# Miles v. Anton

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · March 21, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10165090

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** March 21, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

PHILLIP L. MILES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20-CV-246 JD

JULIE ANTON,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Phillip Miles was an inmate at Indiana State Prison. He was hired by Officer
Austin Nunn to work at the commissary. During his employment, he was told he could attend
Muslim prayer services held during work hours on Fridays, but was fired just days later by
Defendant Julie Anton after telling her he was leaving for such a service. Mr. Miles sued Ms.
Anton for violation of the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment and retaliation, also
under the First Amendment. Ms. Anton has moved for summary judgment but, for the reasons
below, the Court will deny the motion.

A. Factual Background
The facts here are straightforward. Mr. Miles was incarcerated at Indiana State Prison.
Mr. Miles is a Muslim. (Pl. Aff., DE 82-1 ¶ 2.) According to Mr. Miles, as a Muslim, he is
required to attend Jumu’ah prayer if it is available.1 (Id. ¶ 3.) Indiana State Prison provides
Jumu’ah services on Fridays between 11 a.m. and 1:45 p.m.

1 According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, “Jumu’ah [is] Friday of the Muslim week and the special noon
service on Friday that all adult, male, free Muslims are obliged to attend. . . . The obligation for communal worship
On July 22, 2019, Officer Austin Nunn hired Mr. Miles to work in the prison
commissary. His work-hours were from 6:30 a.m. until 1:45 p.m. At the time he was hired,
Officer Nunn told Mr. Miles that he could attend Jumu’ah services during his work hours. (Id. ¶
5; Pl.’s Resp. Statement of Material Facts, DE 83 at 5.)
Ms. Anton worked at the prison and was Mr. Miles’s supervisor at the commissary.2

Eleven days into his employment, on August 2, Mr. Miles told Ms. Anton that he would be
leaving work early to attend Jumu’ah service at which point Ms. Anton told him he could not
attend or he would be “done.”3 (Pl.’s Resp. Statement of Material Facts, DE 83 at 6.) Mr. Miles
chose to go to the service.
That same day, Ms. Anton noticed that some items were missing in the commissary and
requested an investigation. A review of a video recording showed that Mr. Miles and another
offender took trash bags out of the commissary before the designated time and contrary to their
job duties. (Id. ¶ 12.) Subsequently, Officer Nunn learned that Ms. Anton would be terminating
Mr. Miles’s employment. He went to Ms. Anton and “warned [her] that she could not fire Mr.

Miles for wanting to attend his religious services at which time she told [him] that she would
write [Mr. Miles] up as a ‘3380’ which is known to offenders as a work evaluation.” (Id.) Ms.
Anton terminated both Mr. Miles and the other offender seen in the video recording some time
before August 5 for the stated reason that they stole from the commissary.

on Friday is enjoined upon Muslims in the Qurʾān (62:9).” Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/jumah (last
visited March 18, 2024).
2 The parties do not explain whether Ms. Anton and Officer Nunn shared their supervisory duties, whether
they had different responsibilities, or anything else that would help clarify their respective roles in relation to Mr.
Miles.
3 In her affidavit, Ms. Anton denies telling Mr. Miles that he could not attend his religious services. (Def.’s
Aff., DE 71-3 ¶ 6.)
Meanwhile the investigation into the theft concluded a week or so later, on August 13.
William Lessner emailed Ms. Anton saying that he reviewed the video recording and did not
believe that Mr. Miles participated in the theft, but the other offender did:
I reviewed the full camera footage for this incident. It does not appear that Offender
Miles had anything to do with the theft. Offender Edwards however can be seen
throwing commissary into the trash. He then takes it to the garbage by CCH,
removes the commissary, then takes it to cell 336 West in CCH.
Are you going to do the conduct report?
(DE 71-2 at 2.) Ms. Anton responded to Mr. Lessner asking, “What is Miles taking out in the
large bag over his shoulder?” to which Mr. Lessner responded that it was trash. Ms. Anton then
sent another response disputing that it was trash and saying that she “heard through the grapevine
that it was both of them involved, but it’s okay I don’t want either of them working for me.” (Id.
at 1.)
No conduct report was ever issued against Mr. Miles. (Pl.’s Aff, DE 82-1 ¶ 14.)
Mr. Miles appealed his job termination stating that he was fired over a conflict between
Officer Nunn and Ms. Anton and because Ms. Anton felt uncomfortable being around young
black men. (Classification Appeal, DE 71-1 at 4.) His appeal was denied. He later learned from
Officer Nunn about his conversation with Ms. Anton, so he filed this lawsuit asserting that his
First Amendment rights were violated.

B. Legal Standard
On summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there “is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, making every legitimate inference and resolving every doubt in its favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment is not a tool to
decide legitimately contested issues, and it may be granted only if no reasonable jury could
decide for the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely merely

on allegations or denials in its own pleading, but must “marshal and present the court with the
evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651,
654 (7th Cir. 2010). There must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the
opposing party’s position and “inferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not
suffice.” Trade Fin. Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 2009); Anderson,
477 U.S. at 252. Instead, the opposing party must have “evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find” in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

C. Discussion
Mr. Miles claims that Ms. Anton fired him from the commissary job in violation of his
rights under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment and in retaliation for going to
Jumu’ah prayer. Ms. Anton disputes these claims, first arguing that she imposed no substantial
burden on the observation of his religious beliefs or practices as he was allowed to go to the
service; moreover, he was free to participate in other forms of religious practices. And in any
case, according to Ms. Anton, he was fired for stealing and poor performance, not for attending

the Jumu’ah service. Second, Ms. Anton maintains that Mr. Miles’s retaliation claim fails
because there is no evidence that he was deterred from attending Jumu’ah services. Finally, Ms.
Anton insists that her decision to fire Mr. Miles is protected by qualified immunity. The Court
will consider Ms. Anton’s argument’s in turn.
(1) Free Exercise Claim
Prisoners have a right to exercise their religious beliefs under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment. Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592–93 (7th Cir. 2011). “The Free
Exercise Clause prohibits the state from imposing a substantial burden on a central religious

belief or practice.” Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). “A substantial burden puts substantial pressure on an adherent to
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.
2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even so, correctional officials may restrict
the exercise of religion if the restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate penological
objectives, which include safety, security, and economic concerns. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89–91 (1987). Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has long established “the
general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by
a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a
particular religious practice.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.

520, 531 (1993).
Mr. Miles submits that Ms. Anton placed a substantial burden on his central belief and
practice by prohibiting him from attending the obligatory Jumu’ah prayer, contrary to the
promise made by Officer Nunn. Ms. Anton responds claiming that Mr. Miles has no right to
congregate services and cites Turner v. Hamblin, 955 F. Supp. 2d 859, 860 (W.D. Wisc. Jan. 21,
2014). But Turner is not helpful as it deals with the prisoners’ rights to hold their own services
when non-prisoner volunteers are unavailable to lead them. Id. 860–61. In Turner the district
court recognized that prisoners could not lead their own services because of security concerns
arising out of prisoners assuming positions of authority over other prisoners. Id. But no such
concerns are identified in Mr. Miles’s case. Instead, he wanted to attend a service sanctioned by
the prison, and Ms. Anton has failed to show that his desire to participate is not sincere or that
losing his job over his religious expression put no pressure on him to modify his behavior and to
violate his beliefs.

Nor has Ms. Anton shown that there were legitimate penological objectives to require
Mr. Miles to keep his regular schedule even on Fridays. In her opening brief, Ms. Anton
acknowledges that prison officials may not impose a substantial burden upon a prisoner’s
religious exercise, unless their actions relate to “legitimate penological interests” (Pl.’s Br, DE
72 at 5 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)), but that’s where her discussion ends.
Ms. Anton does not identify any penological interest, let alone provide evidence to justify their
reasonableness. Instead, she sidesteps the issue by resorting to her argument that Mr. Miles did
not have a right to a communal service to begin with and that he had “alternative means to
exercise his right to congregate prayer.” (Id. at 6.) In her reply brief, now represented by
different counsel, Ms. Anton appears to suggest that Mr. Miles was subject to neutral rules of

general applicability, so his claim fails as a matter of law. She also argues that allowing Mr.
Miles to attend weekly Jumu’ah services may have created a perception of favoritism, which is
detrimental to prison administration. While the latter arguments are an improvement upon the
initial ones, they all fail because they are either not backed up by evidence or there are genuine
issues of material fact that need to be resolved by the jury.
In particular, although Ms. Anton denies this, the Court must accept––as it must in
deciding a motion for summary judgment––Mr. Miles’s claim, supported by Officer’s Nunn’s
affidavit, that he requested to go to Jumu’ah prayer, but was told by Ms. Anton to choose
between his job and the service. Ms. Anton’s assertion that there were penological or neutrally
based reasons of general applicability for denying his request fail in light of Officer Nunn’s
statement that, when he hired Mr. Miles, he told him he could attend Jumu’ah prayer. This is all
the more true because Ms. Anton offers no evidence to support her arguments. As the record
stands, a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Anton imposed a substantial burden on Mr. Miles’s

central religious belief or practice without a legitimate penological objective. Furthermore,
Officer Nunn’s permission for Mr. Miles to attend Jumu’ah prayer during work hours
undermines Ms. Anton’s claim that his work hours were subject to neutral rules of general
applicability.
Moreover, Ms. Anton’s claim that she fired Mr. Miles because of his stealing from the
commissary is contradicted by several layers of evidence. First, if the jury were to believe Mr.
Miles and Officer Nunn, it could reasonably infer that her stated reason is pretextual. Both Mr.
Miles and Officer Nunn assert that Ms. Anton made Mr. Miles choose between his job and going
to Jumu’ah service. Second, Officer Nunn told Ms. Anton that she may not fire him for attending
a religious service to which she responded that she would write him up as a “3380.” Next,

although Ms. Anton asked that the theft be investigated, she did not wait for the outcome of the
investigation, but fired him either immediately or within a period of three days. Meanwhile, the
investigation concluded a week later, with the investigator determining that Mr. Miles was not
involved in the theft. Ms. Anton ultimately discounted that finding because she didn’t “want
either of them working for [her].” (DE 71-2 at 1.)

(2) Retaliation Claim
Mr. Miles also brings a First Amendment retaliation claim against Ms. Anton. To prevail
on this claim, he must show “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he
suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the
First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendant[’s] decision to take
the retaliatory action.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).
Regarding the first prong, Ms. Anton complains that Mr. Miles “has not shown how the

requirement he attend Jumuah services is necessary to his muslim [sic] faith nor if he was able to
engage in alternative means of worship” (Def.’s Br, DE 72 at 6). But Mr. Miles has submitted an
affidavit stating that he is a Muslim and that attending Jumu’ah prayer is obligatory if such
services are available. While not dispositive, this appears consistent with the general precepts of
the Muslim religion, see supra, fn.1, and Ms. Anton has presented no evidence contradicting the
sincerity of Mr. Miles’s faith. Given that “[r]eligious worship and discussion . . . are forms of
speech and association protected by the First Amendment,” Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 617 (7th
Cir. 1992) (citing Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981), and other Supreme Court cases), Mr. Miles has clearly engaged in protected activity.
As to the second prong, Ms. Anton argues that Mr. Miles did not suffer a deprivation that

would likely deter First Amendment activity because he was not prevented from practicing his
religion. “The second element . . . is an objective test. We ask whether the alleged conduct by the
defendants would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in
protected activity. Generally, the severity of retaliatory conduct is a fact question . . . .” KFJ, Inc.
v. Vill. of Worth, 11 F.4th 574, 585 (7th Cir. 2021).
A reasonable jury could conclude that firing Mr. Miles from his commissary job for
attending Jumu’ah prayer is a sufficient deprivation likely to deter First Amendment activity. See
Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[w]hether retaliatory conduct is
sufficiently severe to deter is generally a question of fact” for the jury). If Mr. Miles and Officer
Nunn are to be believed, Mr. Miles lost his commissary job over his choice to attend Jumu’ah
prayer and became ineligible for any other job for ninety days, without the ability to appeal the
decision. (See Nunn Aff., DE 82-2 ¶ 6.) This is a significant loss to a person of ordinary firmness
that would have a deterrent effect. That Mr. Miles elected to go to the service, and thus proved to

be stronger than one of “ordinary firmness,” cannot be held against him. After all, the test is
objective and the action is judged in relation to a person of ordinary firmness, not Mr. Miles
himself. Therefore, Ms. Anton’s argument that Mr. Miles has not been deterred from practicing
his religion is of limited value.
Next, Ms. Anton suggests that Mr. Miles suffered no deprivation to begin with because
he has no right to any prison job. (Pl.’s Rep. Br., DE 93 at 5.) It is true that a prisoner has no
property interest in a prison job, see Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243, 246 (7th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (“Wallace could be moved from one job to another for almost any reason. Any prisoner’s
interest in the job-of-preference is ‘meager, transitory, [and] uncertain’. Prison tailors lack a
‘legally enforceable’ interest in that job, as opposed to some other. It follows that Wallace had no

liberty or property interest in being a tailor.”), “[b]ut otherwise permissible conduct can become
impermissible when done for retaliatory reasons,” Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th
Cir. 2000). The dispositive question is not whether Ms. Anton could legally fire Mr. Miles, but
whether his firing resulted in deprivation that would likely deter his First Amendment activity.
The jury could find that being fired from a commissary job is a sufficient deterrent for a person
of ordinary firmness to exercise his religious obligations. Ms. Anton suggests that his firing is
akin to Antoine v. Uchtman, 275 F. App’x 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2008), where the Seventh Circuit
found that the guards’ threatening and racist statements to the prisoner without any concrete
action had no power to dissuade the prisoner from filing grievances. But this case is different
because Mr. Miles was fired not merely threatened. Ms. Anton also likens Mr. Miles’s case to
Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 2020), where an adverse action was lacking
because the prisoner was laterally transferred to a different prison after complaining repeatedly
about the conditions of the original prison. But Mr. Miles was not moved laterally to either

another prison or another job; instead, he lost his job. Given the differences, Ms. Anton’s
reliance on these cases is misplaced.
Regarding the third prong, Ms. Anton argues that she was not motivated by retaliatory
animus in firing him from the commissary position. However, a reasonable jury could conclude
that Mr. Miles’s First Amendment activity was “at least a motivating factor” in her decision to
fire him, given Mr. Miles’s and Officer Nunn’s assertions, as discussed above. Mr. Miles has
provided evidence by which a reasonable jury could conclude that Ms. Anton violated his First
Amendment rights by firing him from his job after he went to Jumu’ah prayer. For all these
reasons, summary judgment must be denied on the retaliation claim.

(3) Qualified Immunity
Finally, Ms. Anton argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Miles’s
claims under the First Amendment because she could not have known that firing him for “theft
would lead to a constitutional violation.” (Def.’s Br., DE 72 at 2.) The doctrine of qualified
immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “The protection of
qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is a mistake of
law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But where
the “qualified immunity decision depends upon and cannot be separated from” factual disputes,
“which are [also] integral to the merits of [the plaintiff’s] claim,” summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds is inappropriate. Smith v. Finkley, No. 20-1754, 2021 WL 3660880,

at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 2021).
Such is the case here. Ms. Anton’s claim that she fired Mr. Miles for theft is contradicted
by Mr. Miles’s evidence that the allegation of theft was a mere pretext, and since immunity turns
on issues of disputed facts, summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is improper.

D. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Ms. Anton’s motion for summary judgment.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 21, 2024

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10165090. Public record. Not legal advice.