# Hollins v. Church Church Hittle + Antrim

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · July 7, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10164106

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** July 7, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION

BETH HOLLINS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:20-CV-304 JD

CHURCH CHURCH HITTLE + ANTRIM,
et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Beth Hollins has filed an amended motion for preliminary approval of a class
settlement and preliminary certification of the class for settlement purposes. This Court denied a
prior motion seeking preliminary approval of the settlement, explaining that insufficient
information had been submitted to the Court. The Plaintiff has now provided additional
information, including an exhibit detailing the hours worked on the case by counsel.
Accordingly, the Court will preliminarily approve the settlement, preliminarily certify the class
for settlement purposes, approve the notice to class members, and set the matter for a final
approval hearing.
A. Factual Background
Defendants Church Church Hittle + Antrim and Elizabeth Barnes, on behalf of creditor
Aberdeen Ventures, attempted to collect a $81.52 medical debt incurred by the Plaintiff Beth
Hollins. In attempting that collection, the Defendants sent Hollins two letters in which they
threatened or implied that litigation might be instituted against her.
On August 18, 2020, Plaintiff Beth Hollins filed her Complaint in the instant action on
behalf of herself and on behalf of a putative class. The Complaint alleged that the Defendants
never actually intended to initiate litigation against Hollins, despite the letters’ representations.
Hollins brought one claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), which
prohibits debt collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means
in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.

On January 7, 2021, Plaintiff, as an individual and representative of the class, moved for
preliminary approval of a class settlement and preliminary certification of a putative class for
settlement purposes. (DE 31.) According to the settlement, this putative class consists of:
(a) all individuals (b) to whom defendant Church Church Hittle + Antrim sent
a letter seeking to collect a medical or healthcare debt stating (i)”[W]e may . . .
take legal action against you for the collection of the above amount”, or (ii)
“[W]e may file suit against you” or (iii) “[client] does not wish to file suit
against you. However, if you do not pay or make payment arrangements, we
will proceed as necessary”; (c) on behalf of Aberdeen Ventures d/b/a Immediate
Care Center, (d) which letter was sent at any time from August 18, 2019 through
and including September 8, 2020.
(Class Settlement Agreement, DE 31-1 ¶ 9.) This Court then denied the motion, explaining that
the Plaintiff did not provide the Court with sufficient information to determine that the settlement
was fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Court’s denial was largely based on Plaintiff’s counsel
failing to provide any “information to show its requested fees [were] reasonable under the
lodestar method.” (DE 35 at 13.)
Plaintiff has now filed an amended motion for preliminary approval of the class
settlement and for preliminary class certification. (DE 39.) The settlement and proposed class is
the same as that previously submitted, but Plaintiff now includes more exhibits and briefing in
support. (Class Settlement Agreement, DE 39-1.) As relevant here, the settlement provides for
relief to class members in the amount of $4,000, which will be distributed evenly among the
class members who submit a claim form and do not exclude themselves from the settlement. (Id.
¶ 11.) The settlement separately provides for $1,000 to Beth Hollins as the Plaintiff and Class
Representative. (Id. ¶ 12.) Finally, the settlement provides that Plaintiff may petition the Court
for approval of attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $14,000 and that the Defendants will
pay those fees as the Court finds reasonable up to $14,000. (Id. ¶ 13.)
Defendants have filed no objection to the amended motion for preliminary approval of

the class settlement and preliminary certification of the class for settlement purposes. (DE 39.)
The motion is therefore ripe for review.
B. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that the claims of a class proposed to be

certified for purposes of settlement may be settled only with the court’s approval. Ultimately, the
Court may approve a proposed settlement if the Court determines it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate. Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 877 F.3d 276, 283 (7th Cir.
2017). Ensuring that a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate helps address the concern “for
the unnamed class members whose interests the named plaintiffs represent and the settlement is
meant to serve.” In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 869 F.3d 551,
556 (7th Cir. 2017). This inquiry is also meant to check the “tendency of class settlements to
yield benefits for stakeholders other than the class.” Id.
Rule 23(e)(1) lays out certain procedures that must be followed before final approval of a
settlement. First, the parties must provide the court with information sufficient to enable the

court to determine whether to give notice of the proposed settlement to the class. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e)(1)(A). In 2018, Rule 23(e) was amended to “provide guidance to federal courts considering
whether to grant preliminary approval of a class action settlement.” Nistra v. Reliance Tr. Co.,
No. 1:16-CV-04773, 2020 WL 13645290, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2020). In “deciding whether
to send notice” the Court must determine whether “it likely will be able both to approve the
settlement proposal under Rule 23(e)(2) and, if it has not previously certified a class, to certify
the class for purposes of judgment on the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), Committee Notes.
If the district court finds that it will likely approve the settlement and certify the class, the
court must then direct the parties to provide notice “in a reasonable manner to all class members

who would be bound” by the proposed settlement agreement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). For any
Rule 23(b)(3) class proposed to be certified for purposes of a settlement under Rule 23(e), “the
court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). This notice requirement “is designed to guaranty that those bound by the
ruling in a class action were accorded their due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be
heard.” Chaffee v. A&P Tea Co., Nos. 79 C 2735 and 79 C 3625, 1991 WL 5859, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 16, 1991).

C. Discussion
The Court will first consider whether the class should be preliminarily certified for the
purpose of judgment on the proposed settlement. After that, the Court will consider whether the
settlement should be preliminarily approved. If the Court determines that the class should be
preliminarily certified for the purposes of judgment on the proposed settlement and finds that the
settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, then the Court will direct the parties to provide
notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound and also set a date for a

final approval hearing.
(1) Preliminary certification of the class for purposes of judgment on the settlement
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the certification of class actions
in federal court. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011). Rule 23(a) ensures
that the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to
litigate. Id. at 349. Rule 23(a)’s four requirements—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy—effectively limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff’s
claims. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

If all these prerequisites are met, a court must also find that at least one of the subsections
of Rule 23(b) is satisfied. In this case, Plaintiff seeks class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
“When certification is sought under Rule 23(b)(3) . . . proponents of the class must also show:
(1) that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the proposed class predominate
over questions affecting only individual class members; and (2) that a class action is superior to
other available methods of resolving the controversy.” Messner v. Northshore Univ.
HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012). The Court will examine each of these
requirements in turn.

(a) Numerosity
The first requirement under Rule 23(a) is that the purported class be “so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). To be impracticable, joinder
need not be impossible, but instead must be shown to be inconvenient and difficult. Copeland v.
Wabash Cnty., Indiana, 338 F.R.D. 595, 601 (N.D. Ind. 2021). When determining whether
joinder of all class members is impracticable, the court may consider many factors, including: the
class size; judicial economy arising from the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions; the ease of

identification of members of the proposed class; the geographic dispersion of class members; the
inconvenience of trying individual suits; the nature of the action; the size of each plaintiff’s
claim; the financial resources of the class members; requests for prospective injunctive relief
which would involve future class members; and any other factors relevant to the practicability of
joining all the class members. Olson v. Brown, 284 F.R.D. 398, 407 (N.D. Ind. 2012). “While
there is no magic number that applies to every case, a forty–member class is often regarded as
sufficient to meet the numerosity requirement.” Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cty., 850 F.3d
849, 859 (7th Cir. 2017).

The Court finds that the numerosity requirement has been met. Plaintiff’s counsel
represents that the proposed class consists of around 1,710 individuals. (DE 39 at 21.) Joinder of
so many individuals would be impracticable, if not impossible. Management and administration
would be rendered extremely cumbersome and difficult, requiring service of separate notice and
pleadings and entry of a separate order as to each joinder. Joinder would tend to result in
multiplicity and a waste of judicial resources, factors which Rule 23 seeks to prevent.
Accordingly, the numerosity requirement has been met.

(b) Commonality
The second requirement under Rule 23(a) is the need to have “questions of law or fact
common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “Concerning the commonality requirement,
claims of individual class members may arise from a ‘common nucleus of operative fact,’ which
is usually satisfied where the defendant engaged in standardized conduct towards members of the
proposed class.” Olson, 284 F.R.D. at 410 (quoting Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir.
1998)). And “[w]here the same conduct or practice by the same defendant gives rise to the same
kind of claims from all class members, there is a common question.” Suchanek v. Sturm Foods,

Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014). “That common contention, moreover, must be of such a
nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.
The commonality requirement is satisfied because the putative class members’ claims
arise from the same conduct or practice of the Defendants. As to each of the class members, the
Defendants are alleged to have sent letters seeking to collect a medical or healthcare debt which
threatened or implied legal action. The class members claims depend on the answer to the same

question: whether the threat of legal action was a misrepresentation in violation of the FDCPA.
Given that this question is central to each class members’ claim under the FDCPA, the parties
have satisfied the element of commonality.
(c) Typicality
The third requirement under Rule 23(a) is the need to show that “the claims or defenses

of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(3). Typicality is closely related to the proceeding question of commonality. Copeland, 338
F.R.D. at 604. The typicality requirement “is meant to ensure that the named representative’s
claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” Howard v.
Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Off., 989 F.3d 587, 605 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). A claim is typical if it “arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that
gives rise to the claims of other class members and . . . are based on the same legal theory.”
Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 2008). Some factual variations may not defeat
typicality, rather, the requirement is meant to ensure that the named representative’s claims have
the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large. Id.

The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has raised a claim under the FDCPA which is typical
of the class’s claims. Plaintiff’s claim, like that of all class members, is based on Defendant
Church Church Hittle + Antrim sending them letters “seeking to collect a medical or healthcare
debt stating (i) ‘[W]e may . . . take legal action against you for the collection of the above
amount,’ or (ii) ‘[W]e may file suit against you’ or (iii) ‘[client] does not wish to file suit against
you. However, if you do not pay or make payment arrangements, we will proceed as necessary.’”
Given that Plaintiff’s claim and the class members claims all arise from this conduct, Plaintiff’s
claim is typical of those of her potential fellow class members, and the typicality requirement has

been satisfied.
(d) Adequacy of Representation
The fourth and final requirement of Rule 23(a) is that “the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Adequacy of
representation includes two parts: “the adequacy of the named plaintiff’s counsel, and the

adequacy of representation provided in protecting the different, separate, and distinct interest” of
the class members. Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chi., 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993).
“A class is not fairly and adequately represented if class members have antagonistic or
conflicting claims.” Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992). Also, counsel for
the named plaintiffs must be experienced and qualified and generally be able to conduct the
litigation. See Eggleston v. Chi. Journeymen Plumbers’ Loc. Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 896
(7th Cir. 1981).
The Court concludes that from all appearances Hollins will fairly and adequately
represent the class because she has a common interest in the success of the litigation. To the
extent that Hollins stands to recover additional monies based on her individual claims, this is

fully disclosed in the notice of settlement and these claims do not create a conflict between
Hollins’ interests and those of the class. Moreover, the proposed Class Counsel— Edelman,
Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC — represents they are experienced in prosecuting class
actions and has attempted to obtain the most favorable benefits possible for all members of the
Proposed Class. (Qualifications of Attorneys, Exhibit 1, DE 40-1.) The Court believes that the
class representative and proposed Class Counsel will protect the due process rights of class
members whose rights will be adjudicated despite their absence.
The Plaintiff has therefore met the adequacy requirement and satisfied all of the Rule

23(a) requirements for class certification.
(e) Rule 23(b)(3)
In addition to meeting class certification requirements under Rule 23(a), the proposed
class must satisfy the requirements of one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). Plaintiff seeks
to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the

“predominance” and “superiority” requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) limit class certification to cases
in which “a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote . . .
uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or
bringing about other undesirable results.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615
(1997) (citation omitted). “Predominance” tests the “legal or factual questions that qualify each
class member’s case as a genuine controversy” and is similar to Rule 23(a)(3)’s requirement of
typicality. Id. at 623. Relative to superiority, in assessing whether the requirement has been met,
courts should consider:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Here, the predominant question common to the proposed class members is whether the
letters sent by the Defendants threatened or implied legal action without the intent to take such
action. Resolution of each class member’s claim will hinge on the same operative facts relative
to the Defendants conduct. The significant and common issue of whether the threat of legal

action was a false representation outweighs any individualized damages issues, and the Court
finds that the Proposed Class is cohesive enough to warrant adjudication by representation. See
Messner, 669 F.3d at 815 (citations omitted) (“It is well established that the presence of
individualized questions regarding damages does not prevent certification under Rule
23(b)(3).”).
A class action is also superior to pursuing these claims individually. It is doubtful that
many individual claims would be pursued in light of the expense of litigation and the statutory
cap on damages under the FDCPA, which reduces the incentive to litigate individual claims.
Jackson v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., 227 F.R.D. 284, 290 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“The FDCPA
affords recovery of up to $1,000 in statutory damages for individual plaintiffs; as such, the

potential recovery here is not likely to provide sufficient incentive for members of the proposed
class to bring their own claims.”); Foley v. Student Assistance Corp., 336 F.R.D. 445, 451 (E.D.
Wis. 2020) (“[L]ike many FDCPA cases, a class action is superior to individual litigation for
reasons of judicial economy and the small-stakes nature of the claims at issue.”). In addition,
there is no indication that other litigation is already pending concerning the controversy, nor is
there any indication that resolution of these claims in this Court is undesirable. Further, no facts
indicate that there will be any difficulty managing this class action, especially in light of already
identified class members and the pending settlement. The personal notice and opt-out
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) will also protect the interests of those who will qualify as class
members. Accordingly, resolution of the claims asserted in Hollins’ complaint through a class
action would be superior to other available methods of pursuing these claims.
Because the parties have shown that certification is likely appropriate under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(a) and (b)(3), the Court finds that this case should be preliminarily certified as a class

action for the purposes of settlement. The class preliminarily certified consists of:
(a) all individuals (b) to whom defendant Church Church Hittle + Antrim sent a
letter seeking to collect a medical or healthcare debt stating (i) “[W]e may . . . take
legal action 3 against you for the collection of the above amount”, or (ii) “[W]e
may file suit against you” or (iii) “[client] does not wish to file suit against you.
However, if you do not pay or make payment arrangements, we will proceed as
necessary”; (c) on behalf of Aberdeen Ventures d/b/a Immediate Care Center, (d)
which letter was sent at any time from August 18, 2019 through and including
September 8, 2020.
Rule 23 requires that a court certifying a class also appoint class counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1)(B), (g). Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). In appointing class counsel, the court must consider the following: “the
work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; counsel’s
experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in
the action; counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and the resources that counsel will
commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). The court may also consider “any
other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B).
The firm of Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, has put extensive work into
reviewing and investigating the potential claims. Counsel has experience in handling class action
litigation and has demonstrated knowledge of the FDCPA. Counsel also has competently
represented the class in coming to the proposed settlement. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, will fairly and adequately represent the interests
of the class, and thus appoints the firm as Class Counsel for settlement purposes only.

(2) Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement
When considering whether preliminary approval of a class action settlement should be
granted, the Court must consider: (1) the strength of the plaintiffs’ case on the merits compared
to the amount of the defendants’ settlement offer, (2) an assessment of the likely complexity,
length and expense of the litigation, (3) an evaluation of the amount of opposition to the
settlement among affected parties, (4) the opinion of competent counsel, and (5) the stage of the
proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the time of settlement. Wong v. Accretive

Health, Inc., 773 F.3d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 2014); Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc.,
463 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir. 2006).
“The most important factor relevant to the fairness of a class action settlement is the
strength of plaintiff’s case on the merits balanced against the amount offered in the settlement.”
Wong, 773 F.3d at 864 (quotation marks and citations omitted). When analyzing the strength of a
plaintiff’s case, the Court “should ‘estimat[e] the range of possible outcomes and ascrib[e] a
probability to each point in the range.’” Synfuel Techs., 463 F.3d at 653 (quoting Reynolds v.
Beneficial Nat. Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 285 (7th Cir. 2002)). While “‘a high degree of precision
cannot be expected in valuing a litigation,’ the court should nevertheless ‘insist that the parties
present evidence that would enable possible outcomes to be estimated,’ so that the court can at

least come up with a ‘ballpark valuation.’” Id. at 653 (quoting Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 285).
Ultimately, the Court should quantify ‘“the net expected value of continued litigation to the
class.”’ Id. (quoting Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 284–85).
As to the first factor, the amount offered supports the settlement being fair, reasonable,
and adequate. The Plaintiff’s case does appear somewhat strong. A debt collector threatening
legal action which it has no intention to pursue is clearly conduct prohibited by the FDCPA.
Cuenca v. Harris & Harris, Ltd., No. 16-CV-05385, 2017 WL 1196922, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31,

2017) (“[A] statement that implies a debt holder will take an action it has no intention of taking
violates the FDCPA.”); see Jenkins v. Union Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1120, 1136 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(“The FDCPA [in section 1692e(5) is] aimed at preventing empty threats of litigation as a means
of scaring the debtor into payment.”). The letters sent to Hollins included threats of litigation,
such as “unless you send payment in full as indicated above or make appropriate arrangements to
pay this debt in a timely fashion . . . we may file suit against you.” (Exhibit A, DE 1-1.) Given
the small debt owed by Hollins, $81.52, it also seems somewhat likely that that Church Church
Hill + Antrim did not intend to file suit against her.
However, even though the case may be somewhat strong, the Defendants’ limited
financial resources weigh in favor of the settlement being fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Plaintiff’s counsel represents that, after obtaining “detailed financial information from
Defendants, including various financial statements, balance statements, and insurance coverage
documents,” it was revealed that the Defendants’ had a limited net worth and that “[f]urther
protracted litigation might risk any recovery at all for the class and thus, it was in the best
interest of the class to explore an early resolution.” (DE 39 at 8.) Plaintiff’s counsel represents
that, given the limited financial means of the defendants, the amount offered to the class in the
settlement is fair and reasonable.
The Court agrees. Under the FDCPA, in the case of a class action, the class may recover
an amount “not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt
collector[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B). Plaintiff’s counsel represents that one percent of the
Defendants’ cumulative net worth is $4,270.15. (DE 39 at 11.) The Class Recovery of $4,000 is
therefore around 94% of the maximum recovery for the class. Continued litigation brings
inherent risk and certain expense, even in a case that appears strong at the outset. The proposed

settlement would alleviate that risk and expense, while also providing the class with an amount
close to the statutory maximum allowed. Accordingly, the Court finds that the $4,000 settlement
amount, when weighed against the strength of the Plaintiff’s case and the defendants’ limited
financial resources, supports finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
Plaintiff’s counsel have also now convinced the Court that the proposed award of
attorneys’ fees of $14,000 is fair. In its prior order, the Court was concerned with whether the
attorneys’ fees were being ordered pursuant to equitable principles based on the settlement
resulting in a common fund or were being ordered pursuant to the FDCPA’s fee-shifting statute.
However, the lodestar method is permissible in both common fund cases and fee-shifting cases.
In re Stericycle Sec. Litig., 35 F.4th 555, 560 n.2 (7th Cir. 2022) (In a common fund case, when

determining the reasonableness of proposed attorneys’ fees, “a district court may choose either
the percentage method or the lodestar method.”); City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562
(1992) (“In a statutory fee-shifting case, the court determines a reasonable amount of attorneys’
fees by applying the lodestar method.”).
Previously, the Court explained that Plaintiff’s counsel did not submit any timesheet to
allow the Court to calculate the lodestar. The Court also explained that, under the percentage
method,1 the attorneys took an “extraordinary 74% fee.” (DE 35 at 10.) Because Plaintiff’s

1 Under the percentage method, “[t]he ratio that is relevant to assessing the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fee that
the parties agreed to is the ratio of (1) the fee to (2) the fee plus what the class members received.” Redman v.
Radioshack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 630 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court calculated the percentage of 74% by taking the fee
“counsel fail[ed] to provide any information to show its requested fees are reasonable under the
lodestar method,” the Court explained that it could not find that the award of attorneys’ fees was
reasonable. (Id. at 13.)
Plaintiff’s counsel now includes the necessary information to calculate the lodestar.

Under the lodestar method, the court multiplies the reasonable number of hours worked by the
reasonable hourly rate of counsel to produce what is called the “lodestar.” Harman v. Lyphomed,
Inc., 945 F.2d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 1991). The lodestar then may be multiplied to compensate the
attorney for the “size [of] the risk the attorney assumed at the outset by taking this type of case.”
Id. Counting solely the attorney time, counsel worked 63.7 hours on the case. (Exhibit G, DE 40-
1.) Counsel is requesting attorney’s fees in an amount of $14,000.00. Accordingly, based solely
on attorney time, Plaintiff’s counsel are seeking an hourly rate of $219.78. Given the risk
assumed, and the experience of the counsel involved, the Court believes that this amount is
reasonable and is comparable to awards in other FDCPA cases. See Collins v. Bowman, Heintz,
Boscia & Vician P.C., No. 1:10–cv–1629–JMS–TAB, 2012 WL 1142442, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Mar.

8, 2012) (recommending award of $300/hour in FDCPA case in which defendant did not object
to it), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1142560 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 4, 2012); Staples
v. Parkview Hosp., Inc., No. 1:07–CV–327, 2010 WL 780204 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 3, 2010) (finding
a rate of $225/hour “well within the range of hourly rates listed in dozens of attorney fee
applications this court has reviewed in recent years”); Needham v. Innerpac, Inc., No. 1:04 CV
393, 2008 WL 5411638, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 24, 2008) (awarding attorney fees at rates of $240,
$250, and $300/hour where the defendant did not challenge the “proposed rates as the prevailing
market rates in the Fort Wayne area”).

to the attorneys, $14,000, and dividing it by $19,000, which is the fee plus what the class members received
($14,000 fee + $4,000 to the class + $1,000 to the class representative).
Accordingly, based on the settlement amount and the lodestar, the Court finds that the
amount of the settlement supports finding the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and adequate.
The Court also finds that continued litigation would likely be lengthy, complex, and
expensive. Plaintiff’s counsel, Heather Kolbus, represents that she “strongly believes in the

strength of the claims asserted [and that] if this litigation were to continue, it would be lengthy,
expensive and involve extensive motion practice, including a motion for class certification (and
possibly a motion for decertification), motions for summary judgment and various pretrial
motions, as well as the retention of experts, preparation of expert reports, and expert
depositions.” (DE 39 at 14.) Furthermore, counsel points out that even if the Settlement Class
recovered a judgment at trial in excess of what is provided for in the settlement, “post-trial
motions and any appellate process would deprive them of any recovery for years, and possibly
forever in the event of a reversal.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel also submitted a timesheet and list of
expenses, totaling over $32,000. (Exhibit G, DE 40-1.) These expenses would no doubt grow
even larger if this litigation were to continue. Given that continued litigation would likely be

lengthy and costly, this too supports finding the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and adequate.
Other factors also favor a preliminary finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate. Class counsel is experienced in consumer class action litigation and represents that this
is a “great result for the class” and “strongly endorses th[e] settlement.” (DE 39 at 15.)
Furthermore, given the statutory ceiling on the amount of fees, it is unlikely that further litigation
will result in a better recovery for the class.
The settlement amount, the complexity of the case, the cost of further litigation, class
counsel’s opinion, and the unlikelihood that further litigation will result in a better outcome for
the class, all support a finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Accordingly,
the Court preliminarily approves the settlement agreement.

D. Conclusion
The Court, having reviewed the proposed settlement and other submissions of the
parties, HEREBY ORDERS, under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
that:
1. The representations, terms, and conditions of the parties’ Proposed Settlement
Agreement (Appendix A, DE 39-1) are fair, reasonable, and adequate. Accordingly, the Court
preliminarily approves the settlement agreement, pending the Final Approval Hearing.

2. As previously stated, for purposes of the Proposed Settlement only, the
Court preliminarily certifies the following class (“Settlement Class”), under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3):
The class consists of (a) all individuals (b) to whom defendant Church Church
Hittle + Antrim sent a letter seeking to collect a medical or healthcare debt stating
(i)“[W]e may . . . take legal action against you for the collection of the above
amount”, or (ii) “[W]e may file suit against you” or (iii) “[client] does not wish to
file suit against you. However, if you do not pay or make payment arrangements,
we will proceed as necessary”; (c) on behalf of Aberdeen Ventures d/b/a Immediate
Care Center, (d) which letter was sent at any time from August 18, 2019 through
and including September 8, 2020.
3. For settlement purposes only, the Court preliminarily appoints the named-Plaintiff,
Beth Hollins, as the Class representative and finds that she meets the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Court also preliminarily appoints counsel for Plaintiff,
Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, as Class Counsel.
4. If for any reason the proposed settlement agreement ultimately does not become
effective, the parties will notify the Court and return to their positions in this lawsuit as those
positions existed right before the parties executed the proposed stipulation. Nothing stated in the
Proposed Class Settlement Agreement or in this Order shall be considered an admission or
waiver of any kind by any of the parties or used as evidence against, or over the objection of, any
party for any purpose in this litigation or in any other action or proceeding of any kind.
5. After reviewing the Manner of Notice to the Class and the Proposed Claim Form

(Exhibit 1, DE 39-1), the Court APPROVES the proposed notice and claim form (except with
respect to revisions ordered below) and DIRECTS that:
a. The notice of hearing form must be substantially similar to the form provided and
approved here (Exhibit 1, DE 39-1), EXCEPT the revisions below are ORDERED to
be made:
- In order to clarify the effect of remaining in the class, paragraph 9
should be amended to and read in its entirety as follows:
If you are a member of the class, you designate the class representative as
your agent to make decisions on your behalf concerning the litigation, the
method and manner of conducting the litigation, the entering of an
agreement with plaintiffs’ counsel concerning attorneys’ fees and costs, and
all other matters pertaining to this lawsuit. If you are a member of this class,
you are giving the class representative and class counsel the authority to
negotiate and accept a settlement of your claims in this matter, subject to
objections and the Court’s final approval. These decisions and agreements
made and entered into by the representative plaintiff will be binding on you
if you are a member of this class. If you desire, you may also retain a lawyer
of your choice and have that lawyer enter an appearance in this case, at your
own cost. For a complete statement of all the contentions, proceedings, and
settlement terms in this case, you should consult the filings regarding this
lawsuit, which are available for your inspection at the Clerk of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond
Division, 5400 Federal Plaza, Hammond, Indiana 46320. You may also
contact the Clerk’s office at (219) 852-6500.

- In order to clarify when objections must be submitted, paragraph 17
should be amended to and read in its entirety as follows:
If you are a Class Member, you can object to the settlement. In order to
object to the settlement or any part of the settlement, you must send a letter
stating that you object and the reasons why you think the Court should not
approve the settlement. These objections must be filed by October 9, 2023.
You must include the case name and number, which is Beth Hollins v.
Church Church Hittle + Antrim, et al., Case No. 20-cv-304-JD-APR
(N.D. Ind.). You must also include your name, address, and telephone
number. You must include the factual and legal grounds for the objection
and documents, if any, to support the objection. If you are objecting to the
settlement, you may also appear at the Final Approval Hearing.
The Court notes that the table provided in paragraph 17 should still be
included in the notice form.

- In order to clarify where the Final Approval Hearing is being held,
paragraph 18 of the proposed notice shall be amended to and read in
its entirety as follows:
The Court will hold a Final Approval Hearing before the Honorable Jon E.
DeGuilio on December 6, 2023 at 10:30 a.m. in the Fourth-Floor courtroom
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
Hammond Division, 5400 Federal Plaza, Hammond, Indiana 46320. The
purpose of the hearing will be for the Court to determine whether the
proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in the best
interests of the class, and to determine the appropriate amount of
compensation for the Class Representative and Class Counsel. At that
hearing, the Court will be available to hear any objections and arguments
concerning the fairness of the proposed settlement.

- At the end of the notice, the following language must be added:
This notice has been authorized by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana. The Court has taken no position in this case
regarding the merits of the claims or the proposed settlement.

- The deadlines below must be included in the Notice:

Pages 1, 2, and 4: Claim Forms must be submitted by Monday, October 9,
2023.

Page 1, 2, and 3: Exclusion Request must be submitted by Monday,
October 9, 2023.

Pages 1 and 3: Objections to be submitted by Monday, October 9, 2023.
Additionally, any other counsels retained by Class
Members should enter appearances by Monday October 9,
2023.

The date of the Final Approval Hearing as set forth at the end of this
Order shall be included in the Notice in the space provided on page 1 and
page 3 of the Notice.

6. With the above revisions, the Court approves the parties’ proposed class notice
and claim form and directs they be mailed to the last known address of the Class Members
reflected in the Defendants’ records within 30 days of entry of this Preliminary Approval Order.
The settlement administrator, Class-Settlement.com, shall distribute the notice and claim form by
letter via First Class U.S. Mail. Each notice must be sent with a request for forwarding addresses.

Before mailing the notice required by this paragraph, the settlement administrator will obtain
updated addresses for the Class Members through the National Change of Address (“NCOA”)
database. If a notice is returned as undeliverable and a forwarding address is provided, the
settlement administrator shall forward any such returned notice to the address provided within
four days of receipt. If a notice is returned as undeliverable and a forwarding address is not
provided, the settlement administrator will seek to ascertain the Class Member’s current address
using skip-tracing. If the settlement administrator finds through skip-tracing that the Class
Member has a different address, the settlement administrator will send the notice to that address.
7. The Court finds and determines that the notice of hearing given to Class
Members in accordance with paragraphs 5–6 constitutes the best notice practicable under the

circumstances, constitutes due and sufficient notice of the matters set forth to all persons entitled
to receive notice, and satisfies the requirements of due process and of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
8. Class Members have until October 9, 2023, to submit a claim, request to be
excluded, or object to the Agreement. A request for exclusion must be in writing and state that “I
hereby wish to exclude myself from the settlement in Beth Hollins v. Church Church Hittle +
Antrim, et al., Case No. 20-cv-304-JD-APR (N.D. Ind.).” The request must also include the
name, address, phone number, and signature of the person(s) or entity seeking exclusion. The
request must be mailed to the settlement administrator at the address provided in the class notice.
A request for exclusion that does not include all of the information above, that is sent to an
address other than the one designated in the class notice, or that is not postmarked by the time
specified will be invalid and the person(s) serving such request will remain a class member and
will be bound as a class member by the Agreement, if approved. The settlement administrator

will forward copies of all requests for exclusion to counsel for the parties no later than seven
days after the deadline for Class Members to submit such requests.
9. Within 14 days after the requests for exclusions are due, the settlement
administrator or class counsel must file with the Court a notice of the exclusions, listing the
names of all persons who timely excluded themselves from the Settlement Class by submitting
their requests for exclusions, in accordance with paragraph 8.
10. At least 30 days before the Final Approval Hearing, Class Counsel must file a fee
petition requesting an award of attorneys’ fees and costs no greater than $14,000.00.
11. At least 30 days before the Final Approval Hearing, Defendants must file a notice
that it has complied with the notice requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28

U.S.C. §1715(b).
12. At least 30 days before the Final Approval Hearing, Defendants, through a
settlement administrator, must file with this Court and serve a declaration certifying that notice
and the claim form has been mailed as directed in this Order.
13. At least 30 days before the Final Approval Hearing, the parties are to request
Final Approval of the Settlement and jointly file a memorandum of points and authorities in
support of the motion.
14. The settlement administrator is Class-Settlement.com
15. Any Class Member who does not timely opt out of the Agreement may appear at
the final approval hearing to argue that the proposed Agreement should not be approved. All
written objection papers must be mailed to the Clerk of the Court, as explained in the notice,
served on Counsel for the parties, and postmarked no later than October 9, 2023. For an

objection to be valid, it must be in writing and must contain the following:
i. the objecting Class Member’s name address, and phone number;
ii. the name and number of the case: Beth Hollins v. Church Church Hittle +
Antrim, et al., Case No. 20-cv-304-JD-APR (N.D. Ind.);
iii. the factual basis or legal grounds for the objection; and
iv. documents, if any, to support the objection.
If necessary or desired, the parties may respond to any objections seven days before the final
approval hearing. There will be no replies from objectors
16. A hearing will be held before The Honorable Jon E. DeGuilio, United States
District Judge, in his Fourth-Floor courtroom of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Indiana, Hammond Division, 5400 Federal Plaza, Hammond, Indiana 46320, on
December 6, 2023 at 10:30 a.m. (C.S.T.) (“Final Approval Hearing”), to determine whether the
Proposed Stipulation should be approved as fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of
the Class.
17. The Court reserves the right to adjourn or continue the Final Approval Hearing,
and any adjournment or continuance may be without further notice of any kind other than oral
announcement at the Final Approval Hearing or at any later hearing.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: July 7, 2023

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10164106. Public record. Not legal advice.