# REAGAN v. CHOSEN CONSULTING, LLC

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · September 13, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10168270

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** September 13, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10168270

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that "a plaintiff typically needs only one comparator to avoid summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law"

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

CHARLES REAGAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:19-cv-03794-TWP-MG
)
CHOSEN CONSULTING, LLC, )
)
Defendant. )
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 32) filed
by Defendant Chosen Consulting, LLC ("Chosen Healthcare"). Plaintiff Charles Reagan
("Reagan") initiated this action against Chosen Healthcare alleging gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") (Filing No. 1 at 3). Chosen
Healthcare has moved the Court for summary judgment on this claim, arguing that it terminated
Reagan's employment for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, namely that he engaged in abuse
against multiple residents (Filing No. 32; Filing No. 33). For the following reasons, the Court
denies the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are not necessarily objectively true; the Court, as required by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56, presents them in the light most favorable to Reagan as the non-moving
party. See Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2014); Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Reagan, who is male, first worked for Chosen Healthcare from 1996 through 1999. He
was rehired in June 2017 to serve as a Certified Nursing Assistant ("CNA") in its Essex Nursing
and Rehabilitation facility in Lebanon, Indiana ("Essex") (Filing No. 36-7 at 1). He had previously
worked as a CNA at this location. His job description required, among other things, that he must
1. "work well with residents and staff",
2. "accept supervision and constructive criticism",
3. "possess the ability and willingness to deal tactfully with staff, residents,
family members, visitors, government agencies/personnel and the general
public",
4. "possess the ability and willingness to work harmoniously with other
personnel",
5. "have patience, tact, a cheerful disposition and enthusiasm, as well as the
willingness to handle difficult residents based on whatever cognitive level
they are currently functioning",
6. "not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace", and
7. "cope with the mental and emotional stress of the position".
(Filing No. 33-2 at 1–2). On top of his general duties, Reagan was specifically used as the primary
enforcer of the facility's tobacco and alcohol policies, often requiring him to confiscate cigarettes
and alcohol from residents (Filing No. 36-1 at 3–4, 12). The role of "male authority figure" made
Reagan feel at times that he was "targeted" by some aggrieved residents because of his gender. Id.
No women were tasked with this job, and he believes he was picked for the duty because of his
"deep, stern" voice. Id. at 4, 10, 11. As a result of being used "as a cop," Reagan made a complaint
of gender discrimination to the former Administrator at Essex, Roger Brannan ("Brannan"), in
September or October 2017 (Filing No. 36-26 at 6; Filing No. 36-1 at 7).
Reagan was also required to comply with Chosen Healthcare's Resident Abuse and Neglect
Policy ("Abuse Policy"), which recognized that "each resident has the right to be free from abuse,
neglect, and misappropriation of resident property." (Filing No. 33-3 at 1.) Under the Abuse Policy,
abuse included that which was "verbal," "sexual," "physical," and "mental." Id. at 1–2. The Abuse
Policy stated that "if the alleged violation is substantiated, appropriate corrective action will be
taken." Id. at 4. While the Abuse Policy is silent as to next steps if abuse cannot be substantiated
beyond a resident report, see id., abuse in any of the above-listed varieties was "STRICTLY
PROHIBITED" and would result in suspension, investigation, and "possible termination." (Filing

No. 33-4 at 1.) Reagan acknowledged receipt of the Abuse Policy on June 19, 2017 (Filing No.
33-5 at 1), and understood that resident abuse could lead to termination (Filing No. 33-1 at 4, 5).
Exactly one year later, Reagan received his annual Employee Performance Review, where
his supervisor Deborah Thomas ("Thomas") indicated that he was "excellent" (the highest rating)
in five of six categories: (1) "Job Knowledge," (2) "Work Quality," (3) "Attendance/Punctuality,"
(4) "Initiative," and (5) "Dependability." (Filing No. 36-18 at 1.) In the final category—
"Communication/Listening Skills"—Thomas marked his performance as "Good" (the second
highest rating), indicating that his "[m]ale voice can sometimes be taken as yelling/arguing when
not." Id. Reagan received a total score of 29 out of 30 points, and Thomas thanked him "for all
[his] help." Id. Following this review, Reagan received a pay raise of 3%; approximately six

months earlier, he had received a 13% pay raise because of a "new pay scale." Id. at 2–3.
From September 9, 2018 to September 14, 2018, the Indiana State Board of Health
("Board") conducted a recertification and licensee survey at Essex (Filing No. 33-20 at 1). This
process included an audit involving a resident interview component, which itself included asking
residents whether they had been abused at Essex. Id. During these interviews, three residents
made four abuse allegations against Reagan—who had previously never been disciplined by
Chosen Healthcare for any policy violation (Filing No. 36-7 at 2). These abuse allegations resulted
in his immediate suspension and an investigation into the accusations (Filing No. 33-20 at 2).
Brannan noted in an email that "[t]he allegations being made to surveyors are from smokers who
have had their privileges reduced," and "the smokers are out to get [Reagan] because they don't
like him." (Filing No. 36-6 at 1; see also Filing No. 36-7 at 2 ("Each resident that filed an allegation
of abuse against me did not like me due to enforcing Chosen[ Healthcare]'s smoking policy and/or
some other reason.").)

Specifically, one complaint indicated that Reagan told a resident "I could do something to
you that you would never forget." (Filing No. 33-6 at 1, 4.) Another complaint from this resident
expressed that Reagan "scares" the resident (Filing No. 33-8 at 1). This resident—a smoker who
had called Reagan a "prick" and a "Brutus transvestite" for administering the tobacco rules (Filing
No. 36-1 at 11)—suffers from schizophrenia and bipolar disease (Filing No. 36-5 at 1). Reagan
believed that this resident "doesn't like any males." (Filing No. 36-1 at 11.)
A different resident complained that Reagan had been "throwing [the resident] around."
(Filing No. 33-7 at 1.) This resident, also a smoker ostensibly unhappy with Reagan's enforcement
of tobacco regulations (Filing No. 36-1 at 12; Filing No. 36-6 at 1), suffers from Parkinson's
disease and dementia (Filing No. 36-8 at 1). When this incident was reported to Licensed Practical

Nurse Teresa Cain ("LPN Cain"), a Board surveyor saw LPN Cain "roll her eyes," noting that this
resident frequently made "false claims" against workers. Id. Because she "knew" these allegations
were false, and she found no marks on the resident, LPN Cain indicated that she "would not report
[the] accusation." Id. Later, though Thomas indicated that she would need to "re-educate" LPN
Cain because all allegations of abuse should be reported, LPN Cain still received a score of 28 out
of 30 points and a 3% pay raise following her next annual review. Id.; Filing No. 36-21 at 1.
Finally, another resident's complaint specified that Reagan "came into [a resident's] room
a few weeks ago and insisted that the door stay open. He was also rude to her." (Filing No. 33-9 at
1.) But according to Reagan, this resident, another agitated smoker (see Filing No. 36-6 at 1), also
did not like him because he kept "waking her up" at mealtimes (Filing No. 36-1 at 10). Thomas,
for her part, shared with Board surveyors that she had spoken with Reagan "a couple of times in
the past for talking in a loud voice to residents." (Filing No. 36-3 at 5.)
As part of its investigation, Chosen Healthcare interviewed both Reagan (who consistently

denied the allegations) and the residents accusing him of abuse (Filing No. 33-20 at 2; Filing No.
36-7 at 2). But because no other individuals witnessed the alleged events, Chosen Healthcare
ascertained that it could not entirely and independently "substantiate" the four abuse allegations
(Filing No. 33-20 at 2). As Reagan recognizes, because these instances of abuse were
"unsubstantiated," they were essentially "just a he-said-he-said or she-said situation." (Filing No.
33-1 at 26.) According to Reagan, these false reports and situations are not rare, and CNAs are
daily accused of abuse (Filing No. 36-1 at 19). Reagan acknowledges that "[i]f [residents] made
those reports [against him], then they made those reports. I'm not [going to] say they didn't make
those reports." (Filing No. 33-1 at 17.)
Following the investigation (which Reagan doubts actually transpired (see Filing No. 33-1

at 16)), Brannan suggested ending Reagan's employment, noting that a Board surveyor "want[ed]
a decision on him" the next day (Filing No. 36-13 at 2). Leadership at Chosen Healthcare—former
Regional Operations Director Randy Hornstein ("Hornstein"), Vice President of Clinical Laura
Mace ("Mace"), and former Human Resources Director Wendy Schippers ("Schippers")—agreed
with the recommendation and decided to terminate Reagan. (Filing No. 33-11 at 1, 2). In a separate
email to these leaders, Brannan stated that Reagan "has always had a cocky mouth." (Filing No.
36-19 at 1.) Reagan does not know Mace or Schippers (Filing No. 33-1 at 22), he does not assert
that Hornstein (nor Mace or Schippers, for that matter) ever demonstrated hostility toward
individuals because of their gender (Filing No. 33-10 at 2).
On September 13, 2018, Brannan informed Reagan that his employment was terminated
because of the alleged abuse, but would not provide details concerning the reported incidents
(Filing No. 33-1 at 13–14). Later, Brannan indicated in emails that he terminated Reagan, that
"[s]urveyors wanted [Reagan] fired," and that the "[a]llegations could not be substantiated." (Filing

No. 36-13 at 3, 7.) Another employee, however, stated in an email that Reagan was let "go as a
result of substantiated resident abuse." Id. at 6. In Reagan's view, though, the termination decision
was driven by two coworkers with no supervisory power over him who controlled the "passive"
Brannan and who did not like Reagan because he was a man (but who, Reagan admits, tried to
drive "pretty much" everybody—including women—out of Essex) (Filing No. 36-1 at 3–5, 7).1
Meanwhile, the only other CNA at Essex terminated for resident abuse from January 1,
2015 to November 1, 2019, was Merce Hale ("CNA Hale"), who is incidentally Reagan's mother
(Filing No. 33-12 at 2; Filing 36-7 at 1). Before her termination, two initial abuse allegations were
received by Chosen Healthcare about CNA Hale. First, the brother-in-law of a resident reported
that the resident's arm had a pink spot, which the resident had indicated was made by "the skinny

lady," who was assumed to be CNA Hale, on July 8, 2018 (Filing No. 33-15 at 1, 2). CNA Hale
was immediately suspended, and though it was initially alleged that the pink spot was created by
CNA Hale grabbing the resident's arm during a shower, follow-up investigation of the matter
resulted in a conclusion that abuse did not occur: (1) the resident frequently obtained a red spot on
his arm at that location from his wheelchair, (2) CNA Hale denied ever giving the resident a
shower, (3) the resident was found to be an "unreliable historian," (4) the resident's daughter
indicated that her aunt and uncle were "crazy," that she had "trouble" with them at the "last facility

1 In his response brief, Reagan relied upon statements he made during his deposition that were relayed to him by a
third party that were reportedly said by these coworkers and Brannan. But these statements are clearly double hearsay
not to be considered on summary judgment. See Eaton v. J. H. Findorff & Son, Inc., 1 F.4th 508, 512 n.3 (7th Cir.
2021) ("Inadmissible hearsay evidence may not be considered on summary judgment.") (citations omitted).
resident lived," and that they were trying to get CNA Hale fired, (5) and the resident's sister and
brother-in-law did not believe abuse occurred. Id. at 2. Second, during another Board audit (see
Filing No. 36-16 at 3), a fellow CNA reported that she overheard CNA Hale "tell resident to take
her shower now or she is not getting one" four months later on November 8, 2018 (Filing No. 33-

16 at 1). CNA Hale was again immediately suspended, and an investigation found that the
allegation "could not be substantiated" and there were "no concerns" expressed about CNA Hale
by staff or residents. Brannan determined that CNA Hale needed to be "re-educated on speaking
appropriately to residents." Id. at 2. After reviewing the Abuse Policy with CNA Hale, and her
successful completion of a "post test," Brannan returned CNA Hale to work with a written
disciplinary reprimand four days later on November 12, 2018. Id. Ultimately, CNA Hale was
terminated on May 30, 2019, after a cook reported that she overheard CNA Hale threaten to slap
a resident after he put his soiled hands near his mouth (Filing No. 33-13 at 1; Filing No. 50 at 1).
CNA Hale, along with Reagan's wife Dara Reagan (who was also employed by Chosen
Healthcare as a CNA) ("CNA Dara"), later stated that another female employee at Essex—

Registered Nurse Toinette Mooday ("RN Mooday")—after a yelling match with a resident
escalated to a call to police, was not terminated. Instead, RN Mooday "was allowed to leave
Chosen [Healthcare] for another employer, which she found within a couple of days." (Filing No.
36-15 at 2; Filing No. 36-25 at 1–2.) CNA Dara, however, also indicated that a different woman
employed at Essex—Licensed Practical Nurse Sheila Hilker ("LPN Hilker")—"was terminated by
Chosen" Healthcare after she and a resident "fought over a pitcher of tea" in July 2020 (Filing No.
36-25 at 2). Though the incident occurred on a Saturday, LPN Hilker "was allowed to continue
working until the following Monday, when a complaint for abuse was finally submitted and she
was suspended." Id. Though CNA Dara indicates LPN Hilker was terminated, she also states that
she "was not disciplined for abuse to the best of my knowledge." Id. Finally, during yet another
Board audit (this time in August 2019), the Essex facility was found to have failed to follow several
protocols, which Reagan characterizes would each constitute instances of abuse (see Filing No. 24
passim).

Eventually, Reagan filed a complaint against Chosen Healthcare on September 6, 2019,
alleging gender discrimination under Title VII (Filing No. 1 at 3). On September 8, 2020, Chosen
Healthcare moved for summary judgment (Filing No. 32).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in
order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary
judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hemsworth v.
Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 489–90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, the court reviews "the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "However, inferences that are supported by only speculation or
conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion." Dorsey v. Morgan Stanley, 507 F.3d 624,
627 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "[a] party who bears the
burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively
demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that
requires trial." Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490 (citation omitted). "The opposing party cannot meet
this burden with conclusory statements or speculation but only with appropriate citations to
relevant admissible evidence." Sink v. Knox County Hosp., 900 F. Supp. 1065, 1072 (S.D. Ind.
1995) (citations omitted).
"In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence
to defeat a motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits

of [the] claim." Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). "[N]either the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion
for summary judgment." Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Though Chosen Healthcare contends that Reagan has provided no direct evidence of
gender discrimination (Filing No. 33 at 8–9), the Court need not delve into that argument because
Reagan proceeds solely under the "indirect method." (See Filing No. 35 at 20.) "In discrimination
cases, '[w]hen a defendant moves for summary judgment, the singular question for the district
court is whether the plaintiff has introduced evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that the plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the
discharge or other adverse employment action.'" Igasaki v. Illinois Dep't of Fin. & Pro. Regul.,
988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Purtue v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr., 963 F.3d 598, 602
(7th Cir.), reh'g denied (July 31, 2020)). "One way of proving employment discrimination under
Title VII remains the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 . . . (1973)," which "requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie case of discrimination"—that is,
that "(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he met his employer's legitimate expectations; (3) he
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) another similarly situated employee outside of his
protected class received better treatment from his employer." Id. (citing Marshall v. Indiana Dep't
of Correction, 973 F.3d 789, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2020)). Once this prima facie case is made, "'the
burden shifts to the employer to offer a nondiscriminatory motive, and, if the employer does so,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's stated reason was a pretext.'" Id.
(quoting Purtue, 963 F.3d at 601–02).

Moreover, "a plaintiff need not use the McDonell [sic] Douglas framework after Ortiz [v.
Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016)]," which instructs that "[t]he determinative
question in discrimination cases is 'whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that the plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the
discharge or other adverse employment action.'" Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 957–58 (citing Ortiz, 834
F.3d at 765). But here, the parties argue the case under McDonnell Douglas, so the Court will
analyze under that framework.
A. Prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas
Chosen Healthcare concedes McDonnell Douglas's first and third prongs—that Reagan is
a member of a protected class and that he suffered an adverse employment action (Filing No. 33
at 9–10).2 According to Chosen Healthcare, Reagan can neither prove that "he was meeting Chosen

Healthcare's legitimate expectations" nor that "he was treated less favorably than similarly situated
individuals outside his protected class". Id. at 10. Chosen Healthcare argues that Reagan did not
meet its expectations because "he engaged in inappropriate, prohibited conduct towards residents."

2 That said, Chosen Healthcare contends that Reagan "faces a major hurdle as he is a male plaintiff alleging gender
discrimination." (Filing No. 33 at 8 (citing Katerinos v. United States Department of the Treasury, 368 F.3d 733,736
(7th Cir. 2004); Phelan v. City of Chi., 347 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2003)). True, a male plaintiff alleging gender
discrimination ordinarily "must show background circumstances that demonstrate that a particular employer has
reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously against [males] or evidence that there is something fishy about the
facts at hand." Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2003). But Chosen Healthcare has decided to
concede this element, relieving Reagan of this burden (see Filing No. 33 at 9–10; but see Filing No. 35 at 20 n.22
(arguing that "Reagan is a male in a female dominated field, the majority of the decision makers were female, no other
employee had a performance review note their male/female character traits in order to dock them points, and Chosen
departed from their procedures policies in an unprecedented way in disciplining female employees").
Id. They also contend Reagan "cannot point to a single comparator who received better treatment
by Chosen Healthcare." Id. They point out that the only other Essex CNA also terminated for
resident abuse during the relevant time was a woman, CNA Hale. Id.
As for any contention that CNA Hale was treated more favorably because she was not

terminated until the third allegation against her, the first two complaints "came to different
conclusions, and thus had mitigating circumstances that would distinguish Chosen Healthcare's
treatment of them." Id. at 10–11. The first complaint, for instance, was found to not even have
occurred. Id. at 11. And the second allegation revealed "no concerns" about CNA Hale; even so,
she was counseled, given a written warning, and suspended for four days, demonstrating that she
too faced punishment for her actions. Id. In contrast, four complaints involving allegations of
physical and verbal abuse were made against Reagan. Id.
Reagan responds that he was meeting Chosen Healthcare's "legitimate expectation" and
"was not on any level of discipline". (Filing No. 35 at 20.) He argues that he was treated less
favorably than women at Essex. Specifically, CNA Hale (again, his mother) "was able to return

to work after both a substantiated and unsubstantiated allegation", whereas "[e]very complaint
against Reagan was unsubstantiated but he was not permitted to return to work". Id. at 22. In
short, though "multiple other employees discredited the complaints against Reagan[,]… for some
reason Reagan's [alleged conduct] warranted termination where Hale's warranted a 'suspension.'"
Id. at 23. Additionally, LPN Cain's "failure to not only report allegations of abuse under Chosen
[Healthcare]'s policy but also her failure to adhere to Indiana statute would warrant termination."
Id. Reagan asserts that Chosen Healthcare "refused to discipline her following her failure to report
allegations of abuse." Id. at 24. He argues "it is fairly obvious" that LPN Cain "received better
treatment" when she was simply "re-educated." Id. Finally, "[i]t is not unreasonable to infer from"
Board audits that Chosen Healthcare "allows female employees accused of abuse to be disciplined
under a different term (i.e. inappropriate workplace behavior)." Id. at 25.
Chosen Healthcare replies that Reagan "has shown no comparator who was treated more
favorably than him." (Filing No. 44 at 15.) First, "the undisputed evidence shows Chosen

Healthcare also terminated a female employee for resident abuse." Id. "To the extent that [Reagan]
argues [CNA] Hale was treated more favorably because she was not terminated when there were
two prior abuse allegations against her," Chosen Healthcare explains that Reagan "fails to address
that those allegations had mitigating circumstances that would distinguish Chosen Healthcare's
treatment of them." Id. Specifically, complaints against CNA Hale took place over two years;
"three abuse accusations were made against [CNA] Hale over a two-year period, as opposed to
four abuse complaints made against [Reagan] at the same time." Id. As for CNA Hale receiving
preferential treatment after the first allegation against her, Chosen Healthcare notes that it could
conclusively determine that abuse did not occur because CNA Hale "was not even working when"
the abuse was claimed to have occurred. Id. (citing Filing No. 33-15).3

Considering the second allegation, Reagan argues "the resident himself," along with "other
residents and staff," had no concerns about CNA Hale. Id. at 16. Even so, CNA Hale still received
corrective action. Id. Alleged abuse at the hands of Reagan, on the other hand, could not be
substantiated merely because "none of the alleged abuse incidents were witnessed." Id. And
contrary to Chosen Healthcare's contentions, "[t]he Abuse Policy does not dictate what action must
be taken if an alleged violation cannot be substantiated beyond the residents' own statements, nor
does it prohibit discipline or termination for such violations." Id. Reagan's divergent "tortured"

3 Though Chosen Healthcare claims that this exhibit demonstrates that Chosen Healthcare "could definitively confirm"
at the time that CNA Hale "was not even working" when the alleged abuse occurred (Filing No. 44 at 15), this incident
report merely states that Chosen Healthcare had determined that the resident's shower "was not given by" CNA Hale,
and that CNA Hale had "indicated that she had never given [the resident] a shower." (Filing No. 33-15 at 2.)
reading of the Abuse Policy is "nonsensical" because it would foreclose discipline not witnessed
by others "in an environment where many resident abuse interactions are one-on-one." Id.
Chosen Healthcare asserts that [RN] Mooday, [LPN] Hilker, and [LPN] Cain, who Reagan
alleges were treated more favorably than him, are not proper comparators because they were not

subject to the same decisionmakers as him. Id. at 17. Even putting aside the fact that (1) the
allegation concerning RN Mooday is only supported by "the self-serving allegations in the
affidavits of [Reagan's] mother (Mercy Hale) and wife (Dara Reagan)" and (2) there are no details
about "whether the potential abuse was reported to Chosen Healthcare's management and whether
management concluded abuse occurred." Id. Reagan, they argue, has not shown that RN Mooday
was subject to his decisionmaker, and he cannot: "Schippers and [ ] Hornstein were no longer
employed at Chosen Healthcare in July 2019, and [ ] Mace was not involved in any decision on
whether to take corrective action against [RN] Mooday." Id. As for LPN Hilker, allegations
concerning her are also missing important details—Reagan "fails to identify the 'Administrator'
who allegedly decided to not discipline Hilker," for example—and "Schippers and [ ]Hornstein

were no longer employed at Chosen Healthcare in 2020, and [ ] Mace was not involved in any
decision on whether to take corrective action against [LPN] Hilker." Id. at 18. Concerning LPN
Cain, Reagan's "decision makers were not involved in the decision to discipline [LPN] Cain for
her failure to report resident abuse." Id.
The Court finds that Reagan's claim may proceed because he has provided sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Reagan has demonstrated that he was
meeting Chosen Healthcare's legitimate expectations: before these allegations of abuse against
him, Reagan had never faced discipline from Chosen Healthcare for any policy violation or
allegation of resident abuse and had received positive annual evaluations and several recent pay
increases (see Filing No. 36-7 at 2; Filing No. 36-18 at 1–3).
As for the more-contested, fourth element under McDonnell Douglas, Reagan has
identified a better treated, similarly situated comparator. Ordinarily, "a plaintiff who believes

another individual is similarly situated must at least show that this comparator (1) dealt with the
same supervisor, (2) was subject to the same standards, and (3) engaged in similar conduct without
such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish his conduct or the employer's
treatment of him." Orton-Bell v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 777 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).
"Comparators must have engaged in similar—not identical—conduct to qualify as similarly
situated." Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 850 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). "To
determine whether two employees have engaged in similar misconduct, the critical question is
whether they have engaged in conduct of comparable seriousness." Id. at 851 (quotation omitted).
"While similarly situated parties need not be identical in every conceivable way, they must be
directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects." Marnocha v. St. Vincent Hosp. &

Health Care Ctr., Inc., 986 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).
Here, no one disputes that Reagan and the female CNA Hale shared a supervisor (Thomas),
and set of standards. Chosen Healthcare places too fine a point on distinguishing between the
conduct of Reagan and CNA Hale, who, at least at the summary judgment stage, suffices to serve
as a suitable comparator. See Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 657 (7th Cir.
2021) (noting that "a plaintiff typically needs only one comparator to avoid summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law") (citation omitted). The allegations against both—resident abuse—
if proven true, would demonstrate that they both "engaged in conduct of comparable seriousness."
Coleman, 667 F.3d at 851. Especially relevant here is Chosen Healthcare's treatment of CNA Hale
after a fellow CNA reported that she overheard CNA Hale "tell resident to take her shower now or
she is not getting one." (Filing No. 33-16 at 1.) Though an investigation found that the allegation
"could not be substantiated" and there were "no concerns" later expressed about CNA Hale by staff
or residents, the accusation was indeed relayed by another employee—not merely a "he-said-she-

said" claim of a resident like those involving Reagan. Id.; cf. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 851 ("Where
a proposed comparator violated the same rule as the plaintiff in an equivalent or more serious
manner, courts should not demand strict factual parallels."). But instead of terminating the female
CNA Hale (like was done with the male Reagan), Brannan determined that she merely "needed [to
be] re-educated on speaking appropriately to residents," required her to complete a "post test"
following review of the Abuse Policy, and suspended her for a total of four days. Id. at 2. This,
of course, all followed an earlier complaint against CNA Hale for resident abuse, albeit one that
was ultimately discredited.
True, Chosen Healthcare received four accusations of abuse against Reagan in rapid
succession. But, as described more in depth below, the circumstances surrounding those

allegations were, at the very least, suspicious (or worse) according to Brannan (see Filing No. 36-
6 at 1 (Brannan writing in an email that "[t]he allegations being made to surveyors are from
smokers who have had their privileges reduced," and that "the smokers are out to get [Reagan]
because they don't like him")). In any event, Chosen Healthcare's Abuse Policy does not
differentiate discipline based on the timing or numerosity of allegations; instead, it instructs that
"all alleged violations involving mistreatment, neglect, or abuse" will be reported and investigated
(Filing No. 33-3 at 4–5) (emphasis added), and Chosen Healthcare's policies state that "[r]esident
abuse"—a "prohibited behavior[ ]"—"will not be tolerated, at any time." (Filing No. 33-4 at 1)
(emphasis added). In other words, all instances of resident abuse are considered "of comparable
seriousness." Coleman, 667 F.3d at 851. As Chosen Healthcare itself recognized in its briefing,
"[t]he Abuse Policy does not dictate what action must be taken if an alleged violation cannot be
substantiated beyond the residents' own statements, nor does it prohibit discipline or termination
for such violations." (Filing No. 44 at 16.)

Accordingly, Reagan has put forth enough facts to establish a prima facie case by
demonstrating that he was meeting Chosen Healthcare's legitimate expectations and that Chosen
Healthcare treated (at least) CNA Hale more favorably after she engaged in conduct of comparable
seriousness. See Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 957.
B. Pretext
Chosen Healthcare also contends that it has "provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for discharging" Reagan: "it believed he violated its Abuse Policy after several residents
accused [Reagan] of abuse." (Filing No. 33 at 11–12 (citing Billups v. Methodist Hoss. of Chicago,
922 F.2d 1300, 1303 (7th Cir. 1991) ("There is little doubt that the defendant's articulated reason
is legitimate. Physically abusing an elderly patient is serious misconduct.")).) Relatedly, Chosen
Healthcare contends that Reagan cannot prove any reason for terminating him was pretextual. Id.

at 12. "It is not enough," Chosen Healthcare contends, for Reagan "to allege merely that the acts
for which he was terminated did not occur." Id. (citing Billups, 922 F.2d at 1304). According to
Chosen Healthcare, the only relevant question is whether it "honestly believed the reasons it has
offered to explain the discharge." Id. (citing Billups, 922 F.2d at 1304). Here, Reagan does "not
dispute that residents accused him of abuse," and his "allegation that Chosen Healthcare 'used' the
resident abuse accusations to terminate his employment is based on pure speculation." Id. at 12–
13.
Reagan responds that "the four unsubstantiated allegations of abuse, alleged by three
residents during a State Audit, who were known to dislike Reagan, whose allegations were
discredited by multiple sources, and where the ultimate decision was made by individuals with a
discriminatory animus towards Reagan, should be viewed as pretext for discrimination." (Filing
No. 35 at 25-26.) Moreover, Reagan contends that the "cat's paw" theory applies—that is, that a
subordinate controlled a decisionmaker's determination—when Brannan, "along with assistance

from Gray and Wells, made the decision to terminate Reagan and Chosen [Healthcare] is
attempting to rely on Mace, Schippers, and Hornstein in an attempt to weaken Reagan's claims."
Id. at 26. Specifically, Reagan contends that Brannan "did not like [him] following his gender
discrimination complaint in 2017" and that Gray and Wells did not like him because of "his gender,
age, and position of control (i.e. did not have to listen to their demands)." Id. at 27.
Reagan continues that his "male voice" was designated as "an issue" on three separate
occasions: (1) in his yearly performance review ((Filing No. 36-18 at 1) (noting that his "male
voice can sometimes be taken as yelling/arguing")), (2) to Board surveyors (Filing No. 36-3 at 5
(informing them that Thomas had "talked to" Reagan about his "loud voice")), and (3) in an email
Brannan sent (Filing No. 36-19 at 1 (describing Reagan as having a "cocky mouth") (Filing No.

35 at 27). Reagan contends that these "discriminatory opinions," paired with the outsized influence
of Wells and Gray, Brannan's displeasure based on Reagan's earlier gender complaint, and the
"State's [a]udit," led to his termination. Id. In short, Chosen Healthcare's "reliance on [Mace,
Schippers, and Hornstein] is not only wrong but attempts to mitigate the discriminatory animus
held by multiple Chosen [Healthcare] employees that assisted in Reagan's termination." Id. at 28.
Reagan goes on to argue that not all four complaints were used in the employment decision,
noting that Brannan recommended termination "prior to any of the complaints being substantiated,
and especially prior to any investigation being undertaken" for two of the complaints. Id. at 28–
29. Additionally, Reagan notes that he had no history of resident abuse: "During his prior
employment with Chosen [Healthcare] and again during his most recent employment, his
background showed no history of abuse." Id. at 29. In contrast, CNA Hale "had three allegations
of abuse on three different occasions." Id. As for LPN Cain, "she was only 're-educated' with no
mark of discipline on her record." Id. For her part, RN Mooday "was permitted to leave with no

discipline after a substantiated allegation." Id. Finally, Chosen Healthcare "went out of [its] way
not to discipline [LPN Hilker] under the abuse policy." Id. at 29–30.
Reagan also argues that Chosen Healthcare "is attempting to distort [its] own policy and
argue that the allegations were made (i.e. substantiated) and therefore [it] 'honestly believed'
Reagan engaged in abuse." Id. at 30 (citing Odhuno v. Reed's Cove Health & Rehab., LLC, 355
F. Supp. 3d 1026 (D. Kan. 2018)). The Court, Reagan maintains, should find this "argument
disingenuous." Id. In any event, Chosen Healthcare's "reliance on 'unsubstantiated' allegations of
abuse cannot be found to be a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis. Rather, [its] reliance on
'unsubstantiated' allegations goes against what any reasonable fact finder would do. Residents that
were known to dislike Reagan alleged the allegations, which were found to be unsubstantiated by

both the" Board and Chosen Healthcare. Id. at 30–31. Moreover, because "[f]ailure to report
allegations of abuse/neglect is equal to actual abuse/neglect" under the Abuse Policy, LPN Cain—
like Reagan—should "have been terminated for failing to report." Id. at 31.
Reagan argues that "[i]t appears to be common practice in this industry to permit CNAs
accused of abuse the option to resign in order to avoid discipline." Id. at 31 (collecting cases).
Because of this practice, Reagan could not "develop[ ] an overwhelming record of female CNAs
who were not terminated after allegations of abuse to more clearly demonstrate the discriminatory
treatment." Id. at 32. As argued above, Chosen Healthcare "has shown a pattern of not reporting
abuse and a pattern of not disciplining female employees in the same fashion as males." Id.
Reagan concludes that Chosen Healthcare's "policy notes that only if the allegations are
'substantiated' will, '[a]ppropriate corrective action be taken." Id. This ambiguity, concerning
what takes place when allegations are unsubstantiated, "permits Chosen to discriminately apply
their policy." Id. at 33. As evidenced by the treatment of female employees compared to Reagan,

Chosen Healthcare "refuses to adhere to [its] own policies and, as a result, hid or manipulated
evidence to suggest that other instances of abuse and neglect have not occurred, when, in reality,
they have occurred and instead [have] been given another name." Id.
In reply, Chosen Healthcare argues that it "has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for [Reagan]'s termination, resident abuse." (Filing No. 44 at 19.) It asserts "undisputed
evidence shows that all four resident abuse allegations against [Reagan] could not be substantiated
beyond the resident." Id. (emphasis in original). Indeed, Reagan "agreed that [Chosen
Healthcare] may ultimately believe a resident over an employee and choosing to believe a
resident's word is not discriminatory." Id. Discrimination cannot be inferred when "Chosen
Healthcare chose not to take the risk of continuing to employ someone who multiple residents

accused of abuse." Id.
As for Reagan's cat's paw theory—that Brannan, Gray, and Wells controlled the
decisionmakers into terminating him—Chosen Health argues that Reagan has provided no
requisite underlying evidence of subordinate animus. Id. (citing Johnson v. Koppers, Inc., 726
F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2013)). First, Reagan only relies on his own testimony to support that
Brannan did not like him following a 2017 complaint concerning gender discrimination, yet "it is
unclear how this is evidence of discriminatory animus against individuals because of their gender."
Id. at 20. As for Gray and Wells, Reagan again "only points to his subjective beliefs about [their]
motives and intentions." Id. Chosen Healthcare concludes that Reagan's "cat's paw theory fails as
he cannot even meet the first requirement of showing the alleged biased subordinate harbored
discriminatory animus, much less that it was the proximate cause for his termination." Id.
Though Chosen Healthcare has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his
termination—that is, that they acted as a result of resident abuse allegations—Reagan has shown

that this proffered explanation is a pretext.
To show this reason is pretextual, [a plaintiff] must present evidence suggesting
that the employer is dissembling. The question is not whether the employer's stated
reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the employer honestly believed the
reasons it has offered to explain the discharge. It is not the court's concern that an
employer may be wrong about its employee's performance, or may be too hard on
its employee. Rather, the only question is whether the employer's proffered reason
was pretextual, meaning that it was a lie.
To meet this burden, [a plaintiff] must identify such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, or contradictions in [a defendant's] asserted reason that a
reasonable person could find [it] unworthy of credence. . . . [I]f the stated reason,
even if actually present to the mind of the employer, wasn't what induced him to
take the challenged employment action, it was a pretext.
Coleman, 667 F.3d at 852–53 (quotations omitted). In his effort to defeat summary judgment,
Reagan does, as Chosen Healthcare notes, lean heavily upon his own unsupported, conclusory
deposition testimony. See Bordelon v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 811 F.3d 984, 989 (7th
Cir. 2016) (noting "that the evidence supporting a factual assertion must represent admissible
evidence. Conclusory statements, not grounded in specific facts, are not sufficient to avoid
summary judgment. Rule 56 demands something more specific than the bald assertion of the
general truth of a particular matter; rather, it requires affidavits that cite specific concrete facts
establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted") (quotations and citations omitted).
But that is not all the evidence he musters. Apart from explicit references to Reagan's
gender in regard to his performance by Thomas in a performance review (see Filing No. 36-18 at
1), in a pre-termination email that included Hornstein, Brannan explained that "[t]he allegations
being made to surveyors are from smokers who have had their privileges reduced," and that "the
smokers are out to get [Reagan] because they don't like him." (Filing No. 36-6 at 1.) With these
statements, Brannan outwardly admits that he does not believe the complaints against Reagan to
be true; rather, he supposes they were ginned up by residents to exact revenge upon the tobacco-
policy-enforcing Reagan (who, recall, maintains he was picked for this role because he was a man).

Though Brannan may not have had decision-making power as to Reagan's continued employment,
he apprised Hornstein—a decisionmaker—of his leery views about the complaints. A jury could
view this communication as undermining Chosen Healthcare's contention that the decision to
terminate Reagan's employment was sincerely predicated upon the abuse allegations, as it tends to
show incredulity toward their veracity: did Chosen Healthcare "honestly believe" its reason for
terminating Reagan? With evidence that Hornstein directly received this message, the Court need
not even resort to any cat's paw inquiry to answer that question. Thus, Reagan has identified "such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions in [Chosen Healthcare's] asserted
reason that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy of credence." Coleman, 667 F.3d at 852.
Moreover, "[w]here the plaintiff argues that an employer's discipline is meted out in an

uneven manner, the similarly-situated inquiry dovetails with the pretext question. Evidence that
the employer selectively enforced a company policy against one gender but not the other would
go to both the fourth prong of the prima facie case and the pretext analysis." Id. at 858.4 Here, as
explained above, Reagan has provided adequate evidence to show that Chosen Healthcare "meted
out" discipline in an uneven manner, considering the differing treatment between Reagan and CNA
Hale following similar allegations of resident abuse. All told, when asked "whether the employer

4 This blurring, of course, underscores the Seventh Circuit's explanation that, despite McDonnell Douglas' helpful
framework, the sole "determinative question in discrimination cases is 'whether the evidence would permit a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the
discharge or other adverse employment action.'" Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 958 (quoting Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765). Here, the
answer is yes. See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764 (7th Cir. 2016) ("All evidence should be considered together to understand
the pattern it reveals.").
honestly believed the reasons it has offered to explain the discharge," id., a reasonable jury, armed
with the evidence provided by Reagan, could answer no. Because Reagan has provided sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether Chosen Healthcare's asserted reason for
terminating him was pretextual, this case's resolution is not suited for summary judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Chosen Healthcare's Motion for
Summary Judgment (Filing No. 32).
SO ORDERED.
Date: 9/13/2021 C Va \ atta reat
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge
United States District Court
DISTRIBUTION: Southern District of Indiana

Andrew Dutkanych, III
BIESECKER DUTKANYCH & MACER LLC (Indianapolis)
ad @bdlegal.com
Taylor Jon Ferguson
BIESECKER DUTKANYCH & MACER LLC (Indianapolis)
tferguson @bdlegal.com
Donald E. English, Jr.
JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
donald.english @ jacksonlewis.com
Mary M. McCudden
JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
2800 Quarry Lake Drive, Suite 200
Baltimore, MD 21209
Robert F. Seidler
JACKSON LEWIS PC (Indianapolis)
robert.seidler @ jacksonlewis.com

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10168270. Public record. Not legal advice.