# Jones v. Jeffreys

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · September 20, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156782

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 20, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156782

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that to be properly considered a party, a defendant must be “specif[ied] in the caption”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

GERALD JONES, #B13486, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 23-cv-02889-SMY
)
ROB JEFFREYS, )
ANTHONY WILLS, )
WEXFORD HEALTH RESOURCE, )
INC., and JANE DOES 1-7, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Gerald Jones, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections currently
incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). Jones claims he was wrongfully transferred to Menard, where he was
subjected to unsafe and unconstitutional conditions of confinement. He seeks monetary,
declaratory, and injunctive relief including mental health treatment and/or a prison transfer.1
The case is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any portion of the
Complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages
from an immune defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

1 Jones does not seek a temporary restraining order (TRO) or a preliminary injunction, and he does not cite Rule 65
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing both types of interim relief. Therefore, his request is construed as
one for permanent injunctive relief at the close of the case. Because he allegedly faces imminent danger of serious
physical injury sufficient to overcome the three-strikes bar to litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Court will
screen the Complaint and Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis immediately. Wheeler v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2012). Should Jones wish to pursue interim relief, he may file a separate motion
for TRO and/or preliminary injunction under Rule 65(a) or (b) at any time during the pending action.
The Complaint
Jones makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): Jones was transferred
from Lawrence Correctional Center to Menard Correctional Center on July 29, 2023, after he was
disciplined for an alleged staff assault at Lawrence. Id. at ¶ 1. Menard’s warden (Warden Anthony

Wills) and several non-parties were responsible for the transfer. Id. at ¶¶ 2-6.
Jones suffers from serious mental illness, including depression, anxiety, and a history of
self-harm. Id. at ¶¶ 43-48. The presence of conditions that exacerbate his mental illness and denial
of mental health treatment make placement at Menard inappropriate. Id. at ¶¶ 49-59.
Only eighteen minutes are he arrived, Jones was assaulted by four officers who are not
parties to this action. Id. at ¶ 8. They beat, punched, and kicked him while he was cuffed at the
wrists and ankles, all in retaliation for his alleged staff assault at Lawrence. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 31. The
officers placed him in a cell with no running water, working toilet, or breakfast the following
morning. Id. at ¶¶ 9-11. They ignored his pleas for medical attention and mental health treatment.
Id. Jones maintains that they are all racists. Id.

Following the assault, Jones suffered an emotional breakdown and began cutting his arm.
Id. at ¶ 12. An officer discovered him inflicting self-harm and sprayed him in the face with mace.
Id. at ¶ 13. He was then taken to an outside hospital for treatment of significant blood loss and
required 23 stitches for his wounds. Id. at ¶ 14. When he returned to Menard, Jones’ “flapped
dead skin” was stitched back onto his arm in a manner that caused him to develop gangrene four
days later. He now has a “hole” in his arm. Id. Wexford, Warden Wills, and John Doe (a non-
party physician) are responsible for the infections developing and refused to treat any of his
medical conditions because they did not want to acknowledge his assault. Id. at ¶ 16 and 17.
Although Jane Doe (mental health staff) placed Jones under “constant watch status” when
he returned from the hospital, Jones received no mental health treatment. Id. at ¶¶ 15-18. Jane
Does 1-7 (mental health staff) denied him mental health care on July 30, 2023, July 31, 2023,
August 1, 2023, August 2, 2023, August 5, 2023, and August 15, 2023. When Jones requested
crisis intervention, they simply walked away.2 He describes all seven as racists. Id.

Jones complains about other conduct of non-parties that occurred between July 29, 2023
and August 21, 2023, as follows: (a) shift officers, including Officer Maldonado, routinely turned
off the water to his sink and toilet during the 7-3 and 3-11 shifts (id. at ¶ 19); numerous officers
denied Jones breakfast (id. at ¶¶ 9, 20); all officers denied Jones hygiene supplies (id. at ¶ 21); all
officers denied Jones a proper mattress (id. at ¶ 22); all officers denied Jones laundry services,
clean clothing, and clean sheets (id. at ¶ 23); all officers and Counselor Quick (a non-party) denied
Jones copies of various forms beginning August 4, 20233 (id. at ¶ 24); and Officers Bent, Garcia,
and Jullen (all non-parties) used various intimidation tactics against Jones4 (id. at ¶¶ 32-33).
IDOC Director Jeffreys, Warden Wills, and John Does (all non-parties) implemented an

“assault policy” at Menard, whereby all inmates transferred into the prison due to a past staff
assault are: (a) assaulted by staff upon their arrival; (b) deprived of necessary medical care, food,
clothing, and hygiene supplies; and (c) subjected to a “code of silence” when they attempt to
request basic necessities following their assault. Id. at ¶¶ 29-31.

2 He describes two instances occurring on August 5 and 15, 2023, when two Jane Does (mental health staff) came to
his cell to check on him. When Jones described the staff assault and his resulting mental distress, they walked off
without offering mental health treatment. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-26). Every mental health provider responded to his requests
the same way. (Id. at ¶ 27).
3 This includes grievance forms, phone list forms, visiting list forms, and money voucher forms. Id.
4 These officers engaged in intimidation tactics, like banging on the windows, threatening future assault or murder,
and denying meals, ice, and showers. Id.
Discussion
The Court designates the following claims in the Complaint:
Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Warden Wills and other non-parties
for the wrongful transfer of Jones to Menard on July 29, 2023.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against four officers, who are all non-parties, for
assaulting Jones when he arrived at Menard on July 29, 2023, and denying
him a cell with a working toilet, working sink, and breakfast the next day.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim against an unknown officer, who is a non-party,
for responding to Jones’s suicide attempt by spraying him in the face with
mace on July 29, 2023.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment claim against Wexford, Warden Wills, and John Doe
(a non-party physician) for causing Jones to develop a serious infection
four days after a “skin flap” on his arm was improperly sutured at Menard
on or around July 29, 2023.

Count 5: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for their deliberate
indifference to Jones’s serious mental illness and related mental health
needs from July 29, 2023 through August 21, 2023.

Count 6: Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment claims against non-parties for
miscellaneous deprivations that occurred between July 29, 2023 and
August 21, 2023, including the denial of running water, meals, hygiene
supplies, proper mattress, laundry services, clean clothing, clean sheets,
and various forms and use of intimidation tactics.

Count 7: Eighth Amendment claim against IDOC Director Jeffreys, Warden Wills,
and John Does (all non-parties) for implementing an “assault policy”
against inmates transferred to Menard following discipline for a staff
assault at another prison, whereby prisoners are assaulted by staff, denied
basic necessities, and subjected to a “code of silence.”

Count 8: Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against Defendant for
discriminating against Jones based on his race.

Count 9: Illinois state law claim against Defendants for their intentional infliction of
emotional distress on Jones from July 29, 2023 through August 21, 2023.
Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should
be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly.5
Counts 1 and 4
Jones asserts a claim against Warden Wills in Count 1 for his wrongful transfer to Menard

and a claim against Wexford and Warden Wills in Count 4 for an infection he developed following
a medical procedure on his arm.6 He named these defendants based on their supervisory roles over
prison staff and medical staff, but does not explain how either was involved in the alleged
constitutional deprivation. However, because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply
in § 1983 actions, Warden Wills and Wexford cannot be held liable for the actions of any
subordinates or employees. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001); see also,
Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 528 (7th Cir. 2014). In other words, liability does not “attach unless
the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional violation.” Vance v. Peters, 97
F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). As no other defendants are named in connection with these claims,
Counts 1 and 4 will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief.

Counts 2, 3, and 6
Jones asserts the claims in Counts 2, 3, and 6 against non-parties, including John Does
(various officers, including the four involved in his assault), John Doe (physician), Officer
Maldonado, Counselor Quick, Officer Bent, Officer Garcia, Officer Jullen, and others. When
parties are not listed in the case caption or list of defendants, the Court will not treat them as

5 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
6 All other individuals named in connection with Counts 1 and 4 are non-parties; the claims against them will be
considered dismissed. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (noting that the title of the complaint “must name all the parties”); Myles
v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that to be properly considered a party, a defendant
must be “specif[ied] in the caption”).
defendants. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a); Myles, 416 F.3d at 551-52 (a defendant must be “specif[ied]
in the caption”). Therefore, these claims and non-parties will be dismissed without prejudice.
Count 5
Count 5 arises from allegations that Jane Does 1-7 (mental health staff) failed to provide

Jones with mental health treatment following his transfer, assault, and suicide attempt on
July 29, 2023. Specifically, he alleges that these mental health staff members walked away each
time he requested crisis intervention or counseling from them. To state a viable Eighth
Amendment claim, Jones must plead facts sufficient to suggest that he suffered from an objectively
sufficiently serious medical or mental condition that was met with “deliberate indifference to his
health or safety” by these defendants. Kupsky v. McLaren, 748 F. App’x 74, 76 (7th Cir. 2019).
The objective component of this claim is satisfied at screening by Jones’ allegations regarding his
mental health diagnoses, suicide attempt, and ongoing exposure to conditions posing a serious risk
of harm to his health and safety from July 29, 2023 to August 21, 2023. The allegations also
suggest deliberate indifference – that Jane Does 1-7 were aware that Jones requested and needed

mental health treatment but knowingly or intentionally disregarded his treatment needs. Therefore,
Count 5 will proceed against Jane Does 1-7.
Count 7
Jones asserts a claim against IDOC Director Jeffreys, Warden Wills, and John Does (all
non-parties) for implementing an “assault policy” at Menard. This claim is related to the alleged
staff assault by four unknown officers mentioned in Count 2 and denial of basic needs mentioned
in Count 6.
Claims brought against individuals in their official capacities are treated as a claim against
the governmental entity itself. A governmental unit is not liable under § 1983 unless a
constitutional deprivation is caused by its own policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of
New York City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). An unconstitutional policy or custom can be shown in three
ways: (1) an express policy causing the deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice
amounting to a “custom or usage” causing the loss; or (3) a person with final policymaking

authority causing the deprivation. Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 2004).
Jones does not invoke any of these three theories or develop this claim. Instead, he relies on
conclusory assertions of an “assault policy” arising from his assault by four unknown officers
(Count 2), his subsequent mistreatment by non-parties (Count 6), and a “code of silence” these
non-parties allegedly used. As such, the underlying claims against non-parties do not survive
screening and Count 7 will likewise be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
Count 8
To pursue a claim for discrimination under the equal protection clause, a plaintiff must
show that he “is a member of a protected class,” that he “is otherwise similarly situated to members

of the unprotected class,” and that he “was treated differently from members of the unprotected
class.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 916 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). While Jones
characterizes the defendants as “racists” throughout the Complaint, an assertion of racism, without
more, is insufficient to articulate a plausible claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause. Therefore, Count 8 will be dismissed without prejudice.
Count 9
The Complaint allegations suggest that Jane Does 1-7 (mental health staff) intentionally
engaged in conduct intended to cause severe emotional distress, and did in fact cause severe
distress, when they responded to Jones’ repeated requests for crisis intervention and mental health
treatment after his assault and suicide attempt by walking away. See McGreal v. Village Orland
Park, 850 F.3d 308 (7th Cir. 2017) (articulating elements of claim). As such, the Court will
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Illinois state law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and Count 9 will proceed in conjunction with Count 5 against Jane Doe 1-7.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Identification of Jane Doe 1-7
Jones may proceed with claims against Jane Does 1-7 (unknown members of Menard’s
mental health staff) after identifying each defendant by name and will have the opportunity to
engage in limited discovery to ascertain their identities. Warden Wills (official capacity) shall
remain named in the case in his official capacity for purposes of responding to discovery aimed at
identifying the unknown defendants. Once the names of these unknown defendants are discovered,
Jones must file a motion to substitute the newly identified defendants in place of the generic
designations in the caption and throughout the Complaint.
Pending Motions

IFP Motion (Doc. 2)
Jones filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without prepayment of
the $400.00 filing fee for this action (IFP motion) (Doc. 2). A prisoner is prohibited from bringing
a civil action IFP if the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was
dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Jones admits that he “struck out” before filing this action, but his
allegations regarding the conditions of his confinement suggest that he faces imminent danger of
serious physical harm sufficient to overcome the three-strikes bar to litigation. See Jones v.
Sternes, 124 F. App’x 448, at *2 (2005). Accordingly, the IFP motion is GRANTED. The Court
will enter a separate order assessing the initial partial filing fee.
Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3)
An indigent plaintiff seeking representation by court-recruited counsel must demonstrate:

(a) reasonable efforts to locate counsel on his own; and (b) an inability to litigate the matter without
representation. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (articulating factors court
considers when evaluating motions for counsel). Jones has not demonstrated any efforts to find
counsel to represent him in this case. Although he blames prison officials for denying his request
for a money voucher to pay for postage and denying him access to paper and a pen, he discloses
no attempts to secure counsel using other methods (i.e., email communication, phone calls).
Moreover, the Court finds that Jones is capable of proceeding unrepresented for now. He prepared
and filed a coherent Complaint that survives initial review, and his pleadings are well written,
comprehensive, and clear.
There is nothing more for Jones to do at this time. The Court will order service of this

lawsuit on Warden Wills, in his official capacity. Once the warden appears, the Court will enter a
limited discovery order containing deadlines and instructions for identifying the seven unknown
defendants. When they are identified by name, the defendants will be served with this lawsuit.
Should Jones require assistance in this identification process, he may renew his request for counsel
by filing a new motion, after first attempting to secure counsel on his own. Along with any
renewed motion, Jones should submit a copy of his communications to or from attorneys or law
firms seeking representation. A list of at least three attorneys and law firms contacted, dates of
each contact, and summary of responses is sufficient to show reasonable efforts to find counsel.
Disposition
The Complaint (Doc. 1) survives screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. COUNTS 5 and 9
will proceed against JANE DOE 1-7 (Menard’s Mental Health Staff) in their individual
capacities. ANTHONY WILLS (Warden of Menard Correctional Center) remains named as

a defendant, in his official capacity, for two purposes: (a) identifying the unknown defendants; and
(b) implementing any injunctive relief ordered herein.
COUNTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants ROBERT JEFFREYS and WEXFORD
HEALTH RESOURCES, INC. are also dismissed on the same ground.
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Defendants ROBERT
JEFFREYS and WEXFORD HEALTH RESOURCES, INC. as parties in CM/ECF and
ENTER the Court’s standard HIPAA Qualified Protective Order.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants WARDEN ANTHONY WILLS (official
capacity only) and JANE DOE 1 THROUGH 7 (individual capacities, once identified):

(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each defendant’s place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff. If a defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons
(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and the Court will require that
defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
If any defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be

retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or
disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants Jane Doe 1-7, once identified, need only respond
to the issues stated in this Merit Review Order. Warden Wills need only file an appearance.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, even though his
application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court

and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not independently
investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than seven days after a
transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in
the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 20, 2023

s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge
Notice to Plaintiff
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit
and serve them with a copy of your Complaint, after you have identified them by name. After
service has been achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your

Complaint. When all the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order
containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. You are advised to
wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’ counsel
has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. You do need not submit any
evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156782. Public record. Not legal advice.