# JOHNSON v. CLARK COUNTY SHERIFF

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · June 27, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10169181

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** June 27, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10169181

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978) to claim against an Indiana Sheriff's Office
- applying objective unreasonableness inquiry to pretrial detainee's medical care claim
- affirming district court's dismissal of claims against individual defendants in their individual capacities under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because there is no personal liability under these statutes

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL JOHNSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 4:21-cv-00194-TWP-DML
)
CLARK COUNTY SHERIFF AND SHERIFF'S )
DEPARTMENT JAIL, )
HEACOCK, )
BEN, )
EMERSON, )
KRAMER, )
)
Defendants. )

Order Screening Complaint, Dismissing Deficient Claims,
and Directing Further Proceedings
Plaintiff Christopher Michael Johnson is an inmate currently incarcerated at Plainfield
Correctional Facility. He initiated this civil rights action alleging violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act, and his constitutional rights based on events that
occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at the Clark County Jail (the "Jail"). Because Mr. Johnson
is a "prisoner" as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), this Court has an obligation under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a) to screen his complaint before service on the defendants.
I. Screening Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In determining whether the complaint states
a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). To
survive dismissal,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints such as that filed by the plaintiff
are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)).
II. The Complaint
Construing Mr. Johnson's complaint liberally, he names five defendants: (1) the Clark
County Sheriff (identified as "Clark County Sheriff and Sheriff's Department Jail")1; (2) Jail
Commander Heacock; (3) Nurse Ben; (4) Doctor Emerson; and (5) Nurse Kramer. All defendants
are sued in both their individual and official capacities. Mr. Johnson seeks monetary damages and
an order requiring the defendants to provide him with all medication that has been prescribed by
his orthopedic specialist. He bases his complaint on allegations about two separate issues, each of
which is discussed below.
A. Mistreatment Based on Disability
Mr. Johnson suffers from a physical impairment and uses a cane to walk. Since he arrived
at the Jail in December 2021, the Sheriff, Jail Commander Heacock, and jail staff have forced him
to be in a cell by himself. Mr. Johnson alleges that this results in discrimination because he cannot
have full access to a telephone or watch television like other inmates. Instead, he is forced to stay

1 The Court does not understand Mr. Johnson to be trying to sue the Jail as an entity separate from
the Sheriff or the Sheriff's Department. If he were bringing such claims, they would be subject to dismissal
because the Jail is not a suable entity.
in a cell by himself "with nothing" because he uses a cane to walk. See dkt. 1 at 2. Mr. Johnson
alleges that these actions violate the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
B. Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care
Since December 3, 2021, Doctor Emerson, Nurse Kramer, and Nurse Ben have refused to

provide Mr. Johnson with Gabapentin, which is a nerve pain medication that his orthopedic
specialist has prescribed to him for the last four years. Mr. Johnson informed Doctor Emerson,
Nurse Kramer, and Nurse Ben about his condition and provided them with documentation showing
that he needs Gabapentin, but they have refused to give him Gabapentin or any nerve pain
medication at all. Nurse Ben told Mr. Johnson that the Sheriff maintains a policy that prohibits
medical staff from giving Mr. Johnson Gabapentin. Because Mr. Johnson has not received
Gabapentin, he has been suffering in pain.
III. Discussion of Claims
Applying the screening standard to the factual allegations in the complaint certain claims
are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as submitted.

A. Rehabilitation Act and ADA Claims
Construing Mr. Johnson's complaint liberally, he alleges that the Sheriff and Jail
Commander Heacock have violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because they have
deprived him of access to Jail programs and benefits (access to the phone and the television)
because of his disability.
To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, "the plaintiff must prove that he is a
qualified individual with a disability, that he was denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity or otherwise subjected to discrimination by such an entity, and that the
denial or discrimination was by reason of his disability." Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592
(7th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). The Rehabilitation Act is "functionally identical." Id. (cleaned up).
Under this standard, Mr. Johnson has adequately stated claims under Title II of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act against the Sheriff in his official capacity, and those claims shall proceed.
To the extent Mr. Johnson is attempting to bring official-capacity claims against Jail

Commander Heacock under the Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, those claims are
dismissed as duplicative of the claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity.
Finally, to the extent that Mr. Johnson is attempting to bring individual-capacity claims
against the Sheriff or Jail Commander Heacock under Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation
Act, those claims also fail because there is no personal liability under those statutes. See Stanek v.
St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634, 644 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming district
court's dismissal of claims against individual defendants in their individual capacities under Title
II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because there is no personal liability under these statutes).
Accordingly, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the Sheriff and Jail Commander
Heacock in their individual capacities are dismissed for failure to state a claim.

B. Medical Care Claims
Mr. Johnson also alleges that he was not provided with adequate medical care. Because
Mr. Johnson was a pretrial detainee while he was housed at the Jail, his claims fall under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and he must plausibly allege that the care he received was objectively
unreasonable. Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (applying
objective unreasonableness inquiry to pretrial detainee's medical care claim). Under this standard,
Mr. Johnson has adequately stated claims against the Sheriff, Doctor Emerson, Nurse Ben, and
Nurse Kramer in their individual capacities, and those claims shall proceed.
Mr. Johnson also attempts to sue these defendants in their official capacities. The official-
capacity claim against the Sheriff is actually claim against his office—the Sheriff's Department.
The Sheriff's Department may only be sued when its own actions violate the Constitution. See Levy
v. Marion Cty. Sheriff, 940 F.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 2019) (applying Monell v. Dep't of Soc.

Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978) to claim against an Indiana Sheriff's
Office). To state such a Monell claim, Mr. Johnson must allege that an action taken by the Sheriff's
Department caused the deprivation of his federally secured rights. The Sheriff's Department "'acts'
through its written policies, widespread practices or customs, and the acts of a final
decisionmaker." Id. (citing Bd. of the Cty. Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997)).
Under this standard, Mr. Johnson has adequately stated a Monell claim against the Sheriff in his
official capacity based on the alleged denial of adequate healthcare, and this claim shall proceed.
To the extent that Mr. Johnson is also attempting to sue Doctor Emerson, Nurse Kramer,
and Nurse Ben in their official capacities, he identifies them as employees of the Jail, so such
claims are dismissed as duplicative of the official-capacity claim against the Sheriff.

C. Summary
In summary, the following claims shall proceed:
• Claims under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act against the Clark
County Sheriff in his official capacity;
• Fourteenth Amendment claims against the Clark County Sheriff, Doctor Emerson,
Nurse Ben, and Nurse Kramer in their individual capacities based on allegations of
inadequate medical care; and
• Fourteenth Amendment claims against the Clark County Sheriff in his official

capacity based on allegations of inadequate medical care.
This summary of claims includes all of the viable claims identified by the Court. All other
claims have been dismissed for the reasons stated above. If Mr. Johnson believes that additional
claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court, he shall have through July
25, 2022, in which to identify those claims.
The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect that the defendant currently identified
as "Clark County Sheriff and Sheriff's Department" should be identified as "Clark County Sheriff.”
The clerk is also directed to terminate Jail Commander Heacock as a defendant.
IV. Service of Process
The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process to defendants
Clark County Sheriff, Doctor Emerson, Nurse Ben, and Nurse Kramer in the manner specified by
Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of the complaint filed on December 20, 2021, dkt. [1], applicable
forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service
of Summons), and this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 6/27/2022
Date aaah
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL JOHNSON
270993
PLAINFIELD - CF
PLAINFIELD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Inmate Mail/Parcels
727 MOON ROAD
PLAINFIELD, IN 46168

Clark County Sheriff
Clark County Jail
501 E. Court Ave.
Jeffersonville, IN 47130

Doctor Emerson
Clark County Jail
501 E. Court Ave.
Jeffersonville, IN 47130

Nurse Ben
Clark County Jail
501 E. Court Ave.
Jeffersonville, IN 47130

Nurse Kramer
Clark County Jail
501 E. Court Ave.
Jeffersonville, IN 47130

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10169181. Public record. Not legal advice.
