# Norwood v. Carter

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · August 23, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156694

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 23, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156694

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RICKY NORWOOD, Jr., #2206 4035, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 22-cv-02862-JPG
)
CLAY CARTER, )
BRIAN CARTER, )
TROY REED, )
KEVIN KRIPPS, )
KEEFE COMPANY, )
and IC SOLUTIONS, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Ricky Norwood, Jr., an inmate in Marion County Law Enforcement Center,
brings this pro se action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Plaintiff complains about negligent safety protocols, price gouging, false advertising,
mishandling of inmate trust fund accounts, and mishandling of grievances at the Jail. (Doc. 1).
He seeks monetary relief. Id. at 10.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner complaints and filter out non-
meritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune
defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations are
liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
Plaintiff complains about five aspects of his confinement at Marion County Law
Enforcement Center, and his complaints are summarized below. (Doc. 1, pp. 7-9).
First, Plaintiff alleges that the Jail is not equipped with carbon monoxide detectors or a

proper fire alarm system. When he filed grievances to address his concerns, Brian Carter said
the systems were working “as far as he knew,” Troy Reed said they were “still working on the
issue,” and Kevin Kripps ignored his grievances altogether. Plaintiff brings a claim against these
defendants for negligence. Id. at 7.
Second, Plaintiff was informed by Brian and Clay Carter that the Jail would be switching
to a new vendor for commissary supplies after Keefe Company notified the Jail of its decision to
increase prices for commissary items in a letter dated August 15, 2022. When no new vendor
was selected, Plaintiff complained that excessive commissary prices violated Jail Administrative
Code 701.250, providing that commissary prices should not exceed prices of local stores. Troy
Reed responded to this grievance, by stating that he would speak with Keefe Company. Plaintiff

then filed a grievance with the sheriff and received no response. Plaintiff brings a claim against
the defendants for price gouging. Id.
Third, IC Solutions, the Jail’s phone provider, has increased prices for phone calls by one
cent ($0.01). In August 2022, IC Solutions charged $3.48 for phone calls. Now, calls cost
$3.49. Plaintiff argues that calls should really only cost $3.45. In response to his grievance
about the issue, Clay Carter agreed to contact IC Solutions. When Plaintiff appealed to Troy
Reed and Kevin Kripps, he received no response. Plaintiff characterizes this as false advertising.
Id. at 8.
Fourth, Plaintiff maintains that fifteen percent of profits on sales from commissary and
calls are set aside to “buy things for the jail.” Id. Plaintiff submitted a grievance asking that
these funds be used for inmate recreation (i.e., televisions and board games), education,
grooming supplies, and religious items. Plaintiff claims the funds have instead been used to

purchase additional cleaning supplies, bed linens, and housing materials. Plaintiff characterizes
this as a mishandling of inmate trust funds. Id.
Finally, Plaintiff complains that Troy Reed and Kevin Kripps have not responded to his
grievances for two months. He brings a claim against them for “abridging the grievance
process.” Id. at 8.
Plaintiff asserts the following claims against Defendants in the pro se Complaint:
Count 1: Negligence claim against Defendants for failing to install carbon
monoxide detectors and a proper fire alarm system at the Jail.

Count 2: Price gouging claim against Defendants for failing to use a new
commissary supplier, after learning that Keefe Company intended to
increase the prices of commissary items on or around August 2022, in
violation of Jail Administrative Code 701.250.

Count 3: False advertising claim against Defendants for charging $3.49 for phone
calls when inmates were previously charged $3.48 and should actually be
charged $3.45.

Count 4: Inmate trust fund abuse claim against Defendants for using fifteen percent
of profits from commissary sales and phone calls to purchase cleaning
supplies, bed linens, and housing materials for the Jail instead of using
those funds as Plaintiff requested for education, recreation, religious
exercise, and grooming supplies.

Count 5: Grievance mishandling claim against Troy Reed and Kevin Kripps.

Any other claim not addressed herein is dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled.1

1 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim for relief if it
does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
Discussion
Upon careful review of the Complaint, the Court deems it appropriate to exercise its
authority under § 1915A and dismiss this action as being frivolous, meritless, and for failure to
state a claim for relief. An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law

or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective
standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton,
209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line between
possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557.
Count 1
Count 1 stems from allegations of negligence for failing to install carbon monoxide
detectors or a proper fire alarm system at the Jail. Negligence does not, and cannot, support a
claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Eighth

Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment meted out against convicted persons, and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits all punishment against pretrial
detainees. Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,
1427 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979)). Negligence does
not support a claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.
This claim fails for another reason. Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” deprives a
person of his federal constitutional or statutory rights shall be liable in an action at law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish that he suffered a
deprivation of his federal rights by a defendant who acted under color of state law. Id.;
McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 513 (7th Cir. 1993). Liability requires
involvement in the constitutional deprivation. Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, 839 F.2d 375,
384 (7th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must set forth allegations suggesting that each individual defendant

directly participated in a deprivation of his constitutionally or federally protected rights. Pepper
v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). A “causal
connection” or an “affirmative link” between the misconduct and the official sued is necessary.
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). Here, Plaintiff merely states that he asked about the
status of the carbon monoxide detectors and fire alarm systems at the Jail; he does not allege or
suggest the any defendants played a role in the decision about these systems or their
maintenance. For these reasons, Count 1 cannot proceed and shall be dismissed with prejudice
against the defendants.
Counts 2, 3, and 4
Counts 2, 3, and 4 arise from concerns about the cost of commissary items and phone

calls and the use of profits derived from their sales to make purchases for inmate supplies and
services. Plaintiff’s disagreement about the cost of these items or use of related profits falls far
short of stating a claim for any constitutional deprivation under Section 1983.
Plaintiff points to a Jail regulation that limits commissary prices to equivalent rates
charged for the same items at local stores, i.e., Jail Administrative Code 701.250. However, he
offers no single example of price increases the exceed local rates. And, Illinois state statutes
permit jails to recoup costs for expenses incurred from incarceration. See 730 ILCS 125/20(a)
(county board may require convicted persons confined in its jail to reimburse the county for
expenses incurred by their incarceration to the extent of their ability to pay). The Jail can charge
for commissary items. If Plaintiff disagrees with the cost of any items, he can choose not to
purchase them.
The same can be said of charges for phone calls. Relevant state regulations do not
specify how much county jails can charge, instead stating: “[D]etainees may be required to bear

the expense of any telephone calls they make or to place only collect calls.” 20 ILL. ADM. CODE
701.190 (d). The Court is unaware of a federal regulation or state statute that caps the amount
county jails can charge for phone calls. The Seventh Circuit has held that telephone rates, even
high rates, do not violate the First Amendment. Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir.
2001). The same case foreclosed relief based on telephone rates under the Takings Clause or the
Due Process clause. Id. at 564-66. Plaintiff has no constitutional claim based on the rate for
telephone service.
Finally, Plaintiff’s disagreement with the manner in which the Jail spends its profits from
commissary and phone sales is just that – a difference of opinion with Jail administrators. He
offers no allegations which remotely suggest the Jail misused his trust fund account or inmate

trust funds, generally, in a manner that implicates the Constitution or that any defendants were
personally involved in the misuse of funds. Accordingly, Counts 2, 3, and 4 shall be dismissed
with prejudice.
Count 5
Count 5 stems from the mishandling of grievances at the Jail. Plaintiff alleges that Troy
Reed and Kevin Kripps did not respond to his grievances during a two-month period. This gives
rise to no constitutional claim because the Constitution does not require jails to provide a
grievance procedure in the first place. Moreover, the creation of this procedure does not give
rise to a constitutionally protected right. Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir.
2016); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950-, 953 (7th Cir. 2011); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d
763, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2008). Count 5 shall also be dismissed with prejudice.
Disposition
IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice against
ALL DEFENDANTS as factually and/or legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff’s claims against ALL DEFENDANTS pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED
with prejudice. Plaintiff is ADVISED that the dismissal counts as one of his three allotted
“strikes” under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff is also ADVISED that his
obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred when he filed the action; the filing fee
of $350.00 remains due and payable. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464,
467 (7th Cir. 1998).
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he may file a notice of appeal with this Court
within thirty (30) days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(A)(4). If Plaintiff does choose
to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the
appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724,

725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133 F.3d at
467. Finally, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may incur a “strike.” A
proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-
day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than
twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of the judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be
extended. The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 8/23/2023 s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156694. Public record. Not legal advice.