# Chaney v. Wall

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · November 24, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10153000

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** November 24, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10153000

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ARTHUR CHANEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 19-cv-357-DWD
)
KYLE WALL, )
AIMEE LANG, )
CHRISTI RAYBURN, and )
FRANK LAWRENCE )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Arthur Chaney, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections, alleges that Defendants Kyle Wall, Aimee Lang, and Christi Rayburn were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because they refused or failed to
provide Chaney with pain medication in a timely manner when he requested it. Now
before the Court is a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion filed by
Defendants Wall and Rayburn (Doc. 18). For the reasons delineated below, Defendants’
motion is granted in part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At all times relevant to his complaint, Plaintiff Arthur Chaney was incarcerated at
Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”). He alleges that he was admitted to an outside
hospital due to pain on two occasions in October 2018. On October 11, 2018, before either
hospital admission, Chaney asked Defendant Kyle Wall, a correctional officer at Menard,
for help securing pain medication. Wall allegedly told him that he could not help him
right away, but Chaney asked Wall to call someone to bring the medication. Wall told

Chaney that he could not call because he had to follow a chain of command. Wall said he
would tell the sergeant so that the sergeant could call. Wall returned later and, when
Chaney asked if he’d called for the medication, Wall said he told the sergeant about
Chaney’s request. Chaney did not receive his pain medication as requested.
After his second discharge from the hospital on October 30, 2018, Chaney alleges
that he asked Defendant Christi Rayburn, a nurse in the healthcare unit at Menard, for

his pain medication around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. He claims that it took her almost two hours
to give it to him. The next day, he asked Defendant Aimee Lang, a medical technician, for
his pain medication, and Lang did not give it to him for over three hours.
Chaney’s complaint references a grievance (#290-10-18) about the October 11, 2018
incident with Defendant Wall that he filed on October 13, 2018. A copy of the grievance

was not attached to the complaint, nor was one attached to or mentioned in Chaney’s
response to Defendants’ motion. It also does not appear in the records of the
Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). The ARB records include a single grievance (#12-
11-18) dated November 1, 2018, related to the denial of pain medication. The briefing by
the parties only addresses this grievance.

In the November 1, 2018 grievance, Chaney explained that he was admitted to an
outside hospital on October 24, 2018, and that he returned to Menard on October 30, 2018.
He asked an unnamed nurse, who he described as working from 3:00 p.m. until 11:00
p.m. that day, for his pain medication around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., but she sent him back to
the cellhouse without giving him his medication. She later came to his cell, woke him up,
and gave him his medication before getting into an argument with him. An unnamed

correctional officer stood by and looked at Chaney while the nurse yelled at him.
The grievance also described an encounter the next day with Defendant Aimee
Lang. Chaney explained that Lang delayed Chaney’s receipt of his pain medication for
several hours that day. Chaney also mentioned that the other unnamed correctional
officers in his cellhouse wouldn’t help him when he asked for his pain medication. These
officers told Chaney that they called the healthcare unit for him, but they couldn’t make

the healthcare staff come see him. Chaney did not include dates or times when he had
these conversations with correctional officers, nor did he describe who they were or when
they worked. Chaney named only one officer in the grievance, Officer Presswood, who
he said went “beyond the call of duty” to help him. (Doc. 19-1, p. 4-5).
The November 1, 2018 grievance was marked as an emergency. The Chief

Administrative Officer (“CAO”) found that the matter was an emergency on November
5, 2018, and expedited review of the grievance. A grievance officer denied the grievance
as moot on November 8, 2018, finding that Chaney was being “treated as medical
professionals deem appropriate.” (Doc. 19-1, p. 3). The CAO concurred in the denial on
January 3, 2019. Chaney timely appealed the grievance to the ARB (Id.). On January 17,

2019, the ARB denied Chaney’s appeal, finding that his complaints were handled
appropriately by Menard officials. (Doc. 19-1, p. 2).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is “proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures,
and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [Defendants are]
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467

(7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). That statute states, in pertinent
part, that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983
of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
Id. (emphasis added).

Generally, the Court’s role on summary judgment is not to evaluate the weight of
the evidence, to judge witness credibility or to determine the truth of the matter. Instead,
the Court is to determine whether a genuine issue of triable fact exists. See Nat’l Athletic
Sportwear Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008). In Pavey, however, the
Seventh Circuit held that “debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies” are not required to be decided by a jury but are to be
determined by the judge. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-741 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement. See, e.g., Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006)(noting that “[t]his
circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion”). Exhaustion must occur

before the suit is filed. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff cannot
file suit and then exhaust his administrative remedies while the suit is pending. Id.
Moreover, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the
place, and at the time, the prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286
F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2005). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to use a prison’s grievance
process properly, “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and

the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.
In Pavey, the Seventh Circuit set forth procedures for a court to follow in a situation
where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised as an affirmative defense. The
Seventh Circuit stated the following:
(1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion and permits
whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems appropriate. (2) If the
judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust his administrative
remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the plaintiff has failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must go back and
exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative remedies,
the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials prevent a
prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given another
chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will be
permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being
given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, in
which event the case is over. (3) If and when the judge determines that the
prisoner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies, the case will
proceed to pretrial discovery, and if necessary a trial, on the merits; and if
there is a jury trial, the jury will make all necessary findings of fact without
being bound by (or even informed of) any of the findings made by the
district judge in determining that the prisoner had exhausted his
administrative remedies.

Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742.
As an inmate confined within the IDOC, Bentz was required to follow the
regulations contained in the IDOC’s Grievance Procedures for Offenders (“grievance
procedures”) to exhaust his claims properly. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. The
grievance procedures first require inmates to file their grievance with the counselor
within 60 days of the discovery of an incident. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The
grievance form must:
contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,
including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who
is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This
provision does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the
names of individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much
descriptive information about the individual as possible.

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through
routine channels are then sent to the grievance officer. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.820(a). The grievance officer will review the grievance and provide a written
response to the inmate. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). “The Grievance Officer shall
consider the grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in writing to
the Chief Administrative Officer within two months after receipt of the grievance, when
reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). “The
Chief Administrative Officer shall review the findings and recommendation and advise
the offender of his or her decision in writing.” Id.
If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he or she can file an appeal
with the Director through the ARB. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The grievance
procedures specifically state, “[i]f, after receiving the response of the Chief
Administrative Officer, the offender still believes that the problem, complaint or
grievance has not been resolved to his or her satisfaction, he or she may appeal in writing
to the Director. The appeal must be received by the Administrative Review Board within
30 days after the date of the decision.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The inmate shall

attach copies of the Grievance Officer’s report and the CAO’s decision to his appeal. Id.
“The Administrative Review Board shall submit to the Director a written report of its
findings and recommendations.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d). “The Director shall

review the findings and recommendations of the Board and make a final determination
of the grievance within six months after receipt of the appealed grievance, when
reasonably feasible under the circumstances. The offender shall be sent a copy of the
Director’s decision.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(e).
The grievance procedures also allow an inmate to file an emergency grievance. See
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840. In order to file an emergency grievance, the inmate must

forward the grievance directly to the CAO who may “[determine that] there is a
substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious or irreparable harm to the
offender [such that] the grievance [should] be handled on an emergency basis.” 20 ILL.
ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(a). If the CAO determines the grievance should be handled on an
emergency basis, then the CAO “shall expedite processing of the grievance and respond

to the offender indicating what action shall be or has been taken.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.840(b). If the CAO determines the grievances “should not be handled on an
emergency basis, the offender shall be notified in writing that he or she may resubmit the
grievance as non-emergent, in accordance with the standard grievance process.” 20 ILL.
ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(c). When an inmate appeals a grievance deemed by the CAO to

be an emergency, “the Administrative Review Board shall expedite processing of the
grievance.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(f).
ANALYSIS
The Court has reviewed the record and the briefs submitted by the parties and
finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. The parties agree that the November
1, 2018 grievance was exhausted fully and that it is the only grievance relevant to

Plaintiff’s claims. The issue is whether the grievance exhausted Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Wall and Rayburn, which does not require the Court to decide debatable
factual issues.
Defendants concede that Chaney exhausted his claims against Defendant Lang,
but Defendants Wall and Rayburn argue that Chaney did not exhaust his claims against
them because they are not named in his grievance. An inmate is not required to provide

personal notice to an individual defendant through his grievances. See Maddox v. Love,
655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011)(citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007)(citing Johnson
v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004))). Instead, the purpose of a grievance is to
provide “prison officials a fair opportunity to address [an inmate’s] complaints.” Id.
When a staff member’s name is not known, an inmate can exhaust his claims

successfully by filing a grievance that provides sufficient descriptive language about the
person in question and about the approximate date and time of the incidents grieved. See
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). Chaney suggests that IDOC regulations were unfair
because they required him to list Defendants’ names, but that was not required of him at
the time he filed his grievance. To exhaust his claims, his grievance simply must provide

sufficient detail to allow prison officials to understand the nature and target of his
complaints.
The November 1, 2018 grievance alleges conduct by an unnamed nurse who
worked from 3:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. on or about October 30, 2018. The allegations
closely mirror Chaney’s claims against Defendant Rayburn in this action, and the
description of the unnamed nurse by job description and shift worked was sufficient to

allow prison officials a fair opportunity to address Chaney’s complaints. As such, the
November 1, 2018 grievance exhausted Chaney’s claims against Defendant Rayburn.
The November 1, 2018 grievance does not mention the claims Chaney brings
against Defendant Wall in a manner that provided prison officials with the requisite
notice. Chaney’s allegations against Defendant Wall relate to Wall’s conduct on October
11, 2018, but the grievance primarily addresses conduct on or after October 30, 2018. To

the extent that the grievance mentions a general lack of action or concern demonstrated
by correctional officers, it does not include in a clear manner the issues that Chaney had
with Wall several weeks earlier. The grievance does not provide dates or times, or even
a range of dates, when officers refused to help Chaney, nor does it describe the officers
involved in a manner that provided prison officials with sufficient notice as to who they

were or when they acted. Chaney’s grievance describes individuals who told him that
they called the healthcare unit but could not make the staff bring the medicine over,
which is different in substance from his claims against Wall. Even taking a lenient view
of Chaney’s complaints about correctional officers in the grievance, it does not provide
sufficient notice to prison officials about the issues pleaded against Defendant Wall in

this action. As a result, the Court finds that the November 1, 2018 grievance does not
exhaust Chaney’s claims against Defendant Wall.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the
issue of exhaustion (Doc. 18) is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff Arthur Chaney’s claims
against Defendant Kyle Wall are DISMISSED without prejudice due to his failure to
exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant
Christi Rayburn and Defendant Aimee Lang remain pending.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 24, 2020 U ZL LJ

DAVIDW.DUGAN
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10153000. Public record. Not legal advice.