# Doman v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · October 12, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10164642

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** October 12, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10164642

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding limited remedy failed of its essential purpose when repair was impossible

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JENNY DOMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 3:23-CV-218 JD

HEARTLAND RECREATIONAL
VEHICLES, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
In 2021, Jenny and Trent Doman bought an RV subject to a limited warranty issued by
the manufacturer, Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC. That RV promptly burst into flames,
destroying itself and several other valuable items of personal property. The Domans brought the
instant suit. Defendant Heartland has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the Doman’s claims for
breach of express and implied warranties should be dismissed because the Doman’s did not avail
themselves of the warranty’s limited repair remedy. There is no dispute of whether the RV was
delivered for repair under the express terms of the limited remedy; the parties agree it was not.
However, the Court finds the Doman’s path to recovery is not legally foreclosed under the facts
alleged and therefore declines to grant the motion to dismiss. In this highly unusual case, the
Domans are not necessarily barred from recovery at the motion to dismiss stage despite failing to
abide by the contractual terms because they have pled allegations adequate to state several viable
defenses to their obligations under the limited repair remedy. These defenses include that the
remedy failed of its essential purposes, repair was a legal impossibility, and the contract must be
interpreted in these unforeseen circumstances to avoid absurdity. Though the Domans must
continue to meet their burden at each stage of the litigation, at this stage, the Court denies the
motion to dismiss.

A. Facts

In December 2021, Jenny and Trent Doman, residents of Oregon, traveled to Indiana to
purchase an RV. The Domans had recently purchased a Dodge Ram truck and an ATV from
third parties, and they brought those vehicles with them on their trip to purchase the RV. On
December 18, 2021, the Domans executed the purchase of an RV from authorized dealer Foley
RV for a price of $125,672.47. The RV was subject to a limited warranty issued by the
manufacturer, Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC.
That night, the Domans elected to stay in their new RV at the dealership before departing
on a family trip to Utah. Throughout the night, the Domans experienced difficulty with the RV’s
heating system. They investigated and replaced a blown fuse, but the replacement fuse also blew
immediately. The Domans attempted to contact the dealership about the fuse multiple times

without success, and left voicemails when their calls went unanswered. In lieu of replacing the
fuse again, they decided to use the electric furnace rather than the heating system to provide heat
through the night.
The next morning, the Domans left the RV dealership and set out on their family trip to
Utah. A few hours later, they received a call back from the dealership. The manager of the
dealership instructed the family to schedule an appointment at the dealership for repair when
they returned from their trip but did not indicate the repair was especially urgent. Around 8:00
PM, a warning light illuminated on the Domans’ truck. When Mr. Doman pulled over to examine
the origin of the warning light, he saw a red glowing light emanating from the RV’s exhaust
pipe. Mr. Doman opened the RV’s door, and he was shocked to see flames. The fire grew
rapidly. Though another motorist assisted the Domans, and the local fire department attempted to
put out the fire, they could only contain it. Within fifteen minutes of pulling over, the RV, ATV,
and truck were fully engulfed in flames.

The RV, truck, and ATV were ultimately declared total losses. The Domans did not
attempt to have the RV repaired after the fire. Instead, the Domans notified the RV dealer of
their damages and demanded either damages or a replacement RV. They received neither.
The RV was covered by an express limited warranty issued by Heartland. The limited
warranty contained a two-tier limited remedy. It reads:
1. If within the applicable warranty period a covered defect is found to exist,
Heartland’s sole and exclusive obligation is to repair any such defect.

2. If the primary repair remedy fails to successfully cure any defect after a
reasonable number of repair attempts, Heartland may, as a back-up remedy, at its sole
option, elect to either:

a. Pay owner diminution in value damages; or

b. Provide a similar replacement recreational vehicle, less a reasonable
allowance for the owner’s use of the original recreational vehicle.

On March 17, 2023, the Domans filed the instant suit for breach of express and implied
warranties, negligence, and strict product liability. Heartland moved to dismiss, arguing the
Domans could not recover for breach of contract because they had not exhausted the repair
remedy. Though an amended complaint has since been filed, the parties agree that the arguments
presented in their briefs apply with equal force to the breach of warranty claims in the amended
complaint.

B. Legal Standard
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), the court must “accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th
Cir. 2000). If the allegations of the complaint do not plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a
right to relief, the plaintiff has pled himself out of court. E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs.,
Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). This can occur when the complaint includes “facts that
establish an impenetrable defense to its claims.” Epstein v. Epstein, 843 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th
Cir. 2016). However, where the allegations of the complaint do not conclusively foreclose the
right to relief and where favorable inferences would instead support a plausible claim to relief,
the motion to dismiss should be denied. Id.; Lonzo v. City of Chicago, 461 F. Supp. 2d 661, 664–

65 (N.D. Ill. 2006).

C. Discussion
Defendant Heartland argues the Domans’ breach of warranty claims should be dismissed
because the Domans did not fulfill their contractual duty to present the RV for repair under the
warranty’s limited repair remedy. Indiana law applies because the limited warranty contains a
binding choice of law provision selecting Indiana law. (DE 13-1 at 5, numbered paragraph 3.)
The Court finds dismissal is not appropriate because the allegations of the complaint support the
inference that the Domans may have been relieved of their obligations under the limited repair
remedy because the total and sudden fiery destruction of the RV represented an unforeseen
circumstance. Thus, the Domans may maintain their breach of warranty claims because the
limited remedy failed of its essential purposes, undertaking the repair remedy constituted a
contractual impossibility, and requiring the parties to escalate through the limited repair remedy

after the vehicle’s complete destruction constitutes an absurd reading of the warranty. Under any
of these doctrines, the Domans’ contractual duty to seek repair is excused due to the unforeseen
loss of the RV, and their breach of warranty claims have therefore raised a plausible claim for
relief.

(1) Limited Remedy Failed of its Essential Purposes
Heartland argues the Domans should be barred from recovering for breach of express and
implied warranty because they failed to avail themselves of the limited repair remedy. Under that
provision, if a defect arises, “Heartland’s sole and exclusive obligation is to repair any such
defect.” Courts applying Indiana law to similar limited repair remedies have found the buyer

must give the manufacturer a reasonable opportunity to cure, meaning at least three chances
where the defects are minor. Zylstra v. DRV, LLC, 8 F.4th 597, 602–03 (7th Cir). Thus,
ordinarily, the Court would ask whether the Domans presented the defect for repair at least three
times prior to bringing suit. See id. at 603. Here, however, the parties agree that the Domans did
not present the RV for repair; they notified the dealer of the issue, but the vehicle was destroyed
the very next day. So the question becomes whether any legal defense to the Domans’ obligation
to present the RV for repair exists; if it does, their allegations may state a claim. But if no
defense to this obligation exists, as a matter of black letter law, the Domans’ breach of warranty
claims are foreclosed, and the motion to dismiss must be granted.
The Court denies the motion to dismiss because the Domans may recover despite failing
to deliver the RV for repair if the repair remedy failed of its essential purposes; here, the Domans
have alleged adequate facts to support that inference. A limited remedy fails of its essential
purposes only “when an unexpected circumstance arises and neither party accepted the risk that

such circumstances would occur.” Martin v. Thor Motor Coach Inc., 602 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1093
(N.D. Ind. 2022). Unlike unconscionability, which applies to arrangements which were
oppressive at their inception, failure of a limited remedy’s essential purpose is concerned “with
the application of an agreement to novel circumstances not contemplated by the parties.” Cimino
v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 869, 887 (N.D. Ind. 2008). When an exclusive
remedy fails of its essential purposes, the parties are no longer bound to that remedy. See U.C.C.
2-719.
Here, the parties were not anticipating the RV would burst into flames, totally destroying
itself, before any repair attempt could be made. The acute and immediate failure of the RV was a
highly unusual event; as a matter of both law and common sense, this kind of failure is not the

sort that should be assumed as an inherent risk of contracting by the parties. See Castagna v.
Newmar Corp., 340 F. Supp. 3d 728, 736 (N.D. Ind. 2018) (“a vehicle that causes a fire is not fit
for its ordinary purpose.”) Therefore, the fire qualifies as an unexpected circumstance in which
the limited remedy may fail of its essential purpose.
But the inquiry does not end there; even if something unexpected happened, the limited
remedy will not fail of its essential purpose unless employing the remedy “will not further its
purpose.” Martin v. Thor Motor Coach Inc., 602 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1094 (N.D. Ind. 2022).
Therefore, in deciding whether the remedy failed of its essential purpose, the Court must
determine the remedy’s purpose and whether the unexpected circumstances caused it to fail its
essential purpose. See Cimino, 542 F.Supp.2d at 887 (“this provision should be triggered when
the remedy fails of its essential purpose, not the essential purpose of the U.C.C., contract law, or
of equity”).
In determining the essential purpose of the limited remedy, the Court looks to the parties’

intentions in contracting for the limited remedy. See Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating & Air
Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Ind. 2001). After examining the warranty and case law
interpreting similar provisions, the Court finds the primary purpose of the limited repair remedy
was to offer Heartland the opportunity to repair a defect prior to litigation while at the same time
providing the purchaser with an assurance of reasonably conforming goods. See Zylstra v. DRV,
LLC, 8 F.4th 597, 606 (7th Cir. 2021) (describing the warranty’s “bilateral obligations” and
noting “a notice and opportunity regime gives the manufacturer a chance to make amends with
its customer, see what went wrong with its product, learn from its errors, and evaluate how its
authorized dealers are performing repairs”); see also Raymond v. Thor Motor Coach Inc., No.
3:21-CV-222, 2023 WL 4930105, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 2, 2023) (describing the mutual

obligations and guarantees of each party under an RV warranty with a limited repair remedy and
finding plaintiff could not jump to litigation without engaging in the prescribed steps); BAE Sys.
Info. & Elecs. Sys. Integration, Inc. v. SpaceKey Components, Inc., 752 F.3d 72, 78 (1st Cir.
2014) (purpose of the repair remedy is to provide the buyer with the benefit of their bargain);
Myrtle Beach Pipeline Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 843 F. Supp. 1027, 1042 (D.S.C. 1993),
aff'd, 46 F.3d 1125 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The primary objective of a limited [repair] remedy is to
provide the seller an opportunity to tender conforming goods and thereby limit his exposure risk
for other damages, while simultaneously providing the purchaser with the benefit of his bargain
— i.e. — conforming goods.”).
With the essential purpose of the limited remedy determined, the Court finds the repair
remedy failed of its essential purpose. Because there was no opportunity for the repairs to be
attempted before total failure occurred due to no fault of the Domans, the essential purpose of the
limited remedy is not served by strictly enforcing the limited remedy. The events as they

occurred here are so unusual that the parties could not have anticipated them, and to strictly
enforce the repair remedy would leave the Domans without a remedy,1 which the Court finds
was outside of the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting. See Cimino, 542
F.Supp.2d at 887; Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Ltd., 134 N.E.3d 370, 379
(Ind. 2019) (“The UCC, however, will not leave aggrieved parties without recourse to enjoy and
to enforce the benefit of their bargains.”). In this case, insisting upon the literal terms of the
limited repair remedy does not serve the purpose of that remedy because it would deprive the
buyer of the value of their bargain, the maintenance of which is a key purpose of the repair
remedy. See Kenworth, 134 N.E.3d at 379; Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 814 N.E.2d 634,
643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (finding limited remedy failed of its essential purpose when repair was

impossible). By excusing both parties from their obligations under the limited repair remedy, the
Court approximates the intentions of the parties in contracting, rather than allowing strict
enforcement to operate as a post-hoc get-out-of-jail-free card for the manufacturer.
Moreover, under these unique circumstances, Zylstra does not foreclose the possibility
that the repair remedy failed of its essential purposes. In Zylstra, the Seventh Circuit held that a
reasonable opportunity to repair under Indiana law means at least three opportunities to repair.

1 The Domans would be left without a remedy because products liability actions in Indiana cannot recover
for the product itself. Progressive Ins. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 749 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ind. 2001). “In sum, Indiana
law under the Products Liability Act and under general negligence law is that damage from a defective product or
service may be recoverable under a tort theory if the defect causes personal injury or damage to other property, but
contract law governs damage to the product or service itself and purely economic loss arising from the failure of the
product or service to perform as expected.” Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ind. 2005).
Zylstra v. DRV, LLC, 8 F.4th 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2021). Courts applying Indiana law have cited
Zylstra extensively when dismissing or granting summary judgment in RV cases in which minor
defects are presented for repair fewer than three times. See Massey v. Nexus RVs, LLC, ---
F.Supp.3d ---, No. 3:19-CV-334, 2023 WL 4861979 (N.D. Ind. June 30, 2023); Kutz v. Jayco,

Inc., No. 3:20-CV-281, 2023 WL 5898512, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 7, 2023). However, Zylstra
also said, “Although in Mathews we stated that two chances is not a reasonable opportunity to
cure the defects such that the warranty failed of its essential purpose, we reserve judgment as to
whether, in the case of a major defect that made the RV unusable in any manner, we would
require the purchaser to present the vehicle three times.” Id. The Court finds the instant case
presents just such a major defect; one can hardly contemplate a defect more extreme than the
total fiery loss of the RV. Given this exception, the Court does not strictly apply the literal terms
of the three-attempts rule to this inarguably major defect.
Still, the careful observer may note that even in Zylstra, the Court did not decide whether
a debatably irreparable sewage waste smell constituted a major defect because the Court found

dispositive that the smell was not presented for repair even once, and therefore the limited repair
remedy had not failed of its essential purposes. Read without nuance, this may lead one to
believe the Domans are automatically foreclosed from recovery because they, too, provided only
notice and did not present the vehicle for repair even once. However, the Seventh Circuit was not
considering a vehicle that had been destroyed before the plaintiff had reasonable opportunity to
present it for repair, and there was no contention that it was impossible to present the vehicle for
repair. Given this disparity, the Court finds Zylstra’s conclusion does not control here. The Court
instead finds that the fire not only constituted a major defect under Zylstra, but because
unexpected circumstances made it impossible to seek repair, the repair remedy failed of its
essential purposes despite the lack of repair attempts.
Because the repair remedy failed of its essential purposes, the Court now turns to the
backup remedy, which provides that Heartland may pay either diminution in value damages or

provide a similar replacement recreational vehicle. See Enterprises v. Honeywell Bull, Inc., 730
F. Supp. 1041, 1049 (D. Kan. 1990) (a backup limited remedy does not fail of its essential
purpose even if the first limited remedy does). The Domans availed themselves of the backup
remedy via a demand letter seeking damages or a replacement vehicle; Heartland provided
neither. Accordingly, because the Domans fulfilled their obligation to notify Heartland under the
backup remedy, and Heartland has chosen for some reason not to honor that remedy, the Domans
have satisfied the conditions of the backup remedy and now may sue for breach of warranty
under the terms of the warranty. See 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1).
Because the repair remedy failed of its essential purpose and the backup remedy was
satisfied, the Domans have satisfied the conditions precedent to suit under the limited warranty.

They have stated a basis for recovery, and their breach of warranty claims survive motion to
dismiss.2

(2) Impossibility
The Domans have argued the contractual doctrine of impossibility also relieves them of
their obligations under the repair remedy. The Court finds this persuasive. As with the Court’s

2 This holding should not be read to allow the exception to swallow the rule. As Judge Leichty wisely
noted, “A remedy will rarely fail its essential purpose.” Martin v. Thor Motor Coach Inc., 602 F. Supp. 3d 1087,
1093 (N.D. Ind. 2022).
consideration of failure of essential purpose, here, the Court considers only the limited repair
remedy and whether the Domans were relieved of their obligations under that provision.
“Impossibility has been defined as where the performance of a contract becomes
impossible, non-performance is excused, and no damages can be recovered. To invoke

impossibility, one must demonstrate that performance is not merely difficult or relatively
impossible, but absolutely impossible, owing to the act of God, the act of the law, or the loss or
destruction of the subject-matter of the contract.” Wagler v. W. Boggs Sewer Dist., Inc., 980
N.E.2d 363, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Impossibility presumes an extraordinary and
unpreventable event. Kruse, Kruse & Miklosko, Inc. v. Beedy, 353 N.E.2d 514, 527–28 (1976).
“The standard explanation for the doctrine is that nonperformance is not a breach if it is caused
by a circumstance the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract
was made.” Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 557 F.3d 504, 505 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts, introductory note to ch. 11, preceding § 261 (1981),
quoting U.C.C. § 2–615). Though impossibility is generally an affirmative defense, the Domans
argue the warranty creates bilateral obligations — see Zylstra, 8 F.4th at 606 — and the doctrine

of impossibility excuses them of their obligation to present the RV for repair.
Here, the total destruction of the RV no doubt fits the description of “loss or destruction
of the subject-matter of the contract.” Wagler, 980 N.E.2d at 378; Hipskind Heating & Plumbing
Co. v. Gen. Indus., Inc., 246 Ind. 215, 204 N.E.2d 339, 216 (1965) (excusing both parties from
duty to repair when subject of contract was destroyed by fire). And Indiana courts have found the
total destruction of the subject matter of a contract via fire to relieve a contracting party of its
obligations with regard to the property. Cf. Fam. Video Movie Club, Inc. v. Home Folks, Inc.,
827 N.E.2d 582, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (relieving offeror of obligation to buy building where
it burned to the ground before offer was accepted and writing, “The fiery destruction of
[defendant]’s building made it impossible for [plaintiff] to get what it had bargained for. The
unexpected and premature destruction of a significant portion of the subject matter of the offer
made it unreasonable to continue the time for [defendant] to accept the offer.”). Further, it

appears it is literally impossible under the terms of this contract to repair the RV if it is totally
destroyed, as the terms of the limited remedy distinguish repair from replacement.3 So, as a
preliminary matter, this appears to be the sort of occasion where an impossibility defense to the
buyer’s obligations under the limited remedy would seem appropriate.
In order to find an impossibility defense is truly viable, the Court must be certain that the
intervening event excusing non-performance was not anticipated by the parties. Because
impossibility presumes an extraordinary and unpreventable event, it would not be appropriate to
apply this defense where the parties anticipated the risk of this event and allocated that risk
amongst themselves. See Kruse, Kruse & Miklosko, Inc. v. Beedy, 353 N.E.2d 514, 527–28 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1976). However, “negotiating parties cannot anticipate all the contingencies that may

arise in the performance of the contract; a legitimate judicial function in contract cases is to
interpolate terms to govern remote contingencies — terms the parties would have agreed on
explicitly if they had had the time and foresight to make advance provision for every possible
contingency in performance.” N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d
265, 276 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Indiana law). As noted above, the fire represented an
unexpected circumstance that altered the meaning of the parties’ performance under the limited
repair remedy. That the intervening event (the fire) is a more extreme version of allocated risks

3 The Court does not presume the parties intended to contract to some tortured definition of these common
words that may implicate the Ship of Theseus thought experiment.
(such as electrical defects) does not mean the parties anticipated a fire and allocated the risk to
the buyer. See Kruse, 353 N.E.2d at 527–28 (tempest destroying a ship creates impossibility, but
parties should be assumed to contract with the possibility of adverse winds in mind). Because the
fire was truly unanticipated and destroyed the subject of the contract, the RV, the doctrine of

impossibility relieves the parties of their obligations under the repair remedy. Therefore, the
Domans’ failure to seek repair is not dispositive, and they have stated a claim for breach of
warranty.

(3) Avoiding Absurdity
Finally, though not raised by the parties, the Court notes one addition rationale under
which the Domans’ claim might survive: the principle that absurd constructions of contracts
should be avoided where possible. Generally, “when interpreting the meaning of the words used
in a contract, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and popularly accepted meanings.” USA
Life One Ins. Co. of Indiana v. Nuckolls, 682 N.E.2d 534, 539 (Ind. 1997). “However, if the plain

and ordinary meaning would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with
the rest of the instrument, then the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be
modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.” Id. Where an extreme
and unanticipated scenario collides with a contract’s terms, the rote application of the contractual
terms may result in an outcome the parties never would have assented to had they anticipated it.
In that case, interpreting the contract to avoid absurdity is appropriate.
Here, the absurdity of the instrument strictly applied, as Heartland argues, is evident: it
would require the buyer to present the RV to a dealership for repair three times and for Heartland
to fail that repair after being given considerable opportunity.4 Of course that repair will fail —
repair is a literal impossibility — so requiring the Domans to present the RV for repair could
serve only as a delay tactic. Requiring the parties to engage in this dance despite its obvious
futility is an absurd result and one the Court will not endorse. It is the Court’s duty, then, to read

in a term the parties no doubt would have consented to had they anticipated this scenario: if the
RV is destroyed through no fault of the parties before either party has a reasonable opportunity to
fulfill their obligations, the parties are relieved of their duties under the repair remedy.
On this point, the Court finds Merheb v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority instructive.
267 F.3d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 2001). In Merheb, an employee was discharged after an explosive
and threatening outburst at work. The employee’s employment contract specified a 4-step
progressive disciplinary process for performance improvement, where the parties were to
escalate to the next disciplinary step if the prior step proved ineffective. Upon his discharge, the
employee sued, alleging his employment contract was violated because the business did not
exhaust the steps of the process and instead jumped straight to termination. Relying on the

doctrine of absurdity, the Seventh Circuit found in favor of the employer, calling the employee’s
literal reading of the contract “insane.” The Seventh Circuit took the proposed construction to its
logical end, noting that under strict construction, “if [plaintiff] had killed [coworker], he could
have received only an oral reprimand, and then if he had killed [second coworker], only a written
one.” Id. Of its choice to read absurdity out of the contract, the court wrote:
“Human foresight is limited. Not all contingencies can be anticipated and provided
for in a contract. Attempting to do so would make the process of contract formation
cumbersome and expensive beyond reason. An important function of contract law

4 It’s unclear under the allegations whether any portion of the RV survived unburnt. The allegations state
that the RV was a total loss and engulfed entirely in flames. The absurdity of this construction is greater yet if it is
the case the Domans would have to present a bag of ashes for repair, but it is not defeated in the event some small
portion of the RV was not reduced to dust.
is to fill the interstices of a contract — in effect to complete the contract — by
interpolating terms reasonably to be inferred from the essential terms, purpose,
context, and character of the parties' deal.” Id.

Similarly, here the contract anticipated a series of minor issues for which a progressive
remediation process was sensible. However, an unanticipated and extreme event made the
progressive step process requirement ridiculous in context. Accordingly, it is appropriate to read
in a term governing unanticipated and extreme failures, and it is fitting that the terms governing
such failures treat them differently than anticipated failures.
Worse yet, the strict application of the limited remedy would bar recovery in the event of
cataclysmic failures, but not minor failures, the former of which is clearly a greater deviation
from the expected performance of the product than the latter. It would be absurd to find these
parties intended to make right minor deviations but totally eviscerate the buyer’s ability to
recover in the event of an extreme failure. On this point, the Court finds persuasive Reid Hosp. &
Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Conifer Revenue Cycle Sols., LLC, 8 F.4th 642, 653 (7th Cir. 2021)
(applying Indiana law). In that case, the defendant argued that the ordinary meaning of the terms
of the contract foreclosed recovery for lost profits. However, the contract was for profit
collection services, and defendant’s poor performance meant the plaintiff failed to collect a
significant amount of revenue due. In short, the defendant’s interpretation would mean the
plaintiff contracted for services where no meaningful recovery could be had in the event of
breach. The Seventh Circuit rejected defendant’s reading, writing, “The suggestion that the
parties drafted the contract to ensure that damages would be available [only in an] improbable
scenario but to bar any meaningful accountability for the central purpose of the contract borders
on the absurd.” Id. Here, too, defendant’s reading would eviscerate the central purpose of the
contract: to provide some assurance that the product purchased is at least minimally conforming
or can be made so in a reasonable time. It would not further the purpose of this contract to bar
recovery in the case of an extreme and catastrophic defect, which is no doubt the ultimate
indication of a nonconforming product. For these reasons, after examining the contract and
guiding precedent, the Court finds the contract should be interpreted to avoid absurdity. In this

unusual circumstance, that means both parties are relieved of their obligations under the limited
repair remedy provision.

D. Conclusion
Because several legal defenses to the Doman’s obligations under the limited repair
remedy remain viable, the plaintiffs have not pled themselves out of court, and their breach of
warranty counts state a plausible claim for relief. The motion to dismiss (DE 12) is denied.

SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 12, 2023

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10164642. Public record. Not legal advice.