# Johnson v. Dye

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · September 29, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156856

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 29, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156856

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that taking away a prisoner’s job could amount to a constitutional deprivation
- holding that job removal stated retaliation claim
- finding that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TERRANCE JOHNSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:19-cv-00444-GCS
)
JONATHAN DYE, KYLE HUGHEY, )
ANTHONY WILLS, and ROB )
JEFFREYS, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc.
167). Defendants Jonathan Dye (“Dye”) and Kyle Hughey (“Hughey”) filed their Motion
for Summary Judgment along with a Memorandum in Support on January 17, 2023. (Doc.
167, 168). In their Memorandum in Support, Defendants assert that they did not violate
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the First or Fifth Amendment through their
investigation and issuance of a disciplinary report that implicated Plaintiff with tobacco
trafficking. (Doc. 168). Plaintiff, Terrance Johnson (“Johnson”) filed a Response in
Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on January 24, 2023. (Doc.
170). For the reasons delineated below, the Court DENIES the Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 167).
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Johnson is an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) currently
incarcerated at Hill Correctional Center (“Hill”). Johnson alleged deprivations of his

constitutional rights arising from the issuance of an Inmate Disciplinary Report and a
guilty verdict by the Adjustment Committee, which resulted in disciplinary segregation
for his suspected involvement in trafficking tobacco at Menard Correctional Center
(“Menard”). (Doc. 1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court completed its preliminary
review of Johnson’s initial Complaint on August 8, 2019. (Doc. 14). The Court construed

Johnson’s allegations into the following counts:
Count 1: First Amendment retaliation claim against Dye, Hughey, and
Internal Affairs Supervisor John Doe for drafting a false disciplinary report
and persuading another inmate to submit a fabricated statement against
Plaintiff when he did not provide information in the tobacco trafficking
investigation.

Count 2: Fifth Amendment claim against Dye, Hughey, and Internal Affairs
Supervisor John Doe for drafting a false disciplinary report and persuading
another inmate to submit a fabricated statement against Plaintiff in an
attempt to compel him to give self-incriminating information during the
tobacco trafficking investigation.

Count 3: Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against
Dye, Hughey, and Internal Affairs Supervisor John Doe for filing a false
disciplinary report.

Count 4: Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against
Brookman, Hart, and Lashbrook for disregarding constitutionally required
procedures while conducting the disciplinary hearing.

Count 5: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Wandro,
Baldwin, and Benton for affirming the unconstitutional process used by the
Adjustment Committee during Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing and
upholding the retaliatory actions of Dye, Hughey, and Internal Affairs
Supervisor John Doe.
Id. at p. 3-4. Counts 1 and 2 of Johnson’s Complaint proceeded against Defendants Dye
and Hughey but were dismissed without prejudice against John Doe Defendant. Id. at p.
5-6. Counts 3, 4 and 5 did not survive preliminary review and were dismissed without
prejudice. Id. at p. 7-9. On August 25, 2021, Johnson amended his Complaint to include
Anthony Wills and Rob Jeffreys1 in their official capacities as Warden of Menard and

Director of the IDOC respectively to effectuate any injunctive relief awarded by the
Court. (Doc. 111, p. 2).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Defendants’ Initial Investigation and Documents Produced in Connection
with their Investigation

On the evening of May 9, 2018, Menard Correctional Center Officer Nathan Smith
(“Smith”) discovered several bags of tobacco in Gallery 2 at Menard. (Doc. 170, Exh. 2, p.
9-10). After Smith recovered the tobacco, he released the tobacco to the Internal Affairs
unit, wrote an incident report, and placed an incarcerated worker assigned to Gallery 2 –
CI #12 – on “Investigative Status.” (Doc. 170, Exh. 2, p. 2). In the Incident Report, Smith
stated the following:
[I] was performing a routine shakedown of all 2 gallery . . . During this
shakedown [I] discovered one large plastic glove of tobacco weighing 27.2
grams (verified by I.A. Dye) and 8 small individual bags in the gutter under
the step to the yard door, at the front of the gallery. All contraband was

1 Rob Jeffreys is no longer the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. As such,
the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to substitute Latoya J. Hughes, who is currently the Acting
Director of the IDOC.

2 CI #1 has two separate nickname aliases. For clarity, the Court notes that CI #1 is also
known as “Nickname #1” and “Nickname #2” within the record.
secured . . . and released to I.A. Officer Dye. Chain of Command Notified.

Id. at p. 6. Defendants Dye and Hughey were then assigned to investigate and identify
who was trafficking the tobacco and to determine whether any correctional center staff
were involved. (Doc. 168, Exh. 1, p. 18:17-20); (Doc. 168, Exh. 2, p. 24:1-2).
As part of the investigation, Defendants Dye and Hughey interviewed CI #1 and
CI #2. Defendants first interviewed CI #1 on May 9, 2018, at 9:25 pm. (Doc. 170, Exh. 2, p.
11). During the interview, CI #1 stated that CI #23 and Derrondas Reed4 were responsible
for trafficking tobacco at Menard and that CI #1 occasionally assisted Reed with the

transport of the tobacco around the facility. Id. CI #1 further noted that CI #2 got the
tobacco from upstairs and that Reed throws the tobacco down for CI #2 to “fish off the
gallery.” Id. In his deposition, CI #1 stated that Defendants Dye and Hughey made him
feel as though they “wanted [him] to name Pooh (Reed) and Duck (Johnson)5 during the
investigation.” (Doc. 168, Exh. 8, p. 11:6-9). CI #1 stated Dye and Hughey were

“threatening [him]” if he did not name Reed or Duck as suspects. Id. at 14:21-24.
Following the interview of CI #1, Dye sent an email at 10:47 pm that same day notifying
the chain of command of his preliminary findings. (Doc. 170, Exh. 3, p. 10-11).
On May 10, 2018, Lt. Kalin Bridges (“Bridges”) conducted targeted cell searches in
the North Lower Cell House, including the cells of Reed and CI #2. (Doc. 170, Exh. 3, p.

8). Both Reed and CI #2 were searched, and no contraband was discovered. However, it

3 CI #2 is also known as “Nickname #3” in the record.

4 Derrondas Reed is also known as “Pooh.”

5 Plaintiff, Terrance Johnson, is also known as “Duck.”
was noted that Reed’s “shakedown” revealed an “abundance of commissary items.” Id.
During the shakedown, Johnson and Reed (Johnson’s cellmate) were interviewed. (Doc.

170, Exh. 3, p. 5). Both denied having any knowledge of tobacco in the North Lower
Cellhouse. Id. After the shakedown concluded, Reed and Johnson were placed on
“investigative status” and escorted to North 2 segregation. Id. Lt. Bridges then sent an
email to Joshua Schoenbeck at 2:44 pm (copying Dye) to update him on the investigation’s
progress. Id.
Later that afternoon, Defendant Dye interviewed both Reed and CI #2 about the

alleged tobacco trafficking. (Doc. 170, Exh. 3, p. 5). Dye first interviewed CI #2 at 4:00 pm.
(Doc. 170, Exh. 2, p. 18-19). CI #2 stated that he had never purchased tobacco in the
cellhouse, but he was aware of tobacco being present. Id. at p. 19. CI #2 also disclosed that
he witnessed CI #1 selling tobacco and that CI #1 had previously informed CI #2 that he
had obtained the tobacco from Reed. Id. After completing the interview with CI #2, Dye

emailed his chain of command and relayed the information obtained from the interview.
(Doc. 170, Exh. 3, p. 5). Dye also noted in the email that “[o]ffenders involved will be
interviewed again in the coming days in an attempt to gain further information as to the
original source of the tobacco before issuing disciplinary reports.” Id. Dye then
interviewed Reed at 8:20 pm. (Doc. 170, Exh. 2, p. 16-17). During the interview “Reed

denie[d] having any . . . tobacco in the [North Lower] Cellhouse.” Id. at p. 17.
Additional Confidential Informant interviews took place on May 12, 2018, and
May 16, 2018. (Doc. 170, Exh. 2, p. 20- 23). The first unidentified Confidential Informant
was interviewed on May 12, 2018, at 3:15 pm by Defendant Dye. (Doc. 170, Exh. 2, p. 20-
21). During the interview, the Confidential Informant reportedly stated that the
movement of tobacco had slowed since the shakedown and that he had obtained

information about where the tobacco was coming from. Id. at p. 21. The Confidential
Informant indicated that “Duck and Pooh” had been trafficking tobacco and were
“known as the tobacco guys in the cell house.” Id. The second unidentified Confidential
Informant interview was conducted by Correctional Officer McCarthy (“McCarthy”) and
took place on May 16, 2023, at 9:30 am. The Confidential Informant reportedly stated that
“’Duck’ Terrance Johnson . . . [was] known as the ‘tobacco guy’” and that “Johnson works

with ‘Pooh’ - Derrondas Reed” to traffic the tobacco Id. at p. 23.
After the May 16, 2018, interview concluded, McCarthy updated the chain of
command on the continued progress of the investigation via email at 9:52 am. (Doc. 170,
Exh. 2, p. 24). In the email, McCarthy stated that:
[T]he CI confirmed that “Duck” Terrance JOHNSON R15112 is known as
the “tobacco guy.” Johnson works with “Pooh” Derrondas REED K90424.
The CI claimed that Offender Reed has had a female staff “cuffed” here at
Menard CC for years to the point that they may even have a relationship.
REED is able to obtain weed, tobacco and ecstasy from the described staff
member, claiming that ecstasy is sold for $30 a pill.

Id.

Johnson also testified that Dye and Hughey interviewed him on May 21 and May
24, 2018. (Doc. 169, p. 45:21-52:16). Both interviews took place in the protective custody
room at Menard. Id. at p. 49:18-21. Regarding the May 21, 2018, interview, Johnson stated
that Dye and Hughey inquired as to whether he knew about his cellmate’s (Reed’s)
involvement in trafficking tobacco at Menard, if he had ever seen Reed with tobacco, if
he had any knowledge about how Reed had acquired the tobacco, and if a staff member
had provided the tobacco to Reed. Id. at p. 46:20-24. In response to Hughey’s and Dye’s

questioning, Johnson responded that he “had no knowledge of [Reed’s involvement.]”
Id. at p. 48:5-10.
Johnson reported that the May 24th interview proceeded in a similar manner but
noted that Hughey and Dye “were more amped up” about him giving them information
about Reed and any staff involvement. (Doc. 169, p. 47:5-11). Johnson testified that Dye
and Hughey were “agitated” with him for not providing them with any information, and

they yelled at him due to his unsatisfactory responses. Id. at p. 49:22-51:9. After Johnson
again indicated that he had no knowledge of any tobacco trafficking at Menard, Dye
reportedly told Johnson that he had “fucked” himself, and because Johnson could not
“help” them, they could not “help” him. Id. at p. 49:22-51:9. Dye also purportedly told
Johnson that he would “make sure that [Johnson] did at least a year of segregation” for

failing to cooperate. Id. at p. 51:22-52:16.
B. Dye’s and Hughey’s Decision to Charge Johnson
Around 9:45 pm on May 24, 2018, Defendant Hughey signed and served a
disciplinary ticket on Johnson. (Doc. 170, Exh. 2, p. 26). The ticket charged Johnson with
violations of Menard rules, as well as state and federal law including - “103 – Bribery and

Extortion; 110 - Impeding or Interfering with an Investigation; 203 - Drugs and Drug
Paraphernalia, and 501 - Violating State or Federal Law.” Id. As the lead officers of the
investigation, both Dye and Hughey made the decision to draft the charging document
and to serve it on Johnson. See, e.g., (Doc. 168, Exh. 1, p. 30:9-15) (stating that “[m]yself
and Lieutenant Hughey did the investigation and deemed at the end of the investigation
we had enough information to author disciplinary reports.”). The ticket accused Johnson

of trafficking tobacco at Menard and charged him with violating the four departmental
rules noted above, stating in relevant part:
The Investigations Unit met with a Confidential Informant . . . that stated
he had pertinent information regarding the tobacco being discovered. The
CI stated he was close to offender JOHNSON and knew he was one of the
offenders trafficking the tobacco. The CI stated JOHNSON and another
offender . . . have been running tobacco for a while and are known as the
“tobacco guys.” Prior to the tobacco being discovered a second Confidential
Source . . . had turned over multiple bags of tobacco that he had obtained
from offender JOHNSON.

(Doc. 170, Exh. 2, p. 26).
The Investigation Report also noted that disciplinary tickets were issued to CI #1
and Reed in connection with the trafficked tobacco. (Doc. 170, Exh. 2, p. 25, 27). CI #1’s
ticket was issued by Defendant Dye at 8:30 pm on May 24, 2018. Id. at p. 25. CI #1 was
charged with “103 - Bribery and Extortion; 203 - Drugs and Drug Paraphernalia, 406 -
Trading or Trafficking, and 501 – Violating State or Federal Law.” Id. Reed’s ticket was
served by Defendant Dye at 9:00 pm on May 24, 2018. Id. at p. 27. Reed was charged with
the same offenses as Johnson. Id.
During his deposition, Defendant Dye elaborated on how he and Defendant
Hughey made the decision to issue Johnson a disciplinary ticket. (Doc. 168, Exh. 1, p.
30:14-15). Dye stated that he and Hughey charged Johnson based on statements from
three different informants: CI #1, CI # 2 and the May 12th informant. Id. at p. 26:3-8; 35:
19-22. However, neither CI #1’s interview sheet nor CI #2’s interview sheet indicated that
either confidential informant named Johnson as being responsible for trafficking tobacco.
(Doc. 170, Exh. 2, p. 12-13, 19). Numerous Menard Officers, including Lt. Joshua

Schoenbeck and Lt. Bridges, indicated that these discrepancies were concerning. Lt.
Schoenbeck testified that all formal interviews should be documented with an interview
sheet, and all interview sheets were required to be included in the investigative report.
(Doc. 168, Exh. 4, p. 59:21 – 60:1). Lt Bridges specifically testified that he would have
expected a subsequent interview of CI #2.
C. Deposition Testimony of the Three Informants

Johnson’s counsel deposed the three informants, CI #1, CI #2, and the May 12th
informant, who served as a basis for Dye’s and Hughey’s decision to issue a disciplinary
ticket to Johnson. (Doc. 168, Exh. 8, 9, 10).
CI #1 testified that he never implicated Johnson as being responsible for the
trafficking tobacco during the May 9th interview. (Doc. 168, Exh. 8, p. 11:2-15).

Specifically, CI #1 stated the following:
Q. Did Mr. Dye and Mr. Hughey ask you about [CI# 2] and Pooh [Reed]?
A. Yeah. Yes.
Q. And that’s—that’s during the May 9 interrogation; is that right?
A. Yes.

Q. Did they ask you about somebody named Duck during the May 9
interrogation?
A. At that point, I don’t believe they did. I don't think so.
Q. Did you ever identify someone named Duck as responsible for
trafficking tobacco in this investigation?
A. No.

Id. at p. 24:2-15. CI #1 also indicated that he felt pressure to say that CI #2 and Reed were
involved in trafficking tobacco. Id. at p. 24:16-20.
CI #2 testified that he had only informed Officer Dye that CI #1 had sold tobacco
on the gallery and that CI #1 gets that tobacco from Reed. (Doc. 168, Exh. 9, p. 16:3-19).
CI #3 was deposed on January 20, 2022, after the Court ordered that Defendant
Anthony Wills (“Wills”) reveal the identities of the May 12th and May 16th informants.6

(Doc. 168, Exh. 10). CI #3 testified that Dye and Hughey interrogated him about the
tobacco found in the facility because his cell was positioned in an area where he could
see the tobacco that was uncovered on the evening of May 9, 2018. Id. at p. 11:11-12:24,
16:3-23. CI #3 also testified that he told the officers that he saw the tobacco on the gallery
from his cell; however, he did not provide Hughey or Dye with any names because he

“didn’t know who was trafficking it.” Id. at p. 15:19-22.
D. Johnson’s Sentence to Administrative Segregation and Resulting Injuries
On June 5, 2018, the IDOC Adjustment Committee found Johnson guilty of
committing the four offenses charged by Dye and Hughey. (Doc. 170, Exh. 6, p. 2). The
Committee provided the following explanation for its decision:

Based on the observation of the reporting employee an investigation was
initiated on 5/9/18 and was called to the north lower cell house upon the

6 The Court ordered Mr. Wills to identify both the May 12th informant as well as the May
16th informant. However, Mr. Wills lacked “information or knowledge related to the identity” of
the May 16th informant. (Doc. 170, Exh. 8, p. 2-3). No other officer involved in the deposition could
recall the identity of the May 16th informant, including McCarthy who purportedly interviewed
the informant.
discovery of 27.2g of tobacco on 2 gallery. Cell house staff turned over 8
small bags and one large bag of tobacco that were found under the gutter
leading out to the PC yard. The investigations unit met with CI whose name
and number are being withheld for the safety and security of the institution
that stated he had pertinent information regarding the tobacco being
discovered. The CI stated he was close to offender Johnson and knew he
was one of the offenders trafficking the tobacco. The CI stated that Johnson
and another offender whose name and number are being withheld for the
safety and security of the institution have been running tobacco for a while
and are known as the tobacco guys. Prior to the tobacco being discovered a
second Confidential sources, whose name and number are being withheld
for the safety and security of the institution had turned over multiple bags
of tobacco that he had obtained from offender Johnson. Inmate ID by
offender 360 and state ID card Committee finds inmate guilty based on
information provided and accepts the written report to be factual account
of the incident and is satisfied the violations occurred as reported.

The adjustment committee finds the information provided by the
confidential source to be reliable based upon verification from Intel Officer.

The internal investigation revealed that inmate Johnson R15112 self-
admitted to giving and receiving money for trafficking tobacco.

Id. In accordance with its determination, the Adjustment Committee sentenced Johnson
to four months of “C Grade” status, four months of commissary restriction, six months
of contact visits restriction and four months in segregation. Id.
Johnson reportedly suffered numerous physical and emotional injuries during his
time in segregation. (Doc. 169). Particularly, Johnson testified that he had to deal with
“[r]unning and burning eyes, [a] running nose, coughing, sneezing, [and] choking” when
officers used pepper spray to break up frequent fights in the segregation cell block. Id. at
p. 112:8-13. Johnson also reported passing out because he was not removed from his cell
or provided with protective equipment when a feed box was being welded to his cell
door. Id. at p.113:21-114:2, 114:8-13. Further, Johnson contracted athletes’ foot, suffered
from a lack of sleep, and lost a significant amount of weight while he was in segregation.
Id. at p. 115:23-116:17; 116:25-117:19; 118:8-16. As to his emotional injuries, Johnson

testified that he experienced considerable anxiety, irritability, and depression while he
was in held in segregation and that he still feels this emotional impact to date. Id. at p.
119:3-120:22, 121:15-19.
Dr. Keramet Reiter, an Associate Professor in the Department of Criminology, Law
and Society at the University of California, Irvine, provided the Court with a report
indicating that Johnson’s experiences in segregation, including his physical and resulting

emotional damages are consistent with the known effects of administrative segregation
and entirely foreseeable when an individual is placed in such conditions. (Doc. 170, Exh.
10, p. 12-13).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and affidavits “show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c); Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d
1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The
movant bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material
fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Santaella v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). This Court must
consider the entire record, drawing reasonable inferences and resolving factual disputes
in favor of the non-movant. See Regensburger v. China Adoption Consultants, Ltd., 138 F.3d
1201, 1205 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
See also Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that “we are not
required to draw every conceivable inference from the record . . . we draw only

reasonable inferences.”) (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment is also
appropriate if a plaintiff cannot make a showing of an essential element of his claim. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. While the Court may not “weigh evidence or engage in fact-
finding[,]” it must determine if a genuine issue remains for trial. Lewis v. City of Chicago,
496 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2007).
In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant may not simply

rest on the allegations in his pleadings; rather, he must show through specific evidence
that an issue of fact remains on matters for which he bears the burden of proof at trial.
See Walker v. Shansky, 28 F.3d 666, 670–671 (7th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 276 (citing Celotex,
477 U.S. at 324). No issue remains for trial “unless there is sufficient evidence favoring
the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party . . . if the evidence is

merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–250 (citations omitted). Accord Starzenski v. City of Elkhart, 87
F.3d 872, 880 (7th Cir. 1996); Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 23 F.3d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1994). In
other words, “inferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” Trade
Fin. Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted).

See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (finding that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]”). Instead, the
non-moving party must present “definite, competent evidence to rebut the [summary
judgment] motion.” EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2000)
(internal citation omitted).
DISCUSSION

A. Johnson’s Fifth Amendment Claim
Defendants move for summary judgment on Johnson’s Fifth Amendment claim
on two grounds. (Doc. 168, p. 20-23). First, Defendants assert that Johnson’s Fifth
Amendment rights were not implicated as no criminal case was pending against him
during or after the May 2018 trafficking tobacco investigation. Id. Second, Defendants

assert that Johnson failed to present any evidence of retaliation for the statements Johnson
made during the investigation. Id. at p. 23. Johnson contests Defendants’ arguments on a
legal basis – asserting that an individual’s Fifth Amendment rights can be implicated
“even if there [are] no pending criminal cases against the individual.” (Doc. 170, p. 31 -
32). The Court agrees with Johnson’s position as a matter of law and finds there is

sufficient evidence in the record to allege a Fifth Amendment retaliation claim against
Defendants Dye and Hughey.
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects an individual against self-incrimination by prohibiting the
government from using an assertion of the right to silence in a criminal proceeding

against them. However, Fifth Amendment protections extend beyond criminal
prosecutions to include “other proceeding[s], civil or criminal, formal or informal, where
the answers might incriminate [the person] in future criminal proceedings.” Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (citing McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)). This
extension is in line with the object of the Amendment, the purpose of which “‘was to
insure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any

investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed
a crime.’” Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at p. 77 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562
(1892) (overruled on other grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)).
Defendants argue that the outcome of Johnson’s Fifth Amendment claim is
controlled by the case of Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). (Doc. 168, p. 22). In
Baxter, the Court considered whether drawing an adverse inference from Fifth

Amendment silence in a civil proceeding imposed too high of a cost on the exercise of the
Fifth Amendment privilege. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 316-320. There, a prison inmate
(Palmigiano) had been brought before a prison disciplinary board on charges of inciting
a disturbance. Id. at p. 312. Palmigiano was informed that state criminal charges might
also be brought against him and was advised that he could remain silent at the

disciplinary proceeding but that this silence “would be held against him” in that
proceeding. Id. At the disciplinary hearing, Palmigiano was confronted with
incriminating evidence and chose to remain silent. Thereafter, the Board placed
Palmigiano in segregation for 30 days and downgraded his institutional status. Id. at p.
313, 317. Ultimately, the Court in Baxter concluded that an adverse inference based on

silence was appropriate when additional incriminating evidence had also been
presented. Id. at p. 318. The additional evidence against Palmigiano was plentiful. The
Court, however, clarified that a direct inference of guilt from silence alone was forbidden
in instances where additional evidence of guilt, separate from an individual’s silence, was
not available. Id.
Like Baxter, Defendants note that no criminal proceedings are or were pending

against Johnson in relation to the disciplinary ticket he received on May 24, 2018.
Defendants believe this fact is the necessary trigger for the Fifth Amendment to apply to
Johnson’s case. However, Johnson correctly notes that this is not the crux of determining
whether his Fifth Amendment rights were implicated. Rather, the Fifth Amendment is
implicated where there exists a mere possibility that a criminal case could have been filed
in the face of Johnson’s silence, where no other evidence of his guilt existed. In such

circumstances, the improper use of an individual’s silence can be viewed as a basis for
retaliation.
This exact distinction was noted by the Seventh Circuit in Vermillion v. Levenhagen,
No., 14-2327, 604 Fed. Appx. 508, 509-512 (7th Cir. Mar. 5, 2015). Vermillion concerned an
inmate who alleged that investigators at an Indiana state prison retaliated against him for

failing to answer their questions about escaped inmates. The inmate alleged that he was
placed in administrative segregation and documents were falsified to “exaggerate his
security classification.” Vermillion, 604 Fed. Appx. at 512. The Seventh Circuit noted that
the Fifth Amendment right applies “in the prison disciplinary context, and prison officials
may violate a prisoner’s right against self-incrimination if a prisoner’s silence alone

results in punishment of the kind compelling waiver of the right.” Id. This ultimately
allowed the court to conclude that Vermillion “plausibly allege[d] . . . that [Defendants]
were involved in retaliating against him for his refusal to talk to the Internal Affairs
Investigators.” Id.
The circumstances in this case are similar to Vermillion. Johnson refused to identify
any inmates who were trafficking tobacco at Menard during the May 21st and May 24th

interviews because he was not aware of any relevant information. (Doc. 141, Exh. 1, p.
45:21-52:16). Later that same day, he was issued a disciplinary ticket identical to that of
Reed. However, the justification provided by Dye and Hughey for issuing that ticket to
Johnson is inconsistent with the documentary evidence from the investigation they
conducted. Most notably, neither CI #1’s interview sheet nor CI #2’s interview sheet
indicates that Johnson was implicated for trafficking tobacco at Menard. (Doc. 170, Exh.

2, p. 12-13, 19). Additionally, CI #3 (the May 12th Informant) testified during his
deposition that he did not provide Hughey or Dye with any names because he “didn’t
know who was trafficking it.” (Doc. 168, Exh. 10, p. 15:19-22). Yet, Defendant Dye stated
that he and Hughey charged Johnson based on statements from these three informants.
(Doc. 168, Exh. 1, p. 26: 3-8; 35: 19-22). In light of this record, the Court believes that a

reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants Hughey and Dye lacked any evidence to
implicate Johnson in the tobacco trafficking, and he was retaliated against for refusing to
provide information. Therefore, Johnson’s Fifth Amendment claim will be allowed to
proceed to trial.
B. Johnson’s First Amendment Claim

A successful claim for First Amendment retaliation requires that a plaintiff show,
“(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a
deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment Activity in the future; and (3) the
First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’ decision to
take the retaliatory action.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008)). “Once the Plaintiff proves that an

improper purpose was a motivating factor, the burden shifts to the defendant . . . to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the same actions would have occurred in the
absence of the protected conduct.” Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 943 (7th Cir. 2004); Babcock
v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996). Defendants argue that Johnson has failed to
meet the second and third prongs of the test. (Doc. 168, p. 25-32). Johnson, however,
asserts that he has met all three prongs. (Doc. 170, p. 18- 31). Upon reviewing the record

in the light most favorable to Johnson, the Court finds that Johnson has pointed to
sufficient evidence in the record to create a material dispute of fact regarding the disputed
prongs of the required test. Thus, summary judgment as to Johnson’s First Amendment
claim is denied.
1. Johnson’s Protected First Amendment Activity

To make a prima facie case, Johnson must first show “that he engaged in an activity
protected by the First Amendment.” Bridges, 557 F.3d at 546. Defendants do not dispute
this first element. (Doc. 168, p. 25). Indeed, the Court notes that Johnson had a First
Amendment right to truthfully answer the questions that Defendants Hughey and Dye
posed to him about tobacco trafficking at Menard. See, e.g., Mckinley v. Schoenbeck, No. 17-

1709, 731 Fed. Appx. 511, 514 (7th Cir. April 17, 2018) (noting that “[t]ruthfully answering
questions during an investigation, even if those answers are not what the officers wanted
to hear,” is protected speech); see also Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551. Johnson testified that he
was telling the truth when he told Defendants that he had no information to provide them
to assist with their investigation. (Doc. 170, Exh. 2, p. 48:5-10, 71:8-72:4). Thus, the Court
finds that the first prong of Johnson’s claim is satisfied.
2. Johnson Suffered a Deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment
Activity in the Future

The second prong of the test requires a plaintiff to show “that he suffered a
deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future.” Bridges, 557
F. 3d at 546. Here, Defendants put forward two arguments as to why they are entitled to
summary judgment. First, they argue that the disciplinary action was imposed by the
Adjustment Committee, and as such, Defendants cannot be held responsible for
Johnson’s alleged constitutional deprivation. (Doc. 168, p. 25). Defendants next assert that
Johnson has not suffered a sufficient deprivation that would likely deter First

Amendment activity. (Doc 168, p. 26). The Court will address each of the Defendants’
arguments in turn.
As to Defendants’ first argument, Defendants note that “the Adjustment
Committee made a recommendation for discipline based on the investigation that was
completed” by Defendants. (Doc. 168, p. 25-26). Further, they state that the “defendants

were not on the Adjustment Committee and did not recommend the disciplinary action
of Plaintiff” nor “did [they] provide an opinion or input into the disciplinary action
[against] Plaintiff.” Id. Additionally, Defendants indicate that they “did not threaten
Plaintiff with disciplinary action if [he] did not wish to provide a statement.” Id.
Defendants believe these facts relieve them from liability. However, Johnson’s account of

events differs significantly from Defendants.
The record indicates that Defendants did, in fact, provide input into the
disciplinary proceeding, as it was the ticket issued by Defendants Dye and Hughey that

triggered the disciplinary hearing. Based on Defendants’ investigatory findings, the
Adjustment Committee then determined Johnson’s punishment. The committee relied on
the report drafted by Dye and Hughey in its decision making. Had the ticket by Dye and
Hughey not been issued at the conclusion of their investigation, Johnson would not have
suffered any adverse consequences in relation to the trafficking tobacco incident. Further,
Johnson asserts that the Defendants did indeed threaten him with disciplinary action if

he did not provide a statement about the tobacco trafficking. Johnson specifically
recounted in his deposition that Defendant Dye purportedly told him that he would
“make sure that [Johnson] did at least a year of segregation” for failing to cooperate.
(Doc. 169, p. 51:22-52:16). Thus, Defendants factual argument clearly fails.
Additionally, Johnson correctly points to Seventh Circuit precedent that negates

Defendants’ legal argument on this point. The Seventh Circuit has indicated that an
officer who retaliates against a plaintiff by serving a disciplinary ticket, which causes the
plaintiff to be placed in segregation or suffer other deprivations, can be sued under
Section 1983. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anderson, 912 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2018) (overturning
judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendants – Anderson and Cochran – who

allegedly drafted and served a disciplinary ticket on plaintiff, where plaintiff presented
evidence that defendants had a retaliatory motive for serving the ticket); Pearson v.
Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 739 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding a jury verdict for plaintiff on First
Amendment retaliation claim against prison social worker who wrote and served
disciplinary ticket on plaintiff). Accordingly, Defendants’ argument that liability can be
avoided due to their degree of separation from the decision makers who actually imposed

Johnson’s punishment is misplaced.
Defendants next argue that “Plaintiff’s assertions of his lost job after the issuance
of the disciplinary ticket, and time in segregation are not deprivations that would likely
deter First Amendment activity in the future.” (Doc. 168, p. 26). Defendants assert that “a
prisoner’s liberty interests are limited to freedom from restraint which ‘impose atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,’

or to actions which ‘inevitably affect the duration of a [a prisoner’s] sentence.’” Id.
(quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995)). Defendants then cite to additional
authority from the Eighth Circuit concerning Due Process Clause protections to support
this argument. See, e.g., Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding
that thirty days in punitive segregation was not an atypical and significant hardship

under Sandin). However, Johnson correctly notes there is a lower standard of deprivation
required under a First Amendment retaliation claim as compared to a Due Process Clause
claim. Thus, Defendants’ argument here also fails because they misstate the applicable
standard of law.
To determine whether a defendant’s actions would deter First Amendment

activity, the Court must apply a test, asking only “whether the alleged conduct by the
defendants would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage
in [the] protected activity.” Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 878 (7th Cir. 2011). The standard
is objective, such that a specific plaintiff’s persistence does not undermine his claim. Cf.
Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 880 (7th Cir. 2020) (observing that the standard “does
not hinge on the personal experience of the plaintiff”). In contrast, protections under the

Due Process Clause are triggered only where the freedom of restraint exercised exceeds
a prisoner’s sentence in an unexpected manner or imposes an atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sandin, 515
U.S. at p. 484.7 Given these distinct inquiries, the Court cannot impose the Due Process
Clause standard, as suggested by Defendants, with respect to Johnson’s First
Amendment retaliation claim.

Applying the appropriate standard stated above, the Court finds that Johnson has
provided evidence that deprivations, like those he experienced, would be sufficient to
deter a prisoner of ordinary firmness from engaging in a protected First Amendment
activity. This determination is in line with pre-existing Seventh Circuit case law. Notably,
the Seventh Circuit has indicated that denial of a prison job that would impart palpable

benefits could deter First Amendment activity. See, e.g., McElroy v. Lopac, 403 F.3d 855,
858 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that taking away a prisoner’s job could amount to a
constitutional deprivation); Dewalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618-619 (7th Cir 2000) (holding
that job removal stated retaliation claim), abrogated on other grounds by Savory v.
Cannon, 947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc). The Seventh Circuit also recently

7 The Court in Sandin noted that “[p]risoners retain other protection from arbitrary state
action even within the expected conditions of confinement.” Particularly, the Court noted that
prisoners may pursue actions under the First and Eighth Amendments as well as the Equal
Protection Clause. This suggests the Court recognized the distinction between the differing
applicable standards of deprivation in their own analysis. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487
n.11 (1995).
determined that just six days of disciplinary segregation was a serious enough
deprivation to deter the exercise of a prisoner’s First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Whitfield
v. Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 708 (7th Cir. 2023) (stating that “Whitfield’s first six days of

disciplinary segregation qualify as a serious enough deprivation to deter the exercise of
First Amendment rights.”). Here, Johnson alleges that he lost his job as a janitor/porter
because of the disciplinary actions taken by the Adjustment Committee. Johnson also
alleges that he was placed in segregation for a four-month period. Such allegations meet
or exceed the standard of deprivation as illustrated by existing Seventh Circuit precedent.

3. Johnson’s First Amendment Activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in
the Defendants’ Decision to take the Retaliatory Action

Lastly, Defendants argue summary judgment should be granted because Johnson
has failed to meet the third prong of the First Amendment retaliation test – i.e., that
Johnson must show “the protected First Amendment activity was the reason Defendants
acted.” (Doc. 168, p. 27). Defendants assert that Johnson cannot meet this prong as he has
“failed to show that Defendants retaliated against him for failing to provide a statement
[for the tobacco trafficking investigation].” Id. In response, Johnson points to evidence in
the record to suggest that Defendants’ decision to pursue disciplinary action against him
was at least, in part, motivated by the fact that he refused to provide Defendants with the
information they desired regarding the investigation. (Doc. 170, p. 23). Specifically,
Johnson points to Defendant Hughey’s and Dye’s threatening statements towards him
during the May 2018 interrogations, as well as the timing and composition of the

disciplinary ticket, to suggest retaliatory animus. The Court finds that the divergent
accounts created by Defendants’ and Johnson’s review of the record warrant
consideration by a jury.

The Seventh Circuit has held that threats from defendant correctional officers and
subsequent punishment of an inmate constitute evidence of a retaliatory motive sufficient
to defeat a motion for summary judgment. For example, the Seventh Circuit found that
an officer’s statement to a plaintiff stating that he “shouldn’t have been making
complaints about the prison ‘if he did not want to be in a situation like this one’” was
sufficient evidence of a retaliatory motive where the plaintiff was later assigned to one

month of segregation. See Thomas, 912 F.3d at 974-976. The court deemed other statements
towards the plaintiff as sufficiently indicative of retaliatory motive. Such statements
included: “[y]ou should have thought about that before you made all [your] complaints
about me and filing grievances in the prison” and “[I] [don’t] like inmates who tried to
get staff in trouble.” Id. at 976. More recently and consistent with Thomas, the Seventh

Circuit determined that an officer’s statement to an inmate plaintiff that he could be his
“best friend or wors[t] nightmare” was indicative of retaliatory motive. McKinley, 731
Fed. Appx. at 513.
The statements reportedly directed at Johnson by Defendants Dye and Hughey
are arguably as or more severe than those evaluated by the Seventh Circuit in Thomas and

McKinley. Here, Johnson testified that during his May 24th interview, both Defendants
were “agitated” and yelled at him for failing to provide the information they sought.
(Doc. 169, p. 47:12-21). Johnson further testified that Defendant Dye told him that he had
“fucked” himself by failing to provide them with any information, and that because
Johnson could not “help” them, they could not “help him.” Id. at 49:22-51:9. Defendant
Dye also reportedly told Johnson that “he would make sure that [Johnson] did at least a

year of segregation.” Id. at 51:22-52:16. These statements alone are sufficient for a
reasonable jury to conclude that the Defendants harbored retaliatory motive.
However, Johnson also points to the suspect timing and composition of the
disciplinary ticket as an indication of retaliatory intent. The Seventh Circuit has held that
such evidence can create a triable issue on the motivations of defendants in First
Amendment retaliation cases. In Greene v. Doruff, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district

court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants due to the short amount of time
between the adverse action taken against the plaintiff and the issuance of a “threadbare”
conduct report in the case. 660 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2011). There, the plaintiff reported
that he had told a prison librarian about a grievance he had filed against the defendant
officer just one day before the officer filed a conduct report against the inmate plaintiff.

However, the plaintiff had filed that grievance against the officer one month prior for
firing him as a clerk in the prison library allegedly without cause. Id. at p. 976. The
Seventh Circuit concluded that “the timing of [the defendant’s] action, if we credit the
plaintiff’s testimony (as we must on this record) that he told the librarian about his
grievance the day before [defendant] filed the conduct report, together with the rather

threadbare nature of the report was sufficient . . . to create a triable issue.” Id.
A comparable timeline of events has unfolded in the present case. Initially,
Johnson was only interviewed for information about the tobacco trafficking because his
cellmate Reed had been implicated by confidential informants. Johnson then repeatedly
told investigators that he was aware of no information about the trafficking of tobacco.
The record reflects that Hughey served Johnson with the disciplinary ticket on the same
day (May 24th) that Defendants Dye and Hughey had threatened him. Moreover, the

ticket was identical – down to the typographical errors - to the ticket that was served on
Reed, even though the record reflects there is substantially different evidence supporting
the charges against the two inmates. Together, this evidence could lead a reasonable jury
to conclude that Defendants Dye and Hughey served the ticket on Johnson in retaliation
for not providing any information regarding the tobacco trafficking.

4. Defendant’s Burden to Demonstrate Non-Retaliatory Motive
Because the Court has concluded that the evidence is sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of retaliation, Defendants Dye and Hughey have the burden to show they would
have taken the same disciplinary action “in absence of the protected speech.” Zellner v.
Herrick, 639 F.3d 371, 378-379 (7th Cir. 2011). If they satisfy that burden, Johnson must then

present evidence from which a jury could “infer the defendant’s proffered reason is a lie”
or “pretext.” Id. at 379. On this point, Defendants assert that there is “overwhelming
evidence [which] shows the ticket issued to Johnson was based on a totality of evidence
from the investigation conducted.” (Doc. 168, p. 27). Johnson, however, believes that “the
evidence adduced during discovery suggests the proffered non-retaliatory justification is

pretext.” (Doc. 170, p. 25). The Court agrees with Johnson that the evidence contained in
the record could lead a reasonable jury to believe that Defendants’ reasons for acting were
pretextual.
The only argument advanced by the Defendants to establish their non-retaliatory
motive is that an abundance of evidence existed to charge Johnson with tobacco
trafficking. (Doc. 168, p. 27-31). Defendants recount each phase of the investigatory

process undertaken by correctional officers at Menard to show that the appropriate and
proper steps were taken. Id. However, Johnson notes that the primary evidence relied
upon by Defendants to issue the disciplinary ticket was questionable at best. For example,
CI #1, CI #2, and CI #3 testified under oath that they did not identify Johnson as
responsible for trafficking tobacco to any officer at Menard. (Doc. 170, p. 29). Defendants
note that CI #1 testified that he had implicated Johnson. However, during CI #1’s

deposition, he indicated that he had only implicated CI #2 and Reed. CI #1 recalled that
only Reed and Johnson had been put in administrative segregation, which caused him to
mistakenly believe they were the two inmates he had identified. Id. Further, CI #2 stated
in his deposition that he only implicated CI #1 and Reed. CI #3 (the May 12th Informant)
stated that he did not name any specific individuals in his interview with Defendants Dye

and Hughey. These facts directly contradict Dye’s and Hughey’s testimony that they
relied upon CI #1, CI #2 and the May 12th Informant when deciding to pursue
disciplinary action against Johnson. This alone creates a material dispute of fact regarding
the basis of Dye’s and Hughey’s decision to pursue disciplinary action against Johnson.
As such, summary judgment is precluded.

However, Defendants also assert that Defendants Dye and Hughey relied on
Johnson’s trust fund account statements as justification for pursuing disciplinary action.
(Doc. 168, p. 31). During his deposition, Defendant Dye stated that “at least one of the
highlighted entries” indicated on Johnson’s May 8, 2018, matched one of the entries on
Reed’s trust fund summary from the same date. (Doc. 168, Exh. 11). Defendant Dye also
stated that based on his prior highlights and notations of “13 different people” that these

summaries were used as support in his and Hughey’s decision to issue Johnson the May
24th disciplinary ticket. Id. However, Johnson notes that the investigation report makes
no mention of the summaries, despite testimony from multiple officers that all relevant
information supporting the disciplinary action should have been included in the report.
(Doc. 170, p. 25); see generally, (Doc. 168, Exh. 2). This factual dispute likewise precludes
the entry of summary judgment against Johnson.

C. Defendants’ Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue they are shielded from liability due to qualified immunity. (Doc.
168, p. 32-33). Qualified immunity shields government officials who are performing
discretionary functions from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-818 (1982); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009). Johnson contends that Defendants cannot be shielded by qualified
immunity as he has clearly established that his First and Fifth Amendment rights were
implicated. (Doc. 170, p. 33). The Court agrees with Johnson.
To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, a two-part

analysis must be undertaken: (1) whether a constitutional right would have been violated
on the facts alleged, and (2) whether the right alleged to have been violated was clearly
established. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). The relevant dispositive inquiry
in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable official that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 202.
However, an official who makes a reasonable mistake as to what the law requires is

entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. Id. at 205.
Based on the facts alleged, the Court believes that Johnson has clearly stated claims
against the Defendants for First and Fifth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Antoine v.
Ramos, No. 11-1807, 497 Fed. Appx. 631, 634 (7th Cir. Dec. 5, 2012) (reversing summary
judgment and finding that disciplinary ticket which was alleged to be “fabricated in
retaliation for engaging in protected speech” was properly within the scope of a Section

1983 suit.). Moreover, no credible argument can be advanced that the Defendants were
not aware of a clearly established right on behalf of Johnson to be protected against
retaliation and the imposition of punishment based on a false disciplinary ticket. While
the Defendants may claim there was a reasonable mistake based on their investigation,
the facts interpreted in the light most favorable to Johnson clearly belie that assertion. The

Defendants did not appear to have any evidence connecting Johnson to the trafficking of
tobacco. The threats made by Defendants Dye and Hughey to Johnson during his
interrogation further reinforce the notion that the disciplinary ticket was, in fact,
fabricated and imposed in retaliation for Johnson’s failure to cooperate. The Court is thus
not convinced that the actions of Defendants amounted to a reasonable mistake.

Accordingly, the Court cannot allow them to be shielded by qualified immunity.
D. Johnson’s Requested Injunctive Relief Against Defendants Jeffreys and Wills
Defendants contest Johnson’s requested injunctive relief against Defendants Wills
and Jeffreys because Defendants Hughey and Dye “acted within their duties and took
lawful action” when they issued the disciplinary ticket to Johnson. (Doc. 168, p. 33-34).
Johnson, however, asserts that “injunctive relief from public officials when the officials
act outside their authority or unlawfully” is available. (Doc. 170, p. 34) (citing Illinois
Federation of Teachers v. Board of Trustees, Teachers’ Retirement System, 548 N.E.2d 64, 66 (IIL
Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1990)). As discussed above, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to conclude that Defendants Dye and Hughey acted unlawfully by retaliating against
Johnson for the exercise of his First and Fifth Amendment Rights. Additionally,
Defendants Wills and Jeffreys are the proper parties to effectuate such relief. See Gonzalez

v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7 Cir. 2011). Thus, the Court will allow Johnson to pursue
injunctive relief as a remedy.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed herein, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Doc. 167, 168). A status conference will be set by separate docket
text order to discuss the setting of a trial date.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 29, 2023. aiedon by
Peat ©. D2. Date: 2023.09.29
10:48:50 -05'00'
GILBERTC.SISON sis
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156856. Public record. Not legal advice.