# DAWSON v. CARTER

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · August 23, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10170522

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** August 23, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10170522

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the Warden was personally responsible for the alleged cell conditions, because the Warden "not only knew about the problems but was personally responsible for changing prison policies so that they would be addressed"

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

CHARLES DAWSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:19-cv-00222-MG-JPH
)
CHARLES DUGAN, )
RICHARD BROWN, )
JERRY SNYDER, )
RANDALL PURCELL, )
)
Defendants. )

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law and Denying Motion for a New Trial

Plaintiff Charles Dawson, an Indiana prisoner, filed this civil rights action alleging that he
was confined on Department Wide Administrative Segregation for an extended period of time
without due process and that the conditions of that confinement violated his Eighth Amendment
rights. Dkt. 61 at 1. A trial was held, and the jury found defendants Charles Dugan, Jerry Snyder,
and Dick Brown liable to Mr. Dawson. These defendants now seek judgment as a matter of law in
their favor pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, for
a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a). Defendants argue that Mr. Dawson failed to establish all of the
elements of his claims and that the jury was improperly instructed regarding supervisory liability.
Mr. Dawson responded, and Defendants replied.
For the reasons explained below, the motion for judgment as a matter of law, dkt. [169], is
granted in part and denied in part, and the alternative motion for new trial, dkt [169], is denied.
I. Background
Mr. Dawson's claims arise out of the 16-month period he spent in Department Wide
Administrative Segregation ("DWAS"), a restrictive housing unit at Wabash Valley Correctional
Facility, from October 30, 2018, until his transfer to another prison sometime in March 2020.

A. Verdict
A three-day trial was held, and the jury found as follows:
On Mr. Dawson's Eighth Amendment conditions claim, the jury found for Mr. Dawson in
the amount of $1 and found punitive damages against Mr. Dugan, $5,000; and Mr. Snyder,
$20,000.
On Mr. Dawson's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, the jury found for
Mr. Dawson and awarded him $30,000 in compensatory damages and awarded punitive damages
against Mr. Dugan, $10,000; Mr. Brown, $40,000; and Mr. Snyder, $45,000.
The jury found for Mr. Purcell on both claims and for Mr. Brown on the conditions claim.
B. Evidence Adduced at Trial

The evidence presented at trial taken in the light most favorable to Mr. Dawson includes
the following:
1. Disciplinary Segregation
When a prisoner is found guilty of conduct that violates a prison rule at a disciplinary
hearing, he may be sanctioned with time in disciplinary segregation. Dkt. 175 at 92. Disciplinary
segregation cells are single-man concrete cells with solid doors in a separate wing of the prison.
Id. at 93 and 163. Prisoners in disciplinary segregation are generally in their cell for 23 hours a
day. Id. at 94. There are no windows, and a light is on at all times. Id. at 94-95. Prisoners are
permitted to spend one hour a day outside alone in a caged-in area where they can talk to other
prisoners through the fence. Id. at 96.
2. Department Wide Administrative Segregation (DWAS)
Prisoners are placed in DWAS at the discretion of the internal affairs office and the

Warden. Dkt. 175 at 98. Unlike disciplinary segregation, there is no set out date. Id. at 99. The cells
are nearly identical to those in the disciplinary segregation wing. There are three concrete walls
and a perforated cell door that faces out towards a wall. Dkt. 178 at 158. Disciplinary segregation
cells had a non-perforated solid slab door. Id. at 169. The cell contains a bed, desk, and toilet. Id.
Mr. Dawson's cell did not have a chair. Dkt. 178 at 158. There are no visible windows, and
prisoners are generally confined to their cell for 23 hours a day. Dkt. 175 at 99. A low wattage
nightlight is in each cell so that correctional officers can regularly inspect the cells. Dkt. 178 at
159. This same light is present in general population cells. Id. at 140-141. Mr. Dawson testified
that the light made him feel restless, grumpy, and not well. Id. at 193.
Mr. Dawson has a rod in his leg which causes leg pain and makes sitting on hard surfaces

difficult. Dkt. 178 at 170. Even while in DWAS, Mr. Dawson was able to sit comfortably on his
bed and had access to pain medications to reduce his leg pain. Id. at 171.
Prisoners in DWAS are permitted an hour outside their cell alone in a small caged-in area
with a basketball goal and ball. Dkt. 175 at 100, 160. This one hour of recreation was the only time
Mr. Dawson saw outside. Id. at 162. Birds nested in the fencing surrounding the recreation cages,
so bird feces were all over the recreation yard. Id. at 164. Indoor recreation was time alone in a
room with a pull-up bar and basketball goal. Id. at 161. The roof of the indoor recreation area was
half covered in stained plexiglass and the other half was open to the sky. Id. at 195.
Mr. Dawson was permitted to leave his cell to shower three times a week. Dkt. 178 at 160.
Prisoners on DWAS can yell to communicate with each other, but they cannot see each
other face to face. Dkt. 178 at 163.
Like disciplinary segregation, administrative segregation limits phone calls to one call for
15 minutes each week. Dkt. 178 at 162-163. In person visits were limited to 45 minutes without

contact. Id. at 163, 178. Materials could be requested from the law library, but prisoners in DWAS
could not go to the library. Id.
Food could be ordered from commissary and cooked with a hot pot, but no microwave was
available. Dkt. 178 at 168.
Mr. Dawson testified that cold air would enter his range through an exterior door, and he
would put on his thermals, sweat suit, and uniform to stay warm. Dkt. 178 at 188. The cold
bothered the metal in his leg, causing pain. Id. at 193. In the summer, the air conditioner was not
working on Mr. Dawson's range, so officers opened the door at the end of the range for fresh air
and a fan was permitted. Id. at 188. Field mice were able to enter the range. Id.
General population allows for more freedom and socialization. Many prisoners share a cell.

Dkt. 178 at 169. Meals can be eaten in the chow hall, there is recreation with weights, video games,
basketball, and billiards. Prisoners can socialize with other prisoners and can cook food in the
microwave. Jobs and other programming are available. Id. at 167.
Mr. Dawson testified that not being able to move about the prison and attend visitation
with his family and girlfriend was "depressing over time" and he often felt lonely. Dkt. 178 at 218.
He found his time alone to be a "difficult situation to deal with. . . ." Id.
Mr. Dawson further testified that he told Mr. Dugan that he did not like where he was at.
Dkt. 178 at 219.
3. Mr. Dawson's Placement in DWAS
Mr. Dawson was held in a solitary cell from the time he arrived at Wabash Valley
Correctional Facility until his transfer. On October 26, 2018, Mr. Dawson was completing a one-
year term of disciplinary segregation as a result of a trafficking violation. Dkt. 178 at 84-85. At that

time, Mr. Snyder sent an email stating that Mr. Dawson was being processed for placement on
DWAS. Exhibit 3-A.
On November 1, 2018, Warden Richard Brown reviewed and signed off on a memorandum
sent to Michael Osborn, the Southern Regional Director, recommending that Mr. Dawson be
placed in DWAS. Exhibit 8; dkt. 178 at 139. The recommendation was based on Mr. Dawson's
involvement in a trafficking ring and thirteen conduct violations. Id. That same day, Mr. Dawson
was transferred to administrative segregation. Dkt. 175 at 102-104. He was given a Report of
Classification Hearing form which did not provide any information about his right to appeal.
Exhibit 1-A; dkt. 178 at 84. The form did not explain why Mr. Dawson was being transferred to
DWAS or how long he would be there. Id. at 85.

4. Report of Classification Hearing
Indiana Department of Corrections ("IDOC") policy provides that a series of classification
reviews must be completed to maintain someone in DWAS. Dkt. 175 at 104. Specifically,
prisoners are entitled to a review every week during the first two months of their placement in
DWAS. Id. at 105. Mr. Dugan was responsible for completing these weekly reviews for
Mr. Dawson during his first 60 days in DWAS. The weekly reviews included the completion of a
"Report of Classification Hearing" form. See Exhibits 1-B, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E, 1-G, 1-H. When
completing these forms, Mr. Dugan did not recommend that Mr. Dawson be reviewed for release.
Id. at 109, 114. Mr. Dugan did not complete the section of the form titled "recommendation and
basis." Exhibits 1-B, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E, 1-G, 1-H. Nor do these forms provide any information as to
why Mr. Dawson should remain on DWAS. Id.
Mr. Dugan explained that he did not have the authority to Order Mr. Dawson's release from
DWAS, but that his weekly reviews could be an opportunity to start the process to be reviewed for

release from DWAS. Dkt. 175 at 100. Mr. Dugan testified that Mr. Dawson could have asked to
be reviewed for release, but there is no information on the form that explains that fact. Id. at 114.
5. 30-Day Reviews – October 2018 through January 2019
Beginning in October 2018, Mr. Dugan began producing what are known as 30-day
reviews for Mr. Dawson. Dkt. 175 at 118. The purpose of the 30-day review is to determine whether
a reason for segregation still exists for an inmate. Id. at 101-102. Every prisoner in administrative
segregation was entitled to a 30-day review. Id. at 102.
Mr. Dugan completed the 30-day reviews for October, November, December, and January,
in less than a minute by simply updating the date on a prepared computer form. Id. at 120; see
Exhibit 2-A, 2-B, 2-C, 2-D. No information was actually reviewed in completing these forms. Id.
Mr. Dugan was taught to complete these forms in this manner by Mr. Snyder. Dkt. 175 at 142-143.

These reviews would not result in Mr. Dawson's release from DWAS. Dkt. 175 at 121 and 127.
Nowhere on the forms does it state that Mr. Dawson could appeal the decision. Id. These reviews
did not indicate what Mr. Dawson should be doing to get off of DWAS. Id. at 128.
6. ACT Program
On December 18, 2018, Mr. Dugan completed another Report of Classification Hearing
form. Exhibit 1-F. Again, he did not provide any reason for his recommendation that Mr. Dawson
remain in administrative segregation. He did, however, refer Mr. Dawson for participation in the
ACT program. Id.; dkt. 175 at 115. The ACT program is a nine-month program for prisoners in
DWAS. There are multiple parts to the program, some of which cannot be completed while in
DWAS at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. Id. at 115-116. The ACT program in DWAS
consists of two volunteers talking simultaneously to 12 inmates who are locked in 12 different
cells on two different floors once a week. Dkt. 178 at 77-78.
7. 30-Day Reviews – February 2019 through May 2019

Beginning in February 2019, and continuing through May 2019, the 30-day review forms
were identical but added a paragraph that stated:
Placement on Department-Wide Administrative Status Housing may be appealed
by submitting a Classification Appeal (SF 9260) within ten working days of
admission to a Department-Wide Restrict Status Housing Unit or any subsequent
Classification action (i.e., 30 Day or 90 Day reviews).

Exhibits 2-E, 2-F, 2-G, and 2-H. In completing these reviews Mr. Dugan also reportedly reviewed:
"reason for current placement, conduct history, Program participation, OCMS notes, interactions
with staff and other offenders." Id.; dkt. 175 at 129-130. None of these reviews reflected that
Mr. Dugan recommended that Mr. Dawson's be reviewed for release from administrative
segregation. Dkt. 175 at 131. These reviews took ten to fifteen minutes to complete. Id. at 171.
8. Full 90-Day Reviews
A full review (also referred to as a 90-day review) was the only process which could result
in transfer out of DWAS. Dkt. 175 at 174. The full 90-day reviews do not happen automatically
every 90 days and an inmate must wait at least 90 days after receiving the results of a full review
before requesting another full review. Dkt. 178 at 54 and 176. It can take months for prison staff
to complete a full review. Id. at 170. Mr. Dawson was never told how to apply for a full review,
and he was never asked if he wanted a full review. Id. at 174-175. If a full review occurs, the
prisoner is notified of the results when a decision has been made. Dkt. 178 at 55.
On March 14, 2019, Mr. Dawson submitted a Classification Appeal through the
institutional mail. In the appeal, he reported that he had been on DWAS since October 30, 2018,
but had not received a 30-day or 90-day review to see if his state of mind had changed so that he
could be placed back in general population. He also stated that he was not a threat to the safety or
security of the facility and was requesting immediate release back to general population. Exhibit
5; dkt. 178 at 131. No full review was ever completed as a result of this Classification appeal.

Mr. Dawson filed this lawsuit on May 7, 2019, and service was issued to the defendants on
June 18, 2019.
On June 25, 2019, Mr. Snyder sent an email to Mr. Purcell asking him to "[p]lease do a
staff initiated full review on [] Dawson #162406. When you make the OCMS note and on the
review itself, please note that it is staff initiated. Thank you." Exhibit 3-E; Dkt. 178 at p 58.
Mr. Snyder sent this request after the IDOC Director of Classification requested copies of initial
review, 7-day review, 30-day reviews, any full reviews, annuals reviews and the Behavioral
Modification Plan for Charles Dawson. Exhibit 3-D.
9. Behavior Modification Plan
Prisoners are entitled to receive a behavior modification plan within three days of their

admission to administrative segregation. Dkt. 175 at 112-113. However, Mr. Dugan provided this
completed form to Mr. Dawson on June 25, 2019 (eight months after Mr. Dawson was placed in
administrative segregation). Id. It recommends that Mr. Dawson participate in every program
listed: ACT program; Education (Literacy or TASC); Thinking for a Change, if available; MRT
Group, if available; Independent Study – Anger Management; Independent Study – Substance
Abuse. Exhibit 4. Mr. Dugan's understood that completion of this programming would assist
Mr. Dawson in getting moved off of administrative segregation. Dkt. 175 at 112.
10. 30-Day Reviews – June 2019 through September 2019
The June 2019 30-day review included additional language. Exhibit 2-I. Mr. Dugan wrote:
"Upon successfully completing the four phases of the ACT Program a Department-Wide
Administrative Restrict Housing Status review will be conducted to determine eligibility for

release to complete Phase 5." Id.; dkt. 175 at 131-132.
On July 1, 2019, a new 30-day review form was adopted by the IDOC. Dkt. 175 at 133;
178 at 71. This form provided the same relevant information as the June 2019 30-day review.
Compare Exhibit 2-J to 2-I. The 30-day review forms for July, August, and September are identical
expect for the date. Exhibits 2-K, 2-L; dkt. 175 at 135.
11. Mr. Dawson's 90-day Review
On August 6, 2019, Jerry Snyder sent an email addressed to Charles Dugan and others.
This email set forth the result of a full 90-day review providing that Mr. Dawson was "Denied due
to OII [Office of Investigation and Intelligence] information of his involvement in a major
trafficking ring at MCF in 2017. Will recommend approval with 2 years clear conduct in November

2019." Exhibit. 3-G. Mr. Snyder instructed staff to "advise offenders of the outcome and make an
appropriate OCMS note." Id. Mr. Dawson's involvement with the trafficking ring is the same
conduct that resulted in his disciplinary segregation sanction. Dkt. 175 at 180. At that time,
Mr. Dawson did not have other disciplinary conduct violations. Id.
That same day, Mr. Dugan completed a Report of Classification Hearing which told
Mr. Dawson for the first time that he would not get off of administrative segregation until
November 2019, at the earliest. Exhibit 1-J; Dkt. 175 at 181. At this time, Mr. Dugan understood
that even if he recommended a review, Mr. Dawson would not have the opportunity to be released
from administrative segregation for at least three months. Dkt. 175 at 182.
12. 30-Day Reviews – November 2019 through January 7, 2020
On November 14, 2019, Mr. Dugan completed a 30-day review that recommended
Mr. Dawson be reviewed for transfer given his overall positive adjustment and because he had
recently completed phase 4 of the ACT program. Exhibit 2-M. Mr. Dugan recommended that

Mr. Dawson be reviewed for release to phase 5 on the ACT program. Id.; dkt. 175 at 136-137.
Mr. Dugan's recommendation could result in a full review. Dkt. 175 at 139-140.
On January 7, 2020, Mr. Dugan completed another 30-day review. This review reflects that
Mr. Dawson remained in DWAS awaiting a decision on his release. Exhibit 2-N.
No one was ever released as a result of a 30-day review or the appeal of a 30-day review.
Dkt. 175 at 173-174.
13. Charles Dugan
Mr. Dugan is a caseworker at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. Dkt. 175 at 91.
He provides reviews and programming, assists with attorney-client phone calls, and delivers legal
mail and law library items. Id. Between 2018 and 2020, Mr. Dugan monitored prisoners in both

the disciplinary segregation area and the administrative segregation areas. Id. at 97. Between 2018
and 2020, one of Mr. Dugan's responsibilities was to conduct 30-day reviews. Mr. Snyder instructed
Mr. Dugan on the language to use when completing the reviews. Dkt. 178 at 92.
Mr. Dugan reported to casework manager Randall Purcell, Unit Team Manager Jerry
Snyder, and Warden Richard Brown. Dkt. 175 at 100-101. During Mr. Dawson's time in
administrative segregation, Mr. Dugan would stop and talk to him regularly and never had any
issues with him. Dkt. 175 at 151.
14. Randall Purcell
Mr. Purcell was a caseworker at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility during the times
relevant to the claims. Dkt. 178 at 11-12. He reported to Jerry Snyder. Mr. Purcell never assisted
Mr. Dugan with the inmates held in administrative segregation. Id. at 12-13. Mr. Purcell's only
involvement with Mr. Dawson was initiating his two 90-day reviews. Id. at 13; Exhibit 1-I.
Mr. Purcell would initiate a review in response to a staff or prisoner's request for a 90-day review.
Dkt. 178 at 37. He would forward a questionnaire to the prisoner. That questionnaire asked

prisoners why they are in segregation, what would they like the Office of Investigation and
Intelligence (OII) to know, and how they have bettered themselves in the last 90-days. Id. A
completed questionnaire would then be sent to the decisionmakers including the housing
lieutenant, Mr. Snyder, OII, the deputy warden of reentry and the warden. Dkt. 178 at 38 and 98.
Mr. Purcell testified that he sent this questionnaire to Mr. Dawson in July, but never received a
response. Id. at 38. But Mr. Dawson testified that he was never provided a 90-day questionnaire.
Id. at 178.
Mr. Purcell also initiated a full review in November 2019, after Mr. Dawson had completed
the four phases of the ACT program available in administrative segregation. Id. at 40.
15. Jerry Snyder

Mr. Snyder was a Unit Team Manager. Dkt. 178 at 48. He testified that the purpose of the
30-day review was to determine whether a prisoner should remain in administrative segregation
because he is a threat to the facility. Id. at 51. He understood that before March 2019, the 30-day
reviews were simply prepared forms that took about 30 seconds to complete. Dkt. 178 at 51-52.
Mr. Snyder never disciplined Mr. Dugan for spending 30 seconds on 30-day reviews. Id. at 52.
He believed that Mr. Dugan completed reviews for about 72 inmates in 30 minutes. Dkt. 178
at 105. Mr. Snyder also understood that during the relevant time period, no one was ever released
from administrative segregation as a result of a 30-day review. Id. Mr. Snyder put the 30-day
review protocol in place. Dkt. 175 at 179.
Mr. Snyder testified that he could have requested a full review of Mr. Dawson but did not
do so until June of 2019, after this lawsuit was filed. Dkt. 178 at 72, 117-118. He further
acknowledged that prisoners are never told how to request a full review which is the only review
that can result in removal from administrative segregation. Id. at 72-73. In addition, Mr. Snyder

was responsible for advising that Mr. Dawson's transfer was denied because he was involved in
trafficking at Miami Correctional Facility in 2017. Id. at 73. It was Mr. Snyder's recommendation
that Mr. Dawson be approved for transfer only after two years of clear conduct. Id. at 74.
16. Richard Brown
Mr. Brown was the Warden at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. Dkt. 178 at 119.
He understood that the 30-day reviews were conducted by individuals who had no authority to
make the decision to release someone from administrative segregation. Id. at 122. Nor was there
any review of individual prisoner's characteristics during the 30-day reviews. Id. Warden Brown,
along with Mr. Snyder, put the 30-day review protocol in place. Dkt. 175 at 179.
Mr. Brown was the decision maker at the facility level for all 90-day full reviews. Dkt. 178

at 123. Mr. Brown testified that staff may request 90-day reviews, but that does not happen very
often. Id. at 124. Thus, if neither staff nor a prisoner requests a 90-day review, then a 90-day review
is not conducted, and the prisoner would remain on administrative segregation indefinitely.
Dkt. 178 at 131. Before a prisoner would be transferred out of DWAS, Mr. Brown would have to
recommend release and then that recommendation would be submitted to central office for final
approval. Id. at 138.
II. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Now before the Court is Defendants' Second Motion for Judgment as matter of Law and Motion
for New Trial in the Alternative. Dkt. 169. Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because Mr. Dawson failed to establish one or more elements of his conditions claim and
because there was insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Dawson was deprived of a meaningful
review as required to support his due process claim. Defendants also seek qualified immunity on all
claims.
Rule 50 provides that this Court may enter judgment as a matter of law if it "finds that a
reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis" to support the verdict. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), (b). The Rule 50 "standard largely 'mirrors' the summary-judgment standard,

the difference being that district courts evaluate Rule 50(a) [and 50(b)] motions in light of the trial
record rather than the discovery record." Dupree v. Younger, 143 S. Ct. 1382, 1387 (2023) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–251 (1986)). Thus, in reviewing the motion
for judgment as a matter of law, the Court draws all reasonable inferences in Mr. Dawson's favor.
Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 674 (7th Cir. 2022). The Court must "must affirm
the jury's verdict 'unless there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find
for the non-moving party.'" Id. at 675 (quoting J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367, 378 (7th Cir.
2020) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted)). A Rule 50(b) motion may be granted "only on grounds
advanced in the pre-verdict motion." Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 659

(7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Abellan v. Lavelo Property Mgmt., LLC, 948 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir.
2020)).
The defendants' Rule 50(b) motion seeks judgment as a matter of law based on the doctrine
of qualified immunity. "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "The defense
provides 'ample room for mistaken judgments' and protects all but the 'plainly incompetent and
those who knowingly violate the law.'" Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2008)). "A state official is protected by
qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows: '(1) that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the challenged
conduct.'" Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 350–51 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). To be clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct, the
right's contours must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood
that what he is doing violates that right. Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 546–47 (7th Cir. 2018).
"Whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity is a legal question for
resolution by the court, not a jury." Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 621 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991)). Qualified immunity "ordinarily should be decided
by the court long before trial," Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228, "because '[t]he entitlement is an immunity
from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,'" id. at 227 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985)); see also Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Qualified
immunity protects a defendant from liability as well as from the burden of standing trial. For that

reason, courts should determine as early on in the proceedings as possible whether a defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity."). However, when defendants raise a qualified immunity defense
in their answer, dkt. 16 at 2, they do not waive that defense simply by waiting until after trial to
assert this defense in a post-trial motion. Instead, there are occasions when a complete factual
record is necessary. See Emad v. Dodge Cnty., No. 22-1876, 2023 WL 4188509, at *5 (7th Cir.
June 26, 2023) (concluding that summary judgment awarding qualified immunity to defendants
was improper when the factual basis supporting the claims was unclear).
A. Conditions of Confinement Claims
The jury found for Mr. Dawson on his Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
claim, awarding him $1.00 in nominal damages and assessing punitive damages against Mr.
Dugan, $5,000; and Mr. Snyder, $20,000. Mr. Dugan and Mr. Snyder now argue that they are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Mr. Dawson failed to prove both the objective and
subjective standards of his conditions of confinement case and because they are entitled to
qualified immunity. Dkt. 170 at 13. For the reasons explained below, Mr. Dugan and Mr. Snyder
are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
"'[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an
inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.'"
Johnson v. Prentice, 29 F.4th 895, 904 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994)). This is known as the deliberate indifference standard. Thus, an Eighth Amendment

claim has subjective and objective elements, "each of which must be satisfied." Quinn v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc., 8 F.4th 557, 565 (7th Cir. 2021).
1. Objective Element
Defendants argue that Mr. Dawson has failed to establish the objective element of the
deliberate indifference standard because there was insufficient evidence upon which the jury could
conclude that the conditions in DWAS show a strong likelihood of serious harm. Dkt. 170 at 3.
In response, Mr. Dawson argues that the evidence supports the conclusion that he was subjected
to extreme temperatures,1 was denied proper seating which exacerbated the pain caused by the rod

1 Describing the temperatures as "extreme" is somewhat misleading. Mr. Dawson testified that, when the
temperature was cold, "we would just have to put our thermals, our sweat suit and uniform that they give
in his leg, was subjected to sleep deprivation because the lights were on constantly,2 had no
window in his cell, and suffered as a result of the limited opportunity to exercise. Dkt. 179 at 2.
These conditions, he asserts, satisfy the objective element of his conditions claim.
For the purposes of resolving the Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, the

Court assumes that these conditions are objectively sufficiently serious. Thomas v. State of Illinois,
697 F.3d 612, 614–15 (7th Cir. 2012) ("a trier of fact might reasonably conclude that the prisoner
had been subjected to harm sufficient to support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment even if
he had not contracted a disease or suffered any physical pain.").
2. Subjective Element
Next, Mr. Dugan and Mr. Snyder argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law because there is no evidence that they were aware of the risks Mr. Dawson faced as a result of
the temperature, lack of table and chair, sleep deprivation, or inadequate exercise. Dkt. 170 at 5.
Nor is there any evidence that they had any authority to change the challenged conditions or that
they failed to take reasonable measures to abate the risk of serious injury posed by the challenged

conditions. Dkt. 170 at 5-7.
Mr. Dawson disagrees. He explains in response:
Testimony established that personnel at Wabash was aware that the lights were on
constantly, that there was no air conditioning in the summer. The liable defendants did
not dispute the testimony of [Mr.] Dawson as to those conditions. All liable defendants

us to stay warm in there." See Dkt. 178 at 241. Also, when the air conditioning was not working, staff would
"open up the door to -- the end of the door at the end of the range for us to get fresh air. And I think we
were allowed a fan in there, too." Id.
2 The same light is on in general population cells.
were aware that the administrative segregation cells were located in a separate wing,
and were identical to the disciplinary segregation cells.

Dkt. 179 at 4.3 But, knowledge of the presence of safety lights and a lack of air conditioning is not
sufficient to establish Mr. Dugan's and Mr. Synder's personal liability. There is no evidence that
Mr. Dawson ever complained about the temperature or his inability to sleep to either Mr. Dugan or
Mr. Synder. There was no evidence that either defendant was aware that Mr. Dawson had a metal rod
in his leg that required additional accommodations. There is no evidence that Mr. Dugan or Mr. Synder
were responsible for the temperature in Mr. Dawson's cell, the furniture available, the lighting, or the
recreational facilities. "Simply put, [the defendants] cannot be held liable for failing to do something
[they] had no authority to do." Hunter v. Mueske, 73 F.4th 561, 566–67 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Burks
v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Public officials do not have a free-floating obligation
to put things to rights ... Bureaucracies divide tasks; no prisoner is entitled to insist that one employee
do another's job.")). The possibility that they could have done more does not evince deliberate
indifference. Hunter, 73 F.4th at 567.
Mr. Dawson makes a novel argument based on the theory that he was subjected to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement every time he was provided a 30-day review, which
suggested that someone had reviewed his situation in segregation and denied release. Dkt. 179
at 3-8. Mr. Dawson argues that:
Dugan was part of the fraud and the psychological torture resulting from these
fraudulent 30-day reviews designed to make an inmate think that he had yet failed
again to secure release. All of the defendants testified and acknowledged that the
30-day reviews were not really reviews, were simply "cut and paste" from month

3 Mr. Dawson further states that "All liable defendants were aware as to the solitary confinement protocols
and the dangers of prolonged confinement." Dkt. 179 at 4. In support of this statement, Mr. Dawson points
to Exhibit 8 which is a Memorandum from Warden Brown to Michael Osburn stating, "Per mental health
evaluation by Dr. Sims, Psychologist, [Mr. Dawson] does not exhibit current signs or symptoms of an AXIS
1 Diagnosis and is not at high risk to decompensate in a SCU." Exh. 8. This evidence reflects that
Mr. Dawson was not expected to decompensate in the segregation. In addition, there was no testimony that
Mr. Dugan or Mr. Snyder were aware that Mr. Dawson faced an excessive risk of psychological injuries
caused by prolonged confinement in solitary conditions.
to month, and that a 30-day review had never resulted in an inmate’s release. It
simply was not designed that way. Dawson was never told that. He was led to
believe otherwise, each and every month for over a year. The jury was free to
conclude that this ruse caused severe mental and emotional harm.

Id. at 3-4. This argument fails because Mr. Dawson's Eighth Amendment right to humane
conditions of confinement does not include the right to due process. A fraudulent review process
is not a condition of confinement that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need
such as food, warmth, or exercise. See Isby, 856 F.3d at 522 (discussing conditions of confinement
claims in context of long term segregation). Instead, the sham 30-day reviews directly implicate
Mr. Dawson's due process rights and Mr. Dawson can gain "nothing by attracting additional
constitutional labels." Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (constitutional claims must be addressed under the most
applicable provision)).
3. Qualified Immunity
Finally, Defendants argue that Mr. Dugan and Mr. Snyder are entitled to qualified
immunity on the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim because Mr. Dugan and
Mr. Snyder did not violate Mr. Dawson's constitutional rights and because "there is no authority
clearly establishing the right that would put the question beyond debate." Dkt. 170 at 13-14.
Once qualified immunity is raised, the plaintiff, not the defendant, carries the burden of
overcoming the affirmative defense. Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 688
(7th Cir. 2001) (citing Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F. 3d 717 (7th Cir. 1999)). In response, Mr. Dawson
argues that Defendants waived their qualified immunity defense by not raising it until seeking
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a). But Mr. Dawson offers no legal support for his
claim that the qualified immunity defense has been waived. Dkt. 179 at 10-11. When defendants
raise a qualified immunity defense in their answer, dkt. 16 at 2, they do not waive that defense
simply by waiting until after trial to assert it in a post-trial motion. Instead, there are occasions
when a complete factual record is necessary. See Emad v. Dodge Cnty., No. 22-1876, 2023 WL
4188509, at *5 (7th Cir. June 26, 2023) (concluding that summary judgment awarding qualified
immunity to defendants was improper when the factual basis supporting the claims was unclear).

Now that the record is fully developed and qualified immunity has been raised, Mr. Dawson has
the burden of showing that every reasonable official would have understood that the conditions in
DWAS were unconstitutional. Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 546–47 (7th Cir. 2018).
In an apparent effort to defeat the qualified immunity defense, Mr. Dawson points to
Woodward v. Correctional Medical Services of Illinois, Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 930 (7th Cir. 2004)
(affirming a punitive damages award in a § 1983 action where defendants disregarded procedures
and were not properly trained). Dkt. 179 at 13. But Woodward does not establish that any of the
conditions Mr. Dawson faced, either individually or collectively, violated his Eighth Amendment
rights. To the contrary, in Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 522 (7th Cir. 2017), the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's conclusion that complaints relating to the lighting, food, temperatures,

sleeping arrangements, the restricted time for showers and exercise, and so forth, do not rise to the
level of extreme deprivation of basic human needs required to satisfy Eighth Amendment.
In the absence of any evidence that Mr. Dugan or Mr. Synder were deliberately indifferent
to the harm Mr. Dawson faced as a result of the lighting, temperature, and other conditions in DWAS,
they are entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law on the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
claims. In addition, because not every reasonable official would have understood that the
conditions in DWAS were unconstitutional, Mr. Dugan and Mr. Synder are entitled to qualified
immunity on the Eighth Amendment claim.
Accordingly, an Amended Judgment shall be entered reflecting that Defendants Charles
Dugan and Jerry Snyder are entitled to qualified immunity on the conditions of confinement claim.
B. Due Process Claim
On Mr. Dawson's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, the jury found for
Mr. Dawson and awarded him $30,000 in compensatory damages and awarded punitive damages
against Mr. Dugan, $10,000; Mr. Brown, $40,000; and Mr. Snyder, $45,000.

Defendants raise four arguments in support of their motion. First, they argue that the Court
should find as a matter of law that Mr. Dawson's confinement in DWAS did not implicate a liberty
interest. Dkt. 170 at 8. Second, even assuming a liberty interest was implicated, the Court should
find that no reasonable jury could find that Mr. Dawson was denied periodic and meaningful
reviews. Id. at 10-12. Third, Mr. Brown and Mr. Snyder are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because they lacked personal involvement. Id. at 12-13. Finally, Defendants argue they are entitled
to qualified immunity. Id. at 13. For the reasons explained below, all four of Defendants' grounds
for relief are denied.
1. Liberty Interest
"[A] liberty interest may arise if the length of segregated confinement is substantial and the

record reveals that the conditions of confinement are unusually harsh." Marion v. Columbia
Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). Defendants argue
that Mr. Dawson's confinement in DWAS does not implicate a liberty interest. They explain,
"[w]hile Plaintiff's length of confinement" in DWAS "tips this case towards a liberty interest, the
record must reveal that the conditions of confinement are unusually harsh." Dkt. 170 at 9; see also
dkt. 180 at 7-9.
Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to show that that the conditions
Mr. Dawson faced were unusually harsh. Id. Defendants are mistaken. Mr. Dawson was
indefinitely confined in a solitary windowless cell for 23 hours a day for 16 months. This evidence
was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the conditions Mr. Dawson faced were unusually harsh.
Defendants argue in reply that Mr. Dawson was required to present evidence that the
conditions at issue were more restrictive than those faced at the most restrictive prison in the same

state. Dkt. 180 at 8 (citing Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 585 (7th Cir. 2005)). But Defendants
have waived that specific issue by not first raising it in their Rule 50(a) motion prior to the close
of evidence. See dkt. 177 at 9-13. In addition, Defendants effectively conceded that Mr. Dawson
had a liberty interest in avoiding placement in DWAS because they did not request a jury
instruction on this issue, nor did they object to Final Instructions 14 or 15 on this basis. Dkt. 152
at 15-16; dkt. 178 at 233-234. Instead, they presumed that a liberty interest was at stake, consistent
with their proposed case-specific instructions. Dkt. 120-at 5. Further, the parties did not respond
to the Court's order requesting a stipulation on this issue, which reflects the Court's efforts to bring
this issue to the parties' attention prior to trial. Dkt. 142 at 2.
In any event, the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish that Mr. Dawson had

a liberty interest in avoiding his 16-month DWAS placement. Spending 23 hours a day alone in a
cell for 16 months is unusually harsh, particularly when the placement is indefinite. Beamon v.
Pollard, 711 F. App'x 794, 795–96 (7th Cir. 2018) ("Whether a liberty interest is implicated by
disciplinary segregation depends on both the time and conditions of confinement. . . . ").
2. Meaningful and Periodic Reviews
Next, Defendants argue that even assuming a due process claim was implicated,
Mr. Dawson's claim fails because there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude
that Mr. Dawson was denied periodic and meaningful reviews. Dkt. 170 at 10 (citing Final Jury
Instruction 15, dkt. 152 at 16). Defendants argue that "all that Plaintiff established at trial is that
the forms evidencing the review results from February 1, 2019 through June 30, 2019, were
boilerplate. And therein lies the fault in Plaintiff's presentation: it is the process of the review that
the jury is required to evaluate—not the process in providing Plaintiff with the results of the
review." Dkt. 170 at 11.

Defendants' argument in this regard is not well taken. When drawing all reasonable
inferences in Mr. Dawson's favor, there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
find that Mr. Dawson was denied periodic and meaningful reviews. Bohanon, 46 F.4th at 674-675.
There was considerable testimony regarding the review process. From this testimony, the jury
could infer the following:
• A full review (also referred to as a 90-day review) was the only process which could
result in a prisoner being transferred out of DWAS. Dkt. 175 at 174. Thus, the jury
could conclude that all other reviews, such as the boilerplate 30-day reviews, were
a sham because they could not result in Mr. Dawson's release from DWAS.
Dkt. 152 at 15 ("A meaningful review does not need to be formal or adversarial,

but the review must be open to the possibility of a different outcome.").
• A jury could also conclude that the full reviews were not provided periodically.
The full 90-day reviews do not happen automatically every 90 days. Dkt. 178 at 54.
Prisoners including Mr. Dawson were never told how to request a full review. Id.
at 72-73. Mr. Dawson was never asked if he wanted a full review. Id. at 174-178.
Staff may request a full review, but that does not happen very often. Id. at 123-124.
Thus, if neither staff nor a prisoner requests a full review, then a full review is not
conducted, and the prisoner would remain on administrative segregation
indefinitely. Id. at 131-132. In addition, approximately five months after
Mr. Dawson was transferred to DWAS he submitted a Classification Appeal stating
that he had not received a 90-day (the full review) and seeking immediate release
back to general population because he was not a threat to the safety or security of
the facility. Exhibit 5. No full review was completed as a result of this Classification

Appeal. A reasonable jury could conclude that a review process that may never be
completed is not sufficiently frequent to be considered periodic. Dkt. 152 at 15
(explaining "at a minimum, the periodic review must be sufficiently frequent so
that the inmate's placement in segregation does not become a pretext for indefinite
confinement.").
• A reasonable jury could further conclude that the full 90-day review Mr. Dawson
was provided was not meaningful. Staff initiated a full 90-day review only after
Mr. Dawson filed this lawsuit and service was issued to the defendants. Exhibit 3-E;
Dkt. 178 at p 58. On August 6, 2019, Jerry Snyder emailed the results of the full
90-day review, stating that Mr. Dawson was "Denied due to OII [Office of

Investigation and Intelligence] information of his involvement in a major
trafficking ring at MCF in 2017. Will recommend approval with 2 years clear
conduct in November 2019." Exhibit 3-G. Mr. Dawson's involvement with the
trafficking ring is the same conduct that resulted in his disciplinary segregation
sanction, which he had already served. Dkt. 175 at 180. The jury could conclude
that Mr. Dawson was not given a meaningful review, but instead was denied release
from DWAS simply to punish him for his past conduct for which he already served
his disciplinary sanction. Dkt. 152 at 15 ("Prison officials may not use past events
alone to justify indefinite confinement.").
The evidence reflects that Mr. Dawson was denied meaningful and periodic reviews while
on DWAS. No relief is warranted on this basis.
3. Personal Involvement
Mr. Brown and Mr. Snyder argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law

because they were not personally involved in the complained-of conduct. Dkt. 170 at 12 (citing
dkt. 152 at 19). Specifically, they argue there is no evidence that Mr. Brown or Mr. Snyder were
personally involved in performing or initiating the periodic review process. In response,
Mr. Dawson argues that Mr. Brown and Mr. Snyder were actively involved in the fraud designed
to ignore inmates in administrative segregation and leave them there indefinitely. Dkt. 179 at 10.
The evidence was sufficient to establish Mr. Brown's and Mr. Snyder's personal
involvement in denying Mr. Dawson his due process right to periodic and meaningful reviews of
his placement in DWAS. This is because Mr. Brown and Mr. Snyder were supervisors actually
engaged with the underlying constitutional violation. "[T]o recover damages against a prison
official acting in a supervisory role, a § 1983 plaintiff may not rely on a theory of respondeat

superior and must instead allege that the defendant, through his or her own conduct, has violated
the Constitution." Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015). Individual liability "may
be found where an official knows about unconstitutional conduct and facilitates, approves,
condones, or turn[s] a blind eye to it." Id.
First, the evidence reflects that Mr. Brown and Mr. Snyder played a personal role in
Mr. Dawson's placement in DWAS. Mr. Snyder sent an email stating that Mr. Dawson was being
processed for placement on DWAS, Exhibit 3-A, and Mr. Brown reviewed and signed off on a
memorandum recommending that Mr. Dawson be placed in DWAS, Exhibit 8; dkt. 178 at 139.
A reasonable jury could infer that these Defendants personally understood that once Mr. Dawson
was placed on DWAS that he would be held there without meaningful and periodic reviews.
Second, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Brown and Mr. Snyder put the sham
30-day review protocol in place. Dkt. 175 at 173-179. These reviews were periodic but not

meaningful. Specifically, Mr. Snyder was a Unit Team Manager. Dkt. 178 at 48. He testified that
the purpose of the 30-day review was to determine whether a prisoner should remain in
administrative segregation because he is a threat to the facility. Id. at 51. However, Mr. Snyder
testified that he understood that the 30-day reviews were pre-prepared forms that took about
30 seconds to complete and that no one was ever released from administrative segregation as a
result of a 30-day review. Dkt. 178 at 51-52. Similarly, Mr. Brown was the Warden at Wabash
Valley Correctional Facility. Id. at 119. He testified that he knew the 30-day reviews were
conducted by individuals who had no authority to make the decision to release someone from
administrative segregation and that there was no review of individual prisoner's characteristics
during the 30-day reviews. Id. at 122. A reasonable jury could conclude that the 30-day periodic

reviews were a sham designed to falsely suggest that prisoners on DWAS were receiving
meaningful and periodic reviews of their placement.
Third, the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Brown and
Mr. Snyder knew the full 90-day reviews were not completed sufficiently frequently and that they
condoned this practice. Mr. Brown was the decision maker at the facility level for all 90-day full
reviews. Dkt. 178 at 123. Mr. Brown testified that staff may request 90-day reviews, but that does
not happen very often. Id. at 124. Thus, he understood that if neither staff nor a prisoner requests
a 90-day review, then a 90-day review is not conducted, and the prisoner would remain on
administrative segregation indefinitely. Dkt. 178 at 131. Similarly, Mr. Snyder acknowledged in
his testimony that prisoners are never told how to request a full review, which is the only review
that can result in removal from administrative segregation. Dkt. 178 at 72-73. A jury could easily
infer that Mr. Brown and Mr. Snyder knew that the full 90-days reviews were the only meaningful
reviews and that these reviews were not conducted periodically (meaning, sufficiently frequently).

Thus, the evidence taken in the light most favorable to Mr. Dawson permits the inference
that Mr. Brown and Mr. Snyder knew prisoners on DWAS like Mr. Dawson were not provided
meaningful and periodic reviews and that they facilitated, approved, and condoned this practice.
This is sufficient to support personal liability. See e.g., Haywood v. Hathaway, 842 F.3d 1026,
1032-33 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Warden could be held personally responsible for the
harm caused by cold prison conditions because the evidence showed he "had actual knowledge of
the unusually harsh weather conditions, that he had been apprised of the specific problem with the
physical condition of [the plaintiff's] cell (i.e., the windows would not shut), and that, during the
time period of [the plaintiff's] complaint, the warden toured the segregation unit himself"); Gray
v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Warden was personally responsible

for the alleged cell conditions, because the Warden "not only knew about the problems but was
personally responsible for changing prison policies so that they would be addressed").
In addition, a reasonable jury could further conclude that Mr. Snyder denied Mr. Dawson
a meaningful full 90-day review. The evidence reflects that Mr. Snyder initiated a full 90-day
review after Mr. Dawson filed this lawsuit. Mr. Snyder participated in the review by reporting the
results stating that Mr. Dawson was denied release from DWAS because of his prior involvement
with trafficking in 2017 and that approval for release from DWAS would not issue until
November 2019. Exhibit 3-G. Mr. Snyder's conclusion was understood by Mr. Dugan to reflect
that there was nothing he could do that would result in Mr. Dawson's release from DWAS prior to
November 2019. A reasonable jury could conclude that the Mr. Snyder's conclusion was based on
past conduct and not Mr. Dawson's current circumstances. This is sufficient to show Mr. Snyder's
personal involvement in denying Mr. Dawson a meaningful review.
4. Qualified Immunity

"Qualified immunity shields government officials from damages if they did not violate a
clearly established, specific federal right." See City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503
(2019) (cited by Mathews v. Brown, 768 F. App'x 537, 539–40 (7th Cir. 2019)).
Defendants acknowledge that the right to periodic and meaningful reviews was clearly
established during the time period relevant to this case. Dkt. 170 at 14. The periodic review must
not be a sham or pretext and should provide helpful notice to the inmate as to the reasons for his
placement and how he could get out. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 527 (7th Cir. 2017).
Defendants argue instead that "the evidence presented at trial shows a concerted effort to
ensure that the reviews were meaningful [after February 2019]. Mr. Dugan testified that he took
into consideration a multitude of factors when reviewing Plaintiff and that were listed on the

review results." Dkt. 170 at 14. But the jury could reasonably reject the assertion that the 30-day
reviews after February 2019 were meaningful because the trial testimony reflects that regardless
of the information considered, the 30-day reviews and appeals of 30-day reviews never resulted in
a transfer out of DWAS. Dkt. 175 at 173-174; See Isby, 856 F.3d at 528 ("while submission of
new evidence or a full hearing may not be necessary to meet the requirements of due process under
Hewitt, an actual review—i.e., one open to the possibility of a different outcome—certainly is.).
Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claim.
III. Motion for New Trial
Defendants argue in the alternative that they are entitled to a new trial on the due process
claim, because Mr. Brown and Mr. Snyder were prejudiced by Jury Instruction No. 17. Dkt. 170
at 14.

Under Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a "new trial should be granted
'only when the record shows that the jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the
verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience.'" Estate of Burford v.
Accounting Practice Sales, Inc., 851 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). A district
court's jury instructions are given deference and analyzed as a whole to determine if they accurately
state the law and do not confuse the jury. Doornbos v. City of Chicago, 868 F.3d 572, 580 (7th
Cir. 2017); see also Sanchez v. City of Chicago, 880 F.3d 349, 355 (7th Cir. 2018) ("We review
de novo whether a challenged jury instruction fairly and accurately summarized the law, but the
trial court's decision to give a particular instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.")
(citation omitted). "If an instruction is legally deficient, a new trial is required only if the flawed

instruction could have confused or misled the jury causing prejudice to the complaining party."
Doornbos, 868 F.3d at 589; see also Armstrong v. BNSF Ry. Co., 880 F.3d 377, 381
(7th Cir. 2018).
Defendants challenge Final Instruction No. 17. That instruction states:
Final Instruction No. 17

Defendants are being sued as individuals. Neither the Indiana Department
of Correction nor the State of Indiana is a party to this lawsuit.

To prevail on his claim against any Defendant, the Plaintiff must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant was personally involved in the
conduct that Plaintiff complains about.

Dkt. 152 at 19.
Defendants argue that Final Instruction No. 17 should have also included the following
statement: "You may not hold any Defendant liable for what the other Defendant did or did not
do." Dkt. 146-1 at 19 (Court's Proposed Final Jury Instructions); see also Seventh Circuit Civil
Pattern Instruction 7.02. But there was no error in not including this statement. As the Court

reasoned during the instructions conference, "there were numerous instances where the defendants
had pressed witnesses over their involvement or lack of involvement in the conduct that formed
the basis of plaintiff's allegations." Dkt. 177 at 24. Taken overall, the instructions given made it
clear that to find a defendant liable the jury had to find that he was personally involved. See Betker
v. City of Milwaukee, 22 F. Supp. 3d 915, 923 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (discussing same instruction).
The Defendants' argument that they are entitled to a new trial because "the jury could
properly find a supervisor liable without the requisite knowledge and inaction and was improperly
instructed on the law," dkt. 170 at 16, is not persuasive. To the extent Defendants suggest that there
was insufficient evidence to support a finding of personal involvement by Mr. Brown and
Mr. Snyder related to the due process claim, this contention has been rejected. See, infra, II(B)(3).

Further, no theory of respondeat superior liability was developed or at issue. The jury was
properly instructed: "To prevail on his claim against any Defendant, the Plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant was personally involved in the conduct that
Plaintiff complains about." Mr. Dugan testified that he reported to his casework manager Randall
Purcell, Unit Team Manager Snyder and Warden Brown. Dkt. 175 at 100-101. And the evidence
taken in the light most favorable to Mr. Dawson is that Mr. Snyder and Mr. Brown developed the
sham 30-day review protocols that never resulted in release from DWAS. Dkt. 175 at 179. Further,
the jury found for Mr. Brown on the conditions claim and for Mr. Purcell on all claims, such that
there is no basis to conclude that the jury believed that Mr. Brown could be held liable for what
another Defendant did or did not do simply because he was the Warden. Given the evidence
adduced at trial, there is no plausible basis to conclude that Mr. Brown or Mr. Snyder were found
liable based on respondeat superior liability.
Finally, Defendants argue "[i]f the Court believed there was evidence establishing a
supervisor's knowledge of Mr. Dugan's performance of the reviews," Seventh Circuit Pattern
Instruction 7.23 regarding Liability of Supervisor should have been provided. Dkt. 170 at 16. But
Mr. Dawson correctly notes that this argument is waived because Defendants did not tender this
instruction to the Court for consideration. Dkt. 179 at 15; see also dkt. 120 (Defendants’ Proposed
Case-Specific Final Instructions).
The instructions given were accurate and complete, and, even assuming that they were
imperfect, Defendants have failed to show prejudice in any respect. Accordingly, the motion for
new trial is denied.
IV. Conclusion
The motion for judgment as a matter of law, dkt. [169], is granted in part and denied in
part, and the alternative motion for new trial, dkt [169], is denied.
Mr. Dugan and Mr. Synder are entitled to qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment
claim. Accordingly, an Amended Judgment shall be entered reflecting that Defendants Charles
Dugan and Jerry Snyder are entitled to qualified immunity on the conditions of confinement claim.
Defendants’ motion is denied in all other respects.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 8/23/2023 .
a Cenc \ettecd>
ario Garcia
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana

30

Distribution:

All Electronically Registered Counsel

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10170522. Public record. Not legal advice.