# McClurkin v. Baldwin

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · March 29, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10154804

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 29, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BRYAN MCCLURKIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:17-CV-01228-NJR

JOHN BALDWIN, S.A. GODINEZ,
KIMBERLY BUTLER, GAIL WALLS,
MIKE NELSON, CHARLOTTE MIGET,
DR. FUENTES, MARTHA M. OAKLEY,
M. MOLDENHAUER, LISA TINDALL,
B. RUPPERT, and DR. J. TROST,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Pending before the Court are two motions for summary judgment. Defendants Dr. Fe
Fuentes, Michael Moldenhauer, Lisa Tindall, Belinda Ruppert, and Dr. John Trost (“Wexford
Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment on April 2, 2021 (Doc. 206). Defendants
John Baldwin, S.A. Godinez, Kimberly Butler, Gail Walls, Mike Nelson, Charlotte Miget, and
Martha M. Oakley (“IDOC Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment on July 1,
2021 (Doc. 218). For the reasons set forth below, both motions are granted.
INTRODUCTION
On November 9, 2017, Plaintiff Bryan McClurkin, an inmate in custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Menard
Correctional Center (“Menard”) (Doc. 1). McClurkin filed two subsequent amended
complaints on November 30, 2017 and July 12, 2018 respectively (Docs. 11, 77). While initially
proceeding pro se, counsel was appointed for McClurkin on October 3, 2019 (Doc. 150).
Currently, McClurkin resides at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”), but his
allegations concern medical treatment during his incarceration at Menard (Doc. 77).

McClurkin’s allegations relate to the lack of adequate medical attention from 2014 to 2017 for
chronic pain stemming from a fall during a Tactical Team “shakedown” at Menard and his
ongoing osteoarthritis (Id.). Defendants, with the exception of Defendant Nelson, filed
summary judgment motions regarding McClurkin’s failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies (Docs. 79, 81, 100). The motions were denied (Doc. 128).
McClurkin proceeds on one count under the Eighth Amendment alleging all
defendants were deliberately indifferent towards his serious medical needs (Docs. 12, 76). At

the time of the underlying events, the Wexford Defendants were employed at Menard as
follows: Michael Moldenhauer as a nurse practitioner, Dr. John Trost as a physician and site
medical director, Lisa Tindall as a nurse practitioner, Dr. Fe Fuentes as a physician, and
Belinda Ruppert as an x-ray technician (Doc. 207). The IDOC Defendants held the following
positions at Menard during the relevant time period: Mike Nelson as a medical technician,
Martha Oakley as a nurse, Charlotte Miget as a nursing supervisor, Gail Walls as the Director
of Nursing and Healthcare Unit Administrator, Kimberly Butler as Warden, S.A. Godinez as

Director of IDOC then Acting Director from May 2011 to March 2015, and John Baldwin as
the Acting Director of IDOC from August 2015 to May 2019 (Doc. 220).
McClurkin filed a timely response to both the Wexford Defendants’ and IDOC
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Docs. 221, 222). The Wexford Defendants filed
a timely reply to McClurkin’s response (Doc. 223).
In their motion for summary judgment, the Wexford Defendants argue that
McClurkin has not set forth any evidence demonstrating that they were deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs. The Wexford Defendants also contend that McClurkin’s
claims fail because his various health issues from 2014 to 2017 were evaluated and treated

based on each provider’s professional judgment.
Similarly, the IDOC Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because
McClurkin has failed to demonstrate that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs (Doc. 218). The IDOC Defendants also assert qualified immunity as a defense to all
claims (Id.).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The records of medical treatment are extensive in this case because McClurkin alleges

inadequate medical care over a period of three years regarding pain across several regions of
his body.
McClurkin alleges that, during a tactical team shakedown in the auditorium at
Menard on April 8, 2014, his chair collapsed causing him to hit his shoulder and lower neck
on a metal bar and land on his handcuffed wrists (Doc. 77). He alleges that this incident
caused his chronic pain (Id.). Immediately after the fall, McClurkin felt pain and sought
medical attention (Id.). Defendant Nelson, a medical technician present in the auditorium,

took McClurkin’s blood pressure, examined his body for injury, and told him there would be
follow-up care (Doc. 220-1, p. 37). McClurkin estimated that, at the time of his injury, his pain
was a four out of ten (Id. at p. 34). Nelson noted that McClurkin was not hurt after the fall,
and if he was, Nelson says he would have escorted McClurkin to the healthcare unit, which
he did not (Doc. 220-3, p. 34).
Two days later, McClurkin filed an emergency grievance (Id. at pp. 51-52). A week
passed without a response, so he filed another emergency grievance with Defendant Butler
(Id. at p. 35). Butler expedited McClurkin’s grievance as an emergency and sent the grievance

to a grievance officer, who investigated and recommended it be found “moot” because
Defendant Dr. Fuentes had just examined McClurkin (Id. at p. 34). Butler concurred in the
officer’s finding (Id.).
Dr. Fuentes first evaluated McClurkin two weeks after the initial incident. She
discussed McClurkin’s fall and injury and prescribed Naproxen twice a day for two weeks
(Doc. 209, p. 33). She also advised McClurkin to follow-up in sick call if his pain persisted.
Just two days later, McClurkin was seen in sick call regarding the shoulder and neck pain (Id.

at p. 35). He was also seen two weeks later on May 11, 2014, by Defendant Oakley, a nurse
(Id. at p. 36). Oakley noted a slight impairment to the range of motion in the neck, but no
other limitations in range of motion (Id.). She observed no bruising, redness, or swelling, but
McClurkin reported tenderness to the touch (Id.). Oakley referred McClurkin to the MD call
line, so he could be evaluated by a physician (Id.). On May 30, 2014, McClurkin saw a
physician1 and reported that the Naproxen was “not working” (Id. at p. 38). The physician
observed a good range of motion and prescribed Motrin for one month (Id.).

McClurkin complained of neck and upper back pain in nurse sick call on June 17, 2014
(Doc. 220-2, p. 35). He stated that his symptoms started during the collapsing chair incident,

1 The medical records and motions are unclear as to the treating physician on this date. The IDOC Defendants’
motion for summary judgment indicates that this visit was with Dr. Fuentes (Doc. 220), but the Wexford
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment indicates that Dr. Fuentes only saw McClurkin once in April 2014
(Doc. 207). The medical records are illegible as to the treating physician’s name (Doc. 209, p. 38).
and his pain level was a seven out of ten (Id.). The nurse referred him to the MD call line (Id.).
Defendant Moldenhauer, a nurse practitioner, evaluated McClurkin on June 20, 2014, and he
noted that McClurkin had difficulty ambulating and complained of occasional numbness in

his right leg and in his finger (Doc. 209, p. 41). Moldenhauer ordered x-rays of McClurkin’s
cervical and thoracic spine and told McClurkin to follow-up in two weeks to review the
results (Id.).
Four days later, Defendant Ruppert performed the x-ray, and results showed the
alignment of McClurkin’s cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine was within normal limits (Id.;
Doc. 210, p. 187). The report also listed “degenerative change” in McClurkin’s spine, which
indicated osteoarthritis according to Moldenhauer (Doc. 210, p. 187; Doc. 207-2, ¶ 9). On July

3, 2014, McClurkin visited Moldenhauer for a follow-up (Doc. 209, p. 45). During this visit,
the x-ray results could not be reviewed as they were not yet returned (Id.). The visit notes
indicate that McClurkin’s shoulder displayed good range of motion, and McClurkin reported
improvement in his hip and back (Id.). For his ongoing shoulder pain, Moldenhauer
prescribed Tylenol and follow-up as needed (Id.).
In mid-September, McClurkin filed a grievance requesting an MRI despite never
being told he needed an MRI (Doc. 220-1, p. 59; 220-4, p. 11). A couple weeks later, Defendant

Miget reviewed McClurkin’s request and determined that his recent x-ray and nurse
practitioner visits did not indicate a need for an MRI (Doc. 220-4, p. 10). In mid-October,
McClurkin wrote another letter to a grievance officer complaining of numbness in his left
arm and stating his injury was spreading (Doc. 222-1, p. 10).
The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) reviewed McClurkin’s grievance from
April 17, 2014 and subsequently denied it because McClurkin had been receiving ongoing
medical attention (Doc. 220-3, p. 30). Defendant Godinez concurred in the ARB response (Id.).
McClurkin also appealed his grievance dated September 22, 2014, and the grievance officer
recommended it be found moot because McClurkin had been receiving treatment (Doc. 220-

4, p. 1). Butler concurred with the recommendation (Id.).
McClurkin’s next report of pain came almost nine months later on March 5, 2015
(Doc. 209, p. 58). Medical notes evidence that McClurkin complained of left shoulder, neck,
and arm pain and finger numbness and tingling (Id.). He also reported that Ibuprofen was
not working to treat the pain (Id.). The treating nurse referred McClurkin to the MD call line,
provided Ibuprofen, and instructed him to avoid heavy lifting and other strenuous activity
(Id.).

Four days later, McClurkin saw Defendant Dr. Trost who examined the areas of
reported pain, noted McClurkin was neurologically intact, prescribed Naproxen for six
months, and ordered another x-ray of the cervical spine and left shoulder (Id. at p. 59). The x-
ray results showed no fracture or significant arthritic change in the left shoulder (Doc. 210,
p. 188). The images taken of the cervical spine showed degenerative changes with mild to
moderate hypertrophic spurring, no fracture, and no acute bony abnormality (Id.). After
reviewing the report, Dr. Trost determined the degenerative changes indicated osteoarthritis

and decided that without an acute injury follow-up was unnecessary (Doc. 207-3, pp. 28-30).
In June 2015, McClurkin reported knee pain that grew worse with physical activity
and saw Dr. Trost again, who prescribed Naproxen for six months as needed (Doc. 209, p. 65).
Just over a month later, McClurkin reported his persistent knee pain to nurse sick call and
received Ibuprofen along with a referral to the MD call line (Id. at p. 67). Knee x-rays were
ordered a month and a half later. The x-rays were taken by Ruppert and showed no acute
fracture, dislocation, or joint effusion, but evidenced mild to moderate osteoarthritic changes,
bone spurs, and a fabella at the posterior left knee (Doc. 210, p. 189). In October 2015,
McClurkin reported to sick call for left knee pain, which he described as a ten out of ten on a

pain scale (Doc. 209, p. 72). He received a knee sleeve, cold pack, and Ibuprofen (Id.).
After several months passed, in late July 2016, McClurkin was next seen for an
emergency visit at Menard for left leg pain and was referred to the MD call line (Id. at p. 77).
Two days later, McClurkin saw Defendant Tindall, a nurse practitioner, for his leg pain that
started two weeks prior (Id. at p. 81). Along with his high levels of pain, McClurkin
complained of loss of sensation and numbness in his back (Id.). Tindall ordered left hip and
lumbosacral spine x-rays, prescribed Tramadol (a narcotic pain reliever) and Robaxin (a

muscle relaxant) to manage the pain, and ordered medical lay-in for a week (Id.). The x-rays
were taken the next day (Doc. 210, pp. 190-191). The results indicated no acute fracture or
dislocation and mild joint space narrowing at the left hip and lumbar spine which was likely
degenerative (Id.).
A couple weeks later, McClurkin went to sick call for back pain and was referred to
the MD call line again (Doc. 209, p. 83). Moldenhauer evaluated McClurkin within a few days
(Id. at p. 85). McClurkin reported that his left leg and left hip pain felt as if they were “on fire”

(Id.). Moldenhauer prescribed Naproxen for a month, sent a request for a lower-back MRI to
collegial review, and ordered a medical lay-in for two weeks (Id.). The next day, Dr. Trost
presented the MRI referral to collegial review (Doc. 210, p. 7). A non-defendant reviewing
physician denied the request for an MRI and recommended an alternative treatment of plain
film x-rays and a physical therapy evaluation (Id.).
During this time, McClurkin reported that he was in extreme pain, and he could not
stand or walk (Doc. 222-1, p. 11; Doc. 222-2, pp. 78-80). According to McClurkin, the lack of
mobility persisted for about two months (Doc. 222-2, pp. 80-81).

In September 2016, McClurkin saw an outside physical therapist for consultation and
then received a regimen of exercises to perform daily at Menard (Doc. 209, p. 90; Doc. 220-1,
p. 93). A few days later, Moldenhauer followed up, and McClurkin did not voice any
complaints (Doc. 220-2, p. 75). Medical notes indicate that McClurkin completed his home
exercises under supervision on seven occasions in October and three occasions in November
(Id. at pp. 77-84). McClurkin alleges that his physical therapy consisted of performing
stretches on a dirty, hard tile floor of the Healthcare Unit waiting area and within the confines

of his small cell (Doc. 222-2, pp. 94-96)
In mid-October of 2016, another x-ray showed mild multilevel degenerative disc
disease which had remained stable since March 2015 (Doc. 210, p. 192). In mid-November,
after eight weeks of ineffective physical therapy, Dr. Trost appealed the alternative treatment
plan and renewed the request for an MRI (Id. at p. 8). In mid-December, an MRI was
performed on McClurkin’s cervical and lumbar spine (Id. at p. 12). The MRI showed no
fracture, edema, soft disc herniation, acute soft tissue abnormalities, or pathological enlarged

lymph nodes (Id. at p. 14). The spinal column appeared normal (Id. at p. 15). The results
further indicated severe left foraminal narrowing and degenerative changes (Id.).
McClurkin filed another grievance requesting a transfer and an MRI on October 17,
2016, which was reviewed by Defendant Walls (Doc. 220-3, pp. 4, 26). Walls indicated that
she could not transfer McClurkin and could not override the decision in collegial review
regarding an MRI (Id. at p. 26). In November 2016, McClurkin again wrote to the ARB
explaining his ongoing symptoms and requesting a transfer (Doc. 222-1, pp. 17-18). This
grievance letter was subsequently denied as moot (Id.).
According to Dr. Trost, the degenerative changes present in McClurkin’s x-rays were

consistent with osteoarthritis (Doc. 207-3, pp. 52-53). Dr. Trost referred McClurkin to an
orthopedic surgeon who evaluated him in May 2017 (Doc. 210, p. 31). After the MRI, the ARB
reviewed McClurkin’s October 17, 2016 grievance and recommended it be found moot
because McClurkin had received an MRI and was scheduled to see an orthopedic surgeon
(Doc. 220-3, p. 2). Defendant Baldwin concurred in the recommendation (Id.). The orthopedic
surgeon determined that McClurkin’s symptoms, at the time, were not severe enough to
warrant surgery, but if his symptoms worsened McClurkin may be a candidate for spinal

decompression surgery in the future (Id. at pp. 24, 31).
McClurkin eventually transferred to Stateville in late 2017 (Doc. 221-2, p. 113). He
began participating in physical therapy and reported positive results and pain relief (Id. at
p. 114).
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Ruffin
Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving
party bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are in genuine dispute; any doubt
as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); see also Lawrence v. Kenosha Cty., 391 F.3d 837, 841
(7th Cir. 2004).
Once the moving party sets forth the basis for summary judgment, the burden then
shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond mere allegations and offer specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322-24. A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the nonmoving
party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect
to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The party opposing summary
judgment must offer admissible evidence in support of his version of events; hearsay
evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Durling v. Menard, Inc., No. 18 C
4052, 2020 WL 996520, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2020) (citing McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 92

F.3d 473, 484 (7th Cir. 1996)). In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court
must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.
Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[i]nferences that rely upon speculation or conjecture
are insufficient.” Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2014). “Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no
‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (citation omitted).

II. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” may constitute cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976). A prisoner is entitled to “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious
harm”—not to demand specific care. Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). A
prisoner’s dissatisfaction with a medical professional’s prescribed course of treatment does
not give rise to a successful deliberate indifference claim unless the treatment is so “blatantly
inappropriate as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate the
prisoner’s condition.” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Thomas v.

Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir. 1974)). “[T]he Eighth Amendment does not reach disputes
concerning the exercise of a professional’s medical judgment, such as disagreement over
whether one course of treatment is preferable to another.” Gaston v. Ghosh, 11-CV-6612, 2017
WL 5891042, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2017) (citing Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir.
2017)).
To succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he
suffered from an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) that the individual defendant

was deliberately indifferent to that condition. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir.
2010); Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579,
584 (7th Cir. 2006)).
A medical condition is objectively serious if “a physician has diagnosed it as requiring
treatment, or the need for treatment would be obvious to a layperson.” Lockett v. Bonson, 937
F.3d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014))
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Prevailing on the second prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison official has
subjective knowledge of—and then disregards—an excessive risk to prisoner health. Greeno
v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff need not show the individual “literally
ignored” his complaint, but that the individual was aware of the condition and either
knowingly or recklessly disregarded it. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008).
“Something more than negligence or even malpractice is required” to prove deliberate
indifference. Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409; see also Hammond v. Rector, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1086 (S.D.
Ill. 2015) (“isolated occurrences of deficient medical treatment are generally insufficient to
establish . . . deliberate indifference”). Deliberate indifference involves “intentional or

reckless conduct, not mere negligence.” Berry, 604 F.3d at 440 (citing Gayton v. McCoy, 593
F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Assessing the subjective prong is more difficult in cases alleging inadequate care as
opposed to a lack of care. Without more, a “mistake in professional judgment cannot be
deliberate indifference.” Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.
2016). This is in contrast to a case “where evidence exists that the defendant [ ] knew better
than to make the medical decision[ ] that [he] did.” Id. (quoting Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722,

731 (7th Cir. 2016)) (alterations in original). A medical professional’s choice of an easier, less
efficacious treatment can rise to the level of violating the Eighth Amendment, however,
where the treatment is known to be ineffective but is chosen anyway. Berry, 604 F.3d at 441.
A delay in treatment may also show deliberate indifference if it “exacerbated the inmate’s
injury or unnecessarily prolonged his pain.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F. 3d 768, 777-78 (7th Cir.
2015). Whether the length of delay is tolerable depends upon the seriousness of the condition
and the ease of providing treatment. Id. at 778.

ANALYSIS
I. Wexford Defendants
The Wexford Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate because
McClurkin has failed to produce sufficient evidence showing that any one of them
demonstrated deliberate indifference in addressing his chronic pain.
The Wexford Defendants do not dispute that McClurkin suffered from a serious
medical condition. Primarily, they argue that there is no evidence that their alleged actions
or inactions deviated so significantly from acceptable professional judgment as to rise to

deliberate indifference, and that no evidence shows that they caused McClurkin’s
osteoarthritis or chronic pain.
McClurkin argues that issues of material fact exist as to whether the Wexford
Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. In support of this argument, McClurkin points
to the fact that the care he received after his chair collapsed was delayed, did not address his
medical condition, and did not alleviate his worsening symptoms. McClurkin contends that
the Wexford Defendants persisted for years with a course of treatment that was ineffective

despite McClurkin routinely informing Defendants and other medical staff that his pain
continued. He states that his chronic pain lasted over three and a half years, and the unknown
causation of his pain creates an issue of material fact.
The types of pain and the frequency of sick call complaints varied over the course of
McClurkin’s treatment at Menard. From April 2014 to March 2015, McClurkin complained of
pain in his left shoulder, neck, and upper back with numbness in the right hand, arm, and
leg. Within that time, the medical records show a gap from July 2014 to March 2015, during

which McClurkin did not see sick call for any pain but did file a few grievances. Next, from
June 2015 to October 2015, McClurkin mainly complained of knee pain in both legs.
McClurkin then reported lower back, hip, and left leg pain from July 2016 to May 2017.
Generally, the records indicate that his chronic pain migrated throughout his body, and he
went long periods without seeking medical treatment. Moreover, McClurkin does not offer
evidence that any of the defendants caused his pain rather than his underlying osteoarthritis
or the collapsing chair incident.
The Court will address each of the Wexford Defendant’s involvement in treating

McClurkin’s conditions.
a. Defendant Michael Moldenhauer
Defendant Moldenhauer evaluated McClurkin on several occasions. In June 2014, he
ordered x-rays of McClurkin’s cervical and thoracic spine. In July 2014, McClurkin visited
Moldenhauer for a follow-up, where Moldenhauer noted McClurkin’s shoulder displayed
good range of motion and his hip and back showed improvement. Moldenhauer prescribed
Tylenol and follow-up as needed. In August 2016, Moldenhauer evaluated McClurkin after

complaints of left leg and hip pain. Moldenhauer prescribed Naproxen, sent a request for a
lower-back MRI to collegial review, and ordered a medical lay-in for two weeks (Id.). In
September 2016, Moldenhauer followed up with McClurkin after a physical therapy
consultation.
There is no evidence that Moldenhauer knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
McClurkin’s health. Conversely, the record shows that Moldenhauer addressed McClurkin’s
complaints by prescribing pain medications and life-style adjustments, as well as ordering

diagnostic tests like x-rays and an MRI. There is no allegation that Moldenhauer delayed
McClurkin’s medical care and no evidence that he did. On this record, no reasonable jury
could find that Moldenhauer was deliberately indifferent to McClurkin’s serious medical
need, that he demonstrated intentional or criminally reckless conduct, or that his medical
decisions substantially departed from accepted professional judgment. Berry, 604 F.3d at 440;
Collignon v. Milwaukee Cty., 163 F.3d 982, 987-88 (7th Cir. 1998). To the extent that McClurkin
argues that his successful physical therapy treatment at Stateville demonstrates that
Moldenhauer should have prescribed a different treatment, the Court disagrees.
Moldenhauer appears to have used his medical judgment to treat McClurkin’s osteoarthritis.

McClurkin offers no evidence that the treatment pursued by Moldenhauer was unreasonable
and departed from acceptable professional judgment. As such, he is entitled to summary
judgment.
b. Defendant Dr. Fe Fuentes
The medical records are unclear as to whether Defendant Dr. Fuentes evaluated
McClurkin on one or two occasions. Dr. Fuentes treated McClurkin on April 22, 2014, two
weeks after his collapsing chair incident. Responding to McClurkin’s complaints, Dr. Fuentes

prescribed Naproxen and instructed him to return to sick call if symptoms persisted. If Dr.
Fuentes treated McClurkin again, that visit occurred on May 30, 2014. During that visit, the
physician—Dr. Fuentes or someone else—observed a good range of motion and prescribed
Motrin.
Whether Dr. Fuentes treated McClurkin on one or both occasions, no reasonable jury
could find that she had subjective knowledge of an excessive risk to McClurkin’s health, and
then disregarded that risk. The records indicate that she evaluated McClurkin and prescribed

medication to treat his symptoms. If she conducted the May visit, she also adjusted his
medication after McClurkin stated the first type of medication was ineffective. On this record,
no evidence supports a finding that Dr. Fuentes was deliberately indifferent to McClurkin’s
serious medical needs and, thus, she is entitled to summary judgment.
c. Defendant Lisa Tindall
The medical records indicate that McClurkin saw Defendant Tindall during only one
emergency appointment in August 2016. During that visit, Tindall prescribed pain

medication, ordered x-rays, and recommended medical lay-in. From this one visit, Tindall
attended to McClurkin’s medical concerns and ordered treatment as well as diagnostic tests.
Tindall’s treatment does not lead to an inference of deliberate indifference. Accordingly,
Tindall is entitled to summary judgment.
d. Defendant Dr. John Trost
Like Moldenhauer, Defendant Dr. Trost evaluated McClurkin on several occasions. In
March 2015, Dr. Trost prescribed pain medication and ordered shoulder and spine x-rays for
McClurkin when he complained of left shoulder pain, back pain, and numbness. When

McClurkin complained of knee pain in June 2015, Dr. Trost prescribed pain medication. In
August 2016, Dr. Trost presented a request for MRI at collegial review, which was denied.
After Dr. Trost determined that physical therapy was ineffective, he appealed the denial of
the MRI, which was then approved. In May 2017, Dr. Trost referred McClurkin to an
orthopedic surgeon for evaluation to assess the need for surgical solutions.
In his deposition, Dr. Trost explained that treating chronic pain from osteoarthritis
starts with non-steroidal anti-inflammatory medications to control inflammation and pain.

He stated that treatment progresses through x-ray evaluations, physical therapy, MRIs, and
potential surgical solutions. McClurkin offers no evidence that this medical treatment plan
ran afoul of accepted professional judgment or that McClurkin suffered from an acute injury
that Dr. Trost failed to diagnose or treat.
There is no evidence that Dr. Trost knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
McClurkin’s health. On the contrary, the record indicates that Dr. Trost treated McClurkin’s
various ailments on different occasions by prescribing pain medications, ordering diagnostic

tests, and adjusting course when alternative options proved ineffective. There is no allegation
that Dr. Trost caused a delay in McClurkin’s medical care and no evidence that he did. To
the extent that McClurkin argues that his successful physical therapy treatment at Stateville
demonstrates that Dr. Trost should have pursued a different treatment, the Court disagrees.
Dr Trost, just as Moldenhauer, appears to have used his medical judgment to treat
McClurkin’s osteoarthritis. McClurkin offers no evidence that his treatment plan was
unreasonable or departed from acceptable professional judgment. On this record, no

reasonable jury could find that Dr. Trost was deliberately indifferent to McClurkin’s serious
medical need. As such, he is entitled to summary judgment.
e. Defendant Belinda Ruppert
Defendant Ruppert, an x-ray technician, was only responsible for performing x-rays
ordered for McClurkin. The record does not indicate that Ruppert had other input or control
over McClurkin’s medical treatment. No reasonable jury could find that Ruppert was
deliberately indifferent in simply taking McClurkin’s x-rays. In fact, she fulfilled her

responsibilities and performed x-rays when they were ordered. There is no evidence of a
substantial delay in taking x-rays, and no allegation that Ruppert caused any delay in
scheduling or performing the x-rays. Accordingly, Ruppert is entitled to summary judgment.
Upon this record, no reasonable juror could conclude that any Wexford defendant—
Michael Moldenhauer, Dr. Fe Fuentes, Lisa Tindall, Dr. John Trost, or Belinda Ruppert—
demonstrated deliberate indifference to McClurkin’s serious medical needs.
II. IDOC Defendants
The IDOC Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate because they
were not deliberately indifferent to McClurkin’s serious medical needs. Defendants Baldwin,

Butler, Godinez, Miget and Walls argue that they were not personally involved in
McClurkin’s medical treatment, and appropriately reviewed grievances. Defendants Nelson
and Oakley argue they had limited involvement in McClurkin’s medical care and treated him
appropriately. The IDOC Defendants do not dispute that McClurkin suffered from a serious
medical condition. The Court will evaluate each of the IDOC Defendant’s involvement in
McClurkin’s treatment.
a. Defendant S.A. Godinez and John Baldwin
Defendants Godinez and Baldwin argue that, as Director and Acting Directors of the

IDOC, they did not provide any kind of medical treatment—diagnosing patients, prescribing
or distributing medications, or creating treatment plans. They also state that they are not
trained or licensed physicians and cannot overrule healthcare unit decisions. Moreover,
Godinez and Baldwin contend that they are not involved in scheduling medical
appointments or ordering diagnostic tests. Godinez and Baldwin are clearly not medical
professionals and are in no position to treat any type of medical condition, so it is appropriate
for them to defer to the judgment of prison medical staff. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435,

440 (7th Cir. 2010) (Nonmedical personnel are entitled to defer to the judgment of prison
health professionals.). While Godinez and Baldwin cannot ignore medical needs of prisoners
and should ensure access to treatment to address serious medical complaints, McClurkin’s
medical records reflect that he received ongoing medical care for his various instances of
pain. By reviewing and subsequently denying the grievances, directly or by signatory,
Godinez and Baldwin did not disregard an excessive risk to McClurkin’s health, as nurses
and physicians treated McClurkin for his ongoing pain within their medical discretion.
Furthermore, by the time Godinez or Baldwin reviewed the grievances, the medical care

sought had already been provided.
No reasonable jury could find that Godinez and Baldwin intentionally or recklessly
disregarded an excessive risk to McClurkin’s health by concurring with the ARB in denying
his grievances. Instead, the evidence indicates that they entrusted medical treatment to the
professional judgment of prison medical staff. Godinez and Baldwin are entitled to summary
judgment.
b. Defendant Kimberly Butler

Defendant Butler makes similar arguments regarding her lack of participation in the
process of prisoner health care. Butler did have personal knowledge of the chair collapsing
incident through review of McClurkin’s initial grievances in April 2014.
In his Complaint, McClurkin stated that Butler acknowledged his initial grievance as
an emergency, because she expedited it. Once the grievance officer determined the grievance
was moot, because McClurkin had seen Dr. Fuentes the same day, Butler signed off as
concurring with that finding. Butler also concurred with the grievance officer’s

recommendation to find McClurkin’s grievance dated September 22, 2014 moot. Although
she initially expedited the grievance, after the grievance officer investigated, Butler then
concurred with a finding of mootness. This concurrence does not show deliberate
indifference. Instead, the evidence demonstrates Butler expedited McClurkin’s initial
grievance after the chair collapse incident, and once she had additional information from the
grievance officer that McClurkin had received medical treatment, she updated her
assessment. This does not show that she knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
McClurkin’s health. Accordingly, Butler is entitled to summary judgment.
c. Defendants Charlotte Miget and Gail Walls

Like the preceding IDOC Defendants, Miget and Walls argue that they did not directly
provide medical treatment, prescribe or distribute medications, or create treatment plans.
They also contend that they could not order MRIs and were not involved in placing medical
holds on prisoners. In assessing grievances, Miget and Walls reviewed both the grievance
and the medical records. For McClurkin, they found he was receiving adequate medical care
and indicated that if he had ongoing needs, he could request care through the nurse sick call
procedure.

Defendants Miget and Walls can also defer to the professional judgment of
McClurkin’s medical providers. See Berry, 604 F.3d at 440. Miget and Walls, however, cannot
ignore a prisoner’s grievance or request for medical attention. The record does not indicate
that either did. Miget and Walls both reviewed McClurkin’s grievances and medical records
and provided responses indicating their findings. McClurkin argues that because Miget and
Walls did not personally speak with the prisoners or their medical providers about the
grievances an issue of material fact emerges as to whether they were deliberately indifferent

to his medical needs. It is undisputed, however, that Miget and Walls reviewed McClurkin’s
medical records. McClurkin offers no argument as why review of medical records is
insufficient to address the grievances or how it would create an inference of deliberate
indifference to solely review medical records. Miget and Walls’s actions, or alleged inactions,
do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Miget and Walls are entitled
to summary judgment.
d. Defendant Mike Nelson
Defendant Nelson only evaluated McClurkin on the day of the collapsing chair
incident in April 2014. Nelson reported to a grievance officer that McClurkin did not state

that he was hurt requiring further medical attention, otherwise he would have escorted
McClurkin to the healthcare unit. McClurkin, likewise, estimated that at the time of the
incident he experienced a four out of ten on a pain scale. The record indicates that Nelson
evaluated McClurkin’s complaint, checked for an injury, and found no reason to escalate
treatment. From this one interaction, there is no evidence that Nelson knew of and
subsequently disregarded an excessive risk to McClurkin’s health. McClurkin alleges that
Nelson promised that someone would follow up with him regarding the incident, but no

follow-up ever occurred. Even if Nelson made this promise and failed to follow through, it
does not create an inference of deliberate indifference. On this record, Nelson is entitled to
summary judgment.
e. Defendant Martha M. Oakley
McClurkin’s medical records indicate that Defendant Oakley saw him once on May
11, 2014. Oakley noted a slight impairment in the range of motion of McClurkin’s neck. She
did not observe bruising, redness, or swelling. McClurkin reported tenderness to the touch
during this evaluation. Oakley referred McClurkin to the MD call line, so he could be

evaluated by a physician. It appears that Oakley addressed McClurkin’s concerns and
referred him to the MD call line, so his treatment could be escalated for physician evaluation.
This one-off treatment does not lead to an inference of deliberate indifference. As such,
Oakley is entitled to summary judgment.
Based on this record, no reasonable juror could conclude that any IDOC defendant —
S.A. Godinez, John Baldwin, Kimberly Butler, Charlotte Miget, Gail Walls, Mike Nelson, or
Martha Oakley — demonstrated deliberate indifference to McClurkin’s serious medical needs.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants
Dr. Fe Fuentes, Michael Moldenhauer, Lisa Tindall, Belinda Ruppert, and Dr. John Trost
(Doc. 206) is GRANTED. The motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants John
Baldwin, S.A. Godinez, Kimberly Butler, Gail Walls, Mike Nelson, Charlotte Miget, and
Martha M. Oakley (Doc. 218) is also GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter
judgment and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 29, 2022 Tl
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NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL |
Chief U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10154804. Public record. Not legal advice.