# Weidner v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · July 30, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10159676

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** July 30, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
ELIZABETH WEIDNER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) CAUSE NO. 1:19CV249-PPS
)
ANDREW M. SAUL, )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Elizabeth Weidner applied for social security disability benefits at age 31, alleging
that she had become disabled six years earlier at age 25. [DE 13 at 5.] She has a high
school education and studied a year-and-a-half at a culinary school before dropping out.
[AR at 20.]1 Prior to the alleged onset of disability, Weidner had spent 4½ years working
as a cashier at McDonald’s, the only job she has ever held. [AR at 46, 222-224.] An
administrative law judge found that Weidner has a number of severe impairments:
reported multiple site joint pain problems/arthralgias; reported low iron levels; mild to
moderate obesity; bipolar disorder/depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and
anxiety complaints. [AR at 13.]

1 The administrative record [AR] is found in the court record at docket entry 10, and consists of a
total of 732 pages. I cite to the pages of this AR according to the Social Security Administration’s Bates
stamp numbers rather than the court’s Electronic Case Filing page number.
Weidner’s application was denied based on the ALJ’s determination that she had
the residual functional capacity to perform light work, subject to certain limitations, and

that there are jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that Weidner can
perform. [AR at 19, 27.] In this appeal, Weidner argues that reversal is required because
the ALJ did not include all of Weidner’s limitations in the residual functional capacity
determination, failing to consider limitations from all medically determinable
impairments, both severe and non-severe. [DE 13 at 14.]
Discussion

My review of the Commissioner’s decision is deferential. I must affirm it if it is
supported by substantial evidence, meaning “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d
884, 889 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The role of the courts is “extremely limited,”
and I am “not allowed to displace the ALJ’s judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence,

or by making independent credibility determinations.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413
(7th Cir. 2008). I can’t reweigh the evidence or substitute my judgment for that of the ALJ.
Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2015). But these standards do not mean that I
“will simply rubber-stamp the Commissioner’s decision without a critical review of the
evidence.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000).

When considering the evidence, “an ALJ is not required to provide a complete and
written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence, but ‘must build a logical
bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.’” Minnick, 775 F.3d at 935, quoting Schmidt v.
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Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005). This means that an ALJ’s decision must offer an
explanation of the rationale from the evidence to his or her conclusions “sufficient to

allow us, as a reviewing court, to assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and
afford [the claimant] meaningful judicial review.” Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121
(7th Cir. 2014).
Weidner invokes sound legal principles. The regulations governing disability
determinations clearly require that an ALJ consider evidence of non-severe impairments
and any resulting limitations. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a)(1)- (3). The ALJ’s assessment of

residual functional capacity must take all limitations into account. Id. See also Ray v.
Berryhill, 915 F.3d 486, 492 (7th Cir. 2019) (the ALJ must “consider the limitations imposed
by all impairments, severe and non-severe”). Weidner cites Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809,
813 (7th Cir. 2015). “In this circuit, ‘both the hypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ’s
RFC assessment must incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations supported by the

medical record.’” Id., quoting Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 2014).
Specifically, Weidner argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment and resulting
hypothetical to the vocational expert “do not account for meaningful limitations in
concentration, persistence, and pace.” [DE 13 at 15.] The ALJ found that Weidner has
moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or maintaining pace. [AR at 17.] In

fashioning the RFC assessment, the ALJ included limitations “to understanding, carrying
out and remembering simple instructions consistent with unskilled work,” as well as “no
sudden or unpredictable workplace changes in terms of use of work tools, work
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processes, or work settings, and if there are workplace changes, they are introduced
gradually” and “work that doesn’t require satisfaction of strict or rigid production quotas

or does not involve assembly-line pace work.” [AR at 19.] The RFC also described
Weidner as limited to “only superficial interactions with supervisors, coworkers, and the
general public, defined as occasional and casual contact with no prolonged conversations
and contact with supervisors [that] is short but allows the supervisors to give
instructions.” [Id.] All of these limitations were incorporated in the hypothetical posed
to the vocational expert. [AR at 76.]

Rather than take a position on how the ALJ should have fashioned the RFC, given
the findings of moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or pace, Weidner
merely argues that the ALJ’s description was insufficient, relying on Yurt. This type of
argument is weaker than an argument that spells out what was inadequate about the
description of the claimant’s limitations. Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir.

2019) (“It is unclear what kinds of work restrictions might address Jozefyk’s limitations
in concentration, persistence, or pace because he hypothesizes none.”) In Yurt, reversal
was required because the ALJ failed to present the vocational expert with the six areas of
moderate limitation he found in the claimant’s mental functioning, including deficiencies
in concentration, persistence and pace. The Seventh Circuit applied its repeated rejection

of “the notion that a hypothetical...confining the claimant to simple, routine tasks and
limited interactions with others adequately captures temperamental deficiencies and
limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace.” Id. at 858-59.
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But since Yurt, courts have found RFC’s and hypotheticals to be sufficient where
they “adequately account for the claimant’s demonstrated psychological symptoms,”

without reliance on generic and over-simplified limitations. Jozefyk, 923 F.3d at 498. See
also Saunders v. Saul, 777 Fed.Appx. 821, 825-26 (7th Cir. 2019). The ALJ here avoided such
over-simplification by detailed limitations addressing Weidner’s inability to grasp
complicated tasks or instructions, difficulty with sudden changes in how or where work
is required to be performed, and her need to avoid demanding productivity quotas.
Although Weidner challenges these as “insufficient under the Yurt standard,” the

argument is conclusory and unpersuasive. [DE 13 at 16.] A judicial reviewer accepts an
ALJ’s hypothetical where its formulation describing limitations in concentration,
persistence or pace, in whatever words, succeeds in “‘specifically exclud[ing] those tasks
that someone with claimant’s limitations would be unable to perform.’” Saunders, 777
Fed.Appx. at 825, quoting O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d , 519 (7th Cir. 2010).

Weidner does not show that the ALJ’s formulation of the RFC failed to meet these
requirements in describing her limitations in concentration, persistence and pace.
Beyond this argument, Weidner offers a laundry list of issues she contends the
ALJ gave inadequate consideration to, including obesity, positive antinuclear antibodies
or “ANA”, and Weidner’s heavy breathing and rocking behavior during the ALJ’s

hearing. [DE 13 at 17-18.] Rather than fail “to acknowledge or account for” these
conditions, the ALJ’s decision addresses each of them and offers an analysis of their
limited impact on Weidner’s functional abilities.
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For instance, the ALJ found that the medical evidence relating to Weidner’s
slightly elevated ANA did not reflect or support any “significant limitations of

function...for 12 months in duration.” [AR at 14.] The ALJ took into account the
cumulative effects of Weidner’s obesity and their contribution to the “disabling effects of
the other impairments established by the record.” [ AR at 14.] The ALJ’s decision
expressly considers the lack of evidence indicating that Weidner uses an assistive device
or has severe cardiovascular or respiratory impairments that might be impacted by
obesity, or that Weidner has significant deficits in muscle strength. [AR at 23.]

Weidner’s counsel made arguments to the ALJ concerning Weidner’s heavy
breathing and rocking back and forth during the hearing. The ALJ reasonably observed
that “there is no significant evidence that such behaviors were routinely documented
within the record.” [AR at 25.] Weidner now takes issue with that assessment, citing a
therapist’s observation that Weidner “continues to exhibit very childlike communication

patterns and behaviors” and contending that her ongoing treatment results indicated that
Weidner’s symptoms and behavior interfered with her occupational functioning. [DE 13
at 18, citing AR 472.] The ALJ was well aware that Weidner had long-term treatment and
therapy at the Northeastern Center for bipolar disorder and posttraumatic stress
disorder. [AR at 24.] The ALJ considered that “despite the claimant’s reported social

limitations, the evidence establishes that the claimant kept fairly regular appointments
with Northeastern Center, where she routinely interacted with her therapist, and the
evidence documents she also interacted with her case facilitator.” [AR at 24.]
6
The several hundred pages of medical records from this treatment contain
references to improvements and successes as well as difficulties and setbacks. This

breadth of findings is reflected in the ALJ’s opinion, including observations that:
• mental status exams indicate Weidner had “a logical/coherent/goal directed
thought process, normal thought content, a below average fund of
knowledge/intellectual level at times, but also average knowledge/intelligence,
no memory deficits, appropriate judgment, and intact insight” [AR at 16];
• Weidner was found to be “polite and cooperative,” but did at various times
exhibit “slowed/soft speech” or “normal rate/volume/spontaneity” of speech
[AR at 17];
• Weidner’s “ability to make eye contact improved throughout treatment” [AR at
17];
• “at times, the claimant had an attention/concentration problem, but at other
times, her abilities to pay attention and concentrate were within normal limits”
[AR at 25];
• “claimant was appropriately dressed, well groomed, with good hygiene, normal
mood, was oriented to person/place/time/situation, had appropriate judgment,
intact insight, average fund of knowledge/intelligence, normal attention/
concentration, normal use of language, no memory deficits, was optimistic” and
“identified/used coping strategies” and was able to identify her abilities [AR at
25].
All of this, as well as Northeastern Center documentation concerning instances of heavy
breathing, slowed speech, normal speech and work on fidgeting, was taken into account
by the ALJ in concluding that there was no “significant evidence” in the record that
behaviors like those noted at the hearing “were routinely documented within the
record.” [AR at 25.]
The numerous details from Weidner’s Northeastern Center treatment that the ALJ
cites throughout the decision clearly demonstrate that the “line of evidence” Weidner
7
now cites was carefully considered. The ALJ summarized the impact of the evidence this
way:

The record tends to suggest that while the claimant’s mental impairments
were medically documented over two years, the claimant was fairly stable
throughout the period at issue in this decision, and it does not appear that
her condition significantly worsened since she stopped working. The
medical evidence of record does not tend to reflect significant clinical
findings over multiple examinations.
AR at 19. This last observation is particularly significant. As is true of virtually every
claimant for Social Security disability benefits, Elizabeth Weidner has real health
challenges. But “having been diagnosed with these impairments does not mean they
imposed particular restrictions on her ability to work.” Weaver v. Berryhill, 746 Fed.Appx.
574, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2018).
To qualify for benefits, Weidner bears the burden “to establish not just the
existence of the conditions, but to provide evidence that they support specific limitations
affecting her capacity to work.” Id. at 579. Weidner does not cite to professional
opinions or conclusions from Northeastern Center concerning functional limitations
pertinent to her ability to maintain employment. This discussion demonstrates that
Weidner wrongly contends that the ALJ ignored evidence of meaningful limitations or
lines of supporting evidence. Instead, it appears that Weidner urges me to reweigh the
evidence that was carefully described and considered by the ALJ, something that is
beyond the role of judicial review. L.D.R. by Wagner v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 1146, 1152 (7th
Cir. 2019).
Conclusion
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The scope of judicial review is limited. I find that the ALJ sufficiently articulated
his findings and conclusions to permit meaningful judicial review, so that a remand is
not warranted for lack of explanation. Beyond that, my role is not to determine whether

the plaintiff was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but whether the ALJ’s findings
were supported by substantial evidence and whether any errors of law were made.
Hawkins v. Saul, 2019 WL 6492491, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 3, 2019). Applying these standards, I
will affirm the denial of disability benefits.
ACCORDINGLY:
The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff

Elizabeth Weidner’s application for social security disability benefits is AFFIRMED. The
Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendant Commissioner and against plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: July 30, 2020.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10159676. Public record. Not legal advice.