# Warren v. IDOC

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · March 27, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156203

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 27, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TRENT WARREN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:20-CV-1295-MAB
)
CHAD WALL, )
GARRICK HALE, )
JESSE REID, JOSH MCDONALD, and )
JAMES GROVES, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is currently before the Court on the motions for summary judgment
on the issue of exhaustion filed by Defendants Garrick Hale, Jesse Reid, and Chad Wall
(Doc. 37; see also Doc. 38), and Defendants Josh McDonald and James Groves (Doc. 76. See
also Doc. 77). For the reasons explained below, the motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Trent Warren, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections,
brought this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional
rights at Pinckneyville Correctional Center. The pertinent factual allegations are that
Plaintiff was deprived of exercise and socialization for approximately thirty-eight days
while housed in segregation at Pinckneyville (Doc. 22, pp. 7–8; Doc. 1, pp. 15, 27, 28).
Specifically, Plaintiff was sent to segregation on February 26, 2020, and transferred to
Pinckneyville the next day (Doc. 1, p. 9). He claims that inmates in segregation at
Pinckneyville were not allowed to have a cellmate or go to yard unless they had a double-
cell permit (Id. at p. 27). He alleges that Counselor Jesse Reid did not file a double-celling

permit for him until April 6, 2020, after he had been in segregation for over a month (Id.).
As a result, he was only able to attend yard one time on March 14, 2020, and was
otherwise kept in his cell for 24 hours a day for a majority of the time (Id.). He further
alleges that Sergeant James Groves would tell him that he was not allowed to attend yard
until the double-cell permit had been approved, and Lieutenant Chad Wall would not
authorize him to go to yard (Doc. 22, p. 8; Doc. 1, pp. 15, 28). Plaintiff also alleges that the

one time he was taken to yard on March 14, 2020, Officer Garrick Hale and Sergeant Josh
McDonald forced him to stay outside for hours in extreme weather conditions without
proper clothing and no access to shelter or a bathroom (Doc. 22, pp. 3–4, 9; Doc. 1, pp. 16,
25). Following a threshold review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff
was permitted to proceed on the following claims:

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Reid, Wall, and John Doe 2 (who
was later identified as James Groves) for denying him the ability to exercise
and socially interact with other inmates while in segregation.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim against Hale and John Doe 1 (who was
later identified as Josh McDonald) for forcing him to remain outside in
extreme weather conditions for two and a half hours without shelter and
restroom facilities.

(Doc. 22; see also Doc. 50).
Defendants Hale, Reid, and Wall filed a motion for summary judgment on the
issue of exhaustion on April 25, 2022 (Doc. 37; see also Doc. 38). Defendants McDonald
and Groves, who belatedly joined this case, then filed their own motion for summary
judgment on the issue of exhaustion on February 17, 2023 (Doc. 76, see also Doc. 77).
Defendants argue there are three relevant grievances, but none of them suffice to exhaust

Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the first motion for summary
judgment filed by Defendants Hale, Reid, and Wall, disputing Defendants’ arguments
and facts (Doc. 42). He did not file a separate response to the second motion for summary
judgment filed by Defendants McDonald and Groves. However, given that the two
motions for summary judgment are substantively identical, Plaintiff’s response to the
earlier motion is equally applicable and suffices as to the second.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper only if the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(a). In making that determination, the court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party.

Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that a prisoner may not bring a lawsuit
about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available administrative
remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011).
Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear the burden of proving.

Pavey, 663 F.3d at 903 (citations omitted). In order for a prisoner to properly exhaust his
or her administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the
place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286
F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). Failure to
do so means failure to exhaust. Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004).
However, an inmate is required to exhaust only those administrative remedies that are

available to him. Pyles v. Nwaobasi, 829 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 2016); Dole v. Chandler, 438
F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). Administrative remedies become “unavailable” when prison
officials fail to respond to a properly filed inmate grievance or when prison employees
thwart a prisoner from exhausting. Pyles, 829 F.3d at 864; Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d
829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002); Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.
As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance process

outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code to exhaust his claims. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §
504.800, et seq. (2017). The normal grievance process usually involves three steps. First,
the offender must submit a grievance to their counselor within 60 days of the incident,
occurrence, or problem, and after the counselor responds, the grievance goes to the
grievance officer. Id. at § 504.810(a). However, if the grievance concerns discipline, then

it bypasses the counselor and goes directly to the grievance officer. Id. After the counselor
responds, the grievance goes to the grievance officer, who tenders a recommendation to
the warden within two months after receipt of the written grievance, “when reasonably
feasible under the circumstances.” Id. at § 504.830(e). The warden then reviews the
recommendation and provides the inmate with a written decision on the grievance. Id.

If the inmate is unsatisfied with the warden’s decision, he or she has thirty days from the
date of the warden’s decision to appeal to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). Id.
at § 504.850(a). The ARB submits a written report of its findings and recommendations to
the Director of the IDOC, who then makes a final decision, which should be issued
“within six months after receipt of the appealed grievance, when reasonably feasible
under the circumstances.” Id. at § 504.850(d), (e).
DISCUSSION

In this case, there is a genuine dispute of material facts as to whether Plaintiff
exhausted his administrative remedies.
The Court begins with Count 3, which is against Defendants Hale and McDonald
for leaving Plaintiff out on the yard in extreme weather conditions on March 14, 2020.
Plaintiff grieved this incident in grievance number 1538-06-20 (Doc. 38-1, pp. 8–11), which

Defendants indicate was dated “as April 30, 2020, and June 15, 2020” (Doc. 38, p. 3; Doc.
77, p. 3). The counselor, grievance officer, warden, and ARB all rejected the grievance as
untimely because it was not filed within 60 days of the incident as the regulations require
(Doc. 38-1, pp. 8, 9, 10). Defendants likewise contend that this grievance cannot serve to
exhaust Plaintiff’s administrative remedies as to Count 3 because it was not timely

submitted (Doc. 38, p. 9; Doc. 77, p. 9). Defendants, however, did not provide any
explanation as to why this grievance had two dates (see Doc. 38, pp. 3, 9; Doc. 77, pp. 3,
9). Defendants also completely ignore the portion of the grievance that explicitly states
Plaintiff “want[ed] to make clear this is the second time filing this grievance” because
“the first one never got processed” (see Doc. 38, pp. 3, 9; Doc. 77, pp. 3, 9; see Doc. 38-1, p.

10).
In his response brief, Plaintiff reiterates that he submitted this grievance for the
first time on April 2, 2020 (which is curious because that date does not match the date at
the top of the grievance, which says April 30, 2020) (Doc. 42, p. 8). He says submitted it
by putting it in the door of his segregation cell, and Defendant Jesse Reid picked it up (Id.
at pp. 3, 4, 9). When Plaintiff did not receive a response within 60 days, he resubmitted

the grievance (Id. at pp. 5, 9). Plaintiff’s representations, although somewhat inconsistent
with the documentation, are still sufficient to establish a dispute of fact as to when
Plaintiff first submitted this grievance and whether prison officials failed to respond,
thereby rendering the grievance process unavailable to Plaintiff and the subsequent
refusal to consider the merits of the grievance the second time Plaintiff submitted it
invalid.

Turning next to Count 2, which is against Defendants Reid, Wall, and Groves for
denying Plaintiff the ability to exercise and socially interact with other inmates after being
placed in segregation on February 26, 2020, due to the lack of a double cell permit. Of the
grievances discussed by Defendants, there is only one that could potentially cover
Plaintiff’s allegations in Count 2: grievance number 696-03-20, dated March 9, 2020 (Doc.

38-1, pp. 20–25).1 The primary focus of this grievance is Plaintiff’s assertion that he was
not served with a disciplinary or investigative report informing him of the reasons for his
confinement in segregation within eight days, like the rules require (see Id. at pp. 22–23).
However, at the end of the grievance, Plaintiff complained briefly about a loss of

1 Grievance number 1538-06-20 cannot cover Count 2 because it is specifically about Plaintiff’s time on the
yard on March 14, 2020 (Doc. 38-1, pp. 8–11; see also Doc. 38, pp. 3, 9). Grievance number 1561-06-20, dated
June 17, 2020, also cannot cover Count 2 because Plaintiff complains about not getting recreation time in
the yard or the dayroom after he was released from segregation due to COVID restrictions (Doc. 38-1, pp. 3–6;
see also Doc. 38, pp. 3–4, 9–10). Neither grievance has anything to do with being denied yard time while in
segregation due to the lack of a double-cell permit.
privileges in segregation, stating “Due to confinement offender is losing his privileges
and his right to attend recreation of exercise of a minimum of 8 hrs per week out of cell

which offender is constantly housed in this cell away from other people 24/7 unable to
participate in school or other programming.” (Id.). Plaintiff obtained responses from the
counselor, the grievance officer, and the warden (Id. at pp. 21, 22). The grievance was
denied at the facility level because it was “a duplicate issue” that had previously been
addressed in response to a different grievance (Id. at p. 21).2 Plaintiff appealed to the
ARB, where the grievance was received on May 13, 2020 (see id. at p. 20). The ARB did

not respond until approximately eight months later on January 11, 2021, when it rejected
the grievance for presenting a duplicate issue (Id.).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust this grievance prior filing suit as
he did not receive a response from the ARB until December 7, 2020, which was three days
after he initiated this lawsuit (Doc. 38, p. 11; Doc. 77, p. 11). Even if that were not true,

Defendants argue this grievance does not exhaust as to them because “Plaintiff does not
name Defendants or any individuals but rather generalizes his complaints about not
being provided sufficient yard time” (Doc. 38, p. 11; Doc. 77, p. 11).
In response, Plaintiff argues that this grievance should have been deemed
exhausted when the ARB failed to respond to it within six months (Doc. 42, p. 6). Plaintiff

further argues that he did not name any of the Defendants because, at that time, he did

2 This other grievance was #772-03-20, dated March 17, 2020 (Doc. 38-1, pp. 34–38). The Court notes that
this grievance addressed only the nature of the ticket Plaintiff received and whether he was properly served
with it (see id.). It does not address the loss of privileges or yard time while in segregation (see id.).
not know who was responsible for him missing yard (Id.). And he claims that prison
officials failed to address his complaints about the lack of yard time in responding to his

grievance (Id.). These arguments are sufficient to establish a dispute of fact as to whether
the grievance process was rendered unavailable to Plaintiff and whether his failure to
identify Defendants in the grievance should be excused.
Furthermore, Plaintiff also contends in his response brief that he submitted a
grievance on April 2, 2020, complaining that he was denied exercise and social interaction
while in segregation because he did not have a double cell permit (Doc. 42, pp. 3, 4, 18–

19). He claims that he placed the grievance in the door of his cell and that Counselor Reid
picked it up, but he never received a response (Id.). Plaintiff’s contention is sufficient to
establish an additional dispute of fact as to whether the grievance process was rendered
unavailable to him with respect to Count 2.
Based on the various factual issues identified in this Order, summary judgment

for Defendants is inappropriate and must be denied. Resolving these issues will require
an evidentiary hearing. See Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). If Defendants
want to continue to pursue the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, they must request a Pavey hearing within 14 days of this Order. If no request is
made, the Court will enter a scheduling order for discovery on the merits of this case.

Alternatively, the parties may request that this case be referred for alternative dispute
resolution.
CONCLUSION
The motions for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion filed by Defendants
Garrick Hale, Jesse Reid, and Chad Wall (Doc. 37) and by Defendants James Groves and

Josh McDonald (Doc. 76) are DENIED. Defendants must file a notice within 14 days of
this Order either withdrawing the affirmative defense of exhaustion or requesting a Pavey
hearing. If a hearing is requested, Defendants shall identify the witnesses they intend to
call to testify.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 27, 2023
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156203. Public record. Not legal advice.