# Dorn v. Jefferys

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · October 17, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156909

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** October 17, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JAMES DORN,
#N90855,

Plaintiff, Case No. 22-cv-02378-SPM

v.

ROB JEFFREYS,
MARK WILLIAMS,
LIEUTENANT WRANGLER,
LIEUTENANT CROUSE,
GARZA,
LINBOOM,
LITTLE,
SERGEANT MOORE,
LEDBETTER,
HAAS,
BENNETT,
GRAVEL,
SCHENKEL,
URASKI, and
BAYLOR,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:
Plaintiff James Dorn, a transgender inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who
is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her constitutional rights that took place at Pinckneyville Correction
Center and Hill Correctional Center. The Amended Complaint is now before the Court for
preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, any portion of a
complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or requests money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief
must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro
se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816,
821 (7th Cir. 2009).
THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that in the spring of 2022, she was housed in 5 House, B Wing at
Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”). (Doc. 17, p. 51). In April 2022, an inmate
named Minor, who was also housed in the same wing as Plaintiff, assaulted another inmate who
identifies as transgender. (Id. at p. 8, 35). Lieutenant Wrangler witnessed the first incident and
allowed the inmates to continue fighting. Eventually, Wrangler told the inmates to “lock up.” (Id.
at p. 8). Plaintiff wrote to Wrangler about the incident and told Wrangler that she did not feel safe
around Minor, but she did not receive a response. (Id. at p. 52). On May 3, 2022, Minor spit on
another transgender inmate and tried to fight the inmate because the inmate refused to “be with
him.” Wrangler spoke to Minor, but again, no disciplinary action was taken against Minor, and
Minor remained housed in B Wing. (Id.).

On May 15, 2022, Minor spit on Plaintiff and told her that “she is a disgrace to Vice Lords.”
(Doc. 17, p. 36). Minor then “beat up” Plaintiff. (Id. at p. 36, 48, 52). On May 27, 2022, Plaintiff
was interviewed by Internal Affairs Officer Uraski about the incident. (Id. at p. 36). Uraski asked
Plaintiff if she feared for her life, and Plaintiff said yes. Uraski told Plaintiff that he was going to
place her under investigation until she will be transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center
(“Pontiac”) under protective custody. The transfer did not occur, and Plaintiff was transferred to
Hill Correctional Center (“Hill”). (Id.).
On or around June 2022, after her transfer, Plaintiff gave a letter to Officer Little requesting
to speak to Lieutenant Crouse of the Internal Affairs Unit at Hill. (Doc. 17, p. 36). In the letter,

Plaintiff explained that she had been a high-ranking member of the security threat group, the Vice
Lords. Once she “was found out to be homosexual,” a hit was placed on her life. Plaintiff wrote in
the letter that for the last three years she has felt like she has been running for her life. (Id.). Plaintiff
explained that prior to being transferred to Hill, she was spit on at Pinckneyville because she is
disliked by other members of the Vice Lords. (Id. at p. 38).

That same month, Plaintiff asked Officer Little about the status of her transfer to protective
custody at Pontiac. (Doc. 17, p. 37). Little told Plaintiff that she was transferred to Hill on a
disciplinary transfer and that Hill does not have protective custody. (Id. at p. 38). Little informed
Plaintiff about the PRISM program at Centralia Correctional Center for transgender inmates. Little
told Plaintiff that when he came back from his July 4th break, then he would talk to Plaintiff’s
counselor and Schenkel, a mental health staff member, about getting Plaintiff transferred to the
PRISM program. Little also told Plaintiff that in the meantime, he would transfer her to a building
where she would have no problems. (Id.).
In July, Plaintiff was threatened by an inmate named Tru. (Doc. 17, p. 39). Tru had stabbed
an inmate in the jaw and then told Plaintiff that she was next. Around August 25, 2022, Tru was

let out of restrictive housing and moved to the same wing as Plaintiff. One day when Plaintiff was
returning from lunch, Tru pointed his finger in Plaintiff’s face and said he was “going to kick [her]
ass.” Plaintiff’s cellmate told Bennett, the wing officer, about the incident. (Id. at p. 39-40). Later
that day, Plaintiff was informed that Tru had been “moved off the wing.” Plaintiff left her cell and
spoke to Bennett personally. (Id. at p. 40). Bennett told Plaintiff to write to the Internal Affairs
Unit. Plaintiff then asked to speak to a crisis team member. A mental health staff member was
called. Plaintiff also asked to speak to Little. Plaintiff told Little about the most recent threat, and
Little said he was “washing his hands of her.” (Id.).
Plaintiff spoke to Lieutenant Crouse around July 20, 2022, about her life being in danger

and her request to be transferred to Pontiac protective custody. (Doc. 17, p. 41). Crouse said he
would look into it, but Plaintiff never heard back from Crouse. (Id.).
On September 8, 2022, Plaintiff was moved to a new cell house. (Doc. 17, p. 41). At the
new cell house, Plaintiff asked to see Lieutenant Jones and showed Jones a paper signed by
Schenkel. The paper designated Plaintiff as transgender and stated that Plaintiff was supposed to

be housed in a one-person cell. (Id.). Jones called Schenkel about the paper. (Id. at p. 42). Schenkel
stated she had never seen the paper and in all her years at Hill, she has never granted a transgender
person and single cell. Schenkel told Jones that Plaintiff must have forged her signature. Schenkel
wrote Plaintiff a disciplinary report for falsifying her signature on the form. (Id.).
Plaintiff states that Schenkel was supposed to submit her name to the PRISM program back
in July 2022. Schenkel, however, waited to submit her name until Plaintiff had already refused
housing three times due to fear for her safety. (Doc. 17, p. 42-43). By this time, Plaintiff’s grade
status had been demoted to C-grade, and Plaintiff could not participate in the program due to her
C-grade status. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that Schenkel and Little advised her that if she feared for her
life, then she should refuse housing. (Id. at p. 23). For repeatedly refusing housing, however,

Plaintiff has been at C-grade status for over thirteen months. Furthermore, when she refuses
housing her TV, tablet, hot pot, and headphones are taken, until she goes before the Adjustment
Committee. She is also locked in a cell for most of the day and is only allowed to leave for a
shower. (Id.).
On January 24, 2023, Plaintiff refused housing again and was told she was moving to cell
OR 55. (Doc. 17, p. 43). Plaintiff told Gravel that OR 55 had plumbing problems, and Gravel told
Plaintiff it did not matter. After moving to the cell, the next day Gravel came and told Plaintiff that
her toilet was leaking into the cell below. A plumber and a lieutenant came to the cell. (Id. at p.
43). The lieutenant told Gravel to move Plaintiff to a different cell. (Id. at p. 44). After packing her

property, Plaintiff told Gravel that she was ready to move. Gravel stated that he did not care what
the lieutenant said, “this is his wing and he’s not going to move the Plaintiff nowhere[sic].” For a
week, the water was turned off in Plaintiff’s cell and she was unable to flush her toilet. (Id.).
SEVERANCE AND TRANSFER
Plaintiff asserts claims for violations of her constitutional rights that allegedly occurred

while she was incarcerated at two different correctional facilities. As a result, the Court must
determine whether the claims are properly joined or, if improperly joined, should be severed or
dismissed. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 prohibits a plaintiff from asserting unrelated claims
against different defendants or sets of defendants in the same lawsuit. Therefore, multiple
defendants may not be joined in a single action unless the plaintiff asserts at least one claim to
relief against each respondent that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences and presents a question of law or fact common to all. See George, 507
F.3d at 607. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 grants district courts broad discretion when
deciding whether to sever claims or to dismiss improperly joined defendants. See Owens v.

Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011).
The alleged constitutional violations that occurred at Pinckneyville and Hill not only took
place at two different facilities, but they involve different defendants and arise from separate
transactions and occurrences. The only common defendants are IDOC Director Jeffreys and
Administrative Review Board Member Baylor who allegedly mishandled grievances written while
Plaintiff was incarcerated at both institutions. (See Doc. 17, p. 25-26). Their involvement in
Plaintiff’s claims that occurred at Pinckneyville and Hill is not enough to bring the allegations
under the same umbrella. The matter is further complicated by the fact that Pinckneyville is located
within this judicial district, while Hill is located within the Central District of Illinois. Accordingly,

consistent with George v. Smith and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 21, the Court will
sever the claims that occurred at Hill against Jeffreys, Williams, Crouse, Garza, Linboom, Little,
Moore, Ledbetter, Haas, Bennett, Gravel, Schenkel, and Baylor into a separate action and transfer
the new action to the proper venue. The remaining claims, which occurred while Plaintiff was at
Pinckneyville against Wrangler, Uraski, Jeffreys, and Baylor shall be addressed in this case and

reviewed pursuant to Section 1915A.
DISCUSSION
Based on a review of the First Amended Complaint and Plaintiff’s articulation of her
claims, the Court designates the following counts:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Wrangler,
Uraski, Jeffreys, and Baylor.

Count 2: Claim under 18 U.S.C. § 922 against Wrangler for failure to obey
state regulations.

Count 3: State law claims against Wrangler and Uraski.

The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned in the First
Amended Complaint that occurred at Pinckneyville but not addressed in this Order is
considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly1 pleading
standard.
Count 1
In order for a plaintiff to succeed on a failure to protect claim, the plaintiff must plead that
she was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the
defendant acted with “deliberate indifference” to that danger. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994); Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff also must allege that

1 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
prison officials were aware of a specific, impending, and substantial threat to her safety. Pope v.
Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996). In other words, the defendant had to know that there was a
substantial risk that those who attacked plaintiff would do so, yet failed to take any action. See
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733-34 (7th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim against Defendant Wrangler for failure to protect.
Plaintiff alleges that Wrangler was the lieutenant of Plaintiff’s housing wing at Pinckneyville and
was aware that inmate Minor was assaulting inmates who identify as transgender. Wrangler,
however, allowed Minor to remain in the same housing unit as Plaintiff, resulting in Plaintiff being
spit on and “beaten up” by Minor. Count 1 will proceed against Wrangler for failing to protect
Plaintiff from attack by another inmate on May 15, 2022.
Count 1 will be dismissed as to Uraski for similar reasons stated in the original Merit
Review Order. (Doc. 15, p. 10). Plaintiff claims that Uraski failed to protect her by not placing her
to protective custody at Pontiac, and instead, Uraski transferred her to Hill. (Doc. 17, p. 28). This
is not sufficient to state a claim for failure to protect. The Eight Amendment is not violated when:

[A] prisoner is put in fear of assault by other inmates, or even when a prisoner is
actually assaulted. It is violated only when correctional officials know of a
substantial risk to the prisoner and, through intention or deliberate indifference to
the prisoner’s safety, fail to take reasonable steps to prevent injury.

See DeJesus v. Peters, 92 C 0387, 1997 WL 392000, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1997) (citations
omitted). There are no allegations that Uraski knew of a specific threat to Plaintiff’s safety at Hill
and transferred her there anyways. The First Amended Complaint states that Plaintiff told Uraski
that Minor spit on her because she is a disgrace to the Vice Lords and that she feared for her safety
at Pinckneyville. (Doc. 17, p. 9). A failure to protect claim requires more than “general allegations
of fear or the need to be removed.” Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F. 3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2008).
Additionally, failure to transfer Plaintiff to the facility of her choice does not violate the
constitution. (Doc. 15, p. 10). See i.e. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983)(Inmates
have no justifiable expectation to be incarcerated in any particular prison); Johnson v. Barry, 815
F.2d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff had no protected expectation to either stay at his facility
or avoid transfer to a facility with more severe rules); Robertson v. Jeffreys, 2023 WL 2777933, at

*1 (C.D. Ill. April 4, 2023) (no constitutional right to transfer); Jackson v. Brookhart, 2021 WL
1146984, at *3 (S.D. Ill. March 25, 2021) (“there is no constitutional right for a prisoner to be
housed in a particular institution or placement.”). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
failure to protect and deliberate indifference claims against Uraski for not transferring Plaintiff to
Pontiac are dismissed.
The Court also dismisses the failure to protect claims against IDOC Director Jeffreys and
Administrative Review Board Member Baylor. Plaintiff asserts that Baylor refused to hear
Grievance #1414-05-22 dated May 17, 2022, concerning Wrangler’s conduct and the assault on
Plaintiff by Minor. In reviewing the grievance, Baylor wrongly stated that he had already
addressed the issue in responding to a different grievance on May 31, 2022. (Doc. 17, p. 25).

Plaintiff states that she is suing Jeffreys because he signed his name and concurred with Baylor’s
decision to deny her grievance. (Id. at p. 26).
These allegations do not state claim for an Eighth Amendment violation against either
Defendant. Grievance #1414-5-22 was written after Plaintiff was spit on and assaulted by Minor
and received by the Administrative Review Board in July 2022, after Plaintiff had already been
transferred to Hill. Thus, Jeffreys and Baylor cannot be held responsible for failing to protect
Plaintiff from Minor when they were not informed of the problem until months after the assault
occurred. Furthermore, generally, a prison official “who simply processed or reviewed inmate
grievances lack personal involvement in the conduct forming the basis of the grievance.” Owens

v. Evans, 878 F. 3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, Count 3 is dismissed as to Jeffreys and
Baylor.
Count 2
Count 2 brought under 18 U.S.C. § 922 for Wrangler’s failure to obey state law is dismissed
with prejudice. (See Doc. 17, p. 27). Section 922 is a criminal statute dealing with unlawful

possession and sales of firearms. The statute does not provide for a private cause of action. See
Price v. Indy Trading Post, No. 19-cv-001267-JMS-TAB, 2019 WL 2010197, at *4 (S.D. Ind.
May 7, 2019) (discussing that Section 922(d) does not create a federal civil cause of action).
Count 3
Plaintiff purports to bring state law claims against Wrangler for “official misconduct,
dereliction of duty, negligence, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress,”
but she offers only a conclusory statement which does not state a claim. Thus, these state law
claims are dismissed without prejudice as to Wrangler. (Doc. 17, p. 27-28).
Plaintiff brings similar state law claims against Uraski, which are also dismissed as
conclusory. Even if Plaintiff had stated a colorable state law claim against Uraski, however, the

Court would not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims since she did not state
a viable federal claim against Uraski.
DISPOSITION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claims against Jeffreys, Williams, Crouse, Garza,
Linboom, Little, Moore, Ledbetter, Haas, Bennett, Gravel, Schenkel, and Baylor for the events
that occurred at Hill Correctional Center are SEVERED into a new case. In the new case, the
Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to file the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) and the Motion for
Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). Once the newly severed action is opened, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1404(a) and on the Court’s own motion, the Clerk of Court is
ORDERED to transfer the action to the United States District Court for the Central District of
Illinois for such further proceedings as that court may deem appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 93(b).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the only claims remaining in this action are the claims
asserted against Wrangler, Uraski, Jeffreys, and Baylor for events that occurred at Pinckneyville

Correctional Center (designated as Counts 1, 2, and 3). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
terminate Williams, Crouse, Garza, Linboom, Little, Moore, Ledbetter, Haas, Bennett, Gravel, and
Schenkel as defendants in this action.
Merit Review Under Section 1915A
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 shall proceed against Wrangler and is
dismissed without prejudice as to Uraski, Jeffreys, and Baylor. COUNT 2 is DISMISSED with
prejudice. COUNT 3 is DISMISSED without prejudice. Because there are no surviving claims
against Uraski, Jeffreys, and Baylor, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate them from
this action as defendants.
The Clerk of Court SHALL prepare for Wrangler the following: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a

Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of
Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the First Amended Complaint,
and this Memorandum and Order to the defendant’s place of employment. If the defendant fails to
sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the
date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the
defendant, and the Court will require the defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the
extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the Defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, his

last known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above
or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the
Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendant Wrangler is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
First Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendant Wrangler should respond to the issues
stated in this Merit Review Order.
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that she is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of
Court and each opposing party informed of any change in her address; the Court will not
independently investigate her whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this Order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 17, 2023

s/Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit and
serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants will
enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from
the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take
90 days or more. When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling
Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is
advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the
defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit
any evidence to the Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156909. Public record. Not legal advice.