# Woodhead v. Ridener

> District Court, E.D. Kentucky · June 8, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10180322

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Kentucky
- **Decided:** June 8, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10180322

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity based on use of force in booking room following arrest
- observing that courts should not adopt the nonmovant’s version of events when it is blatantly contradicted by video evidence

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
(at Lexington)

JAMES WOODHEAD, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 5: 21-189-DCR
)
V. )
)
LEXINGTON POLICE OFFICER ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
ZAKARY RIDENER, INDIVIDUALLY, ) AND ORDER
et al., )
)
Defendants. )

*** *** *** ***
Defendants, Lexington Police Officers Zakary Ridener and Keith McKinney, arrested
Plaintiff James Woodhead during a public protest on July 11, 2020. Woodhead was charged
in state court with inciting a riot, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest—those charges
remain pending. Woodhead claims that the defendants arrested him in retaliation for protesting
and, in the process, placed him in a chokehold and slammed him to the ground. He sued
Ridener and McKinney in this Court, alleging that the defendants violated his federal
constitutional rights to freedom of speech and to be free from false arrest and excessive force.
Woodhead also claims that the defendants committed the torts of state law false arrest and
battery.
The parties agree on most of the facts surrounding Woodhead’s arrest. To the extent
they differ, both officers were wearing body cameras, which recorded the events. Based on all
evidence of record, including the undisputed footage from the defendants’ body-worn cameras,
the undersigned determines that no reasonable juror could conclude that the defendants
battered Woodhead, used excessive force against him, or falsely arrested him. And because
there was probable cause for Woodhead’s arrest, his claim for First Amendment retaliation
necessarily fails. As a result, the Court will grant the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.
I. Background
Woodhead is part of a group called LPD Accountability, which “seek[s] accountability
locally within the Lexington Police Department.” [Record No. 48, p. 52] LPD Accountability
held daily protests in the downtown area of Lexington, Kentucky during the summer of 2020,
at least in part, in response to the deaths of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd. Woodhead
explained that LPD Accountability has a “horizontal” leadership structure and that he is one

of the group’s leaders, along with April Taylor. Id. at pp. 54-55.
LPD Accountability began their July 11, 2020, protest by gathering in a public plaza
near the Fayette County Circuit Courthouse. However, the group quickly moved into the
roadway, which had the effect of blocking traffic on Main Street. [Record No. 34-34, Ridener
BWC Video 2, 00:20-00:30] Lexington Police Officers Ridener and McKinney were on duty
that day. Ridener admonished the group of protestors: “You guys gotta [sic] get out of the

road, please” and “we’re not blocking the road.” [00:30-00:45] McKinney told the group it
was “free and welcome” to march on the sidewalk but could not march in the street. [01:00-
01:10] But when the group remained in the street, Ridener warned, “If you continue to block
the roadway, you will be arrested.” He went on to caution repeatedly: “If you stay in the road,
you’re going to jail.” [01:20-01:30]
The group of protestors eventually crossed the street and continued down the sidewalk
toward the nearby Lexington Police Department. [Record No. 48, p. 108] Several Lexington
Police Officers, including Ridener and McKinney, observed from across the street. The
protestors chanted for several minutes and frequently addressed the officers directly using a
megaphone. At one point, Ridener remarked that the protestors had begun “writing numbers

on arms . . . to get arrested.” [Record No. 34-34, Ridener BWC Video 17, 04:50-05:00] A few
minutes later, Ridener stated on his radio that he had just heard April Taylor inform the group
that if people were willing to “get in the street and get arrested,” it was time to do that. [Id. at
09:50-10:02] The officers discussed that the organizers should be arrested for inciting a riot if
any of the protestors entered the roadway. [Id. at 11:42-11:48]
Shortly thereafter, a protestor walked into the roadway and officers ran out to arrest
her. The scene quickly became chaotic, with protestors screaming and swarming the area.

Woodhead darted into the turmoil, holding up his phone, presumably recording the events. As
he walked in close proximity to police officers, he shouted “fuck all of you!” [Id. at 16:20-
16:22] Within a few seconds of this utterance, Officer Calvin Mattox began to place April
Taylor under arrest. [Id. at 16:25] As he did so, Woodhead ran toward Mattox and Taylor,
lunging toward Mattox and grabbing at his arm. [Id. at 16:25; Record No. 34-34, McKinney
BWC Video 16, 24:43] Officer Ridener immediately seized Woodhead from behind and, with

McKinney’s assistance, took him to the ground and placed him under arrest.
Woodhead was transported to the Fayette County Detention Center (“FCDC”) where
he was charged with inciting a riot, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest. He testified during
his deposition that he was bruised and scraped but did not recall whether he told the medical
staff at FCDC that he had any physical injuries. [Record No. 48, p. 148] However, he did
remember “expressing concern to the medical staff about what had happened.” He also
recalled his blood pressure having been elevated and detention center staff “check[ing] it
multiple times to be able to get a number that they could record.” Id. at p. 149. Woodhead
did not seek subsequent treatment for his blood pressure or any other medical problems.
Woodhead was released from FCDC on his own recognizance later that same day. He

and some of the other protestors met at a downtown restaurant to “regroup” and “debrief about
what had happened before going home.” Id. at pp. 150-51.
Woodhead filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Ridener and McKinney, in
their individual capacities, alleging that they violated his Fourth Amendment rights to be free
from false arrest and excessive force, as well as his First Amendment right to free speech. He
also asserts state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and battery.1 The defendants
have filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there are no genuine issues of material

fact regarding the claims that they violated Woodhead’s rights under the United States
Constitution or state law. The defendants also contend that they are immune from Woodhead’s
claims on the basis of qualified immunity.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute with respect to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). In other words, the Court must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986);
International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy, Michigan, 974 F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir. 2020). The

1 Woodhead also alleged claims for violations of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
and for declaratory relief, but those claims were dismissed on September 8, 2021. [See Record
No. 10.]
moving party has the initial burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, but
once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that there is
sufficient evidence from which the jury could render a verdict in its favor. See Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Electro-Mechanical Corp. v. Ogan, 9 F.3d 445, 448 (6th
Cir. 1993).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all facts and draw
all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Max Arnold & Sons,
LLC v. W.L. Hailey & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 494, 499 (6th Cir. 2006). However, “[t]he mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient;

there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 252; Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 760-61 (6th Cir. 2012).
When a defense of qualified immunity is asserted, the analysis is somewhat altered.
Specifically, the existence of a disputed, material fact does not preclude summary judgment if
the defendants cannot be shown to have violated clearly established law. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir.

1996).
III. Discussion
A. Qualified Immunity
The defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity regarding
Woodhead’s constitutional claims. This doctrine shields government officials performing
discretionary functions from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Murray v. Dep’t of Corrs., 29
F. 4th 779, 786 (6th Cir. 2022). Qualified immunity “gives ample room for mistaken
judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, a
defendant is entitled to summary judgment unless the facts, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to find that a defendant violated a
constitutional right and the right was clearly established. Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 765
(6th Cir. 2011) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).
The Court may consider the two factors in any order, but “both must be answered in

the affirmative for the plaintiff’s claim to proceed.” Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712
F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). Once raised, the plaintiff
bears the burden of showing that a defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Courtright
v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016). Although on summary judgment
the Court construes the facts in favor of the plaintiff, when a defendant raises the defense of
qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the facts and inferences would allow a

reasonable to juror to conclude that the defendant violated a clearly established constitutional
right. See Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 947 (6th Cir. 2020).
B. False Arrest
1. Fourth Amendment
A warrantless arrest by a law enforcement officer is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is
being committed. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). Officer Ridener testified
during his deposition that he observed Woodhead lunge with extended arms at Officer Calvin
Mattox as he began to arrest April Taylor. [Record No. 37, pp. 57-58] This fact is corroborated
by both defendants’ body cam footage, which Woodhead concedes is “accurate as video

footage.” [Record No. 48, p. 97; see also Record No. 34-34, Ridener BWC Video 17, 16:25;
McKinney BWC Video 16, 24:43]
In response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Woodhead does not deny
having engaged in this conduct or that such conduct constitutes an arrestable offense. Instead,
he merely points out that he was charged with inciting a riot, disorderly conduct, and resisting
arrest, rather than attempting to interfere with police duties or attempting to assault a police
officer. [See Record No. 43-1, p. 4.] However, under Kentucky law, a person is guilty of

resisting arrest when he “intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer . . . from
effecting an arrest of the actor or another by: (a) [u]sing or threatening to use physical force
or violence against the peace officer or another; or (b) [u]sing any other means creating a
substantial risk of causing physical injury to the peace officer or another.” K.R.S. § 520.090
(emphasis added).
Probable cause to arrest for any offense precludes a false arrest claim. Apsey v. Chester

Twp., 608 F. App’x 335, 339 (6th Cir. 2015). An officer has probable cause for arrest if “the
facts and circumstances within [the officer’s] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
[plaintiff] had committed or was committing an offense.” Courtright, 839 F.3d at 521. Here,
the defendants observed Woodhead voicing his displeasure with the arrests of protestors before
lunging toward Mattox with outstretched arms as he attempted to place Taylor under arrest.
Based on the undisputed testimony and video evidence, there is no question that Woodhead’s
conduct constituted probable cause for arresting him for the offense of resisting arrest.2 See
Hale v. Kart, 396 F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 2005) (observing that, “[w]hen no material dispute
of fact exists, probable cause determinations are legal determinations” for the court). It makes

no difference that Woodhead was charged with different or additional conduct. See Smith v.
Peyman, 93 F. Supp. 3d 738, 745 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (citing Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 154).
Because no reasonable juror could conclude that the defendants violated Woodhead’s
constitutional right to be free from false arrest, the defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity with respect to the plaintiff’s false arrest claim under § 1983.
2. State Law Claim for False Arrest and False Imprisonment
Kentucky law recognizes no distinction between claims of false arrest and false

imprisonment when considering claims involving law enforcement officers. Lexington-
Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t v. Middleton, 555 S.W.2d 613, 619 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). Law
enforcement officers enjoy a “privilege or immunity” to detain an individual when there is
probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the individual to be detained
committed it. Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 71 (Ky. 2007). Accordingly, the existence of
probable cause to arrest Woodhead defeats his claim for false arrest/false imprisonment.

C. Excessive Force
1. Fourth Amendment
A law enforcement officer’s right to make an arrest “necessarily carries with it the right
to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham v. Connor, 490

2 The Court rejects Woodhead’s suggestion that his actions were permissible because
Taylor’s arrest was unlawful. In Kentucky, a conviction for resisting arrest does not require proof
of a lawful arrest. See Donovan v. Thames, 105 F.3d 291, 298 n.8 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Ky.
Crime Commission/LRC Commentary 1974).
U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Determining whether a particular seizure is “reasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment requires “a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on
the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests

at stake.” Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Here, Woodhead asserts that the defendants used unreasonably excessive force when
they placed him in a “chokehold” and “choke-slammed” him to the ground during his arrest.
Specifically, he claims that he was grabbed from behind, and that an officer “wrapped an arm
around [his] neck and [his] throat,” before “more arms” grabbed him and “torque[d] [his] body
in various directions.” [Record No. 48, pp. 95-96] Woodhead reports that he was then

“slammed to the ground,” where he had “knees on [his] back” and “knees on [his] legs” and
“was face down on the concrete.” Id. at p. 96. He was on the ground for a “relatively short”
duration before the officers stood him up forcefully.3 Id. at p. 133.
Defendant Ridener described the events differently. He testified that, when he saw
Woodhead lunging at Mattox, he “reacted quickly by grabbing Mr. Woodhead’s upper chest
for the purpose of removing his arms from the reach of Officer Mattox.” [Record No. 37, p.

57] Ridener explained that, based on Woodhead’s “quick lunge” and extended arms, he
believed that Woodhead was attempting to harm Mattox and prevent him from arresting
Taylor. Accordingly, Ridener attempted to displace Woodhead’s balance by grabbing his
upper chest and shoulders while using his leg “to displace the balance behind his body.”

3 It is unclear how Woodhead came to identify the defendants as the officers involved in his
arrest. [See Record No. 48, p. 132-33.] Woodhead did not specify each officer’s alleged conduct
in his deposition, but stated that Ridener “has a very distinct tattoo on his arm.” Id. at p. 133.
However, this technique was unsuccessful because Woodhead continued to change position.
McKinney then grabbed Woodhead’s upper body and used his body weight to displace
Woodhead, causing him to fall to the ground. McKinney was then able to grab Woodhead’s

left arm and Ridener applied handcuffs. Id. at p. 58.
Summary judgment generally is improper if the legal question of immunity turns on
which version of the facts is accepted as true. However, the Court is not required to accept the
plaintiff’s version of the facts when it is “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it.” Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 565 (6th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). And the Court “may not adopt
a version of the facts that is ‘blatantly contradicted’ by video footage that is not ‘doctored or

altered in any way’ and which clearly ‘depicts . . . [the events that] actually happened.”
LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek, Michigan, 30 F.4th 572, 578 (6th Cir. 2022); see also
Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2016) (observing that courts should not adopt
the nonmovant’s version of events when it is blatantly contradicted by video evidence).
Woodhead’s arrest was recorded on both Ridener’s and McKinney’s respective body-
worn cameras, and Woodhead does not challenge the accuracy of that footage.4 The video

footage from McKinney’s body camera is particularly revealing, as it provides a frontal view
of Ridener’s seizure of Woodhead from behind. [Record No. 34-34, McKinney BWC Video
16, 24:43. See also Ridener BWC Video 17, 16:28-16:34.] Although the events unfolded very

4 Woodhead has introduced various “screenshots” depicting his arrest. [See Exhibits to
Record No. 42.] It is unclear whether they are still images taken from the officers’ body cam
footage or photographs taken by an unidentified third party. Regardless, they are consistent with
the body cam footage.
quickly (roughly five seconds from initial contact until Woodhead was taken to the ground), it
is clear that Woodhead was not placed in a “chokehold” under any conceivable definition of
that term.

Upon initial contact, Ridener’s body was facing Woodhead’s right side. Ridener’s
forearm briefly rested on Woodhead’s left shoulder and against the left side of his neck; his
upper arm was in front of Woodhead’s neck but does not appear to be touching it. Ridener
then laid the crook of his elbow on Woodhead’s chest, as he apparently attempted to perform
a leg sweep maneuver. [Record No. 34-34, McKinney BWC Video 16, 24:44] When that
technique was unsuccessful, he positioned himself behind Woodhead and appeared to place
both arms in front of Woodhead’s chest. At that point, Woodhead was taken to the ground,

where he struggled with the officers briefly as they attempted to get him into the prone position.
[Id. at 24:47-24:54] The defendants advised Woodhead to stop resisting, placed him in
handcuffs, and brought him to his feet.5 Id. The entire incident occurred in less than 30
seconds.
The Court applies an “objective reasonableness” standard to determine whether an
officer’s use of force in effecting an arrest is excessive in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Griffith v. Coburn, 473 F.3d 650, 656 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 388). The
standard asks whether the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances they faced, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Id. The
relevant inquiry is “reasonableness at the moment” of the use of force, as “judged from the

5 Ridener’s right knee can be seen on Woodhead’s left buttock/upper thigh area as he is being
handcuffed. [Record No. 34-34, Ridener BWC Video 17, 16:50]
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” Id. The Court considers the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or
others, and whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest. Id. (citing Shreve v. Jessamine

Cnty. Fiscal Court, 453 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir. 2006)).
The Court begins by examining the severity of the alleged crimes and whether
Woodhead posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others. Woodhead was
charged with inciting a riot, disorderly conduct in the second degree, and resisting arrest.
These charges remain pending in Fayette District Court, Case Number 20-M-3571. While
these misdemeanors might not constitute the most serious offenses, their weight should not be
unduly diminished, as they occurred in the midst of a volatile atmosphere with a large number

of protestors. And even if Woodhead’s resisting arrest charge is based on his resistance of his
own arrest (as he suggests), officers are not restricted to considering the criminal activity with
which the defendant is ultimately charged. Instead, they also may consider additional criminal
activity they reasonably perceive at the time force is employed. See Kapuscinksi v. City of
Gibraltar, 821 F. App’x 604 (6th Cir. 2020); Moody v. City of Newport News, Virginia, 193
F. Supp. 3d 530, n.16 (E.D. Va. 2016). This factor weighs in favor of the officers’ use of force.

Regarding the second factor, Woodhead’s actions gave the defendants reasonable
concern for the safety of Officer Mattox. Woodhead displayed an aggressive demeanor
through his words and body language, as he shouted expletives at officers in close physical
proximity to them. Ridener observed Woodhead scream and lunge toward Officer Mattox as
Mattox attempted to place handcuffs on April Taylor. [Record No. 37, p. 57; Record No. 34-
34, McKinney BWC Video 16, 24:43] While Woodhead maintains that he was merely
attempting to film the events and did not recall touching Mattox, he concedes, without
explanation, that his hand was extended as he approached Mattox. [Record Nos. 48, p. 113;
43-1, p. 14] The defendants’ concern for the safety of Officer Mattox and others was
reasonable and this factor also weighs in favor of the application of force.

Finally, the Court considers whether Woodhead was actively resisting arrest. As
previously noted, a person is guilty of resisting arrest in Kentucky when he or she intentionally
prevents or attempts to prevent an officer from effecting the arrest of himself or another by
using or threatening to use physical force against the officer. K.R.S. § 520.090. Officers
reasonably believed that Woodhead was attempting to prevent the arrest of April Taylor
through the use of physical force. Woodhead made his opposition to the arrests of other
protestors known to police and attempted to physically place himself between Mattox and

Taylor.6
It is also reasonable for officers to have concluded that Woodhead resisted his own
arrest. Body cam footage indicates that Woodhead struggled with officers for the first several
seconds of their encounter. [McKinney BWC Video 16, 24:45-24:55] Woodhead’s deposition
testimony corroborates this, as he claimed that when Officer Ridener seized him initially, he
did not know who was grabbing him and thought it might have been another protestor. [Record

No. 48 at p. 126] Woodhead stated that he was concerned that he was going to get injured, so
he was “sure [he] was moving to try to make sure that [he] was not getting hurt in the process.”
Id. He further testified that, “[o]nce it was made clear that [he] was being placed under arrest,
then [he] knew it was police.” However, while Ridener seized Woodhead from behind, at least

6 During the arrest of another protestor moments earlier, Woodhead stood nearby,
shouting, “No! This is ridiculous!” He also exclaimed that the arrest was for “no reason” and
officers were “being selective.” [Ridener BWC Video 17, 14:42-15:00]
one other officer (presumably McKinney), in addition to Mattox, assisted from the side, and
all officers were wearing uniforms. [McKinney BWC Video 16, 24:44] Based on Woodhead’s
actions in the presence of uniformed officers, the defendants could have reasonably believed

that Woodhead intentionally attempted to prevent his own arrest. This factor also weighs in
favor of the officers’ application of force.
The “ultimate question is whether the totality of circumstances justifies a particular sort
of seizure.” St. John v. Hickey, 411 F.3d 762, 771 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S.
at 396). Here, the force employed was relatively minimal when considered in light of the
defendants’ perceived need to stop Woodhead from harming Officer Mattox and/or interfering
with the arrest of April Taylor. Defendant Ridener testified with respect to his training

regarding the Lexington Police Department’s resistance control continuum. Pursuant to this
policy, Woodhead’s conduct was considered “active aggressive,” and permissible responses
included pepper spray, pepper ball rounds, “impact weapon strike to non-vital area,” baton arm
bar, and take down. [Record No. 37, pp. 26-27] According to Ridener, the officers performed
a takedown, consistent with the policy, which Woodhead does not challenge.
Woodhead claims that the defendants placed him in a “chokehold” or “choke-slammed”

him to the ground. However, he does not define these terms and has failed to identify any
police practices expert who would explain them to a jury or otherwise opine that the defendants
violated any particular standard of conduct. Officer Ridener testified during his deposition that
he understood a chokehold to be placing an arm around someone’s neck and squeezing.
[Record No. 37, at p. 34] He explained that the Lexington Police Department does not allow
chokeholds to be used. Id.
Woodhead made a vague reference to having had trouble breathing at some point during
his arrest, but the video evidence reveals that no direct or sustained pressure was applied to the
front of Woodhead’s neck or throat. And while he contends that he was “slammed” to the

pavement, he does not identify any injuries that required medical attention. But see Courtright
v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 519 (6th Cir. 2016) (observing that plaintiff need not
suffer severe physical injury to maintain excessive force claim). The use of a leg sweep
maneuver has been deemed reasonable when officers have reason to believe that a suspect
“could lash out and harm them.” See Phillips v. Blair, 786 F. App’x 519, 530 (6th Cir. 2019).
Likewise, the brief placement of an officer’s knee on a resisting detainee’s back or legs does
not constitute excessive force under these circumstances. See Jenkins v. Ann Arbor Police

Dep’t, 2009 WL 185721, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 2009). Based on the foregoing analysis, no
reasonable juror could conclude that the defendants violated the plaintiff’s right to be free from
excessive force.
Woodhead has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that either of the defendants
used excessive force in effecting his arrest. Further, he has not demonstrated a clearly
established constitutional right to be free from the treatment he alleges. Instead, he refers to a

host of cases indicating that the use of a chokehold on an unresistant—or even initially
resistant—individual constitutes excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. See Coley v.
Lucas Cnty., Ohio, 799 F.3d 530, 540-41 (6th Cir. 2015); Degolia v. Kenton County, 381 F.
Supp. 3d 740, 761-62 (E.D. Ky. 2019); Hanson v. Madison Cnty. Detention Ctr., 736 F. App’x
521, 532-33 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Griffith v. Coburn, 473 F.3d 650, 657, 660 (6th Cir. 2007));
Laury v. Rodriguez, 659 F. App’x 837, 845-46 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that officers were not
entitled to qualified immunity based on use of force in booking room following arrest). But
none of these cases involve (or are analogous to) the application of a chokehold on a defendant
who lunged angrily toward a police officer or attempted to interfere with the arrest of another.
While a case directly on point is not required, “existing precedent must have placed the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 613 (6th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011)). With respect to the defendants’
attempted use of a leg sweep, Woodhead relies on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Pershell v.
Cook, 430 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2011). There, officers responding to a 9-1-1 call decided to
serve an arrest warrant on the plaintiff. One of the officers pointed a taser at Pershell upon
entering his home and told him that he was under arrest. Pershell ordered the officer to get out
of his house. At some point, three state troopers entered the house and, after informing him of

the basis for his arrest warrant, “knocked [Pershell’s] legs out from under him using a leg
sweep.” Id. at 412. Pershell was then handcuffed while lying on the ground. Thereafter,
Pershell felt a forceful impact on his left foot and ankle followed by a blow to his left side. He
was transported to jail in a wheelchair and subsequently diagnosed with a hip fracture. Id. at
413.
The district court denied the defendant-officers’ motion for summary judgment based

on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision, concluding that the officers’
administration of force after Pershell was on the ground was objectively unreasonable, since
he was completely neutralized and thus posed no danger to police or others. Id. at 415. The
court also found that using a leg sweep to knock Pershell onto the floor was objectively
unreasonable because he “did not resist arrest or pose an immediate danger to officers at the
time he was knocked to the ground.” Id. Unlike Woodhead, who lunged and extended his
arms toward Officer Mattox, Pershell’s “hands hung by his sides” and he did not swing or
strike at officers.
The Sixth Circuit has determined that the use of takedown maneuvers may amount to

excessive force in certain situations. See LaPlante, 30 F.4th at 581 (denying qualified
immunity where officers used takedown technique resulting in elbow dislocation and fracture
when suspect was not clearly resistant); Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 365-66
(6th Cir. 2009) (denying qualified immunity where officers employed takedown technique
after suspect was already handcuffed within police station); McCaig v. Raber, 515 F. App’x
551, 555 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluding that jury could find use of takedown maneuver
objectively unreasonable where suspect “made no aggressive gestures or statements, attempted

to cooperate, offered no resistance, and stated that he would ‘go easy’”); Pershell, 430 F.
App’x at 415 (denying qualified immunity where, after performing a leg sweep and
handcuffing a suspect, officers struck the suspect three times, causing him to lose
consciousness and sustain a hip fracture); Lawler v. City of Taylor, 268 F. App’x 384, 387 (6th
Cir. 2008) (denying qualified immunity where video footage would allow jury to find that
officer threw the suspect to the floor in booking room after the suspect insulted the officer and

refused to comply with orders); Meirthew v. Amore, 417 F. App’x 494, 497-98 (6th Cir. 2011)
(denying qualified immunity where officer used an arm-bar technique in police station booking
room and suspect was unarmed, handcuffed, and surrounded by officers). However, under the
present circumstances, the defendants cannot be said to have violated any clearly established
constitutional right. Accordingly, they are entitled to qualified immunity.
2. State Law Battery
Woodhead claims that the defendants’ use of force during his arrest constituted battery.
Kentucky law provides public officials with qualified official immunity from liability for

“good faith judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment.” Yanero v. Davis, 65
S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001). Qualified immunity applies when public officials perform “(1)
discretionary acts or functions . . . (2) in good faith; and (3) within the scope of the employee’s
authority.” Id. If the act was discretionary and within the scope of the official’s authority, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to provide evidence that the act was not performed in good faith.
Id. at 523.
Kentucky law permits officers to use reasonably necessary force to make an arrest. See

K.R.S. § 503.090. The amount of force required to effect an arrest is discretionary and within
the scope of the defendants. Nichols v. Bourbon Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 26 F. Supp. 3d 634,
642 (E.D. Ky. 2014) (citing Woosley v. City of Paris, 591 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (E.D. Ky.
2008)). As previously determined, the defendants’ use of force did not constitute a violation
of a clearly established constitutional right in this case. And while Woodhead offers no
specific argument that the defendants acted in bad faith, the body cam footage refutes any

suggestion that they did. See id. The application of force was not gratuitous and lasted no
longer than necessary to place Woodhead under arrest. Accordingly, the defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity.
C. First Amendment Claim
Woodhead claims that he was arrested in retaliation for the content of his speech. A
claim of retaliation based on the First Amendment requires proof that: “‘(1) the plaintiff
engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would
deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is
a causal connection between’ the first two elements, i.e., ‘the adverse action was motivated at
least in part by the plaintiff’s protected conduct.’” Hartman v. Thompson, 931 F.3d 471, 483-

84 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en
banc)).
The defendants do not dispute that Woodhead engaged in protected activity when he
protested from the sidewalk. [Record No. 34-43, p. 13] They also concede that an unlawful
arrest could be sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in free speech.
Id. However, the defendants correctly point out that “probable cause to make an arrest defeats
a claim that the arrest was in retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment.”

Hartman, 931 F.3d at 484 (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, —U.S.—, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1721 (2019)).
As previously explained, based on his interference with April Taylor’s arrest, there is no
genuine issue of material fact that probable cause existed to arrest Woodhead. Woodhead has
failed to address this argument or the controlling authority in his response to the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. [See Record No. 43-1, p. 16 (citing Worrell v. Henry, 2019
F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000) for elements of retaliation claim).] Based on the foregoing, the

defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to the First Amendment retaliation
claim.
IV.
For the reasons outlined in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Record No. 34] is
GRANTED. All costs and expenses incurred by the defendants in this proceeding will be
taxed against the plaintiff.
Dated: June 8, 2022. .

3 Ls, □ > Danny C. se
Qamege United States District Court
“ae —s- Eastern District of Kentucky

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10180322. Public record. Not legal advice.