# Johnson v. Thompson

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · March 9, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156178

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 9, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

IVAN JOHNSON, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3: 18-CV-1476-MAB
)
SCOTT THOMPSON, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This case is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by
Defendant James Groves, Larue Love, Christopher Thompson, and Chad Wall (Doc. 80),
all of whom are or were employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Plaintiff,
Ivan Johnson, filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 86). The Defendants did not file a
reply brief. For the reasons outlined below, the Defendants’ motion is denied in part and
moot in part.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 8, 2018 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s complaint was
screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to filter out non-meritorious claims and he was
permitted to proceed on the following claims against the following individuals:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against John Doe #1
Sergeant, Wall, and Love, for failing to protect Plaintiff from attack by his cellmate,
despite their knowledge of the cellmate’s aggressive behavior, mental illness, and
history of violence;
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Thompson in
his official capacity, for maintaining cell assignment policies that place inmates in
danger of physical harm.

(Doc. 6). Plaintiff’s claim in Count 2 was permitted to proceed against Thompson (who
was the Warden at that time) in his official capacity because Warden Thompson would
have been the appropriate official to carry out any injunctive relief ordered by the Court
(See Doc. 6).
The John Doe Sergeant in Count 1 was later identified as James Groves (Doc. 20).
The case proceeded through discovery (exhaustion was never an issue) and after the close
of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment (Doc. 80). Plaintiff responded in
opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and also filed a motion to
dismiss certain claims that, with the benefit of discovery, presumably lacked any
evidentiary support (See Doc. 85). Specifically, Plaintiff moved to dismiss Count 2 against
Warden Thompson and what Plaintiff described as Count 3, a preliminary injunction

(Doc. 85).
The Court granted the motion pursuant to its inherent authority (Doc. 87). With
the benefit of hindsight, and a careful evaluation of the record, the Court discovered that
the 1915A Screening Order did not categorize Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary
injunction as a standalone count (See Doc. 6.). While its true that Plaintiff’s pro se

complaint advanced a count for preliminary injunction, the Screening Order noted that
Plaintiff did not actually file a motion seeking such relief and thus took no action on the
request (See Doc. 6, p. 3). The Court offers this aside simply to clarify the record. Suffice
to say, Plaintiff dismissed Count 2, which was an official capacity claim against the
Warden. There was never a Count 3 to dismiss. And thus the only claim at issue now is
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Scott Groves, Chad Wall,

and Larue Love.1
Factual Background
Plaintiff, Ivan Johnson, is an inmate, currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional
Center. This case concerns an altercation, or according to Plaintiff – an attack – while
Plaintiff was housed at Pinkneyville Correctional Center with an inmate named Semaj
Dunn. Plaintiff says he warned the Defendants that his cellmate (Mr. Dunn) was

exhibiting abnormal behavior, that he did not feel comfortable in his cell with him, that
the situation was urgent, and that he needed to be moved to a different cell. The attack
on Plaintiff by Mr. Dunn resulted in six or seven stitches to Plaintiff’s lip and ultimately
this lawsuit.
A. The Parties

The incident occurred on March 31, 2018 (Doc. 86-1, p. 5). Plaintiff was in
segregation at that time, which was located in cellblock 5A at Pinkneyville (Doc. 86-1, p.
5). James Groves was a sergeant at Pinkneyville at that time (Doc. 86-2, p. 2). There is only
one sergeant on duty per shift in the segregation unit, and he was the one working the
day shift (Doc. 86-2). Chad Wall was working as a lieutenant in the segregation unit at

Pinkneyville that day as well (Doc. 86-3, pp. 4-5). A lieutenant has supervisory authority

1 Because of Plaintiff’s decision to dismiss Count 2, this renders a substantial portion of the arguments in
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment moot. Specifically, Sections 3 and 4 of Defendants’ Argument
are no longer applicable in light of this dismissal and the Court will not address them (See Doc. 81, pp. 9-
14).
over the correctional officers and the sergeant in the chain of command (Doc. 86-3, p. 5).
Larue Love worked as the Assistant Warden of Operations at Pinkneyville on the day in

question and in this role, reported directly to the Warden (Doc. 86-4, p. 5; 82-3, p. 2). As
the Assistant Warden, Love was responsible for the safety and security of the facility for
both staff and offenders, and was responsible for security of the departments, dietary,
and maintenance (Doc. 82-3, p. 3).
B. The incident and events leading up to it
Plaintiff and Mr. Dunn first became cellmates on March 27, 2018 (Doc. 86-1, p. 8).

They lived together in cellblock 5A (cell 54), which was the segregation unit at
Pinkneyville (Doc. 86-1, pp. 7-8, 26-27). When the two first started living with one
another, they got along okay as Plaintiff describes it, but he soon saw that Mr. Dunn had
some “disturbed behaviors.” (Doc. 86-1, p. 9). For example, within a day or two of living
together, Plaintiff witnessed Mr. Dunn either attempt to or pretend as if he was about to

commit suicide (Doc. 86-1, p. 10). Plaintiff saw Mr. Dunn rip some bed sheets, tie them
together to make a noose, slip the noose around his neck and stand in the front of his cell
waiting for a correctional officer to see him (Doc. 86-1, p. 10). According to Plaintiff, Mr.
Dunn told him this was all “part of his plan” and to just leave him alone (Doc. 86-1, p.
10). Ultimately a correctional officer saw Mr. Dunn and he was taken out of the cell and

placed on suicide watch (Doc. 86-1, p. 10). He returned back to the cell in a day or two
(Doc. 86-1, p. 11).
During their time together, Plaintiff testified that Mr. Dunn also acted unusual in
a variety of other ways. (Doc. 86-1, p. 12). For example, he beat on the door, he talked to
himself, he paced in the cell, was on psychiatric medicine, and he did not sleep (Doc. 86-
1, p. 12). Plaintiff also testified about an unusual practice that Mr. Dunn would engage in

where he, in essence, stood or hovered right over Plaintiff when he would be lying in bed
on the bottom bunk (Doc. 86-1, p. 22).
On March 31st, Plaintiff told Sergeant Groves he was having issues with Mr. Dunn
and gave him a kite to give to Lieutenant Wall (Doc. 86-1, pp. 16-17). When asked about
the specifics of the conversation, Plaintiff said he told Groves the kite was “urgent”
because it involved he and his cellmate and the two were not getting along in the cell

(Doc. 86-1, p. 18). Mr. Dunn was in the cell at this time as well (Doc. 86-1, p. 18). Groves,
for his part, has no recollection of this conversation with Plaintiff on March 31st, 2018
(Doc. 86-2, p.16). Groves does not dispute this conversation could have occurred; he
simply does not recall it (Doc. 86-2, p. 16).2
Plaintiff also voiced his concerns to a mental health professional (“MHP”) visiting

the cell the morning of March 31st. Plaintiff told MHP Smith he was having real
disturbing and life disturbing problems with Mr. Dunn (Doc. 86-1, p. 20). He recounted
to Mr. Smith some of the specific concerns he had about Mr. Dunn including his bizarre
behavior (i.e., he wasn’t sleeping, talking to himself) (Doc. 86-1, p. 20). Although Plaintiff
did not say specifically, it appears his intent with this conversation was to get word about

the urgent nature of his problem with Mr. Dunn to Lieutenant Wall and the Warden or
Assistant Warden (Doc. 86-1, p. 20).

2 Although Groves testified that he has nothing to do with inmate placement because that is handled by
the lieutenant, he also acknowledged that if he believed an inmate was endangered or threatened by his
cellmate, then he would be required to remove the inmate from that situation (Doc. 86-2, pp. 9, 16).
Later in the day around 11:30 or 12, Plaintiff spoke to Lieutenant Wall (Doc. 86-1,
p. 21). He hollered for Lieutenant Wall from his cell, asking to speak with him and told

him it was “urgent” because it concerned he and his cellmate (Doc. 86-1, p. 21). This
conversation occurred during yard time and Mr. Dunn was out of the cell at yard (Doc.
86-1, p. 22). Plaintiff says he told Wall (once he came over to his cell) that he and Mr.
Dunn are not getting along and that he did not feel comfortable being in a cell with him
(Doc. 86-1, p. 22). He also told Wall some of the specifics that were making him feel
uncomfortable (Doc. 86-1, p. 22).3 Plaintiff indicated he was trying to stress the urgency

of the situation and that it was a hostile environment and was not going to end well for
him (Doc. 86-1, p. 22). As Plaintiff tells it, Wall said that what Plaintiff was reporting was
not enough for him to move Plaintiff out of the cell with Mr. Dunn (Doc. 86-1, p. 23).4
At around 1:00 or 1:30, Plaintiff then spoke with Assistant Warden Love (Doc. 86-
1, p. 26). According to Plaintiff, he saw Love on the wing from his cell and asked to speak

with him (Doc. 86-1, p. 26.). He told Love who he was and that he was having “real life
disturbing problems” with his cellmate (Doc. 86-1, p. 27). Plaintiff provided details to
Love to try and explain why this was a very real problem and why Plaintiff needed to be
moved out of his cell as soon as possible (Doc. 86-1, p. 27). He also told Love specifics

3 According to Plaintiff, he told Wall that Mr. Dunn was “SMI” (serious mental illness). Plaintiff says Mr.
Dunn told him he was SMI (which Defendants never disputed). Plaintiff also told Wall that Dunn beat on
the door; talks to himself; and that he hovers over Plaintiff’s head all during the day and night and that this
was making Plaintiff uncomfortable (Doc. 86-1, pp. 22, 35).
4 Wall, for his part, does not recall the incident on March 31, 2018 and does not recall receiving any
complaints from Plaintiff beforehand (Doc. 86-2, p. 25). However, Wall does not dispute that he would
have been responsible for determining whether Plaintiff and Mr. Dunn should be cellmates on that day
(Doc. 86-3, p. 13).
about Mr. Dunn’s disturbing behavior. He noted that Mr. Dunn was SMI, that he was
beating on the door, hovering over Plaintiff while he was lying in bed, not sleeping, and

that he felt like his “life was in danger” and needed to be moved urgently (Doc. 86-1, p.
27). According to Plaintiff, Love said he will see what he can do (Doc. 86-1, p. 27). When
Love was asked about this interaction, he testified that he has no memory of anyone
complaining to him on March 31st, 2018 (Doc. 82-3, p. 5).
Sometime after evening chow (which is around 4:00 p.m.), Mr. Dunn attacked
Plaintiff in the cell (Doc. 86-1, p. 28). Plaintiff was attempting to move past Mr. Dunn in

the cell to put his chow tray by the door and Mr. Dunn shoved him or shoulder bumped
him and then punched him in the face (Doc. 86-1, p. 28). Plaintiff says that after the punch,
he grabbed Mr. Dunn to try and calm him down, and does not recall striking him back
(Doc. 86-1, p. 28). After he released Mr. Dunn from what he described as a bear hug, Mr.
Dunn starting kicking the door and yelling (Doc. 86-1, p. 28). A lieutenant came to the

cell and separated the two (Doc. 86-1, p. 30). Plaintiff ultimately received six or seven
stitches in his upper lip as a result of the attack from Mr. Dunn. He described the punch
as a “nice little punch” on him. He also received medication for his pain such as ibuprofen
(Doc. 86-1, p. 31).5 Ultimately, both Plaintiff and Mr. Dunn received tickets for fighting.6

5 The Offender Disciplinary Report, which was completed by Correctional Officer Bennett, tells a different
story. According to the Report, Plaintiff and Mr. Dunn both stated they “exchanged closed fist punches
around 3:15 p.m. inside the cell.” (Doc. 82-4). According to Mr. Dunn, the altercation occurred because
Plaintiff was trying to “control the cell” and according to Plaintiff, he was not sure why they fought, but
Mr. Dunn was “messed up in the head” and things got heated. The Report notes that both Plaintiff and Mr.
Dunn sustained injuries consistent with a fight having occurred (Doc. 82-4). However, it does not elaborate
any further on this, explain what injuries Mr. Dunn incurred, if any, or why it was consistent with a fight
having occurred.
6 Plaintiff’s brief cites to Exhibit E (Disciplinary Card of Mr. Dunn); Exhibit F (Disciplinary Card of Mr.
Johnson); and Exhibit G (e-mail from C/O Bennett) (See Doc. 86). However, Plaintiff did not attach any of
In short, Plaintiff indicated he told Groves, Wall, and Love that he was
uncomfortable with his cellmate; that his cellmate was exhibiting disturbing behavior;

that the situation in the cell was a real problem; that he needed to be moved as soon as
possible; and that Mr. Dunn doesn’t sleep (Doc. 86-1, p. 36-37). And Plaintiff specifically
told Love that he believed his life was in danger (Doc. 86-1, p. 37) and he told Wall and
Groves the situation with his cellmate was urgent and he needed to be moved (Doc. 86-
1, pp. 21-23, 36-37). For the Defendants’ part, none of them can recall these conversations
and the Offender Disciplinary Report, which is fairly perfunctory, seems to suggest it was

a two person fight rather than an unprovoked attack by Mr. Dunn (Doc. 82-4).
Discussion
Summary judgment is proper when the moving party “shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Factual disputes are genuine only if there is sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the
evidence presented, and they are material only if their resolution might change the suit’s
outcome under the governing law.” Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir.
2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the court’s role is not to determine the truth of the matter, and the court may

not “choose between competing inferences or balance the relative weight of conflicting

these exhibits to his brief or indicate where they might be located on the docket. Therefore the Court was
unable to review or rely on them. In any event, it appears from Plaintiff’s summary of these exhibits they
would only further demonstrate that there are a multitude of factual disputes surrounding the attack on
Plaintiff by Mr. Dunn. And for the purpose of summary judgment, the construes the facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff.
evidence.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Hansen v. Fincantieri
Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley

& Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). Instead, “it must view all the evidence in the
record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes
in favor of the non-moving party.” Hansen, 763 F.3d at 836.
“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments’
obligates prison officials to ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of . . .
inmates.’” Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). In particular, prison officials are required “to protect prisoners
from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. In order to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on a failure to protect, an inmate must
show that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to “an excessive risk” to their
health or safety. Sinn, 911 F.3d at 419 (quoting Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th

Cir. 2015)). Like all deliberate indifference claims, there is both an objective and subjective
component. Gevas, 798 F.3d at 480. First, the prisoner must show that the harm to which
they were exposed was objectively serious. Id. Second, the prisoner must show that the
prison official knew of and disregarded the excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety.
Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2020). This requires “actual, and not merely

constructive, knowledge” of the risk of harm, meaning the official “must both be aware
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw that inference.” Gevas, 798 F.3d at 480 (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837). In deciding whether the prison official was aware of the risk, “the
circumstances as a whole must be considered.” LaBrec v. Walker, 948 F.3d 836, 843 (7th
Cir. 2020).

A. Actual Knowledge
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff
cannot demonstrate Defendants had “actual knowledge” of an impending harm to
Plaintiff from his cellmate. However, before addressing this argument, the Court notes
that Defendants make no mention of or reference to the objective prong of Plaintiff’s
deliberate indifference claim. Defendants’ silence on this subject leads the Court to

conclude that they have conceded the harm and injuries Plaintiff suffered (i.e. six or seven
stitches) was objectively serious. See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) (“a
beating suffered at the hands of a fellow detainee, such as that alleged by [plaintiff],
clearly constitutes serious harm”).
Defendants’ argument regarding their lack of actual knowledge is somewhat

cursory in nature and it is also a nonstarter because it minimizes Plaintiff’s testimony and
fails to fully account for and credit his story and construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to him (See Doc. 81, p.8).7 As outlined above, Plaintiff first told Sergeant Groves
that he and Mr. Dunn were not getting along, the matter was urgent, and that he needed
to be moved as soon as possible (Doc. 86-1, pp. 16-17, 36-37). He also gave Groves a kite

(a written message) to give to Lieutenant Wall about the urgent problem he was having
with Mr. Dunn (Doc. 86-1, pp. 16-17). Plaintiff voiced very specific concerns to Wall that

7 Defendants’ brief dedicates a paragraph to discussing Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2004) (See
Doc. 81, p. 7). But its unclear to the Court why Defendants discuss this case and what application, if any, it
has to the case at hand. The connection to this case is simply never made.
he and his cellmate were not getting along, he needed to be moved and that it was a
hostile environment, unlikely to end well for him (Doc. 86-1, pp. 21-23, 36-37). And

finally, Plaintiff spoke to Warden Love and raised concrete concerns about his safety and
specifically told Love he feared that his life was in danger. (Doc. 86-1, pp. 26-27, 36-37).
All three of these individuals (even Groves) acknowledged that if there was a credible
concern about an inmate’s safety from his cellmate, each Defendant had the power and
authority to move Plaintiff out of the situation.
“[A] complaint that identifies a specific, credible, and imminent risk of serious

harm and identifies the prospective assailant typically will support an inference that the
official to whom the complaint was communicated had actual knowledge of the risk.”
Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 481 (7th Cir. 2015); Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir.
1996) (in failure to protect cases, a prisoner normally can establish actual knowledge of
impending harm by showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat

to his safety). Here, while Plaintiff’s conversations may have differed with each of the
three Defendants, he testified that he told each one of them he was having real life
disturbing problems with his cellmate, that his cellmate was exhibiting strange behavior,
that the situation was urgent, and in one instance, that he feared for his life. Defendants
have not made any suggestion that Plaintiff was not credible or that he was a known

fabricator. Crediting Plaintiff’s story as true (which the Court must for the purpose of
summary judgment), he very clearly conveyed the imminence and urgency of the
situation to each Defendant. And he identified the prospective assailant to each
Defendant. Although Plaintiff did not specifically say he feared Mr. Dunn was going to
punch him in his face, the details, according to Plaintiff, are specific enough to give the
Defendants actual knowledge of an imminent threat of a physical attack on Plaintiff by

Mr. Dunn.
None of the Defendants recall their conversation with Plaintiff on that day in
question, which is not surprising given the lapse in time (Docs. 82-3, p. 5; 86-2, p. 16; 86-
3, p. 25). The Offender Disciplinary Report seems to suggest that officials at Pinkneyville
determined the incident to be a mutual altercation between Plaintiff and Mr. Dunn, but
there is no real explanation as to why this determination was made (Doc. 82-4). In any

event, these factual disputes cannot be resolved at the summary judgment stage. See
Hansen, 763 F.3d at 836 (the Court must view all the evidence in the record in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes in favor of the
non-moving party).
In sum, a reasonable juror, crediting Plaintiff’s testimony, could conclude that each

of the Defendants had actual knowledge of a specific and imminent threat to Plaintiff’s
safety, posed by his cellmate. Summary judgment on the basis of actual knowledge (or
lack thereof) is simply not appropriate. See Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 643 (7th Cir.1996)
(prisoner advised sergeant, inter alia, that cellmate was intimidating him, acting
strangely, had threatened that “something crucial was going to happen” if one of them

was not moved, and was now “deadlocked” in cell, which restricted ingress to and egress
from cell).
B. Heck v. Humphrey and its application, if any, to Plaintiff’s claim
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a

state prisoner cannot proceed on claims for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based
on an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence unless the prisoner demonstrates
that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. Heck applies
both to a prisoner’s original conviction and sentence and to parole revocations. Easterling
v. Siarnicki, 435 Fed. App’x. 524, 526 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,

81–82 (2005)).
Defendants point this Court to a case they say is similar and persuasive - Chencinski
v. Reeder, 2013 WL 2383637, at *4 (S.D. Ill. May 30, 2013). This case involved a First

Amendment retaliation claim and a Due Process claim, both of which were dismissed by
the district court on the basis of Heck. In Chencinski, the plaintiff alleged that he received
a false disciplinary ticket as a means of retaliation for filing grievances. Id. at * 1. He also
claimed he was denied due process at his adjustment committee hearing because he was
not afforded an impartial investigation, an opportunity to put on a defense, and that the

adjustment committee relied on confidential informants without an inquiry into their
reliability. Id.
The plaintiff was found guilty at the adjustment committee hearing and the district
court ultimately concluded that Plaintiff’s claim was Heck barred because “[a] finding
that the disciplinary ticket was issued falsely or that the hearing denied Plaintiff due
process, would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the hearing's result.” Id.
at *4. The Court fails to see how Chencinski has any application to the instant case.

Plaintiff’s claim is an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference for failing to
protect Plaintiff from an attack by his cellmate, which is markedly different than the
claims at issue in Chencinski (First Amendment Retaliation and Due Process).
Moreover, Plaintiff seeks money damages from the Defendants for their alleged
failure to protect him from an attack by his cellmate (See Doc. 1, p. 11; Doc. 6). Plaintiff
does not seek to expunge the disciplinary ticket he received nor is he challenging the

disciplinary process in general. In fact, nothing about this case challenges the validity of
the ticket he received, the disciplinary process that ensued, or the discipline he ultimately
received. Plaintiff seeks money damages as a result of the injuries he sustained because
of the alleged constitutional violations. Neither Heck nor Chencinski have any application
to the instant case. Accordingly, summary judgment on this basis is not warranted.8

C. Qualified Immunity
In light of the Court’s conclusion that Defendants are not entitled to summary
judgment on Count 1, the Court must consider their argument that they are protected by
qualified immunity.
“Generally, qualified immunity protects government agents from liability when

their actions do not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.’” Hernandez v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 634 F.3d

8 As noted supra (n. 1), Plaintiff has dismissed Count 2 against Warden Thompson, which concerned
injunctive relief. As a result, the Court need not address Defendants’ arguments concerning this claim and
will thus move to Defendants’ final argument, which is qualified immunity.
906, 914 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 720 (7th Cir. 2010)). “It protects
‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Burritt v.

Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 249 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)). In determining whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court
must ask two questions: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to Vega,
show that Defendants violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Hernandez, 634 F.3d at
914 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-202 (2001)).

The Court has already determined that Plaintiff put forth sufficient evidence to
establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether his Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment was violated. Thus, the only remaining issue is
whether that right was clearly established. The Court concludes that it was at the time of
the incident. In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court made clear that prison officials have

a duty under the Eighth Amendment to take reasonable steps to insure the safety of
inmates, which includes harm perpetrated on one inmate to another. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
And the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals expounded on Farmer in Pope v. Shafer in 1996,
clearly outlining both the objective and subjective standard for an Eighth Amendment
failure to protect case. 86 F.3d at 92.

Consequently, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s
claim against Defendants for failing to protect him from an attack by his cellmate.
Conclusion
The motion for summary judgment (Doc. 80) is DENIED in part and rendered
MOOT in part. It is DENIED with respect to Count 1, which is Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Sergeant Groves, Lieutenant Wall, and
Warden Love. It is MOOT with respect to Count 2 against Warden Thompson because
Plaintiff opted to dismiss Count 2 in response to Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, thus rendering Defendants’ request for summary judgment on Count 2 moot.
The Court will set this case for a status conference by separate notice to discuss the

referral of this case for mediation or a settlement conference and to discuss trial
scheduling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 9, 2023
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10156178. Public record. Not legal advice.