# ALI v. IDOC EMPLOYEES

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · September 22, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10169454

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** September 22, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10169454

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that unsworn statements do not satisfy the requirement that summary judgment materials be "made upon personal knowledge" and "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence"

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

MUFTI ABDUL EL-MALIK- ALI, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:20-cv-02365-SEB-TAB
)
B. MILLER, )
K PENNINGTON, )
K PRIOR, )
B GROVES, )
RITCHEY, )
M CONYERS, )
D. ALSIP, )
)
Defendants. )

Order Addressing Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment as to State Defendants

Plaintiff Mufti Abdul El-Malik-Ali1 is an Indiana inmate currently incarcerated at Miami
Correctional Facility. He brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the State
Defendants (Justin Richey, Michael Conyers, and Duane Alsip2) exposed him to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement when he was incarcerated at Pendleton Correctional Facility
("Pendleton") because they failed to provide him with protective equipment for use at his kitchen
dishwashing job and delayed his access to medical care after he was injured while washing dishes.3
The State Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and Mr. Ali filed a corresponding
cross motion for summary judgment.

1 Mr. Ali is also known as Frances Smith-Bey, the name associated with his Indiana Department of
Correction Number—955755. See dkt. 78-1 at 8. Because he prefers to be known as Mr. Ali, the Court uses
that name.
2 Mr. Ali identified these defendants as "Ritchey," "M. Conyers," and "D. Alsip" in his complaint.
The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect the correct names for these defendants.
3 Mr. Ali also pursues claims against the other defendants. Those claims are the subject of separate
motions for summary judgment, which the Court resolves by separate entries.
I.
Standard of Review
Parties in a civil dispute may move for summary judgment, which is a way of resolving a
case short of a trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine dispute as to any of the material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Id.; Pack v. Middlebury Comm. Schs., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021). A
"genuine dispute" exists when a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Material facts" are those that
might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the record and draws
all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Khungar v.
Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572-73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or
make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-
finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court is only required to
consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it is not required to "scour
every inch of the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant. Grant v. Tr. of Ind. Univ., 870
F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017).
A party responding to a summary-judgment motion must "identify the potentially

determinative facts and factual disputes that the party contends demonstrate a dispute of fact
precluding summary judgment." S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1(b).4 "A party must support each fact

4 Mr. Ali did not file a stand-alone response to the State Defendants' summary-judgment motion.
Instead, he filed his own motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 88. That motion, however, can also be read
as responsive to the State Defendants' summary-judgment motion. Because Mr. Ali is pro se, the Court
construes his motion liberally and considers the document as both a motion for summary judgment and a
response brief.
the party asserts in a brief with a citation to a discovery response, a deposition, an affidavit, or
other admissible evidence." S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1(e).
When reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences are drawn
in favor of the party against whom the motion at issue was made. Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427,

429 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Tripp v. Scholz, 872 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 2017)). The existence of
cross-motions for summary judgment does not imply that there are no genuine issues of material
fact. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., LLC v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union 150,
AFL-CIO, 335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).
When the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court normally takes the
motions "one at a time." American Family Mut. Ins. v. Williams, 832 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2016).
That is, for each motion, the Court views and recites the evidence and draws all reasonable
inferences "in favor of the non-moving party." Id.
III.
Factual Background5
Except where specifically identified, the following facts are undisputed:

The Court also notes that the State Defendants' response to Mr. Ali's summary-judgment motion
includes a section titled, "Statement of Disputed Material Facts." Dkt. 118 at 4–5. Read in context, the Court
does not understand this section to be a list of facts that the State Defendants contend must be resolved at
trial or a concession that their summary-judgment motion should be denied. Instead, the list consists of
statements from Mr. Ali that the State Defendants contend are not supported by admissible evidence and
facts that are not material to the resolution of the summary-judgment motions.

5 Mr. Ali's motion and reply are not made under penalty of perjury, see dkts. 88, 121, and thus the
factual statements in them are not admissible on their own unless they are supported by other admissible
evidence. See Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that unsworn statements
do not satisfy the requirement that summary judgment materials be "made upon personal knowledge" and
"set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence"). The Court is not obliged to scour the record
looking for evidence to support Mr. Ali's unsworn statements, so this section is based only on the specific
exhibits that Mr. Ali cited in his motion and reply.
A. Exposure to Quat Plus and Interactions with Officer Richey
Mr. Ali's claims against the State Defendants are based on injuries he claims to have
suffered after being exposed to a chemical called Quat Plus while washing dishes on October 9,
2019. Dkt. 78-1 at 24 (Ali Dep.). On that day, Mr. Ali was working in the kitchen at Pendleton.

Id. at 22. Mr. Ali's direct supervisor—an Aramark employee named Todd Neal—directed Mr. Ali
to sanitize dishes in a sink containing Quat Plus. Id. at 22–23. While Mr. Ali was sanitizing items
in the sink containing Quat Plus, he got water containing the chemical on his hands, body, and
shoes, and he felt a burning sensation. Id. at 23, 83. He testified that the Quat Plus solution dripped
into his boot and soaked through his clothes, causing his groin area to get wet. Id. at 83–85. He
testified that he believed that steam or vapor from the Quat Plus solution came into contact with
his face. Id. at 84. At his deposition, Mr. Ali testified that he normally used protective equipment
to do the cleaning job—including big aprons, rubber neoprene gloves, and eyewear—but, because
he was being rushed and was given a direct order by Mr. Neal, he did his job without protective
equipment. Id.

After the burning sensation started, Mr. Ali approached Defendant Officer Justin Richey.
Id. at 76. At his deposition, Mr. Ali testified that Officer Richey was "the officer you go to if you
have any kind of safety issue or . . . need to get medical treatment." Id. He also testified that it was
Officer Richey's job to "fill out an offender report of injury and . . . get on that radio and get you
from Point A to Point B to get decontamination started in an injury situation." Id. at 79. Mr. Ali
told Officer Richey, "I need to go to medical . . . [M]y hands are on fire . . . . I just got burned by
this chemical . . . I need medical attention," or words to that effect. Id. at 76, 79. At the time, Mr.
Ali's hands were "kind of blistered," and his fingernails were "all bent and messed up." Id. at 27.
Officer Richey did not let Mr. Ali go to medical right away, and he did not complete an
injury report. Id. at 76, 77. Instead, Officer Richey said, "Oh, you'll be all right" and made Mr. Ali
go see Mr. Neal to get an injury report before he could go to medical. Id. at 76. Mr. Ali consulted
with Mr. Neal and, after he did so, Officer Richey opened the door and let him go to medical. Id.

at 77–78.
In the medical department, Mr. Ali encountered Defendant Nurse Brittney Moore-Groves,
who refused to treat him immediately and sent him back to the kitchen to get more information
from Mr. Neal. Id. at 25. He got the information and returned to medical with an injury report and
material data safety sheet for Quat Plus. Id. at 25–26. When he returned, Nurse Moore-Groves was
preparing supplies for the diabetic line, so she did not treat him right away. Id. at 26. Mr. Ali
testified that, in total, 45 minutes to an hour passed between the time of his injury and the time he
received treatment. Id. at 81.
At his deposition, Mr. Ali testified that he was suing Officer Richey because Officer Richey
should have immediately filled out an injury report so that he could go to medical without delay.

Id. at 79.
B. Interactions with Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip
At his deposition, Mr. Ali testified that he was suing Mr. Conyers because Mr. Conyers
should have provided safety equipment for inmates working in the kitchen. Id. at 72. Mr. Ali
described Mr. Conyers as the person who "runs the one area where they have all the gloves, the
overalls for winter for yard workers." Id. He testified that he wrote Mr. Conyers one or two letters
and sent him several request-for-interview slips but never received any response. Id. at 71–72.
At his deposition, Mr. Ali testified that he was suing Assistant Superintendent Alsip
because he asked Assistant Superintendent Alsip for personal protective equipment and Assistant
Superintendent Alsip failed to provide it. Id. at 70. Defendant Duane Alsip was an Assistant
Superintendent at Pendleton. Dkt. 73-4 at 72.
In support of his deliberate indifference claims against Mr. Conyers and Assistant
Superintendent Alsip, Mr. Ali has submitted a letter dated October 7, 2019, that is addressed to,

among others, Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip. Dkt. 88 at 3 (citing dkt. 88-4). In
the letter, Mr. Ali complains about Quat Plus being used in the kitchen and states that, on
September 28, 29, and 30, 2019, he experienced burning and pain in his hands as well as stomach
issues. Id. No record evidence shows that Mr. Conyers or Assistant Superintendent Alsip received
this letter before the October 9 incident.6 Mr. Ali has also submitted a grievance dated October 15,
2019, describing the injuries he sustained on October 9 and asking for proper safety equipment.
Dkt. 88 at 3 (citing dkt. 88-1 at 6). He has also submitted an email that was sent to, among others,
Mr. Conyers by another member of Pendleton staff in response to the October 15 grievance.
Dkt. 88 at 3 (citing dkt. 88-2). The email states, "Can you advise me on this? Frye—When will he
receive his Hepatitis or did he already get it, does he need to have blood work done? B. Miller Can

we get this offender gloves and can you look into this the functioning of the sanitizer. Smith &
Conyers any input?" Id. Finally, Mr. Ali has submitted a letter dated October 20, 2019, that is
addressed to, among others, Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip. Dkt. 88 at 3 (citing
dkt. 88-5). In the letter, he complains about the injuries he experienced after using Quat Plus,
complains about not being given protective equipment, and states that he will leave his job in food
services because of the problems. Id.7

6 Mr. Ali testified that, on October 18, 2019, Assistant Superintendent Alsip responded "yes" when
asked, "Did you receive my documents?" Dkt. 73-4. Even assuming that the "documents" included the
October 7 letter, this statement does not establish that Assistant Superintendent Alsip received the October
7 letter before October 9.
7 In his reply, Mr. Ali also states, "10-7, 10-12, 10-20 of 2019 D. Alsip [and] M. Conyers . . .
recieved letters. The letters detailed, 'Serious Risks of Injury, Retaliation of Staff, Requests for P.P.E.[']"
At his deposition, Mr. Ali also testified that, on October 18, 2019, he happened to encounter
Assistant Superintendent Alsip while walking. Id. at 73. He told Assistant Superintendent Alsip
about the use of Quat Plus and his injuries. Id. He also asked Assistant Superintendent Alsip for
gloves to use while working, and Assistant Superintendent Alsip said that he would get Mr. Ali

some gloves to use at work. Id. at 74. In addition, Assistant Superintendent Alsip examined Mr.
Ali's injuries and told him to go to the infirmary. Id. Despite his conversation with Assistant
Superintendent Alsip, Mr. Ali was not provided with gloves, so he left his job in the kitchen on or
about October 23, 2019. Id. at 74.
C. Mr. Ali's Injuries
At his deposition, Mr. Ali testified that, after coming into contact with the Quat Plus
solution, he experienced, among other things, burns to his hands, face, genitals, and left foot.
Dkt. 78-1 at 63. He admitted that he was never diagnosed with chemical burns by anyone at
Pendleton, although he emphasized that no one at Pendleton would ever examine his genitals or
foot. Id. at 27, 29, 39.

In addition, Nurse Moore-Groves has submitted an affidavit stating that, when she saw Mr.
Ali on October 9, she observed redness with a few tiny black scabs on Mr. Ali's right hand and did
not observe any blistering, so she did not believe that Mr. Ali had suffered a chemical burn.
Dkt. 73-1. As a result, she applied ointment and dressing to Mr. Ali's hand. Id. Mr. Ali's medical
records also show that the injuries on his hands healed appropriately within less than two months,
although he was still complaining about lingering symptoms as of November 29, 2019. See dkt. 73-

and cites to "Ex. # A, B, C, D, & #10." Dkt. 121 at 4 (errors in original). The Court is unable to locate these
exhibits as there are no exhibits labeled A, B, C, D, or 10 attached to Mr. Ali's motion for summary
judgment against the State Defendants or his reply in support of that motion. The Court is not obliged to
scour the record to find the exhibits, but it appears that Mr. Ali is likely referring to the October 7, 15, and
20 communications discussed above.
3 (medical records). At his deposition, Mr. Ali disputed that his wounds had, in fact, completely
healed by November 29, 2019. Dkt. 78-1 at 31.
IV.
Discussion
A. Officer Richey
Mr. Ali claims that Officer Richey was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
"Prison officials can be liable for violating the Eighth Amendment when they display deliberate
indifference towards an objectively serious medical need." Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 721–
22 (7th Cir. 2021). "Thus, to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show '(1) an
objectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state official was deliberately, that is

subjectively, indifferent.'" Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016)).
1. Objectively Serious Medical Condition
The Court cannot grant summary judgment to either Mr. Ali or Officer Richey on the
question of whether Mr. Ali suffered from an objectively serious medical condition because
disputed questions of fact remain for trial. For purposes of the Eighth Amendment, an objectively
serious medical condition is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment
or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's
attention." Thomas, 2 F.4th at 721–22 (cleaned up).

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Officer Richey, a reasonable jury might rely
on Mr. Ali's medical records and Nurse Moore-Groves's testimony to conclude that Mr. Ali's
injuries were minimal—amounting to nothing more than scabs that healed relatively quickly with
minimal medical attention. See generally dkt. 81 at 7–8 (arguing that Mr. Ali did not suffer from
an objectively serious medical condition). That is, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Ali's
medical condition was not objectively serious enough to implicate the Eighth Amendment. See
Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996) (opining that a toe with a toenail that had
been removed was not an objectively serious medical need).
But, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Ali, a reasonable jury could credit

Mr. Ali's testimony that he suffered painful blistering on his hands and burns to his genitals and
foot after coming into contact with an industrial cleaning solution. And, while Mr. Ali was never
diagnosed with chemical burns on his genitals—in part, perhaps, because no one at Pendleton ever
examined his genitals—a reasonable jury could conclude that burns on the genitals following a
chemical exposure are the type of condition that is so obvious that even a lay person would
recognize the need for a doctor's attention. Likewise, a reasonable jury could credit Mr. Ali's
testimony and infer that his condition was serious enough to mandate treatment by a doctor from
the fact that Nurse Moore-Groves did, in fact, provide treatment in the form of ointment.
Because Mr. Ali has not established, as a matter of law, that he suffered from an objectively
serious medical condition, his motion for summary judgment must be denied as to Officer Richey.

Officer Richey can, however, still prevail with his motion for summary judgment if he establishes
that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the question of whether he was deliberately
indifferent to Mr. Ali's serious medical needs.
2. Deliberate Indifference
Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence or even objective recklessness. Dean
v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 241 (7th Cir. 2021). Mr. Ali "must provide evidence
that an official actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm." Id. (cleaned up;
emphasis in original). On this point, "A delay in treating non-life-threatening but painful
conditions may constitute deliberate indifference if the delay exacerbated the injury or
unnecessarily prolonged an inmate's pain." Reck v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 27 F.4th 473,
483 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).
Mr. Ali claims that Officer Richey was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs
because Officer Richey knew that Mr. Ali had just been exposed to an industrial chemical and was

complaining of a burning sensation but refused to expeditiously complete an injury report form
and instead delayed by sending Mr. Ali to consult with Mr. Neal. Officer Richey responds that no
reasonable jury could find that he was deliberately indifferent "[g]iven the nature of Plaintiff's
injury and brief nature of the delay." Dkt. 81 at 10. The Court cannot grant summary judgment to
Officer Richey on the question of deliberate indifference because fact issues remain for trial.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Officer Richey, a reasonable jury might
rely on Nurse Moore-Groves's testimony about how minor Mr. Ali's injuries were and the fact that
she—a trained medical professional—sent Mr. Ali back to the kitchen rather than treating him
immediately to conclude that Mr. Ali's injuries were minimal and, thus, that Officer Richey did
not know that any brief delay associated with sending Mr. Ali to consult with Mr. Neal would

expose Mr. Ali to a substantial risk of serious harm. But, taking the evidence in the light most
favorable to Mr. Ali, a reasonable jury could credit his testimony that his hands were blistered and
that his clothing was soaked with a Quat Plus solution when he spoke to Officer Richey. Given
that Mr. Ali told Officer Richey that his hands were "on fire" after being burned by an industrial
cleaning solution, see dkt. 78-1 at 76, 79, a reasonable jury could therefore conclude that Officer
Richey did, in fact, know that—at a minimum—even a slight delay in care would unnecessarily
prolong Mr. Ali's pain.
Officer Richey argues—without citation to evidence or authority—that he could not have
been deliberately indifferent because Mr. Ali only waited 45 minutes to an hour for care and "[a]ny
layperson would admit that they've spent an equivalent amount of time in a medical waiting room,
filling out paperwork and waiting for their name to be called." Dkt. 81 at 9–10. A reasonable jury
might reach that conclusion at trial, but on the record currently before the Court and taking all
inferences in favor of Mr. Ali, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that any layperson would

have to wait 45 minutes to an hour to receive treatment for injuries similar to those alleged by Mr.
Ali. Notably, Officer Richey has not offered any explanation for why he initially ignored Mr. Ali
and sent him to Mr. Neal to get an injury report. Without such evidence, the Court concludes that
genuine issues of material fact remain for trial as to Officer Richey's state of mind.8
Accordingly, the State Defendants' motion for summary judgment must be denied as to
Officer Richey. The Court emphasizes that this decision does not mean that Mr. Ali is likely to
prevail at trial as to his claims against Officer Richey. While the Court concludes that Mr. Ali has
made enough of a showing to keep his claims against Officer Richey for now, he will face an uphill
battle at trial. Perhaps understandably, Officer Richey did not contest the issue of causation for
purposes of summary judgment. See, e.g., Stockton v. Milwaukee Cty., 44 F.4th 605, 615 (7th Cir.

2022) ("[T]he causal link between a defendant's deliberate indifference and a plaintiff's injury is
typically a question reserved for the jury. Where a plaintiff offers sufficient evidence from which
a reasonable jury could infer delayed treatment harmed an inmate, summary judgment on the issue
of causation is rarely appropriate." (internal citations omitted)). But, at trial, Mr. Ali will ultimately
be tasked with proving that Officer Richey's fairly brief delay in allowing Mr. Ali to go to medical
caused him harm—that is, that the delay exacerbated his injury or unnecessarily prolonged his
pain. See Reck, 27 F.4th at 483. Given the limits on lay testimony about causation in such cases,
Mr. Ali's task at trial will not be easy. See, e.g., Korte v. Exxonmobil Coal USA, Inc., 164 F. App'x

8 The Court notes that Officer Richey does not argue that he is entitled to qualified immunity,
thereby waiving the argument for purposes of summary judgment. Dkts. 82, 118.
553, 556 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Expert testimony is needed to establish causation in cases alleging an
adverse health effect when the medical effects of exposure to the toxin are not within the ken of the
ordinary person.") (cleaned up).
B. Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip
At screening, Mr. Ali was allowed to proceed with Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement claims against Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip based on allegations
that they failed to provide him with safety equipment that might have protected him from injuries
he suffered as a result of working with Quat Plus. Dkt. 13.
"The Eighth Amendment prohibits the States from subjecting prisoners to conditions of
confinement amounting to cruel and unusual punishment." Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1048–
49 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345−47 (1981)). The Eighth
Amendment "standard encompasses both an objective and subjective element: (1) the harm that
befell the prisoner must be objectively, sufficiently serious and a substantial risk to his or her health
or safety, and (2) the individual defendants [must be] deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk
to the prisoner's health and safety." Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 693 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal

quotation omitted); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Minor injuries do not
satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. See Lord v. Beahm, 952 F.3d 902,
905 (7th Cir. 2020).
As explained above, neither Mr. Ali nor the State Defendants have shown that they are
entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether Mr. Ali suffered from an objectively
serious medical condition. Thus, Mr. Ali's motion for summary judgment must be denied as to Mr.
Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip. The sole remaining issue, then, is whether Mr.
Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip have shown that they are entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of whether they were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Ali's conditions of
confinement. Deliberate indifference "requires more than negligence and approaches intentional
wrongdoing." Goodloe v. Sood, 947 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). A defendant
"cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions
of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference." Johnson v. Prentice,
29 F.4th 895, 904 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Mr. Ali alleges that Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip violated the Eighth
Amendment because they failed to provide him with protective equipment when he asked. Mr.
Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip argue that Mr. Ali cannot show that their failure to
provide him with protective equipment when he asked caused him to suffer the harm at issue in
this case—the injuries he sustained on October 9, 2019. Dkt. 81 at 8. The Court agrees.
Mr. Ali has failed to designate evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
he was injured on October 9 because Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip ignored his

complaints about Quat Plus. True, Mr. Ali has submitted a letter dated October 7, 2019, and
addressed to Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip in which he complains about the use
of Quat Plus and states that, on September 28, 29, and 30, 2019, he experienced burning and pain
in his hands as well as stomach issues. But there is no evidence that Mr. Conyers or Assistant
Superintendent Alsip received that letter before October 9. Mr. Ali has also submitted several other
documents dated after October 9 in which he complains about Quat Plus and asks for protective
equipment and has testified that he asked Assistant Superintendent Alsip for protective equipment
on October 18. But there is no evidence that he sustained any further injury from working with
Quat Plus without personal protective equipment after October 9. Thus, he cannot show that Mr.
Conyers's and Assistant Superintendent Alsip's failure to provide protective equipment in response
to those requests caused him any harm. See Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 553 (7th Cir. 2015)
(a plaintiff must "establish one of the necessary elements of a constitutional tort: that the officer's
act . . . caused any injury."). Accordingly, Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip are

entitled to judgment in their favor.
None of Mr. Ali's arguments in response (or in support of his own request for summary
judgment) change the conclusion that Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip are entitled
to judgment in their favor. Mr. Ali complains at length about the defendants' refusal to turn over
various items in discovery (including a safety report and video footage). See, e.g., dkt. 88 at 5; dkt.
121 at 1. But he fails to show that he ever timely served the State Defendants with a request for
such materials and, regardless, as explained in the Court's Order of February 9, 2022, it is far too
late for Mr. Ali to raise discovery issues. Dkt. 100. He also complains that "staff began to
sup[p]ress my attempts to get documentation, photographs of my injuries," dkt. 88 at 4, citing to a
copy of an offender injury report that he says was misplaced and/or purposely removed from his

medical records, dkt. 88-7; and a request to "M. Rains" for someone to photograph his injuries,
which request was denied, dkt. 88-8. But those documents do not suggest any wrongdoing on the
part of Mr. Conyers or Superintendent Alsip, and—even if they did—Mr. Ali fails to explain how
they support his claims of deliberate indifference against those defendants. Finally, Mr. Ali states,
"Michael Conyers and Christina Conyers are husband and wife. C. Conyers began to thwart all my
grievances to protect her husband." Dkt. 88 at 6. In support, he cites two request-for-interview
forms in which Ms. Conyers stated that Mr. Ali's grievance appeals about the October 9 incident
were untimely. Dkt. 88-13. Those forms do not show any wrongdoing on behalf of Ms. Conyers
and do not show that her actions were attributable to her husband. And, in any event, Mr. Ali fails
to explain how the fact that his grievance appeals were denied supports his claims of deliberate
indifference against Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip.
Therefore, the State Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be granted as to Mr.
Ali's claims against Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Ali's motion for summary judgment against the State
Defendants, dkt. [88], is denied. In addition, the State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
dkt. [83], is granted as to Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip, but denied as to
Officer Richey. Mr. Ali's claims against Mr. Conyers and Assistant Superintendent Alsip are
dismissed with prejudice. The Court will resolve the other pending summary-judgment motions
by separate entries, so final judgment will not enter at this time.
The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect the proper names for the State
Defendants as follows: Justin Richey (currently identified as "Ritchey"); Michael Conyers
(currently identified as "M. Conyers"); and Duane Alsip (currently identified as "D. Alsip").
The clerk is directed to then terminate Defendants Conyers and Alsip as defendants on
the docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/22/2022 hth Baus Bt keer
SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

15

Distribution:

FRANCES SMITH-BEY a/k/a MUFTI ABDUL EL-MALIK- ALI
955755
Miami Correctional Facility - BH/IN
3038 West 850 South
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only

Brandyn Lee Arnold
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
brandyn.arnold@atg.in.gov

Douglass R. Bitner
Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC
doug.bitner@skofirm.com

Christopher Douglas Cody
HUME SMITH GEDDES GREEN & SIMMONS
ccody@humesmith.com

Conner Ross Dickerson
Cohen & Malad, LLP
cdickerson@cohenandmalad.com

Sarah Jean Shores-Scisney
Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC (SKO)
sarah.shores@skofirm.com

Georgianna Q. Tutwiler
HUME SMITH GEDDES GREEN & SIMMONS
gquinn@humesmith.com

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10169454. Public record. Not legal advice.