# Brown v. Hasemyer

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · April 9, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10157630

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** April 9, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JEREMY BROWN,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 22-cv-01384-SPM
v.

CHAD HASEMYER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Jeramey Brown, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC), commenced this action pro se for violations of his constitutional rights that occurred while
at Menard Correctional Center. After the Court reviewed the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, the Court recruited counsel to represent Plaintiff in this matter. Before this Court is a
motion for leave to file an amended complaint filed by court-recruited counsel on behalf of
Plaintiff. (Doc. 54). Plaintiff states that he would like to amend in order to add (1) Defendants
Kyle Williamson and Justin Frazer, previously identified in the Complaint as John Does 1 and 2;
(2) allegations as to the conditions of confinement Plaintiff suffered while housed at the Menard
maximum-security unit; (3) allegations as to the deprivations of Plaintiff’s right to freedom of
speech and due process; and (4) a general reassertion and reframing of Plaintiff’s causes of action
previously asserted. Defendants do not oppose the motion.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a party may amend a pleading and that
leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” The Seventh Circuit maintains
a liberal attitude toward the amendment of pleadings “so that cases may be decided on the merits
and not on the basis of technicalities.” Stern v. U.S. Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir.
1977). The Circuit recognizes that “the complaint merely serves to put the defendant on notice and
is to be freely amended or constructively amended as the case develops, as long as amendments

do not unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant.” Toth v. USX Corp., 883 F.2d 1297, 1298 (7th
Cir. 1989); see also Winger v. Winger, 82 F.3d 140, 144 (7th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff’s motion is timely filed and will not prejudice Defendants. Thus, the Court
GRANTS the Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. (Doc. 54). The Amended Complaint,
however, is still subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, any portion of
a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or requests money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief
must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
SECTION 1915A MERIT REVIEW
The facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint are substantially similar to the facts as

summarized by the Court in the previous Merit Review Order. (See Doc. 18). The Court, therefore,
will not restate the allegations here. The Court accepts Plaintiff’s articulations of his claims
(Counts 1-4) as stated in the Amended Complaint. Prior to addressing each count in turn, however,
the Court dismisses all claims against Lieutenant Johnson, Correctional Officer Adams, and
Warden Tiffanie Clark. There are no factual allegations against any of these Defendants describing
their conduct or their involvement in the constitutional deprivations in the Amended Complaint.
See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against
a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”). Accordingly, they will be
terminated as parties to this case.
Counts 1 and 2
Count 1 will proceed against Hasemyer and Count 2 will proceed against Hasemyer,
Armbuster-Huffman, Pitts, Sanders, Spiller, Zang, Schoenbeck, Cheek, Choate, Williamson,
Frazer, Wills, Lawrence, Chambers, and Kilduff for the reasons stated in the previous Merit

Review Order. (Doc. 18).
Count 3
Count 3 will proceed against Hasemyer, Armbuster-Huffman, Pitts, Sanders, Spiller, Zang,
Schoenbeck, Cheek, Choate, Williamson, Frazer, Wills, Lawrence, Chambers, and Kilduff.
Count 3 is dismissed, however, as to John Doe 4, Smith, Jeffreys, Mulholland, Baker,
Pierce, and Jackson. There are no factual allegations against these Defendants in the Amended
Complaint describing their conduct or involvement in any alleged constitutional deprivations.
These individuals cannot be found liable simply because they reviewed, denied, or mishandled
Plaintiff’s grievances or because they held supervisory positions.
Count 3 is also dismissed as to Inmates Voynar, Cole, Coulter, Hoskins, James,

Crutchfield, and Bray. Each inmate is described as “an informant/state agent by Internal Affairs
with the Illinois Department of Corrections.” For a defendant to be liable under Section 1983, he
or she must have deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right while “acting under the color of
state law.” (Doc. 18, p. 13) (quoting D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir.
2015)). The Supreme Court has stated that acting under color of state law “requires that the
defendant in a §1983 action have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins,
108 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (internal citations omitted). The designation as “informants” by Internal
Affairs does not confer legal authority over Plaintiff pursuant to state law. See Fleischman v. Matz,
No. 17-cv-1607-dej-pp, 2018 WL 3637541, at *3 (E.D. Wisc. July 31, 2018) (finding that the
plaintiff could not sue fellow inmates where the inmates had no legal authority over the plaintiff).
“Courts have consistently rejected attempts by prisoner plaintiffs to sue fellow inmates under
§1983.” Crane v. Lopez, No. 22-cv-00922-ADA-HBK(PC), 2023 WL 10147656, at *4 (E.D. Cal.

Nov. 20, 2023) (collecting cases). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to establish
that Voynar, Cole, Coulter, Hoskins, James, Crutchfield, and Bray were state actors when they
took possession of Plaintiff’s property.
Count 4
Plaintiff asserts that he has a protected liberty interest (1) in having his grievances heard
and adjudicated by an unbiased tribunal pursuant to IDOC policies; (2) to not be retaliated against
as a result of his constitutionally protected speech; (3) to not be subjected to atypical and significant
hardships far worse and more restrictive than those he would have experienced at any other prison
in Illinois; and (4) to not have his personal property wrongfully or unlawfully withheld, damaged,
and stolen. By depriving him of these his liberty interests, Defendants violated his procedural and

substantive due process rights. (Doc. 54-1, p. 22-23).
Grievance Procedures
First, Count 4 is dismissed to the extent Plaintiff is claiming that his substantive and
procedural due process rights were violated when his grievances where not heard and adjudicated
by an unbiased tribunal. No independent claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause for the mishandling of grievances. “[A] state’s inmate grievance procedures do not
give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d
1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). In fact, the “Constitution requires no procedure at all, so the failure of
state prison officials to follow their own procedures does not violate the Constitution. Maust v.
Headley, 959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1992). Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has specifically
denounced a “Fourteenth Amendment substantive due-process right to an inmate grievance
procedure.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F. 3d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
due process claims are dismissed regarding the review and denial of his grievances.

Deprivation of Property
Next, Count 4 is dismissed to the extent Plaintiff is claiming that he was deprived of his
property without due process of law and that his substantive due process rights were violated by
the confiscation and damage of his property. Illinois provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy
for the loss or damage of property in an action for damages in the Illinois Court of Claims, and the
“Seventh Circuit has closed the door…on any substantive due process claim based on a prisoner’s
confiscation of personal property...” Tatum v. Meisner, 2014 WL 6473481, at *4 (W.D. Wisc. Nov.
18, 2014) (citing Secret v. Brierton, 584 F. 2d 823, 830 (7 Cir. 1978). See also Murdock v.
Washington, 193 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1999); Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir.
1993). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim for the damage and confiscation of

his property.
Remaining at Menard Maximum-Security Unit
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants deprived him of procedural and substantive due process
rights by improperly confining him at the Menard maximum-security unit after his disciplinary
report was expunged. He states that he was held under conditions far worse and more restrictive
than those he would have experienced at any other prison in Illinois and was subjected to an
atypical and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Plaintiff
experienced extreme social isolation, severely restricted movement, and an environment that
virtually eliminated all external stimuli. Plaintiff did not have access to programming, such as a
job assignment, educational classes, and limited to no access to “general time.” He was also
exposed to a heightened danger of violence, since the most dangerous offenders are held at the
Menard maximum-security unit. (Doc. 54-1, p. 15).
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants for housing him at Menard

maximum-security in violation of the Due Process Clause. “[I]t is well-settled that decisions
regarding whether an inmate belongs in minimum, medium, or maximum security are not
sufficient to create a liberty interest supporting a due process claim.” Williams v. Schultz, No. 22-
cv-2-jdp, 2022 WL 3138903, at *2 (W.D. Wisc. Aug. 5, 2022) (citing Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d
527, 532 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A prisoner has no due process right to be housed in any particular
facility.”)). Furthermore, “the Constitution does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding
transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22
(2005) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (no liberty interest arising from Due
Process Clause itself in transfer from low-to maximum-security prison because “[c]onfinement in
any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction

has authorized the State to impose”)). See also DeTomaso v. McGinnis, 970 F.2d 211, 212 (7th
Cir.1992) (“prisoners possess neither liberty nor property in their classifications and prison
assignments. States may move their charges to any prison in the system”). Although Plaintiff was
housed in a much more restrictive environment while at Menard maximum-security unit, he has
not sufficiently pled facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that these conditions – social
isolation, restricted movement, and lack of external stimuli – imposed an atypical and significant
hardship on him beyond the struggles of ordinary prison life. See Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F. 3d
1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997) (“the courts have held that the transfer of a prisoner from one prison to
another is not actionable as a deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty even if the conditions
of confinement are much more restrictive in the prison to which the prisoner is being transferred”);
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-82 (1995) (a cognizable liberty interest “will be generally
limited to freedom from restraint”). He does not have a liberty or property interest in participating
in certain privileges while incarcerated, such as a work assignment, educational classes, and

general social time. See Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F. 3d 568, 571-71 (7th Cir. 2000); Higgason
v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 809–10 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243,
244 (7th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Shettle, 946 F. 2d 1250, 1252 (7th Cir. 1991). Because Plaintiff has
not pled a significant deprivation of liberty and Plaintiff does not have a liberty interest in being
housed at a certain facility, he has failed to state a due process claim regarding his assignment at
Menard maximum-security unit.
First Amendment Retaliation
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment
rights by falsifying disciplinary charges that resulted in having him transferred to Menard
maximum-security unit, finding him guilty of the charges and placing him in segregation for thirty

days, and depriving him of and damaging his property.
“A violation of an inmate’s right to substantive due process may occur through the issuance
of unjustified disciplinary charges when such charges were issued in retaliation for the exercise of
a constitutional right.” Kirsch v. Franklin, 897 F. Supp. 1173, 1178 (E.D. Wisc. 1995) (citing
Black v. Lane, 22 F. 3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994)). However, “the absence of a protected liberty
interest is fatal to his substantive due process claim.” Id. As discussed above, Plaintiff has not pled
conditions at Menard maximum-security unit that amounted to an atypical and significant
deprivation creating a liberty interest, and he does not have a protected interest in remaining at a
certain correctional facility or in retaining his property. Accordingly, his substantive due process
claim based on retaliatory conduct of Defendants is dismissed.
For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and
Count 4 is dismissed without predjudice.
DISPOSITION

For the reasons stated above, pursuant to Rule 15 and after review of the proposed amended
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint. (Doc. 54). Plaintiff is DIRECTED to the file the proposed amended
complaint INSTANTER. After conducting a review of the proposed amended complaint pursuant
to Section 1915A, Plaintiff is proceeding on COUNT 1 against Hasemyer, COUNT 2 against
Hasemyer, Armbuster-Huffman, Pitts, Sanders, Spiller, Zang, Schoenbeck, Cheek, Choate,
Williamson, Frazer, Wills, Lawrence, Chambers, and Kilduff, and COUNT 3 against Hasemyer,
Armbuster-Huffman, Pitts, Sanders, Spiller, Zang, Schoenbeck, Cheek, Choate, Williamson,
Frazer, Wills, Lawrence, Chambers, and Kilduff. COUNT 4 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
All claims against Johnson, Adams, Clark, John Doe 4, Smith, Jeffreys, Mulholland, Baker,

Pierce, Jackson, Voynar, Cole, Coulter, Hoskins, James, Crutchfield, and Bray are DISMISSED
without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate them as parties on the docket.
In light of this Order and the filing of an Amended Complaint naming Defendants Frazer
and Williamson as defendants, the Motion to Substitute is DENIED as moot. (Doc. 53). The Clerk
of Court is DIRECTED to serve process on Frazer and Williamson in accordance with the Merit
Review Order at Doc. 18.
All Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Newly added Defendants shall follow the deadlines as stated in the Initial Scheduling and
Discovery Order regarding discovery and motion for summary judgment on exhaustion deadlines.
(See Doc. 37).
The Motions for Extension of Time are GRANTED. (Doc. 55, 56). A motion for summary
judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is due by Defendants Zang, Wills, Spiller,

Schoenbeck, Pitts, Lawrence, Hasemeyer, Choate, Chambers, Armbruster-Huffman, Cheek, and
Kilduff on or before June 7, 2024.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 9, 2024

s/Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10157630. Public record. Not legal advice.