# Knight v. Flakes

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · May 23, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10162637

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** May 23, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10162637

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of Eighth Amendment claim because the same facts comprised a more applicable First Amendment claim

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

AUSTIN KNIGHT,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:22-CV-394-JD-MGG

FLAKES, BOROLOV, CHEEKS, WEBB,
HOSKINS, SHELBY, R. EVANS,
JENKINS, RUPERT, CAINE, TALBOT,
TRIM, MILLER, J. KENNERK, JOHN
GALIPEAU,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Austin Knight, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a 164 paragraph complaint
against nineteen defendants based on events alleged to have occurred at the Westville
Correctional Facility. ECF 2. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Knight alleges Sgt. Flakes told all the inmates in his dorm he was a snitch on June
27, 2021. ECF 2 at ¶¶ 12 and 15. Shortly thereafter, while Knight was walking laps for
recreation with another inmate, Sgt. Flakes yelled at them out the window of her office,
“Whoop his punk a**!” Id. at ¶ 17 (asterisks in original). When he returned to the dorm,
he alleges inmates threatened him. Id. at ¶ 24. Several approached him and he

responded by attacking one of the inmates with a sharpened screw. Id. at ¶ 25. Knight
alleges Officer Shelby told an inmate on August 1, 2021, he was a snitch and “[w]e ain’t
got no choice but to F him up now.” Id. at ¶ 85. Knight alleges Officer Cheeks
repeatedly told inmates in 2021 he was a snitch who “stole from all his Muslim
brothers.” Id. at 109. Knight alleges Sgt. Flakes told inmates in his housing unit he was a
snitch on August 11, 2021, February 6, 2022, February 8, 2022, February 14, 2022,

February 15, 2022, and February 17, 2022. Id. at ¶¶ 97 and 126. Sgt. Flakes is also alleged
to have told them to “make sure you split him and make him bleed.” Id.
Under the Eighth Amendment, correctional officials have a constitutional duty to
protect inmates from violence. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir. 2008). To
state a claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff must establish the defendant “had actual

knowledge of an impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable
refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant’s failure to prevent it.”
Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “[I]t’s common
knowledge that snitches face unique risks in prison . . ..” Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 570
(7th Cir. 2008). Prison officials may be found liable where it can be proven they knew an

inmate “faced a significant risk of harm from a ‘particular vulnerability’ and exposed
him to that risk anyway.” Wright v. Miller, 561 F. App’x 551, 555 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 915 (7th Cir. 2005)). Such are the allegations here and they
state claims against Sgt. Flakes, Officer Shelby, and Officer Cheeks.
Years ago, on June 17, 2016, Knight alleges he had a mental breakdown and
attempted suicide four times in the next three months. ECF 2 at ¶ 21. He alleges it was

widely known he had a history of mental illness. Id. at ¶ 21. He alleges several
defendants deliberately psychologically victimized him “in a willful and malicious
effort to ‘break him mentally.’” Id. at ¶ 22. He alleges they “were trying to drive him to
suicide with their taunts and mind games.” Id. at 67. Specifically, he alleges Sgt. Flakes
made jokes about him crying after the fight on June 27, 2021. Id. at ¶ 27. He alleges an
unnamed Internal Affairs Officer said, “let’s kill this cocksucker” that it was a “four

man job” and “he [Knight] lost his life.” Id. at ¶¶ 30 and 31. He alleges Officer Borolov,
Officer Webb, Lt. Caine, and Sgt. Trim allowed/helped inmates steal his commissary
order. Id. at ¶¶ 40-48. He alleges Officer Cheeks said “that’s what that snitch gets” on
July 29, 2021. Id. at ¶ 59. Later that day, he alleges Officer Borolov, Officer Cheeks, Lt.
Caine and Sgt. Trim, allowed inmates to taunt him after stealing his commissary order.

Id. at ¶ 60. He alleges they taunted him to “mess with his head.” Id. at ¶ 63. Sgt. Trim
taunted him “saying boo-hoo, they stole my commissary several times.” Id. at 62.
Knight alleges he is Muslim and Lt. Caine told him the wrong direction to face when
praying. Id. at ¶ 65. He alleges Officer Shelby and Officer R. Evans made non-verbal
threats they would attack him while he was cuffed. Id. at ¶ 90. He says he took the

threats seriously because he had seen Officer Shelby beat a handcuffed inmate. Id. at 91.
He alleges Sgt. Flakes came to his cell block on August 11, 2021, and told him he “had
HIV and was dead anyway” and that when he was transferred to the Miami
Correctional Facility he would be killed. Id. at ¶ 97. He alleges Sgt. Flakes also harassed
him on August 12, 2021, and December 1, 2021. Id. at ¶ 99. He alleges Sgt. Flakes cut off
a phone call with his wife. Id. at ¶ 98. He alleges Officer Shelby told another officer to

limit him to one t-shirt, one pair of socks, and one pair of boxers for months. Id. at ¶ 101.
He alleges that rather than turning in his grievances, Caseworker J. Kennerk told other
inmates what he had written in his grievances. Id. at ¶ 102.
“[M]ost verbal harassment by jail or prison guards does not rise to the level of
cruel and unusual punishment[, b]ut some does . . ..” Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 358
(7th Cir. 2015). Here, these allegations state a claim against Sgt. Flakes, Officer Borolov,

Officer Cheeks, Officer Shelby, Officer R. Evans, Lt. Caine, Sgt. Trim, and Caseworker J.
Kennerk because Knight alleges these malicious and sadistic efforts to psychologically
victimize him were targeted to exacerbate his mental illness and encourage him to
commit suicide. The complaint would state a claim against the unnamed Internal
Affairs Officer, but “it is pointless to include lists of anonymous defendants in federal

court; this type of placeholder does not open the door to relation back under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15, nor can it otherwise help the plaintiff.” Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060
(7th Cir. 1997).
Knight alleges Warden John Galipeau turned a blind eye to the harassment
because he witnessed it on several occasions, but did nothing to prevent it. Id. at 146. He

does not say when, how often, nor what he heard. Moreover, it is not plausible to infer
he knew the malicious and sadistic intent to exacerbate Knight’s mental illness. A
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all
the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, “a plaintiff must do better
than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might
suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).
Knight alleges his property was lost, stolen, or damaged on several occasions.

ECF 2 at ¶¶ 33-35, 40-48, and 140. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that State
officials shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law,” but, a State tort claims act which provides a method to seek reimbursement for
the negligent loss or intentional depravation of property meets the requirements of the
due process clause by providing due process of law. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533

(1984) (“For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees,
the state’s action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a
suitable post deprivation remedy.”). Indiana’s tort claims act (Indiana Code § 34-13-3-1
et seq.) and other laws provide for state judicial review of property losses caused by
government employees. Those State laws provide an adequate post deprivation remedy
to redress State officials’ accidental or intentional deprivation of a person’s property. See

Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Wynn has an adequate post
deprivation remedy in the Indiana Tort Claims Act, and no more process was due.”).
Even the destruction of legal materials is merely a property loss if the papers are
replaceable. Hossman v. Spradlin, 812 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir. 1987). Therefore, these alleged
property losses do not state a claim.
Knight alleges Officer Jenkins and Officer Rupert placed him in a cell with feces

and urine smeared on the floor where he was left to sleep on July 29, 2021. ECF 2 at ¶¶
53-55 and 66. He alleges Officer Shelby and Officer R. Evans placed him in a cell on
August 1, 2021, with feces and urine filling the non-working toilet as well as smeared
on the floor and walls. Id. at ¶ 83. He alleges Officer Jenkins and Officer Rupert gave
him a mat soiled with feces and urine on August 2, 2021. Id. at ¶¶ 87-88. The Eighth

Amendment requires prison officials “must provide humane conditions of confinement
. . . and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27
(1984)). Conditions of confinement must be severe to support an Eighth Amendment
claim. “[T]he prison officials’ act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. at 834. The Eighth Amendment only protects
prisoners from conditions that “exceed contemporary bounds of decency of a mature,
civilized society.” Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992). “[A] court
considering an Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions of confinement must
examine the totality of the circumstances. Even if no single condition of confinement
would be unconstitutional in itself, exposure to the cumulative effect of prison

conditions may subject inmates to cruel and unusual punishment.” Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 362–63 (1981) (footnote, quotation marks, and citation omitted). Moreover,
“the duration of the condition . . . determines whether the conditions of confinement are
unconstitutional.” Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1997). Though Knight
may not be able to ultimately demonstrate the severity and duration of these conditions
violated the Eighth Amendment, he has plausibly alleged they do.

Knight alleges Officer Shelby, Officer R. Evans, Officer Jenkins, and Officer
Rupert violated his right as a Muslim to practice his religion when they placed him in
the feces smeared cells because he needed a clean place to pray. ECF 2 at ¶¶ 56, 83 and
159. Prisoners have a right to exercise their religion under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment. Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2011).

Correctional officials may restrict the exercise of religion if the restrictions are
reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives, which include safety, security,
and economic concerns. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). As such, any First
Amendment claim Knight might have would be co-extensive with the Eighth
Amendment claim on which he is already proceeding. Though the measure of his

damages may be influenced by the feces being a religious imposition as well as a
sanitation issue, proceeding on both a First and Eighth Amendment claim based on the
same facts would be redundant. Cf. Hambright v. Kemper, 705 F. App’x 461, 462 (7th Cir.
2017) (affirming dismissal of Eighth Amendment claim because the same facts
comprised a more applicable First Amendment claim); Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580,
586 (7th Cir. 2005) (dismissing additional claims based on same circumstances because

the claim “gains nothing by attracting additional constitutional labels”).
Knight alleges he showed Officer Cheeks and Lt. Caine a deep, inch-long cut on
his eyebrow at 9:00 pm on December 25, 2021. ECF 2 at ¶ 110. At 10:00 pm, Officer
Borolov told him there was no nurse available. Id. at ¶ 111. At 11:00 pm, Officer Cheeks
and either Officer Borolov or Officer Webb took him to a nurse. Id. at 113. Under the
Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and
subjective component by showing: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and (2)
the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that medical need. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A medical need is “serious” if it is one that a physician has
diagnosed as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d
645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Deliberate indifference means the defendant “acted in an
intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the
plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent
that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham,

394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, the complaint does not provide facts from which
it can be plausibly inferred that these defendants were deliberately indifferent by
waiting two hours to take him to see a nurse. Neither does it provide facts showing he
had an emergency which required immediate attention.
Knight alleges Lt. Talbot and Sgt. Miller put rock salt in his food on March 16,
2022, which made him sick for days. ECF 2 at ¶¶ 134-36. “[P]rison officials must ensure

that inmates receive adequate food . . . and must take reasonable measures to guarantee
the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). This allegation states a claim.
In the Claims for Relief section of the complaint, Knight mentions several other
possible legal theories which do not state claims in this case. He asserts a retaliation
claim against seventeen defendants. ECF 2 at ¶ 156. “To establish a prima facie case of

unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) he engaged in activity protected by the
First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First
Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a
motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Douglas v.
Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, Knight has not clearly identified what First Amendment activity he engaged in,
what deprivation each defendant caused, nor why it is plausible it was motivated by
the First Amendment activity.
Knight asserts a State law negligence claim against sixteen individual
defendants. ECF 2 at ¶ 157. He also asserts a State law tort claim against four individual

defendants for improperly handling his commissary order. Id. at 160. State employees
who are merely negligent are acting with the scope of their employment. See Indiana
Code 34-13-3-5(c). Processing commissary orders is within the scope of the defendants’
employment. “Under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, there is no remedy against the
individual employee so long as he was acting within the scope of his employment.” Ball
v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636, 645 (7th Cir. 2014). “Indiana Tort Claims Act confers

on public employees a broad immunity from suit for acts committed within the scope of
their employment.” Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 2016). “If an alleged
action is within the general scope of an individual’s authority, it is authorized within
the meaning of the Tort Claims Act, regardless of whether it was done negligently or
with improper motive.” Reiner v. Dandurand, 33 F.Supp.3d 1018, 1033 (N.D. Ind. 2014)
(quotations and citations omitted).

Under Indiana law, an individual is acting within the scope of his or her
employment if the conduct is “of the same general nature as that
authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized.” Celebration Fireworks,
Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 453 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Restatement
(Second) Agency § 229 (1958)). “Even criminal acts may be considered as
being within the scope of employment if the criminal acts originated in
activities so closely associated with the employment relationship as to fall
within its scope.” Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 473 (Ind. 2003)
(quotation marks omitted).
Bishop v. Indiana Dep’t of Correction, No. 3:20-CV-1064-JD-MGG, 2021 WL 2255364, at *2
(N.D. Ind. June 3, 2021).
Knight asserts a state law Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim
against sixteen individual defendants. ECF 2 at ¶ 157. The elements of an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim are that the defendant: “(1) engage[d] in extreme
and outrageous conduct (2) which intentionally or recklessly (3) causes (4) severe
emotional distress to another.” Curry v. Whitaker, 943 N.E.2d 354, 361 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011). For eight of the sixteen defendants, the complaint does not allege facts from
which it can be plausibly alleged that they engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct
against Knight. For the other eight, he is already proceeding on Eighth Amendment
claims based on the same factual allegations. Because he alleges this conduct caused

him to physically injure himself,1 including this claim would be redundant.2 See Conyers
v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005).
Knight asserts Officer Borolov, Officer Cheeks, and Lt. Caine left him in a feces
smeared cell. ECF 2 at ¶ 158. In the body of the complaint Officers Shelby, Officer R.
Evans, Jenkins and Rupert are mentioned in connection with those allegations, but
Borolov, Cheeks, and Caine are not. The complaint does not plausibly allege facts from

which it can be inferred those three were personally involved with those incidents.
Knight asserts seven individual defendants violated the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) when they left him in a feces smeared cell. ECF
2 at ¶ 159. However, RLUIPA only affords injunctive relief. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S.
277, 285 (2011). Because the amended complaint alleges he was released from that cell in

2021, any RLUIPA claim he might have had is moot.
Knight asserts a retaliation claim against Officer Borolov, Officer Webb, Lt.
Caine, and Sgt. Trim based on their allowing/helping other inmates steal his
commissary items. ECF 2 at ¶ 160. Because he is proceeding against them on an Eighth
Amendment claim based on these same facts for maliciously and sadistically

1 ECF 2 at ¶ 49 (“cut a deep gash in his left forearm”), ¶ 57 and 77 (“on hunger and water strike”
for four days), ¶ 69 (“carving ‘I did not kill me’ in his left bicep and left hand . . . with a nail”), ¶ 70
(“pushed the same nail into the vein in the crook of his right arm”), ¶ 105-107 (deep cut on eyebrow after
collapsing due to lack of food).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) which would otherwise prohibit compensation for a mental or
emotional injury without a physical injury.
psychologically victimizing him to exacerbate his mental illness and encourage him to
commit suicide, including this claim would be redundant. See Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d

580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005).
Knight asserts Officer Cheeks, Officer Hoskins, Officer Shelby, Officer R. Evans,
Officer Jenkins, Office Rupert, Lt. Caine, Lt. Talbot, and Sgt. Miller contaminated his
food. ECF 2 at ¶ 161. In the body of the complaint Lt. Talbot and Sgt. Miller are
mentioned in connection putting rock salt in his food one time, but Cheeks, Hoskins,
Shelby, R. Evans, Jenkins, Rupert, and Caine are not. The complaint does not plausibly

allege facts from which it can be inferred those seven were personally involved with
contaminating his food.
Knight asserts eighteen individual defendants conspired to deprive him of his
constitutional rights. ECF 2 at ¶ 162. However, “mere suspicion that persons adverse to
the plaintiff had joined a conspiracy against him or her [i]s not enough.” Cooney v.

Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009). This complaint does not plausibly alleges facts
showing a conspiracy by anyone other than possibly those against whom he is already
proceeding based on their individual actions. Even if possible, adding a conspiracy
claim against them would be redundant. See Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir.
2005).

Knight asserts Warden John Galipeau and the Indiana Department of Correction
failed to properly supervise the other defendants. ECF 2 at ¶ 163. To the extent he is
seeking monetary damages, the Indiana Department of Correction has sovereign
immunity. Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001). His injunctive relief
claims will be discussed later in this opinion. As for Warden Galipeau, there is no
general supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594

(7th Cir. 2009). “Only persons who cause or participate in the violations are
responsible.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). [P]ublic employees are
responsible for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else’s.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555
F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009).
There is no mention of Officer Bullock or Officer X. Evans in the body of the
complaint. Because the complaint does not provide any facts showing they were

personally involved in violating Knight’s rights, they will be dismissed.
In addition to monetary damages, Knight seeks injunctive relief. He asks that his
phone calls not be monitored and the contents shared with other inmates. The
complaint alleges his wife called prison officials. ECF 2 at ¶ 13. It alleges other inmates
were told about that call. Id. at ¶¶ 13 and 15. It does not describe an instance when the

contents of his calls were shared with inmates after they were monitored.
Knight asks that his food not be tampered with. The complaint alleges he has
often found hair, spit, and mouse feces in his food. ECF 2 at ¶ 96. It is unclear how his
food is being contaminated, but Warden Galipeau has both the authority and the
responsibility to ensure Knight receives constitutionally adequate food as required by

the Eighth Amendment. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011).
Knight asks that the defendants stop psychologically victimizing him and to be
transferred to another prison. He was notified on August 16, 2021, that he had been
approved for transfer. ECF 2-1 at 10. Relocating him is one way for the alleged
psychological victimization to stop. It is unclear why he has not been transferred, but he
will be granted leave to proceed against Warden Galipeau in his official capacity to be

free of psychological victimization as required by the Eighth Amendment.
Finally, Knight asks for a preliminary injunction on all of the claims for which he
seeks a permanent injunction. ECF 4. However, he is not being granted leave to proceed
on all of injunctive relief claims raised in the complaint. For those that are being
dismissed, he has no chance of success on the merits and there is no need for Warden
Galipeau to resond to them. Knight is proceeding on injunctive relief claims to obtain

constitutionally adequate food and to be free from psychological victimization. For
those two claims, Warden Galipeau will be ordered to respond in his official capacity.
“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). “A plaintiff seeking a

preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance
of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Additionally,
[t]he PLRA circumscribes the scope of the court’s authority to enter an
injunction in the corrections context. Where prison conditions are found to
violate federal rights, remedial injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn,
extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right, and use the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation
of the Federal right. This section of the PLRA enforces a point repeatedly
made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging prison conditions: Prison
officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the
institutions they manage.
Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations
omitted). After Warden Galipeau responds, Knight will have thirty days to reply.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Austin Knight leave to proceed against Sgt. Flakes in her individual
capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for creating a substantial risk of harm

by labeling him a snitch and encouraging inmates to attack him on June 27, 2021,
August 11, 2021, February 6, 2022, February 8, 2022, February 14, 2022, February 15,
2022, and February 17, 2022, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(2) GRANTS Austin Knight leave to proceed against Officer Shelby in his
individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for creating a substantial

risk of harm by labeling him a snitch and encouraging an inmate to attack him on
August 1, 2021, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(3) GRANTS Austin Knight leave to proceed against Officer Cheeks in his
individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for creating a substantial
risk of harm by repeatedly labeling him a snitch who stole from his Muslim brothers in

2021, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(4) GRANTS Austin Knight leave to proceed against Sgt. Flakes, Officer Borolov,
Officer Cheeks, Officer Webb, Officer Shelby, Officer R. Evans, Lt. Caine, and Sgt. Trim,
and Caseworker J. Kennerk in their individual capacities for compensatory, and
punitive damages for maliciously and sadistically psychologically victimizing him to
exacerbate his mental illness and encourage him to commit suicide in violation of the
Eighth Amendment;

(5) GRANTS Austin Knight leave to proceed against Officer Jenkins and Officer
Rupert in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for
putting him in a cell with feces and urine smeared on the floor where he was left to
sleep on July 29, 2021, and for giving him a mat soiled with feces and urine on August
2, 2021, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(6) GRANTS Austin Knight leave to proceed against Officer Shelby and Officer

R. Evans in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for
putting him in a cell on August 1, 2021, with a non-working toilet full of feces and urine
which were also smeared on the floor and walls in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(7) GRANTS Austin Knight leave to proceed against Lt. Talbot and Sgt. Miller in
their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for putting rock salt

in his food on March 16, 2022, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;
(8) GRANTS Austin Knight leave to proceed against Warden John Galipeau in
his official capacity for injunctive relief to obtain constitutionally adequate food and to
be free from psychological victimization;
(9) DISMISSES all other claims;

(10) DISMISSES Hoskins, Bullock, X. Evans, John Doe, and Indiana Dept. of
Corrections;
(11) DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service
from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to serve process on) Sgt.
Flakes, Officer Borolov, Officer Cheeks, Officer Webb, Officer Shelby, Officer R. Evans,
Officer Jenkins, Officer Rupert, Lt. Caine, Lt. Talbot, Sgt. Trim, Sgt. Miller, Caseworker

J. Kennerk, and Warden John Galipeau at the Indiana Department of Correction, with a
copy of this order, the complaint (ECF 2), and the preliminary injunction motion (ECF
5);
(12) DIRECTS the clerk to fax or email a copy of the same documents to Warden
John Galipeau at the Westville Correctional Facility;
(13) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the full name,

date of birth, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive
service if it has such information;
(14) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Sgt. Flakes, Officer Borolov, Officer
Cheeks, Officer Webb, Officer Shelby, Officer R. Evans, Officer Jenkins, Officer Rupert,
Lt. Caine, Lt. Talbot, Sgt. Trim, Sgt. Miller, Caseworker J. Kennerk, and Warden John

Galipeau to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D.
Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to
proceed in this screening order; and
(15) ORDERS Warden John Galipeau to file and serve a response to the
preliminary injunction, as soon as possible but no later than June 17, 2022 (with

supporting documentation and declarations from other staff as necessary)
describing/explaining how Austin Knight is receiving constitutionally adequate food
and kept free of psychological victimization as required by the Eighth Amendment; and
(16) GRANTS Austin Knight thirty days to reply to Warden Galipeau’s response to
the motion for preliminary injunction.

SO ORDERED on May 23, 2022
/s/JON E. DEGUILIO
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10162637. Public record. Not legal advice.