# KENNETT TRUCK STOP, INC. v. WEISS

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · July 19, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10169215

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** July 19, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10169215

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding the factor not met when “the Government does not physically invade or permanently appropriate [the] assets for its own use.”
- discussing how standard is synonymous with “arbitrary and capricious” and “random and irrational” standards, at least in land-use context

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION
KENNETT TRUCK STOP, )
)
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No.: 4:21-cv-00177-RLM-DML
vs. )
)
ALAN WEISS et al., )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kennett Truck Stop, Inc. filed a Verified Complaint asserting
various claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against fifteen current and former local
officials of the City of Greendale, Indiana in their individual capacities for alleged
violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. Kennett also asserts state law claims for violations of Sections 21
and 23 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution and seeks judicial review of the
denial of its improvement location permit under Indiana Code § 36-7-4-1600.
Kennett seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and
injunctive relief.
The claims asserted in the complaint all arise from the alleged wrongful
denial of Kennett’s application for an improvement location permit. The
improvement location permit would let Kennett to use gravel treated with
soybean oil instead of asphalt to finish a parking lot at its property. The
defendants have moved to dismiss Kennett’s complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and, for the following reasons, the court grants
the defendants’ motion with respect to Kennett’s complaint, with leave granted
to Kennett to file an amended complaint if it wishes.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) construes the
complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accepts all well-
pleaded facts as true, and draws all inferences in the nonmoving party's favor1.
Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). But Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Twombly and Iqbal “require the plaintiff to
‘provid[e] some specific facts’ to support the legal claims asserted in the
complaint.” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011)

1 The court doesn’t consider the Chronology of Kennett Truck Stop [Doc. No. 25-1] and
the Engineer Reports [Doc. No. 25-2] attached to Kennett’s Response Brief [Doc. No. 25]
as they aren’t referenced in the complaint and aren’t central to the claim. See Hecker v.
Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 582 (7th Cir. 2009).
(quoting Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581)). The plaintiff “must give enough details about
the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.” Swanson
v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Accepting Kennett’s well-pleaded facts as true, these are the facts of this
case. Kennett owns two parcels of land: 1) a northeast parcel – the location of a
gas station – and 2) a southern parcel – the location of pond and metal building.
Kennett applied for the improvement location permit in August 2020. The
permit would have allowed Kennett to use INDOT #53 aggregate – a gravel
substrate – to fill in depressions and facilitate surface drainage on the southern

parcel to correspond with the development of the northeast parcel.
Shortly after Kennett applied for the permit, Greenwood City Manager
Steve Lampert issued a letter denying the approval of the permit for two reasons:
1) Kennett’s lot wasn’t in compliance with Greendale Municipal Code § 155.038
– the requirement that the surface be paved with concrete or asphalt material,
and 2) Kennett’s plans didn’t show any provision to treat the proposed
stormwater runoff from the future parking lot as Greendale Municipal Code §§
155.05-155.06 requires.

Representatives for Kennett and Kennett’s engineer went before the
Greendale City Council in March 2021. Greendale Code Enforcement Officer Jay
McMullen (the building inspector) denied Kennett’s permit for two reasons: 1)
Kennett’s lot wasn’t in compliance with Greendale Municipal Code § 155.038
because INDOT #53 gravel isn’t a concrete or asphalt material, and 2) the
proposed permit didn’t comply with the minimum green area, buffering,
landscaping, and green area requirements set forth in Greendale Municipal Code

§§ 155.128-155.131, and no drawings were submitted as required by those
provisions. The denial letter was the first time since August 2020 that City
representatives raised the issue of the parking lot surface despite ongoing
conversations, meetings, and reports about the permit application.
Kennett alleges that the defendants caused it substantial financial harm,
including thousands of dollars to employ and incur the cost of an engineer, and
caused it harm by not allowing it to use the southern parcel as a parking lot.
Kennett also alleges that the request for a permit was denied without

justification, and that the City discriminated against it, because other similarly
situated businesses in the area aren’t being held to the same requirements.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Individual Defendants
Kennett’s complaint doesn’t plead allegations that allow the court to draw
the reasonable inference that several of the defendants are liable on an individual
basis for the alleged constitutional misconduct. Individuals can’t be liable under

Section 1983 unless they have a “personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 2010)). “The
plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between (1) the sued officials and
(2) the alleged misconduct.” Id. (citing Wolf–Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869
(7th Cir. 1983)).
Nothing in Kennett’s complaint supports a reasonable inference that many

of the individuals listed as defendants violated Kennett’s constitutional rights.
Kennett alleges that it was damaged as a result of “city officials in violation of
state and federal laws” [Doc. No. 1, ¶38], that the “city” or “city officials” are
responsible for discriminating against Kennett, failed to adhere to their own
ordinances and regulations, and have denied a proper permit. [Doc. No. 1, ¶¶41-
46, 47-51]. Lumping defendants together in this manner is insufficient in Section
1983 claims where liability is predicated on an individual’s actions, as suggested
by Kennett’s identification of multiple, individual defendants.

For example, Kennett names Mayor Alan Weiss as a defendant, but only
alleges that he “made recommendations to City Council Members regarding the
application for land usage of Kennett Truck Stop, Inc.” [Doc. No. 1, ¶2]. No
allegation explains how Mayor Weiss made any decision or acted to deprive
Kennett of its constitutional rights. Mayor Weiss must have participated in the
constitutional wrongdoing for liability to attach to him. Cygnar v. City of Chicago,
865 F. 2d 827, 847 (7th Cir. 1989). Similarly, Kennett names City council
members Walt Wilson, Karen Abbott, Rebecca Barhorst, Kurt Mollaun, Brett

Hamilton, Vince Karsteter, and Erin Marqua as individual defendants, but
doesn’t allege how they were involved in the denial of the permit. Aside from the
introductory paragraphs, these individuals aren’t named in the complaint. As a
result, it’s unclear how these individuals participated in the alleged
constitutional wrongdoing. The complaint alleges that City council members
heard comments on the permit, but the members aren’t alleged to have made a
decision regarding the permit. [Doc. No. 1, ¶33]. Simply invoking the name of a

potential defendant, as Kennett did with the listed City council members, isn’t
enough to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Collins v. Kibort, 143
F.3d 331,334 (7th Cir. 1998).
Kennett also alleges that former members of the City’s staff –
Clerk/Treasurer Mary Lynch, Former Mayor Doug Hedrick, Executive Director
of Redevelopment/former council member Al Abdon, Redevelopment
Commission President/Former council member Mike McLaughlin, and former
Code Enforcement Officer Al Putnum – abused their positions to deny Kennett’s

constitutional rights. [Doc. No. 1, ¶¶10-13,15]. The complaint doesn’t explain
any causal connection between these individuals and the alleged misconduct. It
doesn’t identify how these individuals deprived Kennett of a constitutional right.
Lastly, Kennett refers to “the Defendant” multiple times in the complaint
without identifying which defendant it is referring to. [Doc. No. 1, ¶¶53-55]. This
isn’t enough to provide notice, see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544,555 (2007), so claims against these individuals are dismissed.
That leaves Jay McMullen, the City’s Code Enforcement Officer and

Steve Lampert, the City Manager, as the remaining defendants.
B. Kennett’s Fifth Amendment Takings Claim
The court first turns to Kennett’s Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim.
Kennett first alleges that the defendants denied the use of property Kennett

owned and operated, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.
Kennett alleges that the City has interfered with its property rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the
Indiana Constitution. Kennett’s alleged deprivation is derived from potential
economic profit derived from the rights granted through the permit.
Kennett must establish that there was a taking when the defendants
denied Kennett’s permit or otherwise limited Kennett’s ability to use the southern
parcel. There are two types of takings: a quintessential, or per se taking, and a

regulatory taking. Muscarello v. Ogle Cty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 610 F.3d 416, 421-
422 (7th Cir. 2010). Kennett doesn’t allege any physical invasion or seizure of
property for a public use. It argues that its inability to park tractor trailers on
the premises caused Kennett to lose out on thousands of dollars and doesn’t
allow Kennett to use its property as it intended, amounts to a regulatory taking.
To plead a regulatory taking, Kennett must allege that the defendants’
regulation limits so much of some property right that the challenged government
action deprives Kennett of all or substantially all practical uses of the property.

Bettendorf v. St. Croix Cnty., 631 F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir.2011); see also RDB
Properties, LLC v. City of Berwyn, 844 F. App'x 878, 881 (7th Cir. 2021). To
determine whether a regulation is a regulatory taking, the court weighs: 1) the
economic impact on the claimant, 2) the extent of the regulation’s interference
with investment-backed expectations, and 3) the character of the regulation.
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York Cty., 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Under this test,
Kennett’s complaint doesn’t allege a plausible regulatory taking.

i. Economic Impact on the Claimant
Inferring such a regulatory taking is a tall order. Not every regulation that
decreases property value qualifies for compensation. Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. New York Cty., 438 U.S. at 144. Courts have dismissed suits that raise takings
claims based on allegations of property-value losses. See, e.g., RDB Properties,
LLC v. City of Berwyn, 844 F. App'x at 881(re-zoning decision by local ordinance);
Newark Cab Ass'n v. Newark, 901 F.3d 146 (3rd Cir. 2018) (loss of taxi-medallion

value); Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (lease-
and-permit cancellations). To plead a regulatory taking, Kennett must point to
some property right—not just some value—lost as a result of the City's actions.
Newark Cab Ass'n v. Newark, 901 F.3d at 153. The economic impact on the
claimant must be more than mere loss of property value. Kennett’s complaint
doesn’t include sufficient allegations to meet this factor.
The economic impact on Kennett stems from the denial of Kennett’s permit
to use soybean oil and gravel to try to comply with the Greendale Municipal

Ordinance. [Doc. No. 1, ¶¶35, 37]. Kennett’s complaint alleges that it can’t use
the pavement on its property as it wishes, causing Kennett to incur substantial
financial harm. [Doc. No. 1, ¶¶34-38]. But financial harm and loss in property
value isn’t enough to allege a regulatory taking.
Additionally, regulations aren’t takings even when they prohibit the
landowner from making “the most beneficial use of the property”—that is, the
most value-producing use. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York Cty., 438 U.S.

at 125. That Kennett can’t use its property as a parking lot because it’s not in
compliance with the Greendale Municipal Code isn’t the type of economic impact
that amounts to a taking.

ii. Extent of the Regulation’s Interference with Investment-backed
Expectations

The second Penn Central factor is the extent to which regulation interferes
with distinct investment-backed expectations. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York Cty., 438 U.S. at 124. Kennett doesn’t plead or argue that the denial of the
permit interfered with investment-backed expectations. Kennett alleges that it
sought to improve the property for uses stated in its City-approved purchase
agreement. [Doc. No. 1, ¶¶42-43]. For a court to conclude that a regulation is a
taking, Kennett’s investment-backed expectations must be objectively
reasonable. Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis, 736 F.3d 1060, 1074 (7th Cir.
2013). It wouldn’t be objectively reasonable for Kennett expect to be exempt from
regulations set forth in the City’s ordinance, including the requirements related
to obtaining a permit for the desired use of the property. A property owner or
future property owner is presumed to act with knowledge of the applicable
ordinances. See e.g. Albery v. Reddig, 718 F.2d 245, 251 (7th Cir. 1983).
Kennett’s complaint doesn’t clearly articulate the existence of investment-backed
expectations, which points away from the existence of a regulatory taking.
iii. Character of the Regulation
The third Penn Central factor asks whether the regulation should be
characterized as a direct taking rather than an exercise of governmental

discretion. RDB Properties, LLC v. City of Berwyn, 844 F. App'x at 882. A
government action “characterized as a physical invasion by government” is more
likely to be a regulatory taking. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York Cty., 438
U.S. at 124; see also Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225
(1986) (finding the factor not met when “the Government does not physically
invade or permanently appropriate [the] assets for its own use.”). Kennett
concedes that there is no physical invasion of the property, but argues that the
regulation impairs the use of the property for commercial purposes. [Doc. No.

25, p. 4]. According to Kennett’s complaint, Kennett would comply with the
Greendale Municipal Code and so be able to use the parking if Kennett paved its
parking lot with asphalt, instead of keeping it as gravel. [Doc. No. 1, ¶34].
Kennett’s alleged deprivation is characteristic of an exercise of governmental
discretion rather than a permanent invasion or limitation of use. Kennett doesn’t
allege governmental action which can be considered a taking under the Fifth
Amendment. The potentially inconvenient or costly permit requirement required
by the City is the type of exercise of governmental discretion that doesn’t amount

to a taking under the Fifth Amendment. The court grants defendants’ motion to
dismiss Kennett’s Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claims.
C. Kennett’s Due Process Claims
During oral argument, Kennett clarified that it asserts a substantive due
process claim, not a procedural due process claim in its complaint.

i. Protected Property Interest
Kennett must have a constitutionally protected property interest to assert
a due process claim. Citizens Health Corp. v. Sebelius, 725 F.3d 687, 694 (7th
Cir. 2013). Whether a plaintiff has a property interest protected by the Due
Process or Takings Clause typically is “defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Bd.
of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577(1972); Dibble v. Quinn, 793
F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) (due process). For purposes of due process, the
complaint alleges that Kennett has an interest in the permit that it was denied
and property ownership in the southern parcel.

To maintain a claim of property over a government-issued benefit, such as
a license or permit, a plaintiff must show she has “a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it,” rather than “a unilateral expectation to it.” Bell v. City of
Country Club Hills, 841 F.3d at 717 (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v.
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). That is, “a protected property interest exists only when
the state's discretion is clearly limited such that the plaintiff cannot be denied
the interest unless specific conditions are met.” Id. at 719 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted); see also New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v.
Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1480 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[U]nless it is
established that the plaintiffs had the right to receive the building permits, a
federal cause of action does not exist.”).
This isn’t an instance in which Kennett had a “legitimate claim of

entitlement” to the permit. Its alleged property interest only stems from the
permit that it expected to receive, not that it was entitled to receive. An
expectation doesn’t establish a property interest. Under Greendale Municipal
Code, a permit is only issued when it conforms with the Master Plan of the City.
Greendale Municipal Code § 155.097(A). Kennett acknowledges in its complaint
that City representatives stated on multiple occasions that Kennett’s permit
application doesn’t comply with the requirement that its parking lot “must be
paved with dust-proof or hard surface meeting standard specifications

established by the city.” Greendale Municipal Code § 155.038. At no point does
Kennett assert that it has any right to receive the permit.
It doesn’t appear that Kennett has a protectible property interest, but since
the claim fails either way, the court will assume that it does.

ii. Kennett’s Substantive Due Process Claim
Substantive due process protects against government power arbitrarily
and oppressively exercised, either through legislative or executive action. County

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). This limitation is modest and
in the context of land-use decisions runs afoul of the Constitution only if the
action would “shock the conscience.” CEnergy-Glenmore Wind Farm No. 1, LLC
v. Town of Glenmore, 769 F.3d 485,488 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing how standard
is synonymous with “arbitrary and capricious” and “random and irrational”
standards, at least in land-use context). Before the court will consider if there
was an arbitrary and irrational interference with property, Kennett must first

establish either an independent constitutional violation or the inadequacy of
state remedies to redress the deprivation. Gen. Auto Serv. Station v. City of
Chicago, 526 F. 3d 991, 1001 (7th Cir. 2008). Kennett’s complaint doesn’t allege
either.
First, Kennett doesn’t contend that there is an inadequacy of state
remedies. The court of appeals has held repeatedly that a plaintiff who ignores
potential state law remedies can’t state a substantive due process claim based
on a state-created property right. CEnergy-Glenmore Wind Farm No. 1, LLC v.

Town of Glenmore, 769 F.3d 485, 488–489 (7th Cir. 2014). An entity contending
that state or local regulation of the use of land has gone overboard must look to
state court. Id. at 489.
In its response to the dismissal motion, Kennett says that the city council’s
discriminatory practices and the inability to have a fair hearing in state court
show an inadequacy of state remedies. But the complaint contains no factual
support for that statement beyond conclusory legal statements. [Doc. No. 1,
¶¶48, 54]. Kennett had options under state law for obtaining the permit, but it

didn’t use those, or at least the complaint doesn’t allege that it used them. See
e.g. Ind. Code § 36-7-4-1602.
Second, Kennett doesn’t allege an independent constitutional violation. As
discussed throughout, Kennett’s complaint doesn’t properly plead a deprivation
of an independent constitutional violation. LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Vill. of
Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 2010). Without such an allegation,
Kennett must show that the decision to deny the permit was either arbitrary or

irrational – that it shocked the conscience. Unless a governmental practice
encroaches on a fundamental right, substantive due process requires only that
the practice be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, or
alternatively phrased, that the practice be neither arbitrary nor irrational. Gen.
Auto Serv. Station v. City of Chicago, 526 F. 3d 991, 1001 (7th Cir. 2008).
Kennett argues that the determination to deny its permit application was
arbitrary and capricious because it wasn’t in compliance with the Indiana
Department of Transportation’s definition of hard surface and that the decision

to deny the permit wasn’t in alignment with the City’s own code or ordinances.
To go against the grain of the Indiana Department of Transportation when the
City’s municipal code doesn’t have its own definition of “hard surface,” Kennett
argues, shocks the conscience. Kennett does not plead any regulation or
guideline from Indiana Department of Transportation that the City was required
to adhere to when analyzing the Kennett’s permit application.
Kennett’s complaint reveals that the denial of the permit was based on the
City’s interpretation of its own ordinance. Kennett alleges that the City cited

several reasons for denying the permit application. Even if the City’s
interpretation of its own ordinance is erroneous, and the City should have used
a definition set forth in Indiana Department of Transportation’s regulations, the
City’s rational reason for denying the permit wouldn’t become an irrational one.
Harding v. Cnty. of Door, 870 F.2d 430, 432 (7th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, the
court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss Kennett’s Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process claims.

D. Kennett’s Equal Protection Claim
Kennett contends that it has been deprived of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. Although not stated outright,
Kennett effectively makes a “class of one” equal protection claim. This claim
largely mirrors Kennett's substantive due process claim.
The Equal Protection Clause generally prohibits state action that
discriminates on the basis of membership in a protected class or that irrationally

targets an individual for discriminatory treatment as a so-called “class of one.”
Brunson v. Murray, 843 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2016). Since Kennett doesn’t
allege that it is part of a protected class, Kennett must show that it was 1)
intentionally treated differently than others similarly situated and that there is
no rational basis for the difference in treatment or 2) that the government is
treating unequally those individuals who are prima facie identical in all relevant
respects, and that the cause of the differential treatment is a totally illegitimate
animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant. Nevel v. Vill. Of Shaumburg, 297

F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 2002).
Kennett doesn’t allege in its complaint that it is being treating differently
with respect to the permit requirements because of personal or illegitimate
animus, so the court turns to whether Kennett was treated less favorably than
similarly situated property owners and whether there is rational basis for the
treatment. Similarly situated means “identical or directly comparable to [them]
in all material respects.” Reget v. City of La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir.

2010). Kennett alleges broadly that other similarly situated business aren’t being
held to the same requirements. [Doc. No. 1, ¶39], but doesn’t allege any pattern
of misconduct or acts of overt hostility that exclude any rational explanation for
why local officials targeted it. The complaint refers vaguely to others whose
permit applications were treated differently but has no allegations about how
those others were similar to the truck stop.
Further, there is a conceivable rational basis for the denial of Kennett’s
permit application; the permit application didn’t comply with existing ordinance

requirements. [Doc. No. 1, ¶¶29, 34; see also Greendale Municipal Code §§
155.038, 05-06]. Kennett's proposed permit didn’t meet Greendale Municipal
Code’s existing requirements. Federal courts “are not zoning boards of appeal”
and, as such, “[s]tate and local land-use decisions are entitled to great deference
when constitutional claims are raised in federal court.” CEnergy–Glenmore Wind
Farm No. 1, LLC v. Town of Glenmore, 769 F.3d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Maum Meditation House of
Truth v. Lake County, 55 F.Supp.3d 1081, 1089 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“In general,

zoning ordinances imposing restrictions on use and occupation of private land
... satisfy the rational basis test.”) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss Kennett’s
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claims.
E. State Law Claims
Having dismissed (at least for now) all of the federal claims, the court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law

claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction....”); Hagan v. Quinn, 867 F.3d
816, 830 (7th Cir. 2017) (“The usual practice in this circuit is for district courts
to ‘dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal
claims have been dismissed prior to trial.’ ”) (quoting Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193
F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999)).

F. Attorney’s Fees
The defendants request attorney’s fees because the lawsuit is frivolous,
groundless, and unreasonable. [Doc. No. 24, p. 21]. As instructed during oral
argument, the court will consider whether attorney’s fees are appropriate upon
separate motion by the defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the defendants’ motion to

dismiss Kennett’s complaint [Doc. No. 23] without prejudice and grants Kennett
21 days within which to amend its complaint.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: July 19, 2022

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court

Distribution to all electronically registered counsel
of record.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10169215. Public record. Not legal advice.