# Korty v. Indiana University Health, Inc.

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · December 21, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10163400

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** December 21, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10163400

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting “[e]mployers may prefer and reward experience, believing it makes a more valuable employee, for whatever reason”
- holding prior salary is not a separate justification for pay differential

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE
LAURA KORTY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) CAUSE NO. 4:21-CV-33-PPS
)
INDIANA UNIVERSITY HEALTH, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Laura Korty, was a Clinical Nurse Quality Coordinator for Indiana
University Health (“IUH”) when she decided to voluntarily resign. During the process
of training her male replacement, Korty discovered he was making $15,000 more than
she had been earning. That realization prompted this lawsuit under the Equal Pay Act
which IUH now seeks summary judgment on. Because the undisputed facts
demonstrate that the pay disparity between Korty and her replacement was due to
factors other than sex, summary judgment must be granted.
Background
At the outset, I note that Korty has filed a motion to strike. [DE 37.] Korty seeks
to exclude from the summary judgment record some hearsay testimony and certain
facts mentioned by IUH that she claims are irrelevant. [DE 37.] Because I have not
relied on any of that evidence in my decision in this case, I will deny that motion as
moot.
IUH is a healthcare system based in Indianapolis, with dozens of facilities
statewide. [Baker Dec., DE 33-1, at 1.]1 IUH Arnett Hospital is located in Lafayette,
Indiana, and is part of IUH’s West Central Region. Id. Max Foxen is Compensation
Manager for IUH. [Foxen Dep., DE 33-2, at 2.] In that role, he helps create guidelines

for IUH Talent Acquisition Consultants to follow when setting compensation offers for
employees. Id. Factors to consider for new hires include pay range, internal equity,
prior relevant work experience, and budget. [Id. at 2, 10.] IUH uses the term “internal
equity” to review the pay of current IUH employees to determine where to slot the new
hire. [Id. at 3.] IUH’s policy permits pay differences between individuals in the same job

code based on relevant work experience, performance, or seniority. Id. According to
Foxen, talent acquisition coordinators should generally avoid new hire rates that are
higher than incumbent pay; however, exceptions may occur, including when a current
IUH employee experiences a demotion. Id. In other words, when a current IUH
employee is hired for a position where his or her current base pay is above the new pay
(i.e. a demotion), talent acquisition coordinators can take that into account, while also

considering relevant experience and internal equity. Id.
Korty started working with IUH as a patient care intern in December 2010 and
then transitioned to a registered nurse role in October 2011. [Korty Dep., DE 33-3, at 7-
8.] In June or July 2012, Korty transferred to a registered nurse role at IUH Arnett

1 There are a lot of different pieces of evidence in the record including deposition
excerpts, declarations, and exhibits produced during discovery. For the sake of
consistency, the citations in this order are to the blue CM/ECF page number at the top
of each page.
2
Hospital, where she stayed until the summer of 2015, when she resigned. [Id. at 8-9.] In
March 2017, Korty returned to IUH Arnett as an outpatient float nurse. [Id. at 10.] In
October 2017, Korty applied for and received the position of specialist medical staff

quality and peer review nurse at IUH Arnett, which later became known as the Clinical
Nurse Quality Coordinator. [Id. at 11.] Korty started reporting to Laura Baker, Director
of Quality, Patient Safety and Infection Prevention of IUH Arnett. [Id. at 19.]
In that final position, Korty screened cases for IUH Arnett’s committees (i.e.,
emergency room, surgery, pediatrics, etc.), to determine if the case needed to go

through the peer review process, as well as assigning the cases to correct committees,
setting up agendas for the meetings, attending the meetings, and taking minutes. [DE
33-3 at 14.] She also coordinated ongoing professional practice evaluations for
credentialed medical staff at IUH Arnett. [Id. at 15.] While Korty was originally only
responsible for the Arnett Hospital, over her tenure, she also took over the same
responsibilities for IU Health’s Frankfort and White Memorial Hospitals too. [Id. at 14,

17-18.] During her employment, Korty was the only quality coordinator in the West
Central Region. [Id. at 16-17; DE 33-1 at 1.] Around February 2021, Korty told Baker
she was resigning, but she agreed to stay to train her replacement. [DE 33-1 at 3.] At the
time of her resignation, Korty was earning $31.53 per hour or $65,583 per year. [DE 33-4
at 10.]

As Baker began the task of finding Korty’s replacement, she “wanted the role to
focus on increasing provider engagement in setting quality metrics and making the peer
3
review process more robust.” [DE 33-1 at 3.] She reviewed applications and
interviewed candidates, and Baker decided she wanted to hire Justin Reagin to fill the
position Korty was vacating. [Id., Baker Dep., DE 33-4, at 7.] Reagin was an internal

candidate; he was already working for IUH as a Clinical Informaticist. [DE 33-1 at 3.]
Reagin was well qualified for the position. He had worked as a nurse, as well as an
Associate Administrator at IUH Frankfort Hospital for over two years, with staff
management and leadership responsibilities. Id. Because Baker found Reagin to be
such a quality candidate, she wanted to offer a salary he would find acceptable. [DE 33-

4 at 12.]
While Reagin was the best candidate for the job, there was a problem. He was
earning substantially more money in his current position. He was therefore told that he
would have to take a pay cut if he wanted the new job. [DE 36-6 at 4.] Nevertheless,
Baker wanted to find a way to offer Reagin a salary that was attractive enough to make
it work. [DE 33-4 at 12.] Lori Fenton was the IUH Talent Acquisition Consultant

assigned to work on making that happen. [DE 33-6 at 2.]
Baker relied upon, and engaged in discussions with her HR partners, to decide
what Reagin’s salary should be. [DE 33-1 at 3.] The initial pay recommendation for
Reagin was prepared by Fenton. [Id. at 4.] In coming up with her recommendation,
Fenton considered market range, internal equity, and Reagin’s knowledge, skills and

abilities. [DE 33-6 at 3.] Fenton told Baker that she reviewed the market range for the
job and was aware that Reagin was in a higher market range in his Clinical Informaticist
4
position than the CNQC role would provide. [DE 33-6 at 3.] Fenton also told Baker that
Reagin was currently making $41.07/hour, or $85,426 annually. Id. Fenton noted
Reagin’s leadership experience, as well as the nine years of clinical experience that he

and Korty both had. [DE 33-6 at 3; DE 33-1 at 4.] Fenton, as well as Nicole Jarrett from
IUH, both indicated that Reagin’s experience acquired in his higher pay grade positions
was considered valuable – in general, higher pay grades indicate experience at a higher
level. [Jarrett Dep., DE 33-5, at 13, 14, 17; DE 33-6 at 3.]
Fenton initially proposed offering Reagin between $32.00/hour or $66,560/year

and $33.00/hour or $68,640/year. [DE 33-6 at 3.] This would have been roughly
equivalent to what IUH paid Korty for that position. [DE 33-4 at 9.] But according to
Fenton, she “knew there was room to offer him more based on his prior pay and
experience under IUH guidelines, [but] [she] provided a conservative initial
recommendation to be conscious of the department’s budget.” [DE 33-6 at 3.] After
Baker reviewed Fenton’s recommendation, she responded in an e-mail back to Fenton

expressing concern at how big a pay cut Reagin was going to have to take: “Ouch . . .
that’s a pay cut for sure . . [Korty’s] been in the quality coordinator role for 3 years, so
[Reagin] has more RN experience and both his Clinical Informaticist and Nursing
Supervisor Experience will be valuable in this role.” [DE 33-1 at 4; 15.] Nonetheless,
Baker initially agreed to offer Reagin $33/hour. Id.

But then Baker apparently had second thoughts about offering $33/hour. She
followed up with Fenton: “Do we look at internal equity across IU Health at all? There
5
are Clinical Nurse-Quality Coordinators at Bloomington and Ball who do similar roles.”
[DE 33-1 at 4, 15.] Fenton then reviewed the pay rates of the ten other coordinators
within the South Central and East Central regions to compare internal equity, and

noted that it “does change things for [Reagin.]” [DE 33-1 at 4-5, DE 33-6 at 4, 9.] She
identified the average pay for that position in those regions as $38.30/hour or $79,664
annually, with the highest at $40.10/hour. [DE 33-6 at 4, 9.]
Based on this additional information, Baker recommended that Fenton offer
$38/hour to Reagin. [DE 33-1 at 5, 13.] Fenton agreed, and that was the amount she

first offered to Reagin. [DE 33-6 at 4.] But Reagin wanted more. He responded by
inquiring if there was “any wiggle room for negotiation at all” in the offered salary. [DE
33-6 at 4, 22.] Fenton responded that “one thing that IU Health really focuses on is
internal equity with other team members in the role; however you do have amazing
experience & the skill-set that Laura [Baker] is seeking for this position so I will
definitely advocate for that and get back with you as soon as possible.” [Id. at 4, 21.]

Baker then agreed to increase the offer to $38.76/hour (or $80,621 annually). [DE
33-1 at 5.] In raising the offer, Baker noted that her budget was “pretty stretched” and
she did not think offering him any higher amount was in line with internal equity. [DE
33-1 at 5, 12.] This time, Reagin accepted the position. [DE 33-1 at 5.] Here is how Baker
articulated the reasons for Reagin’s higher pay rate:

IU Health does market adjustments for clinical nurses on a fairly
routine basis, and nurses who work in other positions aren’t always
included in those adjustments. Because [Reagin] had maintained a
position as a pediatric nurse and as a supervisor, he was given
6
raises as part of the clinical nurse role. So when he applied for the
position, he’s - and now the clinical nurse quality coordinator, he
already had a higher rate . . .
[DE 33-4 at 13; DE 33-1 at 4.]
Discussion
Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). I must take the facts in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion. Fulk v. United Transp. Union, 160 F.3d 405, 407 (7th Cir.
1998).
Korty’s only claim is under the Equal Pay Act (EPA) which prohibits wage
discrimination on the basis of sex for equal work in jobs that require equal skill, effort
and responsibility and which are performed under similar working conditions. See 29

U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). To establish a prima facie case under the EPA, Korty must show: “(1)
higher wages were paid to a male employee, (2) for equal work requiring substantially
similar skill, effort and responsibilities, and (3) the work was performed under similar
working conditions.” Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc., 470 F.3d 685, 695 (7th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted).

Everyone seems to agree that Korty is able to meet the prima facie case. The
burden therefore shifts to IUH to prove that a statutory affirmative defense applies.
7
Lauderdale v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 876 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2017). There are four
defenses, any one of which can justify the pay differential. In other words, an
employer is not liable if the pay is made pursuant to “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit

system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of product; or (iv)
a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
IUH contends that Reagin’s pay differential was based on the fourth affirmative
defense, a factor other than sex. This fourth affirmative defense is admittedly a bit
fuzzy. It has been described as a “broad ‘catch-all’ exception and embraces an almost

limitless number of factors, so long as they do not involve sex.” Fallon v. State of Illinois,
882 F.2d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1989). Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit “does not require
that the factor other than sex be related to the requirements of the particular position in
question, or that it be a business-related reason.” Id. at 1211. Instead, the question to be
asked under the fourth affirmative defense is “whether the factor is discriminatorily
applied or if it causes a discriminatory effect.” Id. Finally, an employer can’t just give

an after the fact explanation for the pay discrepancy; there must be evidence “that the
employer actually relied on that reason.” Lauderdale, 876 F.3d at 908.
Here, the evidence is clear that there were multiple factors other than sex that
legitimize the $15,000 pay difference between Korty and her male successor.
1. Market Range/Prior Salary

The e-mail chain between Baker and Fenton makes it plain that IUH considered
Reagin’s previous salary in determining what he should be offered initially, and in
8
calculating his final offer. Recall that Fenton initially acknowledged that Reagin was
making $85,426/year in his current position, and recommended that IUH offer him
$32/hour or $66,560/year up to $33/hour or $68,640/year based on his experience and

education. [DE 33-1 at 15.] In response, Baker noticed this would cause Reagin to take
quite a hit, stating “ouch . . . that is a pay cut for sure” and asked Fenton if they could at
least initially offer the $33/hour. Id. Fenton then responded that she could look at the
internal equity to see if they had room to offer more to Reagin. [Id. at 14.]
For Baker to have focused in on Reagin’s prior salary was entirely reasonable.

Indeed, the Seventh Circuit “has repeatedly held that a difference in pay based on the
difference in what employees were previously paid is a legitimate ‘factor other than
sex.’” Lauderdale, 876 F.3d at 908. The Court acknowledges that “[b]asing pay on prior
wages could be discriminatory if sex discrimination led to the lower prior wages.” Id.
But Korty has not made that showing at all — nowhere has she shown that Reagin’s
previous salary was inflated based upon his sex.

IUH has established that its own guidelines provide when a current IUH
employee experiences a demotion (like Reagin did here), the talent acquisition
coordinators can actually approve a new pay rate at the maximum of the new pay grid.
[Foxen Dec., DE 33-2 at 3.] Recall that Reagin held the Clinical Informaticist role prior
to applying for Korty’s job, and he made approximately $20,000 more per year at that

job than IUH was paying Korty for doing hers. It was altogether reasonable for IUH to
consider Reagin’s previous pay in determining how much to offer him for the new
9
position. Indeed, a slew of courts have arrived at the same conclusion. See, e.g., Hubers v.
Gannett Co., Inc., No. 16 C 10041, 2019 WL 1112259, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2019)
(granting summary judgment where undisputed evidence showed that male’s base

salary was higher than a female’s not because of sex, but because of his prior salary);
Purcell v. Indiana Univ-South Bend and Its Chancellor, No. 3:13 CV 386, 2017 WL 447236, at
*4-5 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2017) (granting summary judgment where female lecturer in
music was paid less than male lecturers, where the court found the men had a higher
salary due to their higher market value – they had received higher salaries before and

the university determined their salaries were necessary to attract a new resident quartet
to lecture and perform); Cooper-Schut v. Visteon Auto. Sys., No. IP-01-0899-C-B/G, 2003
WL 1702261, at *13 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2003) (grating summary judgment on Equal Pay
Act claim finding company based its decision to pay a male more than a female for
legitimate reasons other than sex, including his prior salary and experience).
Korty candidly admits that the current state of the law in this circuit allows

consideration of prior salary as a valid reason “other than sex” to explain a pay
disparity. [DE 35 at 8.] However, she advocates that the Seventh Circuit should join
other circuits that refuse to consider prior salary as a factor other than sex because it
simply perpetuates a pay disparity between the sexes.2 While there may be some merit

2 See, e.g., Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding prior salary is
not a separate justification for pay differential); Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir.
2018) (en banc), vacated on unrelated grounds sub. nom Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S.Ct. 706
(2019) (holding “prior salary alone or in combination with other factors cannot justify a
wage differential” because, otherwise, employers could “capitalize on the persistence of
10
to that position, I am bound to follow the precedent of this circuit. As I have said
before, “[i]n a hierarchical system of courts, binding precedent is just that, district court
judges are not free to disregard the law as clearly espoused by the Seventh Circuit, until

it is either overruled by that court or the Supreme Court.”Szany v. Garcia, No. 2:17-cv-
74-PPS-JPK, 2020 WL 2767356, at *15 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Reiser v. Residential Funding
Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004) (district judges must follow the decisions of the
Seventh Circuit, even if they disagree with the decision).
To the extent Korty looks to the Supreme Court case in Corning Glass Works v.

Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 209-10 (1974), to try to sway this court that prior salary should
not be considered, that case concluded that “the company’s continued discrimination in
base wages between night and days workers, though phrased in terms of a neutral
factor other than sex, nevertheless operated to perpetuate the effects of the company’s
prior illegal practice of paying women less than men for equal work.” Here, IUH has
provided undisputed evidence that Reagin’s prior salary was set for a different role

(when he was a Clinical Informaticist), and Korty has provided no evidence at all that
previous salary was already artificially inflated due to sex; therefore, the broader
arguments set forth in Brennan just don’t apply in this case.
While Korty contends Reagin’s prior pay rate is only a pretextual reason for
over-paying Reagin because he is male [DE 35 at 13], this is pure speculation. There is

no evidence to support such a theory. Korty believes it is telling that Reagin wrote in
the wage gap and perpetuate that gap ad infinitum”).
11
an e-mail at the beginning of the application period that “It’s never been all about the
money.” [DE 35 at 12-13, DE 36-3 at 4]. But of course that doesn’t mean it wasn’t partly
about the money. Indeed, that’s the reason Reagin negotiated for more compensation.

Yet, somehow, Korty remains adamant that Reagin did not in fact “negotiate for a
higher salary.” [DE 35 at 13]. That position is deeply perplexing in light of Reagin’s e-
mail to Fenton after he received his first offer asking, in reference to compensation, if
“there is any wiggle room for negotiation at all?” [DE 33-6 at 22.] Of course he was
negotiating salary terms. And Fenton was doing the dance too when she responded by

promising to “let [him] know on the salary piece as soon as possible.” [Id. at 21.]
I don’t see anything improper (much less discriminatory based upon sex), in
IUH’s desire to hire Reagin and, during that process, minimize the pay cut that he
would be taking by moving into Korty’s role. After all, Reagin was their top candidate
and they wanted to do their level best to seal his commitment. As the Seventh Circuit
has aptly recognized, “[m]aintenance of an employee’s compensation in a transfer

between positions is not in our view unusual and avoids the serious problem of
‘unmerited’ pay reductions.” Covington v. Southern Illinois Univ., 816 F.2d 317, 323 (7th
Cir. 1987). And Korty cannot contest that IUH specifically considered the market range,
and Reagin’s prior salary, in setting his pay for the new position. It is right there in the
e-mails. As such, IUH has provided a factor other than sex that justifies the wage

differential.
2. Internal Equity
12
There is yet another reason unrelated to sex that explains the pay differential in
this case, and that is internal equity. Fenton and Baker considered (in a documented e-
mail) the pay rates of ten other clinical nurse quality coordinators within the South

Central and East Central Regions. [DE 33-1 at 14.] Korty points out that these regions
include some hospitals that are geographically far from IU Arnett, but she does not
argue that these jobs are not comparable. [DE 35 at 17.] Anyway, all of the comparators
in the same nurse quality coordinator jobs were female, and most were paid more than
Korty. [DE 33-6 at 4, 18.] Fenton identified the average pay in those regions was

$38.30/hour or $79,664 annually, with the highest at $40.10/hour. Id. Therefore,
Fenton told Baker there was room to offer Reagin more, but IUH could not exceed
$40.10/hour. [DE 33-6 at 4.] Fenton then approved Baker’s request to initially offer
Reagin $38.00/hour. Id. In response, when Reagin asked if there was any wiggle room
in the offered salary, Fenton told him “one thing that IU Health really focuses on is
internal equity with other team members in the role; however you do have amazing

experience & the skill-set that Laura [Baker] is seeking for this position so I will
definitely advocate for that and get back with you as soon as possible.” Id. (emphasis
added). Baker agreed to increase the offer to $38.76 per hour (or $80,621 annually),
which still was in line with the average pay of clinical nurse quality coordinators (and
below the highest earner in that position who was a female in a comparable region), but

in doing so she noted that offering any more would not be in line with “internal
equity.” [DE 33-1 at 5.]
13
There is no doubt at all that internal equity was considered in determining
Reagin’s salary, and it is a sex-neutral basis for coming up with his salary. In response,
Korty claims “[i]f internal equity were a bona fide factor other than sex, IU Health

would have applied it equally to Korty.” [DE 35 at 15.] But Korty was hired at a
different point in time, and with different work experience than Reagin. We don’t
know anything about IUH’s budget when Korty was hired in 2017, or whether she tried
to negotiate a higher salary (like Reagin did), or if she accepted what she was initially
offered.

Additionally, it is really a stretch for Korty to argue that “[i]f Reagin’s pay was
attributable to internal equity, surely internal equity would dictate that Korty’s pay also
be increased for the month that they overlapped.” [DE 35 at 16.] At that point in time,
Korty had already voluntarily turned in her resignation, and just stayed on an
additional month to train Reagin. It seems a bit fanciful to expect IUH to gratuitously
pay an employee who has voluntarily resigned more money during the one month

transition. Such a notion is not ground in reality, nor is it required by the EPA. The
section cited by Korty, 29 C.F.R. § 1620.25, dealing with the equalization of rates only
applies “when a prohibited sex-based wage differential has been proved” and in this
case, Korty has not shown that IUH used a sex-based wage differential.
3. Knowledge, Skills and Experience

Finally, Reagin’s knowledge, previous experience, and skills also are another
factor unrelated to sex that justify his salary. IUH’s compensation guidelines allow for
14
pay differences when based on relevant work experience, performance or seniority. [DE
33-2 at 3.] Baker thought Reagin’s experience as a current RN, Clinical Informaticist,
and Nursing Supervisor would help him increase provider engagement in setting

quality metrics and improving the peer review process. [DE 33-4 at 12; DE 33-1 at 3.]
Although Korty and Reagin both had nine years of clinical experience, Baker thought
Reagin would be a great fit due to his knowledge and experience and Fenton
recognized his experience as valuable. [DE 33-6 at 3; DE 33-1 at 3.] This clearly
provides another factor other than sex that justifies Reagin’s pay rate.

According to Korty’s subjective belief, Reagin’s qualifications were not superior
to hers. [DE 35 at 19.] But they also were not direct comparators - it was not like Korty
and Reagin applied for the same job position at the same time. She was leaving and he
was picked as her replacement. What Korty cannot dispute is that IUH considered
Reagin’s qualifications in hiring him – Fenton and Baker discussed it in their March 5,
2021 e-mail chain. [DE 33-1 at 15.]

Finally, as a last ditch effort, Korty claims that even if Reagin’s qualifications
were superior to hers, “that superiority is to be disregarded when the superiority is in
excess of the skill, experience, training, education, and/or ability required of the
position,” citing 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a). [DE 35 at 19.] However, section 1620.15 defines
“jobs requiring equal skill in performance” for the purpose of establishing whether the

EPA would even apply in the first place – not for purposes of evaluating the “factor
other than sex” defense. The Seventh Circuit has explained that a “factor other than
15
sex” to support a particular pay decision “need not be ‘related to the requirements of
the particular position in question,’ nor must it even be business-related.” Dey v. Colt
Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Fallon v. State of Ill., 882

F.2d 1206, 121 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting “[e]mployers may prefer and reward experience,
believing it makes a more valuable employee, for whatever reason”)). As such,
Reagin’s experience, background, and skill set was a proper consideration for IUH to
examine in determining his salary. And this is another sex-neutral reason that accounts
for his salary discrepancy.

***
To summarize, IUH has articulated at least three factors other than sex that
buttress their decision to offer Reagin what amounted to about $15,000 more than Korty
was earning in the same position. Korty has not identified anything pretextual about
these reasons. In fact, they are all well documented and seem to be legitimate business
reasons that were evaluated and discussed (in writing) prior to offering Reagin his final

salary. Therefore, Korty’s claims fail.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [DE 37] is DENIED
as MOOT. Defendant Indiana University Health, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[DE 31] is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

ENTERED: December 21, 2022.
s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10163400. Public record. Not legal advice.