# EAST v. KIJAKAZI

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · April 18, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10168992

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** April 18, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

TYREL E.,1 )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:21-cv-00308-MJD-JRS
)
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )
)
Defendant. )

ENTRY ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

Claimant Tyrel E. requests judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying his application for Disability
Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act") and
Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d); 42
U.S.C. § 1382. For the reasons set forth below, the Court REVERSES the decision of the
Commissioner.
I. Background
Claimant applied for DIB and SSI in March 2018, alleging an onset of disability as of
March 1, 2018. [Dkt. 17-7 at 2.] Claimant's applications were denied initially and again upon
reconsideration, and a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge James E. MacDonald

1 In an attempt to protect the privacy interest of claimants for Social Security benefits, consistent
with the recommendation of the Court Administration and Case Management Committee of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Southern District of Indiana has opted to
use only the first name and last initial of non-governmental parties in its Social Security judicial
review opinions.
("ALJ") on October 7, 2019. [Dkt. 17-2 at 51-78.] On December 20, 2019, ALJ MacDonald
issued his determination that Claimant was not disabled. [Dkt. 17-2 at 28.] The Appeals Council
then denied Claimant's request for review on December 8, 2020. [Dkt. 17-2 at 2.] On February 4,
2021, Claimant timely filed his Complaint in this Court seeking judicial review of the ALJ's

decision. [Dkt. 1.]
II. Legal Standards
To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must have a disability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
423.2 Disability is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner, as represented by the
ALJ, employs a sequential, five-step analysis: (1) if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity, he is not disabled; (2) if the claimant does not have a "severe" impairment, one that

significantly limits his ability to perform basic work activities, he is not disabled; (3) if the
claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals any impairment
appearing in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpart P, App. 1, the claimant is
disabled; (4) if the claimant is not found to be disabled at step three, and is able to perform his
past relevant work, he is not disabled; and (5) if the claimant is not found to be disabled at step
three, cannot perform his past relevant work, but can perform certain other available work, he is
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Before continuing to step four, the ALJ must assess the

2 DIB and SSI claims are governed by separate statutes and regulations that are identical in all
respects relevant to this case. For the sake of simplicity, this Entry contains citations to those that
apply to DIB.
claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") by "incorporat[ing] all of the claimant's
limitations supported by the medical record." Crump v. Saul, 932 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2019).
In reviewing a claimant's appeal, the Court will reverse only "if the ALJ based the denial
of benefits on incorrect legal standards or less than substantial evidence." Martin v. Saul, 950

F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 2020). Thus, an ALJ's decision "will be upheld if supported by
substantial evidence," which is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2019). An
ALJ need not address every piece of evidence but must provide a "logical bridge" between the
evidence and his conclusions. Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 2015). This Court
may not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its
judgment for that of the ALJ. Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019). Where
substantial evidence supports the ALJ's disability determination, the Court must affirm the
decision even if "reasonable minds could differ" on whether the claimant is disabled. Id.
III. ALJ Decision

ALJ MacDonald first determined that Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since his alleged onset date of March 1, 2018. [Dkt. 17-2 at 33.] At step two, the ALJ
found that Claimant had the following severe impairments: "degenerative joint disease of the
right shoulder, degenerative disc disease of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine,
COPD/emphysema, obstructive sleep apnea, hernias, peripheral arterial disease, hypertension,
coronary artery disease with hyperlipidemia, headaches, obesity, depression, anxiety, obsessive
compulsive disorder (OCD) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)." [Dkt. 17-2 at 34.] The
ALJ determined that Claimant's GERD was non-severe. [Dkt. 17-2 at 34.] At step three, the ALJ
found that Claimant's impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment during
the relevant time period. [Dkt. 17-2 at 34.] ALJ MacDonald then found that, during the relevant
time period, Claimant had the residual functional capacity ("RFC")
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with
exceptions. Specifically, the claimant is able to lift, carry, pull and pull3 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk 6 hours in an 8-hour
workday and stand and/or walk 6 hours in an 8-hour workday4 and sit 6 hour [sic]
in an 8-hour workday. He is never to climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, but is
occasionally able to climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds or crawl,5 but is occasionally
able to climb ramps and stairs, and balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch. He is never
to be exposed to humidity, but is occasionally able to be exposed to dusts, fumes,
odors, gases and poorly ventilated areas. The claimant is able to perform occasional
overhead reaching with the right upper extremity and is frequently able to reach in
all other directions with the right upper extremities. He is never to be exposed to
unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts. Mentally, the claimant is able to
understand and remember simple instructions and carry out simple tasks with
simple work-related decisions and judgment performing these tasks with adequate
pace, persistence and concentration in two-hour segments allowing for normal
breaks. He is able to tolerate occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers
with no interactions with the general public as part of the job duties. He is never to
perform tandem tasks with no hourly quotas, but is able to meet daily expectations.
Last, the claimant is limited to moderate noise environments, as defined in the SCO
[Selected Characteristics of Occupations].

[Dkt. 17-2 at 37] (footnotes added).
At step four, ALJ MacDonald found that Claimant was unable to perform any of his past
relevant work during the relevant time period. [Dkt. 17-2 at 43.] At step five, relying on
testimony from a vocational expert ("VE"), the ALJ determined that Claimant was able to
perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, such as weight recorder
(DOT 222.387-074), photocopy machine operator (DOT 207.685-014), and office helper (DOT

3 The Court assumes the ALJ meant to say "push and pull," not "pull and pull."
4 Recognizing the repeated limitation of "stand and/or walk 6 hours in an 8-hour workday," the
Court is unsure whether "stand and or/walk" was intended to be a different limitation or whether
the repeated portion of the sentence should have been omitted altogether.
5 The Court is unable to discern what this contradictory statement means. Either Claimant was
never to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, or he was occasionally able to do so. Given this
confusion, it is also not certain whether Claimant was limited to crawling occasionally or never.
239.567-010). [Dkt. 17-2 at 44.] Accordingly, ALJ MacDonald concluded that Claimant was not
disabled. [Dkt. 17-2 at 45.]
IV. Discussion
Claimant advances myriad arguments in support of his request to reverse the decision of

the ALJ, most of which pertain to a flawed RFC determination and the absence of a logical
bridge. [Dkt. 22.] The Commissioner responds that the ALJ based his decision on substantial
evidence and therefore reversal is inappropriate. [Dkt. 25.] Ultimately, the Court agrees with
Claimant that ALJ MacDonald's decision is deficient in many respects, with the most compelling
reasons discussed below.6
A. The ALJ's RFC Determination Did Not Account for Claimant's "Severe"
Headaches

The Court begins with Claimant's argument that the ALJ's RFC determination
erroneously omitted limitations regarding his severe headaches and that the ALJ provides no
reason for doing so. [Dkt. 22 at 21.] It is well understood that, "[i]n assessing RFC, the
adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual's
impairments, even those that are not severe." SSR 96-8p; see Crump, 932 F.3d at 570 (The ALJ

6 Before turning to Claimant's more persuasive arguments, the Court notes that Claimant also
sets forth errors at step five, alleging that the ALJ erroneously relied on VE testimony which
departed from the DOT. Claimant highlights that the ALJ found he was limited in his reaching
capabilities, yet argues that "[i]t is undisputed that two of the identified jobs, i.e., photocopy
machine operator and office helper, each requires frequent reaching." [Dkt. 22 at 29] (citing
DOT). However, neither DOT job description, either explicitly or implicitly, mentions anything
about frequent reaching. The Court is therefore confused as to Claimant's "undisputed" claim. In
any case, because the Court finds numerous other issues with the ALJ's decision that require
reversal, it need not address Claimant's unconvincing VE-related arguments further. That said,
the Court does wonder whether the vocations of "weight recorder" and "photocopy machine
operator" still exist in today's national economy, let alone in significant numbers.
must assess the claimant's RFC by "incorporat[ing] all of the claimant's limitations supported by
the medical record.").
Here, ALJ MacDonald found that Claimant was severely impaired by his "degenerative
joint disease of the right shoulder, degenerative disc disease of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar

spine, COPD/emphysema, obstructive sleep apnea, hernias, peripheral arterial disease,
hypertension, coronary artery disease with hyperlipidemia, headaches, obesity, depression,7
anxiety,8 obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)."
[Dkt. 17-2 at 34] (emphasis and footnote added).9 However, Claimant is correct that there is no

7 It is important to recognize that Claimant does not just suffer from "depression," but rather, has
consistently been diagnosed with "major depressive disorder, recurrent, severe with psychotic
symptoms." See, e.g., [Dkt. 17-9 at 341, 641]. It appears that the ALJ mischaracterized
Claimant's major depressive disorder, recurrent, severe with psychotic symptoms as simply
"depression," but "as this Court has counseled on many occasions, ALJs must not succumb to the
temptation to play doctor and make their own independent medical findings." Rohan v. Chater,
98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996); see Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2014) ("This
mistaken reading of the evidence illustrates why ALJs are required to rely on expert opinions
instead of determining the significance of particular medical findings themselves."); see also
Constance L. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 950071, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 30, 2022) (reversing ALJ, in
part, for mischaracterizing the claimant's "major depressive disorder, recurrent, severe with
psychotic symptoms" as "depression" at step two).
8 The Court is unable to locate in the record where Claimant's treating sources diagnosed him
with an anxiety disorder. They do, however, consistently diagnose him with "persistent mood
disorder, unspecified." See, e.g., [Dkt. 17-9 at 349, 351, 529]. If the ALJ substituted Claimant's
persistent mood disorder, unspecified, with "anxiety," then this finding is problematic for the
same reasons explained in note 7 above.
9 The Court additionally notes that ALJ MacDonald failed to consider Claimant's "panic
disorder" as an impairment—a diagnosis appearing at least 16 times in the record since
Claimant's alleged onset date with ample supporting documentation and testimony. See, e.g.,
[Dkt. 17-9 at 349, 351, 529]; [Dkt. 17-2 at 68-69] (Claimant's testimony that, when he is
experiencing a panic attack, "[i]t almost makes you feel like you're dying"; "if I'm in a room, I've
got to get out of it quick. It feels like it's coming in"; "[y]ou start racing in your mind, your heart.
You get all panicky and sweaty and everything and stuff, and then it just becomes a feeling like
you're going to die"; "I run out and I start taking slow breaths, try to take slow breaths"); [Dkt.
17-9 at 607] (psychotherapy treatment note from January 10, 2019, stating "Client reported
increased and intense panic attacks during which he has to go outside in cold for several hours
and felt the house was 'melting.'"). The ALJ made no findings as to whether Claimant's panic
disorder constituted a severe or non-severe impairment, alone or combined. See Ridinger v.
explanation in ALJ MacDonald's decision about how his RFC determination accounts for those
headaches. In fact, the following passage is the ALJ's sole mention of Claimant's headaches in
his decision—again, despite having found them to constitute a severe impairment: "In a
headache questionnaire, the claimant has two headaches per week that last between 4-9 hours at

a time. When having a headache, he is only able to do the essentials of his daily living. (Exh.
B9E)." [Dkt. 17-2 at 38.] To be sure, Claimant also reported that his headaches come with
sensitivity to light and sound, and that he treats his headaches with medication and rest, although
the medications do not provide relief. [Dkt. 17-8 at 60.] As Claimant argues, ALJ MacDonald
"fail[ed] to account for the most significant limitations arising from [Claimant's] headaches, i.e.,
the need to absent himself from the work setting when they occur." [Dkt. 22 at 21.]
The Commissioner asserts that any error here is harmless. [Dkt. 25 at 16.] The Court
disagrees. Indeed, this evidence suggests that Claimant may be off-task for up to 18 hours in a
week due to his headaches, which would be work preclusive per the VE, see [Dkt. 17-2 at 77].
Yet, the ALJ did not appear to consider this or, if he did, failed to provide any explanation of

such. See Lothridge v. Saul, 984 F.3d 1227, 1234 (7th Cir. 2021) (remand necessary where
reviewing court could not tell whether the ALJ addressed evidence that the claimant could not
stay on task for at least 90% of the workday). Ultimately, the ALJ's RFC determination is flawed
because it does not account for Claimant's severe headache impairment or, at the very least,
articulate why that severe impairment did not warrant any limitations. Because the ALJ provides

Astrue, 589 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ("Even impairments that are not severe on
their own must be considered because the combination of impairments may be severe.") (citing
20 CFR § 404.1523). To be sure, the ALJ mentioned Claimant's panic disorder a few times when
summarizing the evidence, but not once in his step two determination. The ALJ on remand shall
be sure to consider all of Claimant's impairments that are supported by the record, which
includes his panic disorder.
no explanation for this omission that would allow the Court to follow his reasoning, the requisite
logical bridge is lacking and thus remand is necessary.
B. The ALJ Did Not Adequately Consider the Medical Opinions of Record
Claimant additionally argues that ALJ MacDonald inadequately considered the State

agency opinions and failed to incorporate the limitations set forth therein. See 20 CFR §
404.1513a(b)(1) (ALJs "are not required to adopt any prior administrative medical findings, but
they must consider this evidence according to §§ 404.1520b, 404.1520c, and 404.1527, as
appropriate, because our Federal and State agency medical or psychological consultants are
highly qualified and experts in Social Security disability evaluation.").
State agency medical professionals reviewed Claimant's file in September 2018 and
November 2018. The State agency doctors, J. Sands, MD, and B. Whitley, MD, found that
Claimant's statements about the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of his
pain, sustained concentration and persistence limitations, and social interaction limitations, were
"substantiated by the objective medical evidence alone." [Dkt. 17-5 at 12, 46.] They determined

that Claimant had exertional, postural, and environmental limitations. [Dkt. 17-5 at 12-13, 46-
47.] Regarding environmental limitations, Dr. Sands and Dr. Whitley reported that Claimant
must "avoid concentrated exposure" to extreme heat, humidity, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor
ventilation, and other "factors that would exacerbate COPD." [Dkt. 17-5 at 13-14, 47-48.]10
The ALJ found the opinions of Dr. Sands and Dr. Whitley "persuasive," and noted that
"[e]nvironmental limitations are warranted because of his respiratory impairments." [Dkt. 17-2 at

10 The Social Security Administration recognizes that an "inability to tolerate very little dust" and
other environmental limitations "significantly impinges on all ranges of work since very few job
environments are entirely free of irritants, pollutants, and other potentially damaging conditions."
POMS DI 25020.015(C).
41.] However, in formulating his RFC, ALJ MacDonald determined that Claimant "is never to be
exposed to humidity, but is occasionally able to be exposed to dusts, fumes, odors, gases and
poorly ventilated areas." [Dkt. 17-2 at 37] (emphasis added). This seemingly contradicts the
environmental limitations opined by Dr. Sands and Dr. Whitley, and belies the significant

medical evidence in support of Claimant's severe COPD and emphysema. Further, Claimant
testified that he is "highly allergic to dust," which contributes to his COPD and emphysema.
[Dkt. 17-2 at 67.] The ALJ does not explain why he deviated from the State agency physicians'
"persuasive" opinions in finding that Claimant could occasionally be exposed to COPD-
exacerbating factors, and thus the Court is unable to follow his reasoning.
Next, State agency psychologists, Kari Kennedy, Psy.D., and Joelle Larsen, Ph.D., found
that Claimant had "mild" limitations in his ability to understand, remember, or apply information
and adapt or manage oneself, and "moderate" limitations in his ability to interact with others and
concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. [Dkt. 17-5 at 11, 45.] Specifically, they determined that
Claimant was moderately limited in his ability to (1) maintain attention and concentration for

extended periods, (2) complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychologically-based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable
number and length of rest periods, and (3) interact appropriately with the general public. [Dkt.
17-5 at 14-15, 49.] Dr. Kennedy and Dr. Larsen then opined that
[t]he totality of the evidence in file suggests that the claimant is able to: remain alert
and pay close attention to watching machine processes; able to inspect, test or
otherwise look for irregularities; able to tend or guard equipment or property,
material or persons against loss or damage. [Claimant] may prefer to work in a
position that requires minimal interaction with others. [Claimant] appears capable
of semiskilled work.

[Dkt. 17-5 at 16, 50.]
ALJ MacDonald found the opinions of Dr. Kennedy and Dr. Larsen "not persuasive" for
the sole reason that "the claimant has had memory issues warranting a finding that the claimant
is limited to simple tasks." [Dkt. 17-2 at 42.] In his RFC determination, the ALJ stated that,
[m]entally, the claimant is able to understand and remember simple instructions
and carry out simple tasks with simple work-related decisions and judgment
performing these tasks with adequate pace, persistence and concentration in two-
hour segments allowing for normal breaks. He is able to tolerate occasional
interaction with supervisors and coworkers with no interactions with the general
public as part of the job duties. He is never to perform tandem tasks with no hourly
quotas, but is able to meet daily expectations.

[Dkt. 17-2 at 37.] Critically, the ALJ does not explain what led to his finding that Claimant could
perform simple tasks "with adequate pace, persistence and concentration in two-hour segments
allowing for normal breaks," especially after the State agency psychologists determined that
Claimant was moderately limited in his ability to maintain attention and concentration for
extended periods, complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychologically-based symptoms, and perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable
number and length of rest periods. Additionally, ALJ MacDonald's inexplicable finding
regarding this two-hour interval figure is not based on substantial evidence, since none of
Claimant's medical records, nor the State agency psychologists, offered this opinion. See
Goodman v. Saul, 2020 WL 3619938, at *8 (N.D. In. June 10, 2020) (remanding where the
ALJ's determination that the claimant could maintain attention and concentration for two-hour
intervals was unsupported by the record); see also Warren v. Colvin, 2013 WL 1196603, at *4-5
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2013) (same; noting that the ALJ "formulated her own independent medical
opinion regarding the effects (or lack of effects) of [the claimant's] moderate difficulties of
concentration, persistence, or pace"). Indeed, since the ALJ rejected Dr. Kennedy's and Dr.
Larsen's opinions, it is unclear what the mental limitations he provided are based on. See Clifford
v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[A]n ALJ must not substitute his own judgment for
a physician's opinion without relying on other medical evidence or authority in the record.").
Moreover, these are the only expert opinions in the record concerning Claimant's mental
limitations.11 By rejecting Dr. Kennedy's and Dr. Larsen's opinions and without relying on any

other expert opinions, ALJ MacDonald's decision lacks any insight into how he formulated
Claimant's mental limitations.
Further, as Claimant underscores, a determination that Claimant could "sustain attention
and/or concentration for at least two-hour periods at a time and for 8 hours in the workday"
essentially amounts to no limitation at all. [Dkt. 22 at 14.] Indeed, the mental abilities required
for any job include "[t]he ability to maintain concentration and attention for extended periods
(the approximately 2-hour segments between arrival and first break, lunch, second break, and
departure)." POMS DI 25020.010(B)(2). It therefore does not make sense that Claimant, who has
moderate limitations in his ability to maintain attention and concentration, "would require the
same frequency of breaks as a typical worker." Warren, 2013 WL 1196603, at *4-5; see also

Brian P. v. Saul, 2020 WL 231081, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2020) ("The ALJ did not explain how
any evidence in the record translates into a finding that [the claimant] can concentrate and persist
for any amount of time at a normal pace, let alone for two-hour intervals."); see also Kelly v.
Colvin, 2015 WL 1930035, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2015) ("[T]he RFC assessment is still fatally

11 At the request of the State agency doctors, consultative examiner Luella Bangura, MD, met
with Claimant on June 14, 2018, and completed a report. [Dkt. 17-9 at 418-422.] Although the
ALJ summarizes Dr. Bangura's examination, see [Dkt. 17-2 at 39], he does not explicitly
consider her opinion nor articulate its persuasiveness. See 20 CFR § 404.1520c (ALJs are
required to articulate how persuasive they find each of the medical opinions and prior
administrative medical findings in a claimant's record); see also 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(3) ("We
will consider all evidence in your case record.").
flawed because there is a complete lack of evidence and analysis supporting the determination
that plaintiff could stay focused for two hours at a time."). These errors require remand.
C. The ALJ Improperly Rejected Claimant's Subjective Symptoms
Finally, Claimant argues that the ALJ failed to offer an explanation for discrediting

Claimant's subjective symptoms. [Dkt. 22 at 25.] After determining that a claimant's medically
determinable impairment(s) could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, the
ALJ must then evaluate how the intensity and persistence of a claimant's symptoms may affect
their capacity for work. 20 CFR § 404.1529(c)(1). An ALJ's credibility determinations are
generally deferential unless "if, after examining the ALJ's reasons for discrediting testimony, we
conclude that the finding is patently wrong." Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, at 751 (7th Cir.
2010). The ALJ's determination may be patently wrong where he fails to "'build an accurate and
logical bridge between the evidence and the result.'" Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 584
(7th Cir. 2006) (citing Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 2000)). Simply put, an ALJ
"must competently explain an adverse-credibility finding with specific reasons 'supported by the

record.'" Engstrand v. Colvin, 788 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Minnick, 775 F.3d at
937).
Here, ALJ MacDonald regurgitated the following boilerplate language:
After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the claimant's medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence
and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.

[Dkt. 17-2 at 38-39.] The ALJ then summarizes the medical evidence, but, critically, summary
does not equate to analysis. See Michael v. Saul, 2021 WL 1811736, at *8 (N.D. Ind. May 6,
2021) ("A summary is not an analysis, as it does not explain why the evidence summarized
undermined [Claimant's] statements about [her] symptoms or limitations, or which statements
were inconsistent.") (emphasis in original) (citing Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 677-78 (7th Cir.
2008)). Indeed, the ALJ does not point to the inconsistencies he claims exist between Claimant's
subjective statements and the medical evidence, and the Court is unable to locate any after

reviewing the entire record. Moreover, the ALJ's statement again contradicts the "persuasive"
opinions of the State agency physicians, who found that Claimant's statements about the
intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of his pain, sustained concentration and
persistence limitations, and social interaction limitations, were "substantiated by the objective
medical evidence alone." [Dkt. 17-5 at 12, 46.] The ALJ again provides no articulation as to why
he deviated from these findings.
The only "analysis" as to why ALJ MacDonald discredits Claimant's statements is as
follows:
A more restrictive residual functional capacity is not warranted because the
claimant was looking for work. House projects were keeping him busy, which is
evidence that he is not as limited as he claims. His ability to perform house projects
and his plan on looking for work is evidence that he is capable of performing light
exertional work with the postural, manipulative and environmental limitations.

[Dkt. 17-2 at 41.] This reasoning is a factually inaccurate mischaracterization of the record, and
thus provides insufficient grounds to reject Claimant's statements.12

12 In fact, the ALJ mischaracterizes the record multiple times. Consider the following examples:
the ALJ stated that "[t]he claimant also enjoy [sic] working on automobiles." [Dkt. 17-2 at 38.]
In reality, Claimant merely reported that his hobbies and interests included "automobiles," [Dkt.
17-8 at 25], which does not necessarily mean he would work on them. This mischaracterization,
while seemingly inconsequential, implies a level of physical exertion that may have weighed in
the ALJ's mind when denying Claimant benefits. Another example: the ALJ stated that Claimant
"spent most of the time with his friends or tasks he enjoyed doing." [Dkt. 17-2 at 41.] However,
the treatment note cited to actually provides that, in discussing Claimant's relationship issues,
"[h]e agrees to spend time with friends or tasks he enjoys but states he feels ill anticipating
returning to home." [Dkt. 17-9 at 589.] Again, this mischaracterization implies a level of
Regarding Claimant performing "house projects," the ALJ cites to two psychotherapy
treatment notes, stating that "[h]ouse projects were keeping him busy and he felt useful since he
was not working. (Exh. B6F/57)" and "[h]e planned on doing more house projects when he was
physically [sic] and feeling productive. (Exh. B13F/7)." [Dkt. 17-2 at 40.] However, there is no

mention, in the ALJ's decision or the record itself, about what such projects entailed. Surely,
"house projects" could range from dusting a shelf, to organizing a laundry cabinet, to fixing the
roof—without any specifics, which the record does not provide, the ALJ cannot rely on this fact
to discredit Claimant because it provides very little, if any, insight into his daily functioning
limitations. Additionally, as Claimant argues, there is no evidence that Claimant is able to
consistently work on household projects for eight hours a day, five days a week, as would be
necessary if he were employed. See Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 700 (7th Cir. 2014) ("The
'sporadic performance [of household tasks or work] does not establish that a person is capable of
engaging in substantial gainful activity.'") (quoting Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1490
(10th Cir. 1993)).

Regarding Claimant "looking for work," the ALJ again cites to psychotherapy treatment
notes, stating that "he was looking for a job and was planning to sell things until he received a
paycheck. (Exh. B6F)."13 [Dkt. 17-2 at 40.] However, this job search occurred in 2017, prior to
Claimant's onset date. In fact, after subsequently finding and accepting a job, Claimant was fired
for not making productivity goals due to his OCD. See [Dkt. 17-9 at 347]. If anything, it appears

physical exertion that may have been used to justify the ALJ's decision, but that was ultimately
not grounded in fact.
13 Citing to exhibits in bulk—for example, ALJ MacDonald's bulk citation to Exhibit B6F,which
contains 71 pages of medical documentation—is an unfortunately common practice among ALJs
that hinders the Court's ability to follow the ALJ's reasoning. See United States v. Dunkel, 927
F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.").
this evidence should support Claimant's claim for disability, not undercut it. The ALJ also bases
his determination on the statement that "[t]he claimant was going to obtain his GED so that he
could get a job. (Exh. B17F/1)." [Dkt. 17-2 at 41.] In reality, the therapy note cited to by the ALJ
discusses how Claimant's teenage son "has been expelled from school. He is in need of a GED

for the job he is to start following his birthday." [Dkt. 17-9 at 587.] This statement clearly does
not pertain to Claimant, but to his son. Still, even if it were true that Claimant was looking for
work, that would not be an appropriate reason to discredit his statements. See Roddy v. Astrue,
705 F.3d 631, 638 (7th Cir. 2013) ("The fact that [the claimant] pushed herself to work part-time
and maintain some minimal level of financial stability, despite her pain, does not preclude her
from establishing that she was disabled.") (citing Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term
Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Goins v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677, 679
(7th Cir. 2014) ("We have explained that 'even persons who are disabled sometimes cope with
their impairments and continue working long after they might have been entitled to benefits.'")
(citing Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2012)).

Accordingly, ALJ MacDonald's determination that Claimant was not as limited as he
claimed on the grounds that Claimant was able to perform "house projects" and because he "was
looking for work" are factually inaccurate and therefore cannot suffice as the reason for
discrediting Claimant's statements. See Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996)
("[W]e cannot uphold a decision by an administrative agency . . . if . . . the reasons given . . . do
not build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result"). Remand is
necessary to fix these errors.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner's decision is REVERSED and
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: 18 APR 2022 LM
Marl J. Dinsm¢gre
United StatesMagistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:
Service will be made electronically
on all ECF-registered counsel of record via
email generated by the Court's ECF system.

16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10168992. Public record. Not legal advice.