# Haywood v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · March 21, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10157526

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 21, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10157526

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the grievance process is designed to “alert the state to the problem and invite corrective action”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KARL HAYWOOD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:22-CV-731-NJR

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
ANTHONY WILLS, DEREK BRANDT,
LATOYA HUGHES, JOHN DOE
CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 1-2,
JANE DOE NURSE, and
JOHN DOE SERGEANT,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Karl Haywood, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) who is currently housed at Hill Correctional Center, brings this action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his Eighth Amendment rights were violated while he was
housed at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”). (Docs. 1, 33).
Now pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed by Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,
(“Wexford”) (Doc. 59), a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendant
Anthony Wills (Doc. 49), and a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by
Defendant Latoya Hughes (Doc. 70). For the following reasons, the motions are granted.
BACKGROUND
On February 25, 2021, Haywood submitted an emergency grievance related to an
incident that occurred on February 18, 2021, while he was housed at Menard. (Doc. 60-1
at p. 18). (Id.). In his grievance, Haywood stated that he was sleeping in his bunk when

he was sprayed with O.C. spray, also known as pepper spray or mace, by Sergeant Derek
Brandt. (Doc. 60-1 at p. 18). His eyes, lungs, and skin began to burn, and he started
coughing and complaining that he could not breathe. (Id.). He screamed, but Sergeant
Brandt told him to shut up. (Id.). Brandt then left the gallery as Haywood, an asthmatic,
struggled to catch his breath. (Id. at p. 19). Haywood also fell and hit his head because he
could not see. (Id.). Brandt returned about 20 minutes later with the tactical team, and

they took Haywood to the Health Care Unit. (Id.). There, Haywood’s eyes were washed
out, but he was denied access to his inhaler for his asthma. (Id.). He was then taken to
segregation, where he remained until February 23, 2021. (Id.). While he was in
segregation, Haywood was denied a change of underwear (his was soaked with pepper
spray), as well as access to the shower, soap, and further medical care for his burning skin

and face. (Id.). As relief, Haywood requested an independent investigation into staff
conduct, disciplinary action for Sergeant Brandt, further medical care for his injuries, and
a transfer for safety. (Id. at p. 18).
On March 9, 2021, the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) reviewed the
grievance and determined it was not an emergency. (Id.). On March 23, 2021, a prison

counselor reviewed the grievance and noted that Defendant Brandt had denied
Haywood’s allegations. (Id.). Thus, the counselor recommended that the grievance be
denied. (Id.).
Seven months later, the grievance was investigated by a grievance officer. (Id. at
p. 16). As part of that investigation, Angela Crain, the Health Care Unit Administrator,
reviewed Haywood’s records from February 18, 2021. (Id. at p. 17). Crain reported that

Haywood was seen in the HCU First Aid for chemical gas exposure, but that he was not
in respiratory distress and that three peak flow readings were obtained. (Id.). Haywood
was observed to be within the chronic clinic peak flow guidelines for asthma. (Id.). The
grievance officer thus recommended that the grievance be denied. (Id. at p. 16). The CAO
concurred in the denial on October 14, 2021. (Id.).
Haywood timely appealed the denial of his grievance to the Administrative

Review Board (“ARB”). (Id.). The ARB denied Haywood’s appeal on January 3, 2022,
stating: “Staff misconduct cannot be substantiated. Grievant has access to medical care.
Treatment is at the discretion of IDOC physicians. Discipline of staff is an administrative
decision. Grievant may submit a request to NSC for any issues that arise.” (Id. at p. 15).
Haywood filed a second grievance on August 2, 2021. (Doc. 60-1 at pp. 24-27). In

this grievance, Haywood complained that IDOC and Menard are severely overcrowded,
leading to doubling of cells that are meant to be single cells. (Id.). He continued: “This
causes breakdowns in medical care, dental care, and mental health.” (Id.). He further
stated that the overcrowding was leading to increased violence among inmates and
excessive force being used by the tactical team at Menard. As relief, Haywood requested

to be transferred out of Menard and its extremely violent conditions, so as to eliminate
his exposure to the tactical team’s aggressive and violent actions. (Id.).
Haywood’s second grievance was reviewed by a counselor on August 19, 2021,
who advised that the tactical team was used for the safety and security of the institution,
inmates, and staff. (Id. at p. 24). Further, if Haywood is in physical or mental distress, he
is encouraged to speak with a mental health or healthcare professional, as he had done

multiple times over the past several months. (Id.). On September 2, 2021, the August 2,
2021 grievance was reviewed by a Grievance Officer and the CAO, and it was found to
be moot. (Id. at pp. 22-23). Haywood appealed this grievance as well. (Id. at p. 22). The
ARB denied the appeal, as it found the issue was appropriately addressed by the facility
administration. (Id. at p. 21). It also found that it could not substantiate staff misconduct,
use of the tactical team is an administrative decision, and medical and mental health

treatment were provided. (Id.).
Haywood filed this action on April 14, 2022. (Doc. 1). He now proceeds on the
Amended Complaint in which he alleges, among other things, that Defendant Brandt told
the Health Care Unit that Haywood was a “staff assaulter” and not to treat him.1
(Doc. 33). Haywood alleges the following counts:

Count I: Excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment against
Defendant Brandt;

Count II: Deliberate indifference/denial of medical treatment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment against all individual
Defendants;

Count III: Unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the
Eighth Amendment against individual Defendants Brandt,
John Doe Sergeant, and John Doe Correctional Officers 1-2;

Count IV: Deliberate indifference/denial of medical treatment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendants
Wexford, Hughes, and Wills in their official capacities; and

1 Defendant Brandt’s report naming Haywood a “staff assaulter” was expunged on February 23, 2021,
because it was determined that Haywood did not actually assault Brandt.
Count V: Unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the
Eighth Amendment against Defendants Hughes and Wills in
their official capacities.

ANALYSIS

I. Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
filed by Wexford

Defendant Wexford has moved for summary judgment, arguing that Haywood
did not exhaust his remedies at the institutional level as to his claim in Count IV that
Wexford violated his Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. 59).
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no material facts are in
genuine dispute and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Machicote v.
Roethlisberger, 969 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). In determining
whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court views the evidence and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d
654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
However, “[i]nferences that rely upon speculation or conjecture are insufficient.” Armato
v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2014).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), “no action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility
until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. The Seventh
Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Dole v. Chandler,
438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006).
“Exhausting administrative remedies requires inmates to follow each step
prescribed by the state’s administrative rules governing prison grievances.” Loving v.

Gomez, No. 19-CV-00029, 2022 WL 3026932, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2022) (citing Chambers
v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 983 (7th Cir. 2020)). Under Illinois’s grievance process, a prisoner
may file, within 60 days of an incident, a complaint to a counselor or grievance officer.
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a)–(b). The counselor or officer reports factual findings and
recommendations to the CAO, who provides a decision to the prisoner. Id. § 504.830(d).
If the prisoner is unsatisfied with the response, he can appeal to the ARB within 30 days

of the decision. Id. § 504.850(a)–(f). The ARB then makes a final determination of the
grievance and sends a copy of its decision to the prisoner. Id. § 504.850(e).
Here, Wexford acknowledges that Haywood exhausted the grievance procedure
as to his February 25, 2021 and August 2, 2021 grievances. It argues, however, that
Haywood did not exhaust his current claim against Wexford because the grievances

made no reference to Wexford, nor did they describe Wexford in any manner.
Haywood, in response, argues that he was not required to name Wexford in his
grievance. Instead, § 504.810 only requires that a prisoner articulate the factual basis for
the grievance, including what happened, when, where, and who was involved. And
Haywood grieved that staff at the Health Care Unit denied him his inhaler even though

he could not catch his breath. Because Wexford operates the Health Care Unit, Haywood
argues, it was put on notice of the incident. Haywood also asserts that, when drawing all
reasonable inferences in his favor, his February 25, 2021 grievance operated to exhaust
his claim in the Amended Complaint that Wexford had an unconstitutional policy of
depriving medical care to inmates who are alleged to be “staff assaulters.”
In reply, Wexford argues that Haywood is not claiming a broad denial of treatment

by the Health Care Unit as a whole, but rather that one Jane Doe Nurse refused to allow
use of his inhaler on a single occasion. Wexford also argues that there is no mention
whatsoever in Haywood’s grievances of any unconstitutional policy or practice
attributable to Wexford.
Because there are no disputes of material fact, the Court did not hold an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008).

Based on the evidence in the record, the Court agrees with Wexford that neither
of Haywood’s grievances provided enough information to alert the state that he had an
issue with Wexford. See Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that
the grievance process is designed to “alert the state to the problem and invite corrective
action”). The only complaint that Haywood made about medical care in his February 25,

2021 grievance was that “They . . . denied me my inhaler spray for my asthma.” (Doc. 60-
1 at p. 19). While an inmate need not specifically name Wexford in a grievance,
Haywood’s complaint about one nurse’s refusal to provide him with an inhaler falls well
below the threshold for exhausting his claim against Wexford.
The Court further agrees with Wexford that Haywood never grieved the denial of

medical care on the basis of being a “staff assaulter.” True, there is no requirement in the
Administrative Code that an inmate spell out a specific policy or practice in his grievance
to fully exhaust a Monell claim against Wexford. Calderson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,
No. 21-CV-1061-DWD, 2023 WL 1100261, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2023) (citing Loving v.
Gomez, 2022 WL 3026932, *4 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (collecting cases and finding “the law does
not require detailed specificity when Wexford is the defendant” because complaints

about medical failures clearly invoke Wexford and its employees)). Indeed, district courts
“have held that grieving activities for which Wexford was responsible, or for which
Wexford was involved in the decision-making process, are generally sufficient to put the
prison on notice that the plaintiff was grieving a policy or practice of the corporation.”
Morrow v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-00664-GCS, 2021 WL 3030329, at *4
(S.D. Ill. July 19, 2021). Likewise, where an inmate complains about the “broad denial of

proper treatment by the health care unit as a whole,” courts have found that the inmate
has sufficiently grieved a policy or practice of Wexford resulting in inadequate medical
care. Id.
Here, however, Haywood did not grieve the broad denial of medical care; he
grieved one instance of a nurse refusing to provide an inhaler. He also made no mention

whatsoever in his grievance—as he now alleges in his Amended Complaint—that Brandt
told Jane Doe Nurse not to treat Haywood because he was a “staff assaulter.” The Court
is mindful that it must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, but it
is unreasonable to infer that Haywood was complaining about Wexford’s
unconstitutional policy of denying medical care to “staff assaulters” based on one

sentence in Haywood’s grievance about the denial of an inhaler.
Because Haywood did not administratively exhaust his claim against Wexford,
Wexford is entitled to summary judgment.
II. Motions to Dismiss filed by Wills and Hughes
Defendants Anthony Wills and LaToya Hughes have moved to dismiss the claims
against them in their official capacities as Warden of Menard and Acting Director of the

IDOC, respectively. (Docs. 49, 70). Both Defendants argue that Haywood’s request for
injunctive relief has been rendered moot by his transfer from Menard to Hill Correctional
Center. Furthermore, his request for monetary damages against them is barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
In response, Haywood argues that Hughes, as the IDOC’s Acting Director, and

Wills, as the Warden of Menard, are liable for system-wide failures that occur throughout
IDOC facilities. Because he seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction against these
Defendants requiring “correction of unconstitutional practices and policies,” Haywood
argues, his claims against Wills and Hughes for injunctive relief are not moot. Haywood
also concedes that he does not seek monetary damages from Wills or Hughes.

The Seventh Circuit has long held that “when a prisoner who seeks injunctive
relief for a condition specific to a particular prison is transferred out of that prison, the
need for relief, and hence the prisoner’s claim, become moot.” Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d
862, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
But a prisoner who attacks “the IDOC’s practices as a whole” and who alleges he was

adversely affected by those practices is not barred by the doctrine of mootness at the
motion to dismiss stage. Id.
In this case, Haywood alleges that Wills, as Warden of Menard, was responsible
for the creation, implementation, and oversight of policies, practices, and procedures at
Menard, while Hughes, as Acting IDOC Director, has overall responsibility for the
IDOC’s policies and procedures, as well as the administration of all corrections facilities

in the state. (Doc. 33 at ¶¶ 102-03). Haywood then claims both Defendants had notice of
the widespread practice of healthcare employees and correctional officers delaying or
denying medical care to inmates at Menard—and doing nothing to ensure that Menard
inmates received adequate and timely medical care. (Doc. 33 at ¶ 105). Specifically,
Haywood asserts, widespread policies or practices existed at Menard pursuant to which
inmates received unconstitutionally inadequate healthcare. (Id. at ¶ 106). Haywood also

claims that both Defendants had notice of widespread policies and practices at Menard
whereby cleaning products were only provided once a week for solitary confinement
cells, leading to unsanitary conditions in the cells. (Id. at ¶¶ 113-14). As a result,
Haywood’s time in solitary confinement at Menard caused him substantial physical and
psychological harm. (Id. at ¶ 118).

The allegations in the Amended Complaint are limited to Haywood’s time at
Menard and do not attack IDOC’s practices as a whole. Likewise, Haywood does not
claim that he has continued to be harmed by IDOC’s policies since moving to Hill.
Because Haywood’s claims are related to a condition specific to a particular prison—
Menard—his transfer to Hill renders his claim for injunctive relief moot. Defendants

Wills and Hughes will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies filed by Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (Doc. 59) is
GRANTED. Wexford is DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendant Anthony
Wills (Doc. 49) is GRANTED. Wills is DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendant Latoya
Hughes (Doc. 70) is also GRANTED. Hughes is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Judgment will be entered accordingly at the close of the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 21, 2024

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10157526. Public record. Not legal advice.