# McCullough, Sr. v. Dennison

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · April 11, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156234

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** April 11, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TIMOTHY MCCULLOUGH, SR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 18-CV-1427-SMY
)
JEFFERY DENNISON, WEXFORD )
HEALTH SOURCES, ETHAN WILKE, )
KAREN SMOOT, and SHERRY )
BENTON, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Timothy McCullough, Sr. is an inmate currently incarcerated at the Shawnee
Correctional Center. He filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious health needs (Doc. 1). Specifically,
McCullough alleges that Defendant Karen Smoot was deliberately indifferent to the side effects
of his psychotropic medications and his need for eye care (Count I), and that Defendant Sherry
Benton was deliberately indifferent to his grievance and need for medical care (Count III). He
also seeks injunctive relief from Defendant Jeffery Dennison.1
Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 118),
which McCullough opposes (Doc. 119). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
Background
The following relevant facts are undisputed unless noted otherwise: When McCullough

1 Dennison is the former warden of Shawnee Correctional Center and was named solely in his capacity to
effectuate any injunctive relief (Doc. 8). However, Dennison is no longer the warden at Shawnee Correctional
Center. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current warden of Shawnee (Darren
Galloway (“Galloway”)) is automatically substituted for former warden Dennison. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 25(d).
transferred to Shawnee on July 24, 2017, he requested evaluation by an optometrist and new
eyeglasses (Doc. 118-1. p. 32). On January 30, 2018, he filed a grievance regarding his request,
noting that he had not seen an optometrist, that he was losing eyesight, and that he was suffering
adverse health effects from not being able to see well (Doc. 118-4, pp. 5-6). A grievance officer
reviewed the grievance and responded in part:

Per K. Smoot – HCUA – Inmate medical chart it is noted that Inmate McCullough
received glasses in 2015 with the recommendation to “follow up as needed”. There
is no documentation to substantiate the inmate’s claim that he has “to have this
procedure each year, at least twice” or verify his claim that he has a “degenerative
eye condition”. At this time SSC does not have an Optometrist, and the traveling
Optometrist is in the facility 1-2 times per month to see inmates who have medical
necessity. It is noted the inmate McCullough is on the waiting list to be seen by an
Optometrist. Reading Glasses are available for purchase in the inmate commissary.
(Doc. 118-4, p. 3).

Karen Smoot was the Healthcare Unit Administrator (“HCUA”) at Shawnee from 2016
through 2020. (Doc. 118-2). The HCUA is an administrative position and is not a medical
treatment provider. Id. Smoot did not provide medical care to individuals in custody at Shawnee
and never provided medical treatment to McCullough (Doc. 118-1, p. 55; Doc. 118-2). She did
not schedule medical appointments for individuals in custody at Shawnee (Doc. 118-2) and did
not have any control or input in the staffing of medical doctors, optometrists, or any other Wexford
employees. Id. McCullough never spoke to Smoot about his eye care (Doc. 118-1, p. 55).
Sherry Benton was employed by IDOC and was assigned to the Administrative Review
Board (“ARB”) during all times relevant to McCullough’s Complaint (Doc. 118-3). She did not
provide medical care to individuals in custody or schedule medical appointments for individuals
in custody. Id. Benton received McCullough’s grievance on April 17, 2018 (Doc. 118-4, p. 1).
Because the grievance was determined to not comply with the timeframes outlined in the IDOC
grievance process, it was not reviewed or considered further. Id.
McCullough was seen by Dr. Maqbool Ahmad, an ophthalmologist, on June 29, 2018, at
Marion Eye Center in Marion, Illinois (Doc. 118-5, pp. 4-5), having been referred by IDOC for
suspected glaucoma (Doc. 118-5, pp. 6-7). Dr. Ahmad diagnosed narrow angles, which is a
painless congenital condition that had most likely existed for all of McCullough’s life (Doc.118-
5, pp. 9, 12). On that date, McCullough’s eyesight was 20/20 (Doc. 118-5, pp. 8-9), and he was

given a laser treatment for his narrow angles (Doc. 118-5).
Dr. Ahmad testified that the narrow angles McCullough experienced were unrelated to his
complaints of blurred vision, pain, and the like and that the complaints were unsubstantiated based
upon his medical knowledge, education, and examination of McCullough (Doc. 118-5, p. 15).
Discussion
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Once a properly
supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

Prison officials impose cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Chatham v. Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2016). To prevail on such
a claim, an inmate must show that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition, and
that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to a risk of serious harm from that condition. Petties
v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2016).
An objectively serious condition includes an ailment that has been “diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment,” one that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, or
which involves chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir.
1997). It is undisputed that McCullough suffered from an objectively serious medical condition
during the relevant period. Thus, the question is whether the defendants knew of but disregarded
the risks associated with his condition. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
First, McCullough asserts that Smoot was deliberately indifferent to his medical
complications and side effects from psychotropic medications. No evidence has been presented

to support this aspect of his claim. Rather, the evidence reflects that McCullough stopped taking
psychotropic medications in the Spring of 2012 – nearly 5 years before his arrival at Shawnee
(Doc. 118-1, p. 21). And there is no documentation or other evidence of him complaining to Smoot
of side effects or complications related to his remote use of the medications. Therefore, Smoot is
entitled to summary judgment on this point.
Likewise, no reasonable jury could conclude that Smoot was deliberately indifferent to
McCullough’s eyecare needs; there is simply no evidence that she ignored his complaints or
disregarded any risk. She had no interaction with him prior to reviewing his January 2018
grievance. In response to the grievance, she noted that McCullough was on the list to see an

optometrist and that glasses were otherwise available at the commissary. While McCullough
argues that Smoot was responsible as an administrator for scheduling inmates and ensuring that
they are treated, Smoot cannot be held vicariously liable for the treatment or lack of treatment of
others, and there is no evidence that she was personally involved in any treatment or scheduling
decisions. See Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017); Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d
1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018).
Finally, to the extent McCullough alleges that Smoot delayed treatment, there is no
evidence tying a delay in treatment to Smoot’s conduct. Nor is there evidence that any delay
resulted in adverse consequences for McCullough. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 730-1 (7th Cir.
2016) (“To show that a delay in providing treatment is actionable under the Eighth Amendment, a
plaintiff must also provide independent evidence that the delay exacerbated the injury or
unnecessarily prolonged pain.”); Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013) (an inmate
must provide “verifying medical evidence” that he suffered substantial harm as a result of the delay
(rather than substantial harm merely from the inmate’s underlying condition).2

Similarly, the evidence on record cannot support a finding that Benton was deliberately
indifferent to McCullough’s medical needs. There is no evidence that she was personally involved
in any treatment or scheduling decisions or that she had direct personal involvement in the conduct
alleged to be a constitutional violation. See Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017);
Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018); Boyce v. Moore, 314 F.3d 884, 888 (7th
Cir. 2002). Her only involvement with McCullough was the receipt of his grievance at the ARB
level. While McCullough argues that Benton had a duty to enforce or protect his need for medical
attention upon receipt of his grievance, Benton cannot be expected to ignore the procedural
requirements set forth in the Illinois Administrative Code for Department of Corrections

Grievances. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code 504 et seq. McCullough did not satisfy those requirements,
and his grievance was properly not considered.
Finally, McCullough’s allegation against Galloway (formerly Dennison) and request for
injunctive relief is unsupported by the evidence presented, as is detailed above; absent a
constitutional violation, no injunctive relief can be granted. McCullough received medical

2 McCullough cites to Williams v. Liefer for the proposition that the jury could find that the delay in medical care
resulted in Plaintiff suffering unnecessarily prolonged and exacerbated pain. 491 F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2007).
However, McCullough testified that he continues to have ongoing pain and headaches – even after receiving the
medical treatment from Dr. Ahmad (Doc. 118-1, pp. 51-52). As such, he has failed to present any verifying medical
evidence that would allow a jury to define the amount of unnecessary and prolonged pain that McCullough suffered
as a result of the delay.
attention from Dr. Maqbool Ahmad, an ophthalmologist and has presented no evidence of
disregard or delay in any additional medical treatment.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 118) is
GRANTED. As no claims remain, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment
accordingly and to close this case. All pending motions are TERMINATED. The April 12, 2023
final pretrial conference and April 24, 2023 jury trial dates are VACATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 11, 2023
Aotigle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156234. Public record. Not legal advice.