# Charleston v. Jones

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · September 8, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10155466

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 8, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10155466

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding the plaintiff offered sufficient medical evidence to satisfy the objective prong through the use of medical records and plaintiff's own testimony about his symptoms, care, treatment, and injuries

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CALEB CHARLESTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 19-cv-764-DWD
)
ALEX JONES, )
JOSHUA SCHOENBECK, )
PAMELA WESTERMAN, )
SARAH WOOLEY, )
JOHN MCCALEB, )
CHASE CARON, )
JEFFREY GARDNER, )
SHAUN GEE, )
HEATHER MCGHEE, and )
TANGELA OLIVER, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:
As narrowed by the Court’s threshold order (Doc. 10), and the Court’s rulings on
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment concerning exhaustion (Doc. 71; Doc. 80),
Plaintiff Caleb Charleston asserts an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
against Defendants Jones, Westerman, Schoenbeck, Wooley, McCaleb, Caron, Gardiner,
Gee and McGhee (the “IDOC Defendants”), and Defendant Oliver for failing to provide
Plaintiff with adequate medical treatment after he was stabbed in his arm by another
inmate on September 6, 2017.
Now before the Court are the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
Oliver (Doc. 106) and the IDOC Defendants (Doc. 109). On June 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed a
response to the motions (Doc. 117). For the reasons detailed below, the Motions will be
granted.
Undisputed Facts

Plaintiff has been an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections since 2013
(Doc. 107-2, p. 13). Plaintiff claims to suffer from nerve pain or damage in his right arm
which started after Plaintiff was stabbed by another inmate at Menard Correctional
Center on September 6, 2017 (Doc. 107-2, pp. 28, 30). At the time of his injury, Defendants
held various positions at Menard: Jones was the assistant warden; Schoenbeck,

Westerman, Wooley, McCaleb, Caron, Gardiner, and Gee were correctional officers;
McGhee was a nurse; and Oliver was a mental health professional. Following his injury,
Plaintiff interreacted with Defendants at various times until he was transferred to Pontiac
Correctional Center on September 15, 2017 (Doc. 110-1). Sometime in 2018, Plaintiff was
diagnosed with forearm neuropathy and prescribed Neurontin (Doc. 110-3, p. 117). On

March 25, 2022, Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he continues to take Neurontin
twice a day for his arm injury (Doc. 107-2, p. 9).
September 6, 2017
On September 6, 2017, a fight involving approximately 30 inmates started in the
prison yard at Menard (Doc. 110-2, pp. 29-30). During the fight, Plaintiff was attacked by

an unidentified inmate who stabbed Plaintiff in his right arm (Doc. 110-2, p. 30). Plaintiff
speculates that he was stabbed by “an ice pick type of shank or knife” (Doc. 110-2, p. 32).
Plaintiff described the puncture wound as “small” (Doc. 110-2, pp. 62-63), or
approximately a “finger-length deep” (Doc. 110-2, p. 32). Plaintiff’s medical records
indicate that the wound was “1 to 2 millimeters” deep, with a “4-centimeter laceration.”
(Doc. 107-2, p. 40). In addition to the puncture wound, Plaintiff jammed his finger and

had a swollen hand (Doc. 110-2, pp. 30-32).
Immediately after the fight started, correctional officers shot gunshots, so inmates
got on the ground (Doc. 110-2, p. 34). Officers then directed inmates, including Plaintiff,
to go to the yard gate to get handcuffed (Doc. 110-2, p. 34). Plaintiff informed Assistant
Warden Jones, and Correctional Officers Schoenbeck and Westerman, that he needed
medical attention, but they did not respond “productive[ly]” (Doc. 110-2, pp. 35-36).

Instead, Plaintiff was instructed to go to the gate where he was handcuffed, and Officer
Westerman escorted Plaintiff to the health care unit where he was seen by Nurse McGhee
and Correctional Officer Wooley (Doc. 110-2, pp. 36-37). Plaintiff described the health
care unit as busy or “a revolving door” because of the fight (Doc. 110-2, p. 68).
Plaintiff told Nurse McGhee that he could not move his arm, that it was bleeding

and in pain, and he thought something was stuck in there (Doc. 110-2, p. 37). Plaintiff
also explained that he felt dizzy and lightheaded, and his finger was jammed and swollen
(Id.). McGhee observed that Plaintiff’s middle finger had a limited range of motion (Doc.
110-2, p. 40). She then cleaned his puncture wound, applied ointment and a bandage
(Doc. 110-2, pp. 38-40). McGhee also administered a tetanus shot (Doc. 110-2, p. 38).

Plaintiff recalls that “after a nice amount of time” blood continued to flow down his arm,
so he asked McGhee for additional bandages or treatment (Doc. 110-2, p. 38). However,
McGhee replied that “[t]here is no doctor here. There is nothing else I can do.” (Doc. 110-
2, p. 38). The medical note from Plaintiff’s encounter with McGhee indicates that Plaintiff
was referred to a medical doctor to follow up for his puncture wound and to check his
middle finger (Doc. 110-2, pp. 40-41; Doc. 1-1, p. 30). McGhee also recommended that

Plaintiff follow up with care for any additional issues (Id.).
Correctional Officer Wooley was at the health care unit the entire time Plaintiff
was treated by Nurse McGhee. Plaintiff told Wooley that he was still bleeding, could not
move his arm, and needed further medical treatment (Doc. 110-2, pp. 41-42). However,
Wooley said she could not do anything, and instead took pictures of Plaintiff’s injuries
and bloody clothes (Doc. 110-2, p. 42).

After leaving the health care unit, Plaintiff was taken to the segregation building
and did not see anyone until approximately an hour later when Correctional Officer
Gardiner took Plaintiff to an interview room (Doc. 110-2, pp. 42-44). Plaintiff told
Gardiner that his arm was in pain, and he needed medical treatment, but Gardiner stated
that he had to complete the interview (Doc. 110-2, p. 44). After the interview, Plaintiff

returned to his cell (Doc. 110-2, p. 45).
Plaintiff was then taken to see Defendant Oliver, a mental health professional, for
a segregation assessment (Doc. 110-2, p. 46). Plaintiff’s encounter with Defendant Oliver
lasted approximately 10 minutes (Doc. 107-2, pp. 69-70). Plaintiff recalls that he was
handcuffed with his arms behind his back the encounter, but that his bandage and blood

were visible (Doc. 107-2, pp. 69-71). Defendant Oliver asked Plaintiff questions about his
mental health (Doc. 107-2, p. 71). Plaintiff asked Oliver for medical treatment, but she
did not provide it (Doc. 107-2, p. 72). Plaintiff testified that he did not know if Oliver was
qualified to provide him with medical treatment for his injury (Doc. 107-2, p. 72). After
seeing Defendant Oliver, Plaintiff was escorted back to his cell.

After returning to his cell, Plaintiff believes he asked Correctional Officers
McCaleb and Caron for medical attention two or three times on September 6th, but they
stated something to the effect of “there is nothing they can do.” (Doc. 107-2, pp. 48-50).
September 7, 2017 to September 15, 2017
Plaintiff’s wound started to scab overnight into September 7, 2017 (Doc. 110-2, p.
50). Plaintiff testified that the scab would come off when he moved his arm, and that this

continued for “some days.” (Doc. 110-2, p. 50). After about a week, Plaintiff testified that
the scab fully formed and he no longer worried about bleeding (Doc. 110-2, p. 62).
However, he did not regain full movement in his arm for a couple of months after the
injury (Doc. 110-2, pp. 62-63). Plaintiff’s wound never became infected (Doc. 110-2, p. 62).
When describing the healing process, Plaintiff stated that the wound “looked good on the

outside, but probably on the inside, it still wasn’t healed up right” (Doc. 110-2, p. 63).
Plaintiff believes that Menard “didn’t take the stab wound so serious because of how
small the puncture wound was” and because it appeared to be healed and was “small”
and “only a little scab” (Doc. 110-2, pp. 62-63). Plaintiff speculates that Menard officials
did not take into consideration the inside of the wound or “how deep the icepick … went

in” (Doc. 110-2, pp. 62-63).
Plaintiff does not recall requesting any medical treatment from staff members on
September 7, 2017 (Doc. 107-2, p. 49), although he testified that other inmates tried to
request care on his behalf, and he tried to speak to different nurses who walked through
segregation (Doc. 107-2, pp. 52-56).

On September 10, 2017, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendants Gee and Wooley
about the September 6th fight (Doc. 110-2, p. 56). Plaintiff recalls asking Gee and Wooley
for medical treatment because he could not move his arm, and it would still bleed when
he moved it, but they ignored his request and continued asking Plaintiff questions about
the fight (Id.).
In the days following his injury, Plaintiff claims he continued to request medical

treatment from unidentified nurses and correctional officers but was ignored (Doc. 110-
2, pp. 53-56). Plaintiff estimates that he might have seen Correctional Officers McCaleb
and Caron about twice a day following his injury until his transfer on September 15, 2017,
but could not recall specific dates (Doc. 110-2, p. 48-49). Plaintiff did not submit any
requests for “sick-call”, did not see a counselor, and did not submit grievances while at

Menard (See generally, Doc. 110-2, pp. 53-59). Plaintiff testified that he did not have any
paper to write a sick-call, and unnamed correctional officers refused to provide it because
he was in lockdown (Doc. 110-2, pp. 59-60).
Plaintiff transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center on September 15, 2017, nine
days after his injury (Doc. 110-1).

Events After September 15, 2017
Once at Pontiac, Plaintiff began receiving treatment for his arm (Doc. 107-1, p. 3;
Doc. 110-3, p. 77). This treatment included pain medication (Doc. 110-3, p. 77). On
October 5, 2017, Plaintiff represented that his wound area was “perfectly healed” but that
he had not been exercising because he wanted his arm to heal (Doc. 107-1, p. 2; Doc. 1-1,
p. 45). Plaintiff was prescribed Motrin for his pain and advised to start exercising (Doc.

107-1, p. 3; Doc. 110-3, p. 77; Doc. 1-1, p. 45). Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that he
consistently complained about his right arm pain over the next few months, although it
was not always his chief complaint (See, generally Doc. 110-3; Doc. 1-1).
In March 2018, Plaintiff transferred to Stateville Correctional Center (Doc. 107-2,
p. 79). While at Stateville, an x-ray was taken of his arm (Doc. 110-3, p. 98) and the results
came back as normal (Doc. 110-3, p. 41; Doc. 1-3, p. 36). Plaintiff also underwent physical

therapy at Stateville and was prescribed nerve pain medication for right arm neuropathy
(Doc. 110-3, p. 117; Doc. 1-3, p. 55). On March 25, 2022, Plaintiff testified that he continues
to take Neurontin twice a day for his arm injury (Doc. 107-2, p. 9). Plaintiff also testified
that he had no problems with his arm “prior to being stabbed” (Doc. 110-2, p. 65).
Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). “Factual disputes are genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence presented, and
they are material only if their resolution might change the suit's outcome under the

governing law.” Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to, and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of, the non-moving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962,
965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Discussion

The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
imposes an obligation on states “to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated
individuals.” Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1072 (7th Cir.
2012) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). “Prison officials violate this
proscription when they act with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of

an inmate.” Holloway, 700 F.3d at 1072 (citations omitted). To succeed on a deliberate
indifferent claim, Plaintiff must establish that he “suffered from ‘(1) an objectively serious
medical condition to which (2) a state official was deliberately, that is subjectively,
indifferent.’” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 964 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing
Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Plaintiff argues that all Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs by failing to provide him with adequate medical treatment or delaying his
treatment immediately following his stabbing on September 6, 2017 until his transfer
from Menard on September 15, 2017. The IDOC Defendants concede that Plaintiff’s
puncture wound following the September 6th fight was an objectively serious medical

condition (Doc. 110, p. 11), and the Court agrees at this stage.1 Thus, only the subjective
component is at issue here.

1 Defendant Oliver argues that the small size of the wound made it such that no person would perceive the
need for a doctor’s attention. However, Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that he had a stab wound that
required treatment. Moreover, a reasonable lay person might perceive that a bleeding puncture wound
To establish the subjective component, Plaintiff must show that each Defendant
“knew of facts from which he could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm existed,

and that he did, in fact, draw that inference.” Walker, 940 F.3d at 964 (citing Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This standard “requires more than negligence and it
approaches intentional wrongdoing.” Holloway, 700 F.3d at 1073; accord Berry v. Peterman,
604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Deliberate indifference is intentional or reckless
conduct, not mere negligence.”); McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir.
2010) (“[N]egligence, even gross negligence does not violate the Constitution.”). In

determining whether an inmate’s care evidences deliberate indifference, courts “must
examine the totality of an inmate’s medical care.” See Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago
Cnty., 165 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1374–75
(7th Cir. 1997) (isolated incidents of neglect during an otherwise continuous stretch of
adequate medical care is insufficient to support an inference of deliberate indifference)).

“In cases where prison officials delayed rather than denied medical assistance to
an inmate, courts have required the plaintiff to offer ‘verifying medical evidence’ that the
delay (rather than the inmate's underlying condition) caused some degree of
harm.” Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2007). In other words, “a plaintiff
must offer medical evidence that tends to confirm or corroborate a claim that the delay

was detrimental.” Id. Certainly, expert testimony would constitute acceptable medical

from an unknown object would mandate care. Thus, the undisputed material facts suggest that Plaintiff
suffered from an objectively serious medical condition. See Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir.
2010) (“An objectively serious medical condition is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor's
attention.”).
evidence, but that is not the only form of verifiable medical evidence that a plaintiff can
use to get past summary judgment on a case like this. See Williams, 491 F.3d at

715 (finding the plaintiff offered sufficient medical evidence to satisfy the objective prong
through the use of medical records and plaintiff's own testimony about his symptoms,
care, treatment, and injuries). In delayed treatment cases, the Seventh Circuit has stated:
No matter how serious a medical condition is, the sufferer from it cannot
prove tortious misconduct (including misconduct constituting a
constitutional tort) as a result of failure to treat the condition without
providing evidence that the failure caused injury or a serious risk of injury.
For there is no tort—common law, statutory, or constitutional—without an
injury, actual or at least probabilistic.

Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff testified that he continues to take nerve pain medication for his right arm
neuropathy resulting from the stabbing (Doc. 107-2, p. 9). However, Plaintiff has not
presented evidence that this ongoing neuropathy or pain resulted from anything but the
physical stabbing. In examining the totality of Plaintiff’s medical care, the undisputed
evidence in the record shows that Plaintiff received medical treatment for his puncture
wound almost immediately following the stabbing on September 6th. Nurse McGhee
cleaned Plaintiff’s puncture wound, applied ointment and a bandage. She also
administered a tetanus shot, recommended follow up treatment for Plaintiff’s injuries,
and referred him to a medical doctor. The wound began healing overnight, with a scab
forming on September 7th. Plaintiff’s testimony then confirms that the puncture wound
was small and appeared to be healing properly “on the outside.” (See Doc. 110-2, pp. 50,
62-63).
Plaintiff did not receive additional treatment at Menard but was transferred to
Pontiac nine-days after his injury. Once at Pontiac, Plaintiff described the wound as

“perfectly healed” and began treatment for the unresolved pain he continued to
experience (Doc. 107-1, p. 3). In the months that followed, Plaintiff continued to complain
about his arm pain and underwent additional medical treatment, including a diagnostic
x-ray and physical therapy. Ultimately, he was diagnosed with neuropathy and began
taking nerve pain medication (Doc. 110-3, pp. 41, 117; Doc. 1-3, pp. 36, 55).
In short, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence of any harm allegedly caused by

Defendants’ treatment, lack of treatment, or delay in treatment from September 6, 2017
until his transfer from Menard on September 15, 2017. It was only with the benefit of
hindsight in the days and weeks following his injury that Plaintiff began to suspect that
his puncture wound might not have healed properly “on the inside” leading him to
request additional medical treatment at Pontiac and Stateville (See Doc. 110-2, p. 63).

Thus, there is no verifiable evidence connecting any alleged deficient treatment or delay
in treatment allegedly caused by Defendants to the long-term consequences or harm
Plaintiff suffers now because of the stabbing. See, e.g., Jackson, 733 F.3d at 790 (some
verifiable medical evidence is required to determine “whether the withholding of
treatment during a brief period in the early stages of the conditions in an otherwise

healthy man … was likely to cause serious, or indeed any, harm”); Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at
1374 (finding that plaintiff could not survive summary judgment when officials delayed
treating a mild cyst infection for six days); Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1458 (7th Cir.
1988) (rejecting Eighth Amendment claim for delay in treatment, in part, because prisoner
failed to produce any evidence of injury caused by the delay); Stevens v. Bukowski, No. 15-
2177, 2017 WL 1088079, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2017) (“[S]hort delays in receiving medical

treatment, standing alone, are not sufficient to show deliberate indifference.”) (citing
Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir. 2015)); LaBrec v. Syed, No. 19-CV-804-JDP,
2021 WL 4206690, at *9 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 16, 2021) (finding that a failure to timely schedule
a follow-up appointment after surgery for additional x-rays was not deliberate
indifference when no evidence indicated that the delay caused a complication). Because
Plaintiff has offered no verifying medical evidence that any alleged delay in his care,

opposed to the actual stabbing he suffered, harmed him, Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment.
Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that Defendants acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind. Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 2006) (“to be
deliberately indifferent, the defendants must have acted with ‘a sufficiently culpable state

of mind.’”) (citation omitted). Applying this standard to medical officials, to be held
liable under the deliberate indifference standard, he or she must respond in a way that is
“so plainly inappropriate” or make a decision that is “such a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards,” that it gives rise to the inference
that they intentionally or recklessly disregarded the prisoner's needs. Holloway, 700 F.3d

at 1073; Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223
F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)). In other words, a prison medical professional is “entitled to
deference in treatment decisions unless no minimally competent professional would
have so responded under those circumstances.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted).

Here, Nurse McGhee and Mental Health Professional Oliver are members of the
medical staff. Nurse McGhee treated Plaintiff’s wound, administered a tetanus shot, and
referred him to a medical doctor almost immediately after his injury on September 6th.
Defendant Oliver saw Plaintiff for a mental health evaluation a few hours after he was
treated by Nurse McGhee. Plaintiff’s encounter with Defendant Oliver lasted
approximately 10-minutes, and Oliver cleared him for segregation (Doc. 107-2, pp. 69-

70). Although Plaintiff argues that he needed additional bandages for his wound, or
some other unidentified treatment, a “[d]isagreement between a prisoner and his doctor,
or even two medical providers, about the proper course of treatment generally is
insufficient, by itself, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771
F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996) (the

mere dissatisfaction or disagreement with a doctor’s course of treatment is generally
insufficient to establish deliberate indifference).
Further, an inmate “is not entitled to demand specific care,” nor is he “entitled to
the best care.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997) (a prisoner is entitled to
“reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm”—not to demand specific

care, or even to receive “the best care possible.”). Thus, even though Plaintiff may have
suggested additional measures to treat his puncture wound, he has presented no
evidence that a “minimally competent professional would have [recommended those
additional measures] under those circumstances.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409. “To infer
deliberate indifference on the basis of a physician’s treatment decision, the decision must
be so far afield of accepted professional standards as to raise the inference that it was not

actually based on a medical judgment,” Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir.
2006), but there is no such evidence here.
As for the non-medical officials, they will generally be justified in believing the
prisoner is in capable hands. Hayes, 546 F.3d at 526–527; Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656
(7th Cir. 2005). A non-medical defendant cannot be held “deliberately indifferent simply
because he failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was

already being treated by the prison doctor.” Johnson, 433 F.3d at 1012 (internal citations
and markings omitted); Bond v. Aguinaldo, 228 F. Supp. 2d 918, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(“Except in the unusual case where it would be evident to a layperson that a prisoner is
receiving inadequate or inappropriate treatment, prison officials may reasonably rely on
the judgment of medical professionals.”).

Here, Plaintiff claims to have complained to non-medical staff members,
Defendants Jones, Westerman, Schoenbeck, Wooley, Gee, Gardiner, McCaleb, and Caron
about his injury at various times from September 6, 2017 until his transfer on September
15, 2017. Plaintiff complained to Defendants Jones, Westerman, and Schoenbeck about
his injury almost immediately after the fight ended on September 6, 2017. At that time,

Jones, Westerman, and Shoenbeck were instructing those involved with the fight to go to
the yard gate to be handcuffed. Thus, when Plaintiff complained of his injuries, Jones
instructed Plaintiff to go to the gate, where he was then handcuffed and escorted to
medical by Westerman. The undisputed facts do not show that Jones, Schoenbeck, or
Westerman ignored Plaintiff’s complaints for care, delayed his care, or had any reason to
believe that the prison medical doctors or assistants would not treat him. Accordingly,

under these facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that Jones, Schoenbeck, or
Westerman were deliberately indifferent.
Plaintiff also encountered Defendants Wooley and Gardiner on September 6th.
Defendant Wooley was present with Plaintiff while he was evaluated by Nurse McGhee
after the fight. Plaintiff claims that he told Wooley that he needed additional medical
care while he was being treated by Nurse McGhee or immediately thereafter. However,

non-medical officials, like Wooley, may defer to the judgment of the medical
professionals. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff has not
presented any evidence to show that Wooley had reason to believe that Nurse McGhee’s
assessment was resulting in mistreatment, and thus, Wooley was entitled to rely on the
assessment. See Hayes, 546 F.3d at 527 (nonmedical officials act with deliberate

indifference “where they have ‘a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison
doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.’”) (quoting Spruill
v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). Thus, Plaintiff cannot show that Wooley acted
with deliberate indifference on September 6, 2017.
Similarly, Defendant Gardiner interviewed Plaintiff approximately two hours

after the fight on September 6, 2017, and after Plaintiff had received medical treatment
from Nurse McGhee. Plaintiff complains that he told Gardiner that he needed medical
treatment, however, Gardiner did not do anything. Just as with Defendant Wooley, no
reasonable jury could find that Defendant Gardiner was deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s medical needs. Gardiner was entitled to defer to the judgment of the medical
professional who had evaluated him a few hours before the interview, and nothing in the

record suggests that Gardiner had a reason to believe that prison doctors or their
assistants were mistreating or not treating him. See Hayes, 546 F.3d at 527. Moreover, the
“mere negligence in failing to detect and prevent subordinates’ misconduct is not
sufficient” to establish a deliberate indifference claim. See, Arnett, 658 F.3d at 756.
Instead, Plaintiff “must demonstrate that ‘the communication, in its content and manner
or transmission, gave the prison official sufficient notice to alert him or her to ‘an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Id. There is no evidence in the record that
Gardiner had reason to believe that Plaintiff’s injury was not being treated or that it posed
“an excessive risk” to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Thus, Plaintiff cannot show that he acted
with deliberate indifference on September 6, 2017.
Defendant Wooley also saw Plaintiff on September 10, 2017, this time with

Defendant Gee. Plaintiff claims that he told Wooley and Gee that he could not move his
arm without it bleeding, but they ignored his request for additional medical care. The
undisputed facts show that Plaintiff’s injury was small and had started to heal before his
interaction with Wooley and Gee. Thus, although Plaintiff believes he asked Wooley and
Gee for medical treatment and was refused, this is not enough to show deliberate

indifference. Instead, Defendants must have had “actual knowledge” of Plaintiff’s
injuries so to infer that he required medical attention. See Troutwine v. Kuhse, No. 16 C
50251, 2019 WL 1227833, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2019) (citing Haley v. Feinerman, 168 F.
App'x 113, 117 (7th Cir. 2006), Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Nothing in the record suggests
that Wooley or Gee had reason to believe that Plaintiff’s injury on September 10th required
medical attention or posed an excessive risk to his health or safety, see, Arnett, 658 F.3d at

756, particularly in light in Plaintiff’s concessions that the wound was small, had begun
healing, was not infected, and “looked good on the outside.” Doc. 110-2, pp. 62-63). Thus,
Plaintiff cannot show that Wooley or Gee were delibaretly indifferent on September 10,
2017.
Finally, Defendants McCaleb and Caron were correctional officers in Plaintiff’s
segregation unit. Plaintiff claims to have told Defendant McCaleb and Caron “multiple

times” about his need for medical care while he was in the segregation unit, both on
September 6, 2017 and the days thereafter, but they told him “there was nothing they can
do.” (Doc. 107-2, pp. 48-50). Plaintiff offers few details on his communications with
McCaleb and Caron. Thus, even crediting Plaintiff’s representation of these
communications as true, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his communications, either

by their content or manner of transmission, gave McCaleb and Caron “sufficient notice
to alert [them] to ‘an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” See, Arnett, 658 F.3d at
756. Instead, the undisputed facts show that before his encounters with McCaleb and
Caron, Plaintiff had either just been evaluated and treated by Nurse McGhee on
September 6th, or his injury had started to heal “on the outside” in the days following.

Thus, there is no indication in the record that McCaleb or Caron had reason to believe
that Plaintiff’s injury was not being treated or that it posed “an excessive risk” to
Plaintiff’s health or safety. Thus, no reasonable jury could find that McCaleb and Caron
were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's injuries on September 6, 2017 or until his
transfer on September 15, 2017.
In sum, no reasonable jury could conclude that any of the Defendants acted with
deliberate indifference in responding to Plaintiff's injury or complaints in the nine-days
following his injury before he transferred from Menard. Accordingly, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment. Because the Court has reached a decision in Defendants’
favor on the merits of Plaintiff's claims and concluded that the evidence does not create

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth
Amendment rights, the Court declines to reach the IDOC Defendants’ qualified
immunity argument.
Disposition
For these reasons, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test. Defendants’ Motions
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 106; Doc. 109) are therefore GRANTED. The Clerk of
Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff, and
to close this case.
SO ORDERED. ll
Dated: September 8, 2022
DAVIDW.DUGAN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10155466. Public record. Not legal advice.