# Crockett v. Jeffreys

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · September 20, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10155484

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 20, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10155484

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding an inmate need not file multiple grievances against specific incidents of lockdowns since he was also challenging the prison’s lockdown policies in general

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DANIEL CROCKETT, #M40122, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:21-cv-00570-MAB
)
ROB JEFFREYS, ET AL., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Sara Stover and Dr. Lynn Pittman’s
Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc.
59). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (Doc. 64). For the reasons set forth below, the
motion is DENIED as to Dr. Pittman and GRANTED as to Stover.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Daniel Crockett filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights while incarcerated at Lawrence
Correctional Center (“Lawrence”) (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Pittman and Stover
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, specifically headaches, pain,
and suffering (Doc. 13, p. 3).
The Court conducted a threshold review of the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, and allowed Plaintiff to proceed on the following claim:
Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Jane Doe, Dr. Pittman, and NP
Stover for exhibiting deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs related to the injury he suffered from the assault by his cellmate and
his subsequent headaches, pain, and suffering.

(Doc. 13, p. 3).1

Defendants Stover and Dr. Pittman filed their motion for summary judgment on
exhaustion of administrative remedies on December 28, 2021 (Doc. 59). Defendants Dee
Dee Brookhart, Dale Monical, Jimmy Stanley and Maranda Tate did not move for
summary judgment on exhaustion. Plaintiff filed his response on January 10, 2022 (Doc.
64). Defendants Stover and Dr. Pittman then filed their reply memorandum in support of
their motion for summary judgment on January 13, 2022. (Doc. 65-1). Having closely
reviewed the briefs and evidence submitted by both parties, the Court determined there
were no disputed issues of material fact and therefore no hearing pursuant to Pavey v.
Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008) was necessary.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate within the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and
is currently incarcerated at Lawrence, where the events at issue also took place (Doc. 13,
p. 1). In his complaint, Plaintiff details that he was assaulted by another inmate on

October 16, 2019 (Id. at p. 2). He was taken to the health care unit where a Jane Doe Nurse
placed a bandage on his face, but did not schedule him to see a doctor. Id. Three days
later, Plaintiff submitted a request to see a doctor due to severe pain and a deformity on
his face. Id. X-rays were taken on October 30, 2019 and, on November 20, 2019, Dr.

1 Jane Doe was later identified as Amie Ulrey on March 31, 2022 (Doc. 79). Ms. Ulrey just recently filed a
motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion (see Docs. 100, 101) and Plaintiff has filed a
response (Doc. 103). The Court will address exhaustion as to Ms. Ulrey in a separate order in due time.
Pittman told him the x-rays did not show any fractures. Id. He asked her to feel the
deformity on his face and she told him it was a bruise on the bone. Id. He subsequently

sent requests to healthcare requesting to see the x-rays and for a second opinion. Id. After
receiving no response, and continuing to suffer in pain, he filed a grievance on December
28, 2019. Id. After appealing the denial of his grievance to the Administrative Review
Board (ARB), Plaintiff wrote to the healthcare unit administrator asking to be examined
for a fracture. Id. Plaintiff was seen by NP Stover on April 23, 2020. Id. After touching the
area with the deformity, NP Stover allegedly stated, “That’s definitely a fracture,” and

scheduled additional x-rays which were taken on May 1, 2020. Id. The x-ray report stated
a fracture could not be excluded. Id. Plaintiff continued to complain that he was in pain
and suffering from severe headaches, but nothing was done. (Id. at p. 3). Plaintiff had a
CT scan on July 1, 2020 which revealed multiple fractures. Id.
GRIEVANCE RECORDS

There is only one grievance in the record related to the claim in Count 2 –
Grievance 12-19-790, dated December 28, 2019 (Doc. 59-1, pp. 106-107, 116, 176-178). In
the grievance, Plaintiff states he saw Dr. Pittman on November 20, 2019 for the results of
x-rays taken for a possible fracture under his left eye (Id. at p. 116). Dr. Pittman told him
the x-rays were negative for a fracture, but he felt a deformity in his face and believed Dr.

Pittman’s diagnosis was incorrect. Id. He asked to see the x-ray, for a “doctor to explain
the reason for what [he] clearly feel[s],” and money damages if there was a fracture. Id. A
counselor responded to the grievance on January 2, 2020, a grievance officer responded
on February 24, 2020, and the Warden responded on February 25, 2020 (Doc. 59-1, pp.
107). The grievance was received by the Administrative Review Board (ARB) on March
19, 2020 and returned without review on August 17, 2020 because “request[s] are not

grievable issues.” (Doc. 59-1, p. 107).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In making that
determination, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to, and draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Courts generally cannot
resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment. E.g., Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S.
650, 656, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L. Ed. 2d 895 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary
judgment is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). However, when the motion for summary judgment pertains to a
prisoner’s failure to exhaust, the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to conduct an
evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s efforts to
exhaust. Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Pavey v. Conley, 544

F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008)). However, where there is no disputed issue of fact, no hearing is
necessary.
Exhaustion
Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear the burden of
proving. Pavey, 663 F.3d at 903 (citations omitted). The Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”) requires prisoners to exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to

filing lawsuits in federal courts with regard to prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Administrative exhaustion “means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing
so properly.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (citing Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d
1022, 1024 (2002)). This is a mandatory rule that a court does not have discretion to waive.
Id. at 93. A lawsuit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies have been
exhausted must be dismissed. Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (2004).

As an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections, Plaintiff was required to
comply with the grievance procedures set forth in the Illinois Administrative Code. 20
ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017). The regulations require an inmate to file his
grievance with his counselor within 60 days of the discovery of an incident, occurrence,
or problem that gave rise to the grievance. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). If the

counselor is unable to resolve the grievance, the grievance is then submitted to a
grievance officer, who reports his or her findings and recommendations in writing to the
Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). The CAO then
provides the inmate with a written decision on the grievance. Id. If the inmate is not
satisfied with the CAO’s response, he may file an appeal with the IDOC Director through

the ARB. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal within thirty
days of the date of the CAO’s decision. Id. The ARB submits a written report of its
findings and recommendations to the Director, who then makes a final determination.
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d), (e).
Though the Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the exhaustion
requirement, Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006), an inmate is required to

exhaust only those administrative remedies that are available to him. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Administrative remedies become “unavailable” to prisoners when prison officials fail to
respond to a properly filed grievance or when prison officials’ “affirmative misconduct”
thwarts a prisoner from exhausting. E.g., Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.
2002); Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.
DISCUSSION

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), all prison inmates bringing an
action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 must first exhaust all administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C
§1997e(a); Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d, 739, 740 (7th Cir. 2008). Defendant Pittman argues
that the sole grievance at issue was not exhausted because the ARB returned it as
procedurally deficient stating “request[s] are not grievable issues.” (Doc. 59, p. 8). It is

evident that Plaintiff was grieving inadequate medical care (See Doc. 59-1, p. 107). In
Grievance #12-19-790 (filed on December 28, 2019), Plaintiff claimed he went to
healthcare on November 20, 2019 for x-ray results for a possible fracture. Id. Pittman
advised the x-ray was negative for a fracture, but Plaintiff believed the diagnosis to be
incorrect. Id. He requested to see the x-rays and speak with someone for a second opinion.

(Doc. 13, p. 2). After weeks of no response, Plaintiff filed Grievance #12-19-790 where he
grieved Pittman’s alleged incorrect diagnosis and requested to see a doctor and the x-ray.
(Doc. 59-1, p. 107). The grievance alerted prison officials to the nature of the wrong for
which Plaintiff sought redress, and served its function of giving prison officials a fair
opportunity to address the complaint of inadequate medical care. The ARB then
evaluated the grievance on its merits and denied it on the basis that Plaintiff received an

x-ray and was informed of its result. Id. Even if the remedy Plaintiff was ultimately
seeking was not one the ARB could grant, Plaintiff is still required to comply with the
exhaustion requirements under the PLRA because the purpose of exhaustion is to permit
the facility’s administrative process to play out. See Dole, 438 F.3d at 808–09
(“Exhaustion is necessary even if the prisoner is requesting relief that the relevant
administrative review board has no power to grant, such as monetary damages . . . or if

the prisoner believes that exhaustion is futile.”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff did
everything he could to exhaust the claim against Pittman and, as a result, the motion will
be denied with respect to her.
However, it is not disputed that Plaintiff failed to file a grievance regarding his
complaints about the interaction with NP Stover on April 23, 2020 or any subsequent

interaction. The question is whether he was required to file a grievance in addition to the
December 28, 2019 grievance when he was complaining about the same medical
condition. In general, a prisoner is not required to file multiple, successive grievances
raising the same issues if the objectionable condition is continuing. Turley v. Rednour, 729
F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding an inmate need not file multiple grievances against

specific incidents of lockdowns since he was also challenging the prison’s lockdown
policies in general). However, separate complaints about particular incidents involving
different people are required where the underlying facts or the complaints are different.
Id.
Here, Plaintiff saw Pittman and Stover five months apart. While he claims Pittman
failed to diagnose the fracture, he indicates Stover acknowledged that he likely had a

fracture but ignored his complaints of continuing pain and headache. (Doc. 13, p. 2.).
Although a grievance need only alert prison officials to the nature of the wrong for which
redress is sought, the December 28, 2019 grievance cannot be construed to object to
medical treatment Plaintiff would subsequently receive (or not receive) from a different
medical provider months later. See Mayo v. Snyder, 166 F. App’x. 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2006)
(holding an inmate failed to exhaust his remedies as he filed a grievance against medical

personnel for failure to respond to requests for appointment, which cannot be construed
to also object to medical treatment he would subsequently receive). While one grievance
about Pittman’s treatment might have sufficed to grieve a continuing course of
inadequate medical treatment by Pittman, the continuing violation theory does not allow
Plaintiff’s December 28, 2019 grievance to exhaust his claim against Stover whose conduct

would not occur until nearly four months later. See Reed v. Larson, No. 18-CV-1182-JPG,
2019 WL 6769319, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2019). As such, Plaintiff failed to exhaust
administrative remedies as to the claim in Count 2 against Stover. Therefore, Stover will
be dismissed without prejudice.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc. 58) is DENIED as to Dr. Lynn Pittman and
GRANTED as to Sara Stover. Defendant Stover is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 20, 2022

s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10155484. Public record. Not legal advice.