# Wardingley v. PQ Corporation

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · November 4, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10163220

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** November 4, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
MADISON WARDINGLEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Cause No. 2:22–CV-115-PPS-JEM
)
ECOVYST CATALYST )
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter arises from a motor vehicle collision on Interstate 80 near Gary,
Indiana. Plaintiff Madison Wardingley claims that she was seriously injured when the
vehicle in which she was a passenger collided with heavy steel containers that fell from a
truck operated by Safe Trans, LLC, a commercial motor carrier. The containers, in turn,
were owned by Defendant Ecovyst Catalyst Technologies, LLC. As is typical in the
trucking industry, Defendant Coyote Logistics, LLC, a third-party logistics company and
freight broker, arranged for Safe Trans to haul the containers on Ecovyst’s behalf.
Wardingley claims each defendant was negligent and their negligence caused her to be
seriously injured. [DE 10 at 4–8.]
Coyote Logistics seeks dismissal arguing that the claims asserted against it, which
sound in negligent selection of Safe Trans and vicarious liability for the alleged
negligence of Safe Trans and its driver, are preempted by the Federal Aviation
Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA). [DE 39; DE 40 at 2.] Because I find that
Wardingley’s claims against Coyote Logistics do not effect pricing, rates or services in
the trucking industry, they are not preempted by the FAAAA. Coyote Logistics’ motion
to dismiss will be denied.

Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from Wardingley’s First Amended Complaint,
which I accept as true for present purposes. On the evening of July 31, 2021, Wardingley
was riding as a passenger in a vehicle on Interstate 80 outside Gary, Indiana, when a
semi tractor-trailer owned by Safe Trans ran off the road and struck a barrier wall.

[DE 10, ¶¶ 9–12.] A load of steel containers owned by Ecovyst fell off of the truck,
landing in the path of the vehicle in which Wardingley was a passenger, and she was
injured in the ensuing crash. Id., ¶¶ 13–15. While the tuck driver claims that the load
shifted and caused him to run off the road, resulting in the collision with the barrier
wall, Wardingley claims that the driver had never before hauled cargo as a commercial
motor vehicle driver and the crash was a result of negligence. See id., ¶¶ 12, 16.

Coyote Logistics identified and selected Safe Trans as the carrier to transport the
Ecovyst containers. Id., ¶ 37. While Coyote Logistics was obligated to choose a safe
motor carrier with appropriate skill and experience carrying cargo like the Ecovyst
containers, Wardingley asserts that it failed to exercise due care in its selection of Safe
Trans and its driver. Id., ¶¶ 38–39. Had Coyote Logistics exercised due diligence in

evaluating the skill, experience, and safety record of Safe Trans prior to selecting the
company to transport the goods, it would have found that the company or its driver
2
were not sufficiently experienced to transport the Ecovyst containers and had previously
violated safety rules by improperly securing cargo. Id., ¶ 39.
Discussion

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint is required to contain “a
short and plain statement showing that [the plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to move for dismissal if the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
At this stage, I accept the complaint’s allegations as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in Wardingley’s favor. Bradley Hotel Corp. v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., 19 F.4th
1002, 1006 (7th Cir. 2021). However, to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), her claim for
relief must be “plausible on its face.” Proft v. Raoul, 944 F.3d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Facial plausibility requires a plaintiff to plead sufficient “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Taha v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 781, 947 F.3d 464, 469
(7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Seventh Circuit has
explained that a plaintiff must plead facts that “suggest a right to relief that is beyond
the speculative level,” which requires alleging “enough details about the subject-matter
of the case to present a story that holds together.” Sevugan v. Direct Energy Servs., LLC,

931 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2019); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir.
2010). “[S]heer speculation, bald assertions, and unsupported conclusory statements” in
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the complaint fail to meet this burden. Taha, 947 F.3d at 469.
Preemption is an affirmative defense, S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of
Am., 697 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2012), and the party raising it bears the burden of proof,

Johnson v. Diakon Logistics, No. 16-CV-06776, 2018 WL 1519157, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28,
2018) (citing Fifth Third Bank ex rel. Tr. Officer v. CSX Corp., 415 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir.
2005)). The Seventh Circuit, observing that “plaintiffs have no duty to anticipate
affirmative defenses,” has held that in most cases, the “more appropriate” procedure to
raise the affirmative defense of FAAAA preemption is to file an answer pleading

preemption as an affirmative defense and then move for judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c). S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 697 F.3d at 547; Johnson, 2018 WL 1519157, at *3
(citations omitted). But practically speaking, such motions are evaluated under the same
standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Adams v. City of
Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2014). And because I have before me all that is
“needed in order to be able to rule on the defense,” the procedural defect is “of no

consequence,” Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2010), so I will turn to the
substance of the parties’ briefing notwithstanding the hiccup in the procedural posture.
Coyote Logistics contends that Wardingley’s state law claims must be dismissed
because they are preempted by the FAAAA. The FAAAA was designed by Congress to
untangle a web of state laws and regulations affecting the trucking industry and create a

more uniform (and federal) paradigm. See Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364,
368 (2008); City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 440 (2002)
4
(noting that intrastate regulation of trucking services had “unreasonably burdened free
trade, interstate commerce, and American consumers”). As the Seventh Circuit has
stated, “Congress enacted the FAAAA's preemption provision in 1994 with the aim of

eliminating the patchwork of state regulation of motor carriers that persisted fourteen
years after it had first attempted to deregulate the trucking industry.” Nationwide Freight
Sys., Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 784 F.3d 367, 373 (7th Cir 2015) (citations omitted).
The Act’s general preemption provision prohibits a state from enacting or
enforcing a:

[L]aw, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law
related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . or any motor
private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the
transportation of property.
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). For starters, reasonable people may wonder whether state tort
claims are even implicated by this preemption provision. They are. So held the Supreme
Court in Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 284 (2014).1 See also Non Typical, Inc. v.
Transglobal Logistics Grp. Inc., Nos. 10-C-1058 & 10-C-0156, 2012 WL 1910076, at *2 (E.D.
Wis. May 28, 2012) (collecting cases).
The statute’s plain terms cover any state laws (including common law claims)
related to prices, routes, or services of a motor carrier, motor private carrier, broker, or
freight forwarder. And the term “transportation” for purposes of the FAAAA is broadly

1 Case law interpreting an identical preemption provision codified in the Airline Deregulation Act
(ADA) lends weight to my analysis of the FAAAA. “[T]he Supreme Court has generally taken the
position that the statutes deregulating the airline industry and those deregulating the trucking industry
should be construed consistently with one another.” S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 697 F.3d at 548; see also id. at
549–52 (construing key Supreme Court authorities). See generally Rowe, 552 U.S. at 367–70.
5
defined as services related to the movement of persons or property, including
“arranging for, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing,
ventilation, storage, handling, packing, unpacking, and interchange of passengers and

property.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(23). Thus, my task is to determine whether run-of-the-mill
Indiana state negligence claims like the one brought here are “related to a price, route,
or service” of Coyote Logistics as a commercial freight broker.
The parties acknowledge that neither the Seventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court
has precisely delineated the scope of FAAAA preemption with respect to personal

injury negligence claims asserted against freight brokers. Review of the relevant case
law uncovers a range of interpretive approaches adopted by the lower courts. Indeed,
“district courts are sharply divided” on the question whether “personal injury claims
alleging negligence by brokers in selecting motor carriers” are preempted by the
FAAAA. Loyd v. Salazar, 416 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1296–98 (W.D. Okla. 2019) (collecting
cases). I am guided, but not bound, by the persuasive weight of decisions evaluating

whether similar tort claims against motor carriers and commercial freight brokers are
preempted by the FAAAA. These decisions fall into two general camps.
On one hand, I was surprised to see that a line of cases has concluded that the
FAAAA’s “related to” language broadly preempts state laws that have an economic
impact on prices, routes, and services of covered entities in the trucking industry. From

this angle, several courts have dismissed state common law claims, including claims
against brokers for the negligent selection of motor carriers, as preempted by the Act.
6
See, e.g., Gillum v. High Standard, LLC, No. SA-19-CV-1378-XR, 2020 WL 444371, at *3–5
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020); Loyd, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1298; Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transp., LLC,
354 F. Supp. 3d 808, 813 (N.D. Ohio 2018); Volkova v. C.H. Robinson Co., No. 16 C 1883,

2018 WL 741441, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2018); Georgia Nut Co. v. C.H. Robinson Co., No. 17
C 3018, 2017 WL 4864857, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017).
On the other hand, several courts have held that state tort laws are too far
removed from carriers’ and brokers’ prices, routes, and services to be expressly
preempted by the FAAAA. See, e.g., Ciotola v. Star Trans. & Trucking, LLC, 481 F. Supp.

3d 375, 387–88 (M.D. Pa. 2020); Nyswaner v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 353 F. Supp.
3d 892, 896 (D. Ariz. 2019); Scott v. Milosevic, 372 F. Supp. 3d 758, 769–70 (N.D. Iowa
2019); Gilley v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., No. 1:18-00538, 2019 WL 1410902, at *5–6
(S.D.W. Va. 2019); Mann v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., Nos. 16 C 102, 16 C 104 & 16 C
140, 2017 WL 3191516, at *7–8 (W.D. Va. July 27, 2017). Other courts, too, have rejected
federal preemption of plaintiffs’ tort claims based on language in a separate subsection

of the FAAAA that expressly carves out state safety regulations from the preemptive
scope of the Act (the so-called “safety exception”). See, e.g., Miller v. C.H. Robinson
Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016, 1026–31 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2866, 2022
WL 2295168 (June 27, 2022); Crouch v. Taylor Logistics Co., 563 F. Supp. 3d 868, 876 (S.D.
Ill. 2021); Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC, No. 19-CV-1300-SMY, 2021 WL 4129327,

at *2–3 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2021); accord Finley v. Dyer, No. 3:18-CV-78-DMB-JMV, 2018 WL
5284616, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 24, 2018).
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Coyote Logistics urges me to adopt the former approach. For her part,
Wardingley raises both sets of countervailing arguments against preemption — state
negligence law falls outside the scope of the general preemption provision, and in any

case falls within the safety exception. I will consider both in turn.
1. The FAAAA Does Not Preempt Wardingley’s Negligence Claims
The lion’s share of the parties’ briefing parses seven words: “related to a price,
route, or service.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Before diving into whether (and what types
of) state laws—or state tort claims—are “related to brokers’ prices, routes, or services,”

it is useful to consider some generally acknowledged principles about the FAAAA.
The Seventh Circuit has endorsed a broad construction of the phrase “related to”
as preempting any “laws or actions having some type of connection with or reference to
a [broker's] rates, routes, or services, whether direct or indirect.” Nationwide Freight, 784
F.3d at 373 (emphasis added). However, in keeping with Supreme Court guidance that
“the breadth of the words ‘related to’ does not mean the sky is the limit,” state laws

with only “a tenuous, remote, or peripheral” relationship to rates, routes, or services are
not preempted. Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 260–61 (2013);
Nationwide Freight, 784 F.3d at 373. Put succinctly, to trigger FAAAA preemption in this
circuit, (1) “a state must have enacted or attempted to enforce a law,” and (2) that law
must relate to a broker’s “rates, routes, or services ‘either by expressly referring to

them, or by having a significant economic effect on them.” Nationwide Freight, 784 F.3d
at 373–74 (quoting Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423,
8
1432 (7th Cir. 1996)).
As previously noted, I can set aside the first issue because state common-law
actions qualify as “other provision[s] having the force and effect of law” under the

FAAAA. Northwest, Inc., 572 U.S. at 284; United Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, Inc., 219
F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2000); Non Typical, Inc., 2012 WL 1910076, at *2 (collecting cases).
Therefore, the second issue—whether the state law relates to rates, routes or
services—is where the rubber meets the road. As the Supreme Court put it, “[s]ome
state actions may affect [rates] in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to have

pre-emptive effect.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388, 390 (1992).
The Seventh Circuit has construed this language to entail that a court “must decide
whether the state law at issue falls on the affirmative or negative side of the preemption
line.” S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 697 F.3d at 550. This isn’t a particularly helpful
description of how I am to go about answering the question. And indeed, I suppose the
lack of guidance from higher courts on the issue of whether state negligence claims are

preempted is what has led to the depth of the disagreement by various judges around
the country on the preemption issue.
Here’s my best analysis of the issue: Evaluating a statute’s preemptive effect is
ultimately an exercise “guided by the rule that the purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone in every preemption case.” Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). I am “mindful of the adage that Congress
does not cavalierly preempt state law causes of action.” Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508
9
F.3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007). As the Supreme Court explained long ago, where
“Congress has neither provided nor suggested any substitute for the traditional state
court procedure for collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct,” that

adage is of particular import. United Const. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S.
656, 663–64 (1954).
Let’s not beat around the bush: the upshot, if Coyote Logistics is right about the
preemption issue, is that Ms. Wardingley will be left holding the bag and the tortfeasor
will go about his merry way free to harm someone else. In other words, the injured

party is deprived of its property without recourse or compensation, and the tortfeasor is
granted “immunity from liability for their tortious conduct.” Id. Frankly, it’s a little hard
to swallow the proposition that Congress intended such a result by displacing all state
negligence claims against trucking companies through the passage of the FAAAA just
because an adverse verdict against a trucking (or brokerage) company could
conceivably effect cartage prices in some remote way.

Coyote Logistics claims I shouldn’t be so skeptical. They tell me that the
negligence claims asserted against it “go to the heart of its business” and
services—arranging for the transportation of property by carriers like Safe Trans as a
federally licensed freight broker—and Wardingley’s allegations reveal that she seeks
“to use Indiana tort law to determine and control [its] services as a broker.” [DE 40 at

11.] Complying with a reasonable duty of care in its selection of motor carriers to safely
and securely transport cargo across the country, Coyote Logistics argues, will require it
10
to incur “additional burden and expense of complying with the patchwork of tort laws
of the fifty states, which is exactly what Congress intended to avoid in enacting the
preemption provision.” Id.

From one angle, Coyote Logistics’ argument has a superficial appeal. It is
reasonable to think that imposing a duty of reasonable care in the selection of motor
carriers entails meaningful economic effects on their services. Freight brokers may have
to undertake additional measures to vet carriers, and these measures, in turn, will
presumably raise their costs of production (and potentially their prices). But from an

economic point of view, the argument cuts both ways. An equally reasonable view is
that negligence in the selection of motor carriers itself “operates as a privately-imposed
transaction cost on the affected sale.” Cf. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 697 F.3d at 559
(citations omitted) (holding that enforcement of state anti-bribery (and more generally
anti-corruption) laws is too tenuously related to the regulation of the rates, routes, and
services in the trucking industry to fall within the FAAAA’s preemption rule). Put

differently, state regulation of commercial freight brokers’ negligence in the selection of
motor carriers “is an attempt to lift this ‘tax’ from the shoulders of its
consumers”—making “market pricing mechanisms work more efficiently—not less.” Id.
(emphasis added). It would thus seem odd to bar enforcement of such laws based on
concerns about a spiral of competing state regulations increasing transaction costs in the

trucking industry.
As the citations set out above show [see supra at 6–8], a considerable amount of
11
ink has been spilled over whether personal injury plaintiffs like Wardingley may
proceed with negligence claims against freight brokers. On balance, I find more
persuasive the line of recent decisions finding that such claims fall outside the

FAAAA’s preemption provision.2 Simply put, I remain dubious that Congress, in its
mission to unencumber the interstate trucking industry from a patchwork of state
tariffs, price controls, and similar economic regulations, also aimed to completely
unyoke trucking companies and freight brokers from commonsense standards of care
enforced through private tort actions. See Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637,

644–45 (9th Cir. 2014). It goes without saying that the law of negligence is not specific to
the trucking industry. Indiana’s common-law duty of ordinary care does not mention or
target a freight broker’s prices, routes, or services. Accord Ciotola, 481 F. Supp. 3d at 388
(evaluating Pennsylvania negligence law). It applies across industries and walks of life.
And, where the law of negligence applies, it’s easy enough to comply—just act
reasonably.

Notably, a number of courts have long held that personal injury claims stemming
from negligence are not preempted by the identical preemption provision applicable to
the airline industry. See Scott, 372 F. Supp. 3d at 769 (citing Charas v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334
(5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also Smith v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir.

2 To be sure, others have viewed the issue differently. At the same time, this view draws
substantial support from the decisions of several lower courts considering similar arguments.
12
1995) (en banc) (“Neither the language nor history of the ADA implies that Congress
was attempting to displace state personal injury tort law concerning the safety of the
airline business.”). This reasoning has equal application to covered entities in the

trucking industry. See Scott, 372 F. Supp. 3d at 769. Lending from earlier ADA cases,
several courts have concluded that personal injury negligence claims are not barred by
the FAAAA. See, e.g., Ciotola, 481 F. Supp. 3d at 390 (holding that “although
Pennsylvania's tort law may have some negative financial consequences for a broker or
carrier, it is not preempted by the FAAAA. Pennsylvania's tort law is a part of the

backdrop of laws that all businesses must follow”); Owens v. Anthony, No. 2-11-0033,
2011 WL 6056409, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 6, 2011) (collecting and applying ADA
precedents to FAAAA’s identical language).
In sum, based on the foregoing authorities, I find that the FAAAA does not
preempt Wardingley’s personal injury negligence claims against Coyote Logistics
sounding in vicarious liability and negligent selection of Safe Trans and its driver.

2. Wardingley’s Claims Fall Within the FAAAA’s Safety Exception
Wardingley’s claims are not preempted under the FAAAA for an independent
reason—they fall within what courts have referred to as the “safety exception.”
Notwithstanding the general provisions in § 14501(c)(1), the Act:
[S]hall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor
vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or
limitations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the
hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate
motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial
responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance
13
authorization.
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). In recent years, following the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis in Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., several lower courts have

interpreted this language to spare state common law claims asserted against freight
brokers from FAAAA preemption. 976 F.3d at 1026–31; see, e.g., Crouch, 563 F. Supp. 3d
at 876; Montgomery, 2021 WL 4129327, at *2–3; Finley, 2018 WL 5284616, at *5.
In Miller, the plaintiff claimed that a freight broker negligently hired an unsafe
motor carrier, who caused an accident resulting in the plaintiff’s bodily injury. 976 F.3d

at 1020. The court determined that selection of a motor carrier strikes at the core
function of a broker and while state negligence laws do not specifically dictate brokers’
services, they nevertheless impose “an obligation on brokers at the point at which they
arrange for transportation by [a] motor carrier,” and thus “related to” brokers’ services.
Id. at 1024–25. At the same time, the court found that the claims were saved by the
safety exception, since under the Act states retain power to “regulate safety through

common-law tort claims.” Id. at 1026. The balance of lower court decisions following
Miller, including those of a handful of lower courts in the Seventh Circuit, have adopted
the second prong of Miller. [See DE 45 at 12–13 & n.2 (collecting cases).]
I find the second prong of Miller’s analysis persuasive and consistent with the
legislative intent underlying the FAAAA: namely, to preempt price and service

regulations dictating the economics of the interstate tucking and freight brokering
markets, not safety, the traditional ambit of state governments. States have a safety
14
interest in private tort actions, like Wardingley’s here, which serve to regulate the safety
of roadways. As the Ninth Circuit correctly observed, the FAAAA’s legislative history
is devoid of any suggestion that “Congress intended to eliminate this important

component of the States’ power over safety.” See 976 F.3d at 1022–23, 1026; accord City of
Columbus, 536 U.S. at 439 (“Congress’ clear purpose in § 14501(c)(2)(A) is to ensure that
its preemption of States' economic authority over motor carriers of property,
§ 14501(c)(1), ‘not restrict’ the preexisting and traditional state police power over
safety.”).

Coyote Logistics retorts that the language of the safety exception is “much more
narrow” than elucidated in Miller, and simply does not apply to common law claims
against freight brokers. [See DE 49 at 8.] Admittedly, the plain language of the exception
does not mention common law tort claims or brokers’ services in selecting motor
carriers, whereas the words “law” and “broker” are expressly included in the general
preemption provision. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), with § 14501(c)(1). The

exception says that it applies to “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect
to motor vehicles,” and Coyote Logistics notes that brokers are not directly responsible
for loading, operating, or maintaining motor vehicles. Coyote Logistics also relies on
case law suggesting that the phrase “regulatory authority” does not “permit a private
right of action” or extend to state common law claims. [DE 40 at 16–17 (citing Gillum,

2020 WL 444371, at *12).] These arguments all press a reasonable, alternative
interpretation of the scope of the phrase “the safety regulatory authority of a State with
15
respect to motor vehicles.” Ultimately, however, I am guided by Miller’s persuasive
reading of the FAAAA’s legislative history, see 976 F.3d at 1022–23, 1026–27, along with
the Seventh Circuit’s admonition that state law should be completely preempted “only

where Congress clearly intended to replace state law with federal law and create a
federal forum,” In re Repository Techs., Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 723 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, for
this independent reason, Wardingley’s claims are not preempted by the FAAAA.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Coyote Logistics, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss

Count III of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint [DE 39] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: November 4, 2022.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10163220. Public record. Not legal advice.