# Groves v. South Bend Community School Corporation

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · November 19, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10161726

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** November 19, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10161726

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing subjective reasons can be important in assessing who is best qualified for a position
- recognizing subjective evaluations of a job applicant are often critical to the decision-making process
- holding a plaintiff’s unsupported inferences do not defeat summary judgment
- discussing requirements to make out a prima facie case of reverse discrimination

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

WILLIAM GROVES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:18-CV-979 JD

SOUTH BEND COMMUNITY SCHOOL
CORPORATION,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff William Groves, a white male, filed this case alleging reverse race
discrimination and retaliation after he lost out on two South Bend Community School
Corporation administrative jobs to a black candidate. Defendant Board of School Trustees of the
South Bend Community School Corporation (“SBCSC”) has moved the Court for summary
judgment on Mr. Groves’s claims. Mr. Groves opposes SBCSC’s motion and has requested the
Court hold an oral argument on the motion before issuing a ruling. For the following reasons, the
Court finds oral argument is unnecessary and grants SBCSC’s motion for summary judgment.

I. Factual Background
William Groves is a white male who began working with the South Bend Community
School Corporation in the 1991-1992 school year. He taught social studies at Clay High School,
one of the high schools within the SBCSC umbrella, and served as head coach of the freshman
football and freshman girls’ basketball teams in that first year. (Ex. 8, Groves Dep. 24:11–14;
DE 25-7 at 2.) He subsequently took on more advanced academic, administrative, and athletic
positions over time, becoming dean of students at Clay in 2001 (Groves Dep. at 35:11–15, 36:3–
8), student management director at Clay in 2004, and then athletic director at Adams High
School, another high school under the SBCSC umbrella, in 2007. (DE 25-7 at 2.) Mr. Groves
was still serving as athletic director at Adams when the events that gave rise to this lawsuit began
in 2017.

SBCSC was going to be losing its Corporation Director of Athletics (“CDA”) at the end
of the 2016-2017 school year and had started looking to hire a replacement. (Ex. 6, Seitz Dep. at
18:17–25; Ex. 8, Groves Dep. at 30:22–23.) The CDA was a Corporation-wide position charged
with maintaining fiscal responsibility throughout the Corporation athletic programs, working to
increase athletic participation, monitoring athletic policies and procedures, leading fundraising
and marketing efforts, and working with the Indiana High School Athletic Association
(“IHSAA”). (DE 30-5.) The 2017 job posting for the position listed only a bachelor’s degree and
a valid driver’s license as required qualifications. (Id.)
Mr. Groves applied for the CDA job opening and was one of four candidates Kenneth
Spells, the SBCSC superintendent in 2017, eventually interviewed. Dr. Spells is a black male and

was the sole person responsible for interviewing and recommending candidates to the school
board for the CDA position. (Ex. 25-2, Spells Dep. at 25:19–21.) Another candidate Dr. Spells
interviewed was Seabe Gavin, a black male who had been an employee with SBCSC since 2002
and had worked as a substitute teacher, student manager, administrative assistant, in-school
suspension coordinator, teacher, and coach during his time with the SBCSC. (Ex. 5, Gavin Dep.
at 19, 21–25, 37.)
Mr. Gavin had a criminal history at the time he applied for the CDA position, having
received two felony convictions in 1999. (DE 30-22; DE 30-23.) He had also previously been
terminated both from an earlier job he had before coming to SBCSC and from a student manager
position he previously held at SBCSC. (DE 30-3; DE 30-4.) SBCSC ran two background checks
on Mr. Gavin in 2002 and 2007, but neither one showed he had a criminal history. (DE 30-33.)
SBCSC did not run any background checks on Mr. Gavin after 2007 despite having a written
policy that background checks were to be run on candidates before hiring them for administrative

positions. (DE 30-31.) Dr. Spells stated the lack of subsequent background checks on Mr. Gavin
aligned with SBCSC’s practice of not performing background checks on current SBCSC
employees who were accepting new positions within the Corporation. (Ex. 10, Spells Dep. at
9:5–12.) Mr. Groves never reported any of his problematic criminal or employment history on
his job applications and there is no evidence that anyone involved in any hiring process at issue
in this case ever learned about Mr. Gavin’s background. (Ex. 4, Spells Dep. at 17:11–23, 19:17–
24; Ex. 5, Henderson Dep. at 17:17–21; DE 30-27.)
Dr. Spells interviewed Mr. Groves, Mr. Gavin, and two other candidates for the CDA
position. He used the same set of questions in each interview. (Ex. 4, Spells Dep. at 54:11–22.)
Dr. Spells eventually recommended that Mr. Gavin be chosen as the new CDA and Mr. Gavin

received the CDA job based on that recommendation. (Ex. 4, Spells Dep. at 15:14–17, 28:17–20,
29:7–10.) Dr. Spells stated he chose Mr. Gavin over the other candidates because Mr. Gavin
interviewed well, gave Dr. Spells the impression he could help ensure SBCSC had a good
relationship with the IHSAA after a stretch of time where the relationship had been strained,
gave good answers about helping students get into college, and was active and visible in the
community. (Ex. 4, Spells Dep. at 29:9–30:2; 30:16–21, 31:13–32:3, 36:21–37:8.)
Dr. Spells stated he did not choose Mr. Groves in part because Mr. Groves interviewed
poorly. Mr. Groves brought up money, his past firing of coaches as an athletic director, and his
desire to have total control over SBCSC athletics if given the CDA job, none of which sat well
with Dr. Spells. (Ex. 4, Spells Dep. at 42:15–25, 46:15–47:10, 48:9–18; Ex. 8, Groves Dep. at
97:14–21.) Dr. Spells also cited Mr. Groves’s past issues with IHSAA compliance and sloppy
paperwork during his time as an athletic director as reasons he did not recommend Mr. Groves.
(Ex. 4, Spells Dep. at 38:17–23, 42:15–25, 45:21–25, 48:9–18.) None of Mr. Groves’s yearly

SBCSC evaluations described IHSAA compliance issues or sloppy paperwork (DE 30-16; DE
30-17; DE 30-18; DE 30-19; DE 30-20; DE 30-21), but Mr. Groves admitted to the issues during
his deposition. (Ex. 8, Groves Dep. at 81:15–19, 91:11–92:21.)
After finding out he did not receive the CDA job, Mr. Groves filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in November 2017
alleging the decision to hire Mr. Gavin was racially motivated. (DE 25-8.) The EEOC issued a
dismissal and notice of rights in September 2018 (DE 25-8) and Mr. Groves then filed his
original complaint with this Court in December 2018 (DE 1).
While this case was pending, Mr. Groves faced more employment issues at SBCSC. In
March 2019, SBCSC announced that it was going to restructure by eliminating the CDA and

individual high school athletic director positions in favor of a new, hybrid position of Dean of
Students/Athletics at four of the SBCSC high schools. The idea to make the change was formed
when Dr. Spells was still superintendent and was implemented when Todd Cummings, a new
superintendent, took control. (Ex. 2, Spell Dep. at 5:9–11, 11:20–13:5, 52:7–12; Ex. 3,
Cummings Dep. at 14:12–16:8.) SBCSC and Dr. Cummings cited cost saving as the driving
force behind the restructuring. (Ex. 3, Cummings Dep. at 14:9–17, 15:24–16:8; DE 30-13.) The
restructuring left both Mr. Groves and Mr. Gavin without jobs. SBCSC’s plan was to allow any
employees whose positions had been eliminated as part of the restructuring to apply for the new
Dean of Students/Athletics positions. (DE 30-13.)
SBCSC put together a committee to interview the nine candidates who were selected to
interview for the four new Dean of Students/Athletics positions. (Ex. 3, Cummings Dep. at
15:24–16:8; DE 25-4 at 15.) The principals of each of the four high schools who would be hiring
someone for the role were on the committee along with a middle school principal. (Ex. 7,

Henderson Dep. at 10:21–11:10; Ex 6, Seitz Dep. at 41:14–19; DE 25-4 at 14.) Both Mr. Groves
and Mr. Gavin applied for the four positions and received offers to interview. (Ex. 6, Seitz Dep.
at 42:22 to 43:8.)
Each high school principal was ultimately responsible for deciding who he would
recommend to the board to fill the Dean of Students/Athletics position at his own school. The
principal at Adams High School, Jim Seitz, recommended Robert Tull, a white male. The
principal at Washington High School recommended Garland Hudson, a black male who had been
the athletic director at Washington before the restructuring. The principal at Clay High School
recommended Al Hartman, a white male who had been the athletic director at Clay before the
restructuring. And the principal at Riley High School, Shawn Henderson, selected Mr. Gavin to

serve as the interim Dean of Students/Athletics at Riley before later making Mr. Gavin’s role
permanent. (Ex. 6, Seitz Dep. at 39:8–10, 40:2–7; Ex. 8, Groves Dep. at 77:14–16; DE 25-9 at 6–
7.)
Mr. Seitz said the main reason he did not offer Mr. Groves the Dean of Students/Athletics
position at Adams, despite Mr. Groves previously serving as the school’s athletic director, was
Mr. Groves’s lack of an administrative license. The lack of an administrative license was
problematic because the person who held the new position at Adams would be required to
evaluate teachers, and an administrative license was required to do those evaluations. (Ex. 6,
Seitz Dep. at 51:19–52:16.) Mr. Tull, the candidate Mr. Seitz ended up recommending, had an
administrator’s license. (Ex. 6, Seitz at 39:13–21, 52:7–8.) Additionally, while Mr. Seitz knew
about Mr. Groves’s CDA-related complaints against SBCSC at the time he made the Dean of
Students/Athletics hiring recommendation, he stated that the complaints played no role in his
decision. (Ex. 6, Seitz Dep. at 38:7–9.)

Mr. Henderson, the principal at Riley said he chose Mr. Gavin over the other candidates,
because Mr. Gavin was the “right fit” for Riley. Mr. Henderson in particular liked Mr. Gavin’s
answers about the growth he wanted to implement in Riley athletics and Mr. Gavin’s answers
about ideas he had to focus on student involvement and achievement. (Ex. 7, Henderson Dep. at
24:22–25:13.) Mr. Henderson did not know about Mr. Groves’s prior complaints against SBCSC
at the time he made his hiring recommendation and stated that race did not play any role in the
decision. (Ex.7, Henderson Dep. at 31:4–14.)
There is no evidence before the Court explaining why the principals at Clay and
Washington High Schools decided to fill their new Dean of Students/Athletics positions with Mr.
Hartman and Mr. Hudson, respectively. The only evidence before the Court is that both men held

the athletic director positions at the respective schools before becoming Dean of
Students/Athletics. (Ex. 8, Groves Dep. at 76:23–77:16; DE 25-9 at 5.)
After finding out he did not receive a Dean of Students/Athletics position, Mr. Groves
filed a second Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC in August 2019. The EEOC issued a
dismissal and notice of rights in September 2019 and Mr. Groves filed an amended complaint in
this case that included allegations over the Dean of Students/Athletics hiring decision. (DE 14.)
SBCSC has moved for summary judgment on all of Mr. Groves’s claims. (DE 25.)

II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper when the movant shows that there “is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A “material” fact is one identified by the substantive law as affecting the outcome of the
suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “genuine issue” exists with

respect to any material fact when “the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Where a factual record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial, and
summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Servs. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts must construe all
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable
inferences in that party’s favor. Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008); King v.
Preferred Tech. Grp., 166 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1999). The non-moving party cannot simply
rest on its pleadings but must present evidence sufficient to show the existence of each element

of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–
23 (1986).

III. Discussion
Mr. Groves’s amended complaint officially listed two claims, both of which alleged
reverse discrimination. The first claim is based on SBCSC’s decision not to hire him as its CDA
in 2017 and the second claim is based on SBCSC’s decision to eliminate his athletic director
position and then not hire him as a Dean of Students/Athletics in 2019. While those are the only
two claims specifically set out in the complaint, the complaint also contained an allegation that
SBCSC’s decision to eliminate Mr. Groves’s athletic director position and not hire him as a Dean
of Students/Athletics was a retaliatory measure in response to his filing an EEOC complaint and
this lawsuit after he lost out on the CDA position. (DE 14 ¶ 71.) Mr. Groves did not defend a
potential retaliation claim in his response to SBCSC’s motion for summary judgment though,
which the Court determines means he waived any claim he had. The Court, however, for

completeness, will still addresses the allegation in this order and explain why there is no
evidence to support it. Before getting to any summary judgment analysis though, the Court first
briefly addresses Mr. Groves’s motion for oral argument (DE 31).

A. Motion for Oral Argument
Mr. Groves requested that the Court allow oral argument in this case because the case
“involves complex issues of employment law including claims of employment discrimination
and allegations of the employer’s failure to follow their internal hiring policies.” (DE 31.)
Pursuant to Local Rule 7-5, the Court may “grant or deny a request for oral argument or
evidentiary hearing in its discretion.” N.D. Ind. L.R. 7-5(c)(1). While the Court respects that this
case involves what Mr. Groves believes are complex issues of employment law, the Court has
carefully reviewed the parties’ briefing of the issues and believes that the briefing has
sufficiently apprised the Court of the issues. Therefore, the Court denies Mr. Groves’s motion for
oral argument and moves to consider the merits of SBCSC’s motion.

B. Mr. Groves’s Discrimination Claims
Mr. Groves brought both of his discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. (DE 14 ¶ 60, 69); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009). When
considering summary judgment on Title VII claims, a court asks whether the evidence would
permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or
other proscribed factor caused the plaintiff’s discharge or other adverse employment action.
Ferrill v. Oak Creek-Franklin Joint Sch. Dist., 860 F.3d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Ortiz v.
Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)).

When reviewing discrimination claims, the Court recognizes that the McDonnell Douglas
framework analysis is no longer required and is now viewed simply as one way to organize and
present a claim of discrimination. The Seventh Circuit has stated that plaintiffs do not have to
“rely on the McDonnell Douglas method to carry that burden; she may well have other ‘direct or
circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of intentional discrimination.’” Joll v.
Valparaiso Cmty. Sch., 953 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Instead, plaintiffs
may point to “ambiguous or suggestive comments or conduct; better treatment of people
similarly situated but for the protected characteristic; and dishonest employer justifications for
disparate treatment.” Joll, 953 F.3d at 929. And as the Seventh Circuit has recognized, “[f]ew
discrimination cases are so straightforward—indeed they are often factually complex and require

sifting through ambiguous pieces of evidence.” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. With a Title VII claim,
the “fundamental question at the summary judgment stage is simply whether a reasonable jury
could find prohibited discrimination.” Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 86, 746 F.3d 835, 840
(7th Cir. 2014).
Because both SBCSC and Mr. Groves relied on the McDonnell Douglas framework in
making their arguments (DE 26 at 13–22; DE 29 at 16–22), the Court will use the framework to
address the parties’ arguments. In using the framework, however, the Court will consider all of
the evidence presented by the parties to decide whether summary judgment is warranted. Ortiz,
834 F.3d at 765–66 (holding “evidence must be considered as a whole, rather than asking
whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by itself” but that the decision “does not
concern McDonnell Douglas or any other burden-shifting framework”).
The McDonnell Douglas framework analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the plaintiff
carries the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. To make a prima facie

case for reverse discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) background circumstances giving rise
to an inference of discrimination; (2) that he applied for and was qualified for an open position;
(3) that he was not hired for the position; and (4) that the employer filled the position with a
person in a protected class. See DeWeese v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 120 F. Supp. 2d 735, 747
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (discussing requirements to make out a prima facie case of reverse
discrimination); see also Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2003); Mills v.
Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1999). While there is no precise definition
of what qualifies as a “background circumstance” for purposes of the first requirement, the
Seventh Circuit has held a plaintiff can meet the requirement by showing some reason or
inclination by the employer to discriminate invidiously against whites, evidence that there is

something “fishy” about the facts of the case at hand, that the person ultimately hired was clearly
less qualified than the plaintiff, or that there was a pattern of hiring members of protected classes
in the past. Rayl v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 87 F. Supp. 2d 870, 883 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (citing
Mills, 171 F.3d at 455–57.)
If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, there is a presumption of discrimination
and the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision. McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley Cty., 866 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir.
2017) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the employer can articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the
stated reason is mere pretext. Id. (quoting Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir.
2012)). Pretext “means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.” Millbrook v. IBP,
Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). In determining whether a
stated reason is pretext, a court does not simply determine whether an employer properly

evaluated competing applicants and must do more than find the decision was an unusual act or
business error. Id. To rise to the level of pretext, there must be evidence that the proffered
reasons were “deceit used to cover one’s tracks.” Id. It does not matter whether the reason is
wise or even incorrect, only whether it is honest. Milliman v. Cty. of McHenry, 893 F.3d 422,
433 (7th Cir. 2018).

1. CDA Position
Mr. Groves’s first reverse discrimination claim stemming from SBCSC’s selection of Mr.
Gavin for the CDA position only requires the Court to conduct an analysis at step three of the
McDonnell Douglas framework. SBCSC has conceded that Mr. Groves can make out a prima
facie case of reverse discrimination given the discrepancy in on-paper qualifications between Mr.
Groves and Mr. Gavin at the time of hiring. (DE 26 at 15.) And Mr. Groves has not disputed that
SBCSC put forward legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its choice of Mr. Gavin over Mr.
Groves, he just argued they are pretextual. (DE 29.) The Court thus only considers whether Mr.
Groves has offered evidence that could make a reasonable factfinder conclude that SBCSC’s

offered reasons are pretextual and meant to hide a racially discriminatory motive.
SBCSC’s stated reasons for the choice of Mr. Gavin over Mr. Groves all came from Dr.
Spells, the SBCSC superintendent who was solely in charge of interviewing and recommending
CDA candidates. (Ex. 10, Spells Dep. at 15:10–17, 29:7–12). Dr. Spells said that he chose to
recommend Mr. Gavin out of the four candidates he interviewed because he believed Mr. Gavin
interviewed very well, gave the impression he could help ensure SBCSC had a good relationship
with the IHSAA after a stretch of time where SBCSC’s relationship with the IHSAA had been
strained, gave good answers about helping students get into college, and was active and visible in
the community. (Ex. 4, Spells Dep. at 29:9–30:2; 30:16–21, 31:13–32:3, 36:21–37:8.) In

contrast, Dr. Spells stated he did not recommend Mr. Groves because Mr. Groves raised salary
concerns during his interview, bragged about firing coaches during his time as an athletic
director, and stated he wanted total control over athletics if hired as the new CDA, all of which
did not sit well with Dr. Spells. Dr. Spells also cited past IHSAA issues at Mr. Groves’s high
school while Mr. Groves was serving as athletic director and prior issues Mr. Groves had with
SBCSC’s human resources department involving sloppy paperwork as further reasons he did not
recommend Mr. Groves for the role. (Ex. 4, Spells Dep. at 38:17–23, 42:15–25, 45:21–25, 48:9–
18.)
The Court, after considering all of the presented evidence, cannot conclude that a
reasonable factfinder could find those stated reasons were pretextual or that racial discrimination

drove the hiring decision. First, Mr. Groves has presented no evidence at all, other than his own
contentions, that shows or even suggests that race ever came up or played any role in the CDA
hiring process. Second, Mr. Groves never disputed the evidence that Mr. Gavin had a good
interview and gave the positive impression Dr. Spells stated he did, which bolsters SBCSC’s
stated reasons for the decision as non-pretextual. Third, while Mr. Groves challenged Dr.
Spells’s reasons for not hiring him by pointing to evidence that the reasons were never codified
in yearly job evaluations (DE 29 at 22; DE 30-15; DE 30-16; DE 30-17; DE 30-18; DE 30-19;
DE 30-20; DE 30-21), the overall evidence suggests the reasons were valid given Mr. Groves
himself corroborated many of them during his deposition. For example, Mr. Groves admitted that
sports teams at Adams had issues with the IHSAA while he was serving as athletic director (Ex.
8, Groves Dep. at 81:15–19), that he had had issues with the SBCSC’s human resources
department over a lack of proper paperwork when he was hiring new coaches (Ex. 8, Groves
Dep. at 91:11–92:21), and that he told Dr. Spells during his interview for the CDA position that

he “thought the salary was low for what the market . . . brings” (Ex. 8, Groves Dep. at 97:14–21).
Finally, the only other evidence Mr. Groves has pointed to in support of pretext is the fact
that his own on-paper qualifications were superior to Mr. Gavin’s and the fact that SBCSC did
not follow its written internal procedures when it did not conduct a background check on Mr.
Gavin before hiring him as the new CDA. (DE 29 at 18–22.) The Court does not find that
evidence is sufficient to convince a reasonable factfinder that SBCSC’s stated reasons for the
CDA hire were pretextual.
The Court starts with Mr. Groves’s qualification-based argument. A difference in
qualifications between two candidates can only be evidence of pretext in the extreme situation
where the difference is so great that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment,

could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question. Millbrook, 280
F.3d at 1180–81. The situation must be extreme in part because a factfinder’s role “is to prevent
unlawful hiring practices, not to act as a super personnel department that second-guesses
employers' business judgments.” Id. at 1181 (internal quotations omitted).
The available evidence here does not show such an extreme difference in qualifications.
(DE 30-1; DE 34 at 5–6.) The only objective qualifications for the CDA position were a
bachelor’s degree and a driver’s license, both of which Mr. Gavin and Mr. Groves possessed.
(DE 29 at 5; Ex. 4, Spells Dep. at 25:5–9, 19–21.) Additionally, while Mr. Groves had many
years of relevant experience, Mr. Gavin also had relevant experience after having been employed
with SBCSC in various capacities since 2002, having coached a season of football and several
seasons of softball, (Ex. 5, Gavin Dep. at 38:1–11, 38:22–39:12), and having had training and
testing on IHSAA rules (Ex. 2, Gavin Dep. at 48:20–49:14). Both Mr. Gavin and Mr. Groves
thus met the objective qualifications and had relevant experience. It is not the Court’s or a

factfinder’s role to further parse qualifications and second-guess SBCSC’s ultimate choice of
Mr. Gavin under these circumstances where both men appeared objectively qualified for the
position. See Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1180–81. That is particularly true given the undisputed
evidence that Mr. Groves had prior issues with the IHSAA and SBCSC human resources during
his time as an athletic director and gave a poor interview, all of which lessened Dr. Spells’s view
of Mr. Groves’s qualifications for the position. (Ex. 4, Spells Dep. at 30:16–18, 31:13–14,
31:23–32:3) See Blise v. Antaramian, 409 F.3d 861, 868 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing subjective
evaluations of a job applicant are often critical to the decision-making process). Therefore, the
Court cannot conclude that a reasonable factfinder presented with the available evidence could
find that there was such a difference in qualifications between Mr. Groves and Mr. Gavin to

suggest that SBCSC’s reasons for hiring Mr. Gavin instead of Mr. Groves were pretextual.
The Court next moves to Mr. Gavin’s argument that evidence of SBCSC’s failure to
follow its internal hiring procedures is enough to suggest pretext. (DE 29 at 19–22.) SBCSC had
an internal policy that required background checks for candidates like Mr. Gavin (DE 30-31),
and SBCSC has not contested that it did not perform a background check on Mr. Gavin as part of
the CDA hiring process (DE 34 at 4–5). But these facts do Mr. Groves little good because he has
failed to present any evidence outside of his own contentions that shows SBCSC’s failure to
conduct a background check was meant to hide Mr. Gavin’s troubling background, Dr. Spells
was lying about his reasons, or that SBCSC had a racially discriminatory motive. Instead, the
evidence suggests the failure was rooted solely in SBCSC’s established practice of not
performing background checks when hiring candidates who were already in the SBCSC system
and presumably, like Mr. Gavin, had already been subject to background checks. (Ex. 10, Spells
Dep. at 9:5–12; DE 30-33.)

While courts have held that an employer’s failure to follow its own internal employment
procedures can constitute evidence of pretext, they have done so when the plaintiff can show a
connection between the failure to follow the procedures and an employment decision based on
someone’s protected status under Title VII. See Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., Inc., 954 F.2d 424,
427 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding failure to follow internal policies was evidence of pretext where the
plaintiff “tied the employment decision to a consideration of age”). Mr. Groves has not presented
any evidence tying SBCSC’s hiring decision to race, connecting the failure to run a background
check to discriminatory motives, or showing Dr. Spells lied about his decision-making. Because
of that, the Court cannot find that a reasonable factfinder could conclude, based on the available
evidence, that SBCSC’s failure to follow its internal hiring policy regarding background checks

constitutes evidence that its stated reasons for hiring Mr. Gavin instead of Mr. Groves were
pretextual.
Having found that Mr. Groves did not meet his burden at the third step of the McDonnell
Douglas framework, the Court concludes summary judgment in favor of SBCSC on Mr.
Groves’s CDA racial discrimination claim is appropriate. While Mr. Groves’s presents no other
evidence or argument to demonstrate a racial motive aside from pretext, which is linked to the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the Court, for completeness also notes that it would reach the
same conclusion it reached above even if it analyzed Mr. Groves’s claim outside the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Viewing all of the evidence that has been presented, see Ortiz, 834 F.3d at
766, the Court can find no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that suggests race played any role
in SBCSC’s decision to hire Mr. Gavin instead of Mr. Groves. It also can find no evidence that
would suggest that the non-discriminatory reasons SBCSC gave for hiring Mr. Gavin instead of
Mr. Groves were not truly believed, based in fact, and appropriate bases for such a decision.

Thus, the Court cannot conclude a reasonable factfinder could find SBCSC’s CDA hiring
decision was racially discriminatory and finds, based on all of the evidence, that summary
judgment in favor of SBCSC is appropriate.

2. Dean of Students/Athletics Position
The Court next turns to Mr. Groves’s second racial discrimination claim rooted in
SBCSC’s choice not to hire him as a Dean of Students/Athletics after eliminating his athletic
director position. In his amended complaint, Mr. Groves framed the racial discrimination as
manifesting itself in SBCSC’s eliminating of his athletic director position at Adams High School
and then failing to hire him as a Dean of Students/Athletics “at any high school in SBCSC.” (DE
14 ¶ 71.) But in his response to SBCSC’s motion for summary judgment, Mr. Groves only
defended his discrimination claim with respect to his not receiving the Dean of
Students/Athletics position at Riley High School, the job that went to Mr. Gavin. He did not
argue or present evidence that his failure to receive a position at any of the other three high
schools was discriminatory. (DE 29 at 17–22.) Mr. Groves’s failure to present any argument or

evidence defending his initial claim that his not being hired at Adams, Clay, or Washington was
also racially discriminatory means he has waived any claim with respect to those hiring
decisions. See Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff failed to
defend her claim at summary judgment stage and therefore abandoned it); see also Keck Garrett
& Assocs., Inc. v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 517 F.3d 476, 487 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, the Court
only analyzes Mr. Groves’s claim related to his failure to be hired into the Dean of
Students/Athletics position at Riley.
Before determining whether Mr. Groves has shown evidence of racially motivated hiring
practices for the Dean of Students/Athletics position, the Court first analyzes whether Mr.

Groves has shown any evidence that, as he claimed, the decision to eliminate his athletic director
position that then caused him to apply for the Dean of Students/Athletics positions was racially
motivated. (DE 14 ¶ 71.) In short, he has not. The evidence before the Court shows the
elimination of Mr. Groves’s athletic director position was part of an SBCSC-wide restructuring
process. The two superintendents involved in the restructuring, Dr. Spells and Dr. Cummings,
clearly stated the restructuring decision was financially motivated and never mentioned race as a
factor. (Ex. 3, Cummings Dep. at 14:9–17, 15:24–16:8; Ex. 4, Spells Dep. 11:20–13:5.) Mr.
Groves never disputed the financial motivation and never provided the Court with any evidence
to suggest race played any role. (DE 29; Ex. 8, Groves Dep. at 74:22–75:6.) Further undermining
Mr. Groves’s allegation is the fact that of the four athletic director positions that were eliminated,

three had been held by white candidates and one had been held by a black candidate (Ex. 8,
Groves Dep. at 77:15–16). That suggests Mr. Groves was not treated less fairly than other
similarly situated individuals. Without any evidence to suggest race motivated SBCSC’s decision
to eliminate Mr. Groves’s athletic director position, the Court finds Mr. Groves’s allegation to
that effect cannot survive summary judgment.
The Court next moves to consider whether the evidence presented about the Riley Dean
of Students/Athletics hiring decision could lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude there were
improper racial motives behind the decision. The Court once again uses the McDonnell Douglas
framework to structure its analysis but considers all of the available evidence in that analysis as
made clear in Ortiz. 834 F.3d at 765.
There was some dispute between the parties as to whether Mr. Groves could make out a
prima facie case of reverse discrimination in relation to the Riley Dean of Students/Athletics

hiring decision. The dispute between the parties stemmed from whether Mr. Groves’s prior
experience made him so much more qualified for the position than Mr. Gavin that a reasonable
factfinder could conclude there were suspicious circumstances behind the hiring decision that
would create an inference of discrimination. (DE 26 at 20; 29 at 18–19); See Mills, 171 F.3d at
455, 457 (recognizing being passed over despite superior qualifications can count as a
background circumstance for making a prima facie case of reverse discrimination). The Court
need not make a final determination as to that question, however, because even if it finds that
Mr. Groves could make out a prima facie case, it cannot find, based on the second and third steps
of the McDonnell Douglas framework, that Mr. Groves can survive summary judgment on the
claim.

Moving to the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Court notes it is
undisputed that SBCSC has offered several non-discriminatory reasons for its decision to hire
Mr. Gavin at Riley. Mr. Henderson, the Riley principal who was on the interview committee for
the Dean of Students/Athletics candidates, was the sole person in charge of making the hiring
recommendation to the SBCSC board for the Riley position. (Ex. 7, Henderson Dep. at 31:4–8.)
He stated that his decision to recommend Mr. Gavin over Mr. Groves and several other
candidates was not based on race but instead on his sense that it “felt like Mr. Gavin was the
right fit” for Riley given Mr. Gavin’s interview responses about building relationships with
students, helping students to achieve at higher levels, and helping to grow Riley’s athletic
programs. Mr. Henderson also stated that Mr. Gavin’s vision aligned well with the way he
wanted to lead the school. (Ex. 7, Henderson Dep. at 12:3–8, 16:8–12, 24:22–26:8, 31:4–18.)
Because SBCSC has presented these non-discriminatory reasons for the choice, it falls to Mr.
Groves to present evidence that suggests the reasons are pretextual. See Scruggs v. Garst Seed

Co., 587 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that selecting a candidate for a position because
the candidate is believed to be better qualified is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason).
Once again considering all of the evidence before it, the Court cannot find Mr. Groves
has pointed to evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude the reasons were
pretextual or that racial discrimination was a factor in the Riley choice. Mr. Groves has presented
no evidence to suggest Mr. Henderson’s reasons for hiring Mr. Gavin were untrue or that Mr.
Henderson did not genuinely believe that Mr. Gavin was the right fit for Riley. He also once
again presented no evidence, outside his own contentions, that race played any role in the
decision. Instead, he fell back on the same arguments he raised with his CDA discrimination
claim, namely that circumstantial evidence in the form of his far superior credentials and

SBCSC’s failure to properly vet Mr. Gavin could convince a factfinder that the stated reasons
were pretextual. (DE 29 at 18–22.) As was true for the CDA claim, the Court cannot find that is
enough.
First, Mr. Groves has once again failed to present evidence showing the difference in the
candidates’ overall qualifications was so extremely lopsided as to suggest pretext. See Millbrook,
280 F.3d at 1180–81. The evidence shows that both Mr. Gavin and Mr. Groves met the minimum
requirements for the Dean of Students/Athletics position because they both held bachelor’s
degrees. (DE 30-14.) The evidence also shows that Mr. Gavin was again objectively qualified for
the position given his prior experience including, importantly, his two years of experience as the
SBCSC CDA that Mr. Groves did not have. (Ex. 5, Gavin Dep. at 87:4–7.) Finally, Mr. Groves
has offered no evidence to suggest that Mr. Henderson did not truly believe Mr. Gavin’s
interview responses about building relationships with students, helping them achieve, and
helping to grow the school’s athletic programs made Mr. Gavin a better choice for the position

than Mr. Groves and the other candidates. (Ex. 7, Henderson Dep. at 12:3–8, 16:8–12, 24:22–
26:8, 31:4–18.) Based on that evidence, the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable factfinder
could view the difference in qualifications between Mr. Gavin and Mr. Groves as being so
skewed as to suggest pretext. See Blise, 409 F.3d at 868 (recognizing subjective reasons can be
important in assessing who is best qualified for a position).
Further, while SBCSC again did not conduct a background check on Mr. Gavin before
hiring him into the Riley Dean of Students/Athletics position, Mr. Groves again failed to connect
that failure to any discriminatory motive or basis for finding pretext. As was true when analyzing
the CDA claim, the evidence shows the failure was tied to SBCSC’s established practice of not
performing background checks when hiring candidates like Mr. Gavin who were already in the

SBCSC system. (Ex. 10, Spells Dep. at 9:5–12.) There has been no evidence presented that
shows SBCSC or Mr. Henderson knew about Mr. Gavin’s criminal convictions or his prior
termination from an SBCSC job and no evidence that the lack of a background check was meant
to hide Mr. Gavin’s background or was tied to racial discrimination. The Court thus cannot
conclude a reasonable factfinder could find evidence of pretext or a racially discriminatory
motive based on that evidence and finds Mr. Groves failed to meet his burden at the third step of
the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Having found Mr. Groves failed to meet his burden under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the Court finds summary judgment on Mr. Groves’s claim appropriate. As was true
for his CDA claim, Mr. Groves again presented no other evidence or argument in defense of his
Dean of Students/Athletics-based racial discrimination claim other than pretext. His reliance on
pretext suggests his arguments were best analyzed within the McDonnell Douglas framework.
However, the Court notes that even if it had analyzed his claim outside the McDonnell Douglas

framework, it would have reached the same conclusion. Viewing all of the evidence that has
been presented, see Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766, the Court finds Mr. Groves has pointed to nothing,
other than his own contentions and beliefs, that suggests a racial motive behind the decision to
hire Mr. Gavin as Riley’s Dean of Students/Athletics or suggests that Mr. Henderson’s reasons
for choosing Mr. Gavin, which SBCSC adopted, were false or based on improper considerations.
Without that evidence, a reasonable factfinder could not find SBCSC racially discriminated
against Mr. Groves.

D. Mr. Groves’s Retaliation Claim
Having analyzed Mr. Groves’s discrimination claims, the Court finally turns to Mr.
Groves’s claim that SBCSC’s decision to eliminate his athletic director position and then not hire
him for a new Dean of Students/Athletics position constituted unlawful retaliation. While Mr.
Groves did not list a separate retaliation claim in his amended complaint, he implied retaliation
occurred. (DE 14 ¶ 71.) However, Mr. Groves presented no evidence or argument on retaliation,
other than a brief mention that he believes he was retaliated against, in his response to SBCSC’s

motion for summary judgment (DE 25 ¶ 2; DE 29.) The Court thus views any retaliation claim
Mr. Groves originally meant to make as abandoned at this summary judgment stage. See Maclin,
520 at 788; Keck, 517 F.3d at 487. Nevertheless, the Court goes on to explain why even if Mr.
Groves had offered argument on his retaliation claim, summary judgment would still be
appropriate based on the evidence before the Court.
In addition to prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of race, Title VII
also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who engage in protected activities,
such as reporting or opposing unlawful employer behavior. § 2000e–3(a). To sustain a retaliation
claim, Mr. Groves must show that (1) he engaged in an activity protected by statute; (2) he

suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there was a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse action. See Vesey v. Envoy Air, Inc., 999 F.3d 456, 461 (7th
Cir. 2021). Retaliation cases, like discrimination cases, require the Court to consider all of the
record. See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765; see also Lauth v. Covance, Inc., 863 F.3d 708, 716 (7th Cir.
2017). The ultimate question at the summary judgment stage is whether a reasonable trier of fact
could infer retaliation. Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2015).
The only question to resolve on Mr. Groves’s retaliation claim is whether the evidence
could support a causal link between Mr. Groves’s protected activity of filing his initial
complaints after losing out on the CDA position and SBCSC’s decision to eliminate his athletic
director job and not hire him as a Dean of Students/Athletics. (DE 26 at 22.) The available

evidence does not suggest a causal connection.
The Court starts with whether a reasonable factfinder could view SBCSC’s decision to
eliminate Mr. Groves’s athletic director job as retaliatory. The only evidence before the Court
that suggests a retaliatory motive is Mr. Groves’s own statement that he is “absolutely positive”
that he was retaliated against. (Ex. 8, Groves Dep. at 107:13–14.) That is not enough. See Herzog
v. Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc., 742 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding a plaintiff’s
unsupported inferences do not defeat summary judgment). It also does not fit with unrebutted
evidence in the form of statements from Dr. Cummings, the superintendent who implemented the
restructuring, that the restructuring was done as a cost-saving measure while SBCSC was dealing
with budgetary and other financial issues. (Ex. 3, Cummings Dep. at 14:12–16:8.) Additionally,
any allegation that SBCSC carried out the restructuring to retaliate against Mr. Groves
specifically is further undermined by evidence showing the restructuring impacted the three other
SBCSC high school athletic directors and Mr. Gavin, the CDA, in the same way it impacted Mr.

Groves. Based on that evidence, the Court cannot conclude a reasonable factfinder could find the
restructuring was a retaliatory measure against Mr. Groves.
The Court next moves to consider whether a reasonable factfinder could view the failure
to hire Mr. Groves into one of the four Dean of Students/Athletics positions after the
restructuring as unlawful retaliation. The Court here reiterates that the decisions about which
candidate to hire for each Dean of Students/Athletics position fell to the principals of the
respective high schools. (Ex. 7, Henderson Dep. at 12:3–8, 31:4–18, Ex. 6, Seitz Dep. at 39:8–
10, 40:2–41:10.) Of the four open Dean of Students/Athletics positions, two, the Washington and
Clay positions, went to candidates who had previously served as those schools’ athletic directors.
(Ex. 5, Gavin Dep. at 60:23–24, 61:4–8.) Mr. Groves never challenged those hiring decisions,

argued they were retaliatory in nature, or presented any evidence to show the principals at
Washington and Clay who made the decisions even knew about his EEOC complaint and
lawsuit.
That leaves the Dean of Students/Athletics positions at Adams, where Mr. Groves had
previously served as athletic director, and Riley, where Mr. Gavin was hired. The available
evidence does not show retaliation was a factor in either hiring decision. Mr. Seitz, the Adams
principal, denied that his knowledge of Mr. Groves’s prior CDA-related complaints played any
role in his decision-making (Ex. 6, Seitz Dep. at 38:3–9) and said he decided against Mr. Groves
because Mr. Groves lacked an administrative license (Ex. 6, Seitz Dep. at 50:21–52:13). Mr.
Groves never disputed that reasoning or presented evidence to show Mr. Seitz acted with
retaliatory intent. Mr. Henderson, the Riley principal, stated he did not even know about Mr.
Groves’s prior complaints at the time he was making his hiring decision, (Ex. 7, Henderson Dep.
at 31:4–8), something Mr. Groves also never disputed. Because of that, it was legally impossible

for Mr. Henderson to have retaliated. Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 897
F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2018) (“To retaliate against a complainant, decisionmakers must be
aware of the complaint”). Thus, the Court finds that there is no evidence to support a retaliation
claim and that summary judgment for SBCSC is warranted.

IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff William Groves’s motion for oral
argument (DE 31) and GRANTS Defendant Board of School Trustees of the South Bend
Community School Corporation’s motion for summary judgment (DE 25). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the Defendant.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: November 19, 2021

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10161726. Public record. Not legal advice.