# COLEMAN v. KELLAMS

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · September 22, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10170533

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** September 22, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

ROBERT D. COLEMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:21-cv-00375-JPH-MJD
)
S. KELLAMS, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Robert D. Coleman, a prisoner at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility,
alleges that Officer S. Kellams violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using
excessive force against him. Officer Kellams has filed a motion for summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. For the reasons that follow, her
motion is GRANTED.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Parties in a civil dispute may move for summary judgment, which is a way
of resolving a case short of a trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment
is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any of the material facts,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Pack v.
Middlebury Comm. Schs., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021). A "genuine
dispute" exists when a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
"Material facts" are those that might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,

572-73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility
determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-
finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court is only
required to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3);
it is not required to "scour every inch of the record" for evidence that is potentially
relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017).
"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[T]he burden on the moving party
may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at
325.
II. Background

The incident that is the subject of Mr. Coleman's allegations occurred on
May 1, 2021, at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility where Mr. Coleman was
confined to a cell on the upper range of a segregation unit. (Id.; dkt. 1 at 2). The
defendant, Officer Samantha Kellams, was a correctional officer cleaning out a
nearby cell. (Id.). Mr. Coleman exposed his penis to Officer Kellams and another
female correctional officer and masturbated for two minutes. Officer Kellams
ordered him to stop. Mr. Coleman did not comply, so Officer Kellams sprayed

him with mace to get him to comply. These facts are undisputed as the incident
was captured on video. (Dkt. 60-2 Manual Filing).
The video begins with Officer Kellams and another female correctional
officer ascending the stairs of Mr. Coleman's range. (Dkt. 60-2 at 00:01).
Mr. Coleman immediately opens the cuff port of his cell, which is located at the
top of the stairs. (Id. at 00:02). When Officer Kellams and her colleague reach the
top of the stairs, Mr. Coleman exposes his penis and starts fondling himself. (Id.
at 00:10 – 00:16). As Officer Kellams passes his cell, she orders him to stop. (Id.

at 00:16).
Officer Kellams and her colleague then begin cleaning out the cell four
down from Mr. Coleman. (00:16 – 01:00). Mr. Coleman continues masturbating.
(Id.). When Officer Kellams exits the cell four down, Mr. Coleman moves closer
to his cuff port and continues masturbating. (01:00 – 01:10). Officer Kellams
then turns and walks back toward the stairs, at which time Mr. Coleman sticks
his penis through the cuff port, continues masturbating, and starts striking his
penis against the cuff port walls. (Id. at 01:30 - 01:40).

Officer Kellams stops, puts down the items in her hands, and confers with
her colleague. (Id. at 01:40 – 01:45). She removes a can of mace from her belt
and approaches Mr. Coleman's cell. (Id. 01:45 – 01:48). Mr. Coleman steps back,
continues masturbating, and sticks his left forearm through the cuff port. (Id.).
Officer Kellams warns Mr. Coleman that she is going to mace him if he doesn't
stop, but he continues, so Officer Kellams deploys the mace. (Id. at 01:48 –
01:55; dkt. 60-1 at 48). Mr. Coleman shouts at Officer Kellams the whole time.

(Dkt. 60-2 at 01:48 – 01:55).
When Officer Kellams steps away from Mr. Coleman's cell, he immediately
sticks his penis through the cuff port and resumes masturbating. (Id. at 01:55 –
02:00). Officer Kellams gives more verbal orders to stop, but Mr. Coleman is
undeterred. (01:59 – 02:15). Eventually, Officer Kellams picks up her items and
walks down the stairs. (Id. 02:10 – 02:15). Mr. Coleman sticks his left arm
through the cuff port and continues masturbating while watching Officer
Kellams and her colleague leave the unit. (Id. at 02:15 – 2:34). Immediately

thereafter, two male correctional officers enter the range, remove Mr. Coleman
from his cell, and take him to a decontamination shower. (Id. at 02:50 – 06:45;
dkt. 60-1 at 56).
Before this incident, Mr. Coleman thought Officer Kellams was "cool."
(Dkt. 60-1 at 42). She knew he liked to expose himself to the women working at
the prison, and he didn't think she would use force to make him stop.1 (Id.).
Mr. Coleman did not suffer long-term injuries. (Id. at 67). He experienced
burning during urination for a few days, and he had a couple blisters, which the

medical staff told him to rinse with cold water. (Id. at 67, 75-76).

1 Mr. Coleman had "a similar incident" earlier that day with another female correctional
officer. (Dkt. 60-2 at 15).
III. Discussion
Officer Kellams argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity for using
mace to try to get Mr. Coleman to stop masturbating and cover himself after he

ignored her verbal order to stop. (Dkt. 61 at 5-6).
A. Legal Standard
Qualified immunity protects government officials from damages liability
"insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" at the
time that the conduct occurred. Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 545
(7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
Although qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the plaintiff has the

burden of defeating it once the defendants raise it. Archer v. Chisolm, 870 F.3d
603, 613 (7th Cir. 2017). To do so, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant
violated a constitutional right, when construing the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff; and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time
of the alleged violation, such that it would have been clear to a reasonable actor
that his conduct was unlawful. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
A failure to show either is fatal for the plaintiff's case, and courts may begin (and
possibly end) with either inquiry. Id. at 236.

To be "clearly established," a constitutional right "must have a sufficiently
clear foundation in then-existing precedent." District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583
U.S. 48, 63 (2018). The principle of fair notice pervades the qualified immunity
doctrine. Campbell, 936 F.3d at 545. Qualified immunity applies unless the
specific contours of the right "were sufficiently definite that any reasonable
official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating
it." Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014).

Given this emphasis on notice, clearly established law cannot be framed
at a "high level of generality." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).
"A rule is too general if the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct 'does not follow
immediately from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.'" Wesby,
138 S. Ct. at 590 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, (1987)).
Existing caselaw must "dictate the resolution of the parties' dispute," Comsys,
Inc. v. Pacetti, 893 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 2018). While "a case directly on point"
is not required, "precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question

beyond debate,” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551, (2017) (quotation marks
omitted).
Put slightly differently, a right is clearly established only if "every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right." Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015). "The Supreme Court’s
message is unmistakable: Frame the constitutional right in terms granular
enough to provide fair notice because qualified immunity 'protects all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Campbell, 936 F.3d

at 546 (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quotation marks
omitted)).
B. Analysis
As a general matter, the Constitution prohibits prison officials from
maliciously or sadistically inflicting pain on prisoners. E.g. Stockton v. Milwaukee

County, 44 F.4th 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2022). Five factors govern whether a guard's
use of force violates the Eighth Amendment: (1) the need for the application of
force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (3)
the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; (4) the guard's efforts
to temper the severity of a forceful response; and (5) the extent of the plaintiff's
injuries. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1992).
Here, Officer Kellams used brief, non-lethal force by spraying Mr. Coleman
with mace for a few seconds after he refused to follow her direct order that he

stop masturbating. (Dkt. 60-2 at 01:48 – 01:55). His injuries were minor and
went away after a week. (Dkt. 60-1 at 67).
Mr. Coleman has not shown that Officer Kellams' decision to use mace
after he disobeyed her order to stop masturbating and cover himself was clearly
unconstitutional. (Dkt. 60-2). He has not provided a "closely analogous case
finding the alleged violation unlawful," shown "such a clear trend . . . that we
can say with fair assurance that the recognition of the right by controlling
precedent was merely a question of time," or shown that Officer Kellams'

conduct was "so egregious and unreasonable that no reasonable official could
have thought he was acting lawfully." Id. at 620-21.
Instead, using mace is appropriate "when reasonably necessary . . . to
subdue recalcitrant prisoners." Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 757 (7th Cir.
2010); see also Kervin v. Barnes, 144 Fed. App'x 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005) ("This
court has held that prison guards may use chemical sprays when reasonably
necessary to subdue recalcitrant prisoners, for orders must be obeyed, and there

are only so many choices available to correctional officers when inmates refuse.").
Courts afford great deference to prison officials in determining when use of force
is necessary. Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The
responsible institutional personnel on the spot are in a better position to
determine when [mace] is necessary than the courts. Clearly, the use of a
chemical agent in dangerous quantities is justified only in narrowly defined
circumstances but the use of nondangerous quantities of the substance in order
to prevent a perceived future danger does not violate 'evolving standards of

decency' or constitute an 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'").
Mr. Coleman has not identified a reasonable, alternative method that
Officer Kellams could have used to get him to comply with her order. At his
deposition, he argued that she should have closed his cuff port or called for
backup. (Dkt. 60-1 at 43). But closing his cuff port was not possible, as Mr.
Coleman had stuck his entire left forearm through the cuff port to hold it open
when Officer Kellams approached his cell. (Dkt. 60-2 at 01:45 – 01:48).
Regardless, no clearly established law requires prison officials to let Mr. Coleman

expose himself to female correctional officers so long as his cuff port remains
closed. Nor does clearly established law require female correctional officers to
wait for backup before dealing with repugnant behavior of prisoners. Instead,
prison officials have substantial discretion in deciding what steps are
appropriate to get a prisoner to comply with reasonable orders. That's true here
when, as explained above, the amount of force used was reasonable under the
circumstances.
Last, Mr. Coleman argues that Officer Kellams' conduct was clearly
unconstitutional because the mace came in contact with his genitals. This
argument is a nonstarter—Officer Kellams' use of mace was in direct response
to Mr. Coleman's refusal to obey her order, stop masturbating, and cover his
genitals. There's no designated evidence of gratuitous or intentional targeting of
his genitals with mace.
IV. Conclusion
Officer Kellams' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt. [59].
Final judgment in accordance with this Order shall now issue.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 9/22/2023
Sjamu Patrick lbanlove
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
ROBERT D. COLEMAN
179553
WESTVILLE - CF
WESTVILLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
9501 South 1100 West
WESTVILLE, IN 46391
Carlton Wayne Anker
Lewis and Wilkins LLP
anker@lewisandwilkins.com

Laura Brown
Lewis and Wilkins LLP
brown@lewisandwilkins.com

Eric Ryan Shouse
Lewis And Wilkins LLP
shouse@lewisandwilkins.com

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10170533. Public record. Not legal advice.