). The plaintiff
has the burden to make a prima facie showing that personal
jurisdiction is proper. See Luv N' Care, Ltd., 438 F.3d at 469.

The Court “must accept as true the uncontroverted allegations in
the complaint and resolve in favor of the plaintiff any factual
conflicts.” Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 869
(5th Cir. 2000). However, the Court is not required to accept
conclusory allegation, even if uncontroverted. See Panda
Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 868
(5th Cir. 2001).
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant on the basis of specific or general
jurisdiction. See Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co.
Kg., 688 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2012). Specific jurisdiction may
be asserted over a non-resident corporation where that
corporation's in-state activity is continuous and systematic and

that activity gave rise to the episode-in-suit. Id. Specific
jurisdiction requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that “(1) there
are sufficient (i.e., not random, fortuitous, or attenuated) pre-
litigation connections between the non-resident defendant and the
forum; (2) the connection has been purposefully established by the
defendant; and (3) the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of
or is related to the defendant’s forum contacts.” Id. at 221. If
a plaintiff makes such a showing, the defendant can then defeat
the exercise of specific jurisdiction by showing that it would
nevertheless fail the basic fairness test. Id. at 221-222.
General jurisdiction requires a showing of substantial,

continuous, and systematic contacts between a nonresident
defendant and a forum, such “as to render [it] essentially at home
in the forum State.” Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d
429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 138 (2014) (quoting in part Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011))). “The continuous and
systematic contacts test is a difficult one to meet, requiring
extensive contacts between a defendant and a forum.” Id. (citing
Submersible Sys., Inc. v. Perforadora Cent., S.A., 249 F.3d 413,
419 (5th Cir. 2001)). The place of incorporation and principal
place of business are where a corporation is considered to be “at
home” and “are thus paradigm bases for jurisdiction.” Id. (citing
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137). Considering the high threshold set in

Daimler, the Fifth Circuit noted that it is “incredibly difficult
to establish general jurisdiction” in a forum other than a
corporation’s place of incorporation or principal place of
business. Id.
A. Specific jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction does not exist over defendant in this
case because plaintiff’s cause of action does not arise out of
defendant’s forum-related contacts. As discussed above, specific
jurisdiction requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that: “(1) there
are sufficient (i.e., not random, fortuitous, or attenuated) pre-
litigation connections between the non-resident defendant and the

forum; (2) the connection has been purposefully established by the
defendant; and (3) the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of
or is related to the defendant’s forum contacts.” Id. at 22.
Plaintiff argues that this cause of action arises out of
defendant’s forum-related contacts because: (1) he received safety
training materials at his home in Louisiana; (2) the receipt of
paychecks and all other work-related payments in Louisiana led to
him being at work on the day of the injury-causing incident; (3)
and his training in Louisiana led him to expect that the crane
operator who dropped the piece of rail that caused his injuries
would not move until directed to move. Rec. Doc. 12 at 8-9. None
of these facts show that the incident forming the basis of this
action arises out of defendant’s contacts with Louisiana.

Plaintiff admits that the incident in which he was injured, and
which forms the basis of his claim, occurred in Mississippi rather
than Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 12 at 10. Plaintiff’s attempt to
tenuously connect the incident occurring in Mississippi to
Louisiana by pointing to the location of his payment and his safety
trainings is unpersuasive.
The complaint does not allege that a specific training in
Louisiana caused the incident leading to his injuries. Plaintiff
seeks to hold defendant liable under FELA for acting negligently
in failing to, among other things, provide plaintiff a safe work
place, enact and enforce proper safety regulations, and train and

supervise the crane operator. None of these allegations of
negligence relate to defendant’s contacts with the State of
Louisiana. None of these allegedly negligent actions that form
plaintiff’s cause of action arise out of defendant’s contacts with
Louisiana. Furthermore, it is the crane operator’s training rather
than plaintiff’s training that plaintiff identifies as negligently
conducted, and the complaint does not allege that the crane
operator was trained in Louisiana.
Finally, the fact that plaintiff was paid in Louisiana and
was sent training materials at his home in Louisiana is a result
of his own residence in Louisiana, and not evidence that this cause
of action arises out of defendant’s contacts with the state.

B. General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction over defendant is absent because its
contacts with Louisiana are not so continuous and systematic as to
render it essentially at home here. As discussed above, the
paradigm locations where a corporation is considered at home are
the state of incorporation and the principal place of business.
There is no allegation that Louisiana is defendant’s state of
incorporation or principal place of business. Rather, plaintiff
seeks to have recognition that this is an “exceptional case” where
a non-resident corporate defendant’s contacts with a forum state
are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at

home in that state. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, n. 19
(2014).
Plaintiff argues that defendant has conducted operations in
Louisiana for decades and relied upon its presence and assets in
the state to collect business and income. Rec. Doc. 12 at 6.
Because this is not a “merely passing involvement,” plaintiff
asserts that defendant should be subject to personal jurisdiction
in the State of Louisiana. However, the fact that defendant has
repeated contacts with Louisiana is not a sufficient basis for the
exercise of general jurisdiction over defendant, unless the
contacts are of such an extent and nature as to render defendant
essentially at home in Louisiana. We must consider defendant’s
operations in Louisiana relative to the entirety of its operations.

Rec. Doc. 8-2 at 2-3.
The Supreme Court has clarified that “[a] corporation that
operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of
them. Otherwise, ‘at home’ would be synonymous with ‘doing
business' tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the
United States.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
Rather, “[g]eneral jurisdiction [] calls for an appraisal of a
corporation's activities in their entirety, nationwide and
worldwide.” Id. In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that nothing
in its caselaw on general jurisdiction “suggests that a particular
quantum of local activity should give a State authority over a far

larger quantum of ... activity having no connection to any in-
state activity”. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Therefore,
applying this framework to the case at hand, defendant’s operations
in Louisiana, when considered relative to its activities
nationwide, do not render it at home in Louisiana. Only
approximately 10% of defendant’s employees work in Louisiana
compared to approximately 60% in Illinois, its state of
incorporation and principal place of business. Rec. Doc. 8-2 at 2-
3. About 14% of its total capital investments were spent in
Louisiana compared to about 59% in Illinois; it paid roughly 9% of
its cash taxes in Louisiana compared to roughly 61% in Illinois;
and it operated about 11% of its track mileage in Louisiana
compared to 55% in Illinois. Id. Defendants’ operations in

Louisiana comprise only a small percentage of its operations
nationwide, especially when compared to its operations in its
paradigmatic home state of Illinois. Furthermore, the Fifth
Circuit has held that having employees located in a forum is not
a sufficient basis for the exercise of general personal
jurisdiction. See Patterson v. Aker Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 235
(5th Cir. 2016)
The remaining contacts with Louisiana that plaintiff
identifies are a result of plaintiff’s residence in Louisiana
rather than defendant’s contacts with the state. Plaintiff states
that he was told he could continue to live in Louisiana to receive

his job assignments and with a few months’ seniority that he could
be headquartered out of Louisiana, and that this was part of the
reason he decided to work for defendant. Rec. Doc. 12 at 2.
Plaintiff’s choice to continue to reside in Louisiana while working
for defendant, or plaintiff’s ability to choose jobs based in
Louisiana after achieving seniority are reflective of his own
contacts with Louisiana, not defendant’s. Similarly, the fact that
plaintiff’s follow-up medical care was in Louisiana after his
injury and that he obtained Louisiana issued drivers licenses are
because he resides in Louisiana and not because of defendants’
continuous and systematic contacts in the state. Furthermore, the
fact that plaintiff viewed an online advertisement from his home
in Louisiana, which was likely also accessible to other individuals

located in other states who had internet access, does not render
defendant at home in Louisiana. See Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
818 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1987)(“[T]hat [defendant] has engaged
in a nationwide advertising program does not support a finding of
general jurisdiction”).
There is only one modern case in which the Supreme Court found
a non-resident defendant’s contacts with a forum state to be so
continuous and systematic as to render it at home in the state.
See Patterson v. Aker Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 2016)
(citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952)). In Perkins, the defendant maintained an office with

company files in the state, maintained bank accounts in the state,
used a state bank as a transfer agent for stock of the company,
corresponded from the state, paid salaries in the state, and held
director’s meetings in the state. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445
(1952). Defendants’ interactions with the state of Louisiana do
not rise to this level. Accordingly, there is not a sufficient
basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction over defendant in
this case and plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 26th day of June, 2019.

___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10184620. Public record. Not legal advice.