# Eason v. Pritzker

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · November 30, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10152962

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** November 30, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

HANNIBAL DWAN EASON,
#M03226,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 20-cv-01157-SPM
v.

J. B. PRITZKER,
ROB JEFFREYS,
ALLEN PASLEY,
JOHN DOE, IDOC’s Administration
Building,
JANE DOE, IDOC’s Administration
Building,
WEXFORD,
MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
and
UNKNOWN PARTIES, Jane Does and John
Does,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Hannibal Eason, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)
who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 US.C. §§12101-
213 (“ADA”). Eason claims that he is hearing disabled, and his communication needs are not being
accommodated. He also alleges that due to his race and hearing disability he is targeted and
discriminated against by staff.
The Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. Under Section 1915A, any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or requests money damages from a
defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
THE COMPLAINT
Eason alleges the following: He was transferred to Menard due to an error by IDOC
Administration on October 17, 2018. (Doc. 1, pp. 40, 43). Prior to being transferred, he was
designated as an inmate who suffers from a serious mental illness (“SMI”). (Id. at p. 31). In order
to transfer him to Menard, the SMI designation was deleted from his record. (Id.). He has attempted
to be transferred from Menard and placed in a prison where there “is more deaf awareness and

deaf inmates[,]” but his requests for a transfer have been denied. (Id. at pp. 16, 43).
Eason is hearing disabled, and Menard does not accommodate his communication needs.
He was not provided a sign language interpreter during the orientation process when he first arrived
at Menard in 2018 and during disciplinary hearings. He continues to be denied the use of a sign
language interpreter during medical appointments. (Doc. 1, p. 27, 33-35, 40, 44).
Menard also does not provide an adequate and accessible telephone system for hearing
disabled inmates. Because Eason is the only inmate at Menard who needs a sign language
interpreter or an ADA phone on a constant basis, he is the only hearing disabled inmate at Menard
who knows how to use the ADA phone. (Doc. 1, pp. 13, 16). The ADA phone provided does not
have a clear connection and frequently “drops” calls. (Id. at pp. 14, 16). Eason is forced to spend

a majority of his allotted telephone time trying to retain clear reception. (Id. at p. 14). Defendants
know that the reception for the ADA phone is poor but refuse to transfer Eason to a prison with a
working ADA phone and other hearing disabled inmates. (Id. at p. 15). Menard provides text-
based telecommunications (“TTY,” “TDD”) and video phone (“VP”) equipment that can be used
by inmates who are hearing impaired, but the use of these technologies only “garble” the phone
call. (Id. at p.15). When Eason is allowed to use the ADA phone, proper procedures are not used
by Menard staff. His hands remain cuffed and the quality and conditions of the calls made on the
Eason is also not provided the same amount of phone time as other inmates. Inmates who
are not hearing disabled are allowed fourteen or more telephone calls a week, and Ron Skidmore,
the ADA coordinator at Menard, deliberately refuses to accommodate Eason so that he has the
same type of access to phone use. (Id. at p. 11-12). Since May 2020, Eason has asked Skidmore
twice for five ADA calls per week, but his requests have been ignored. (Id. at p.13). Because
Menard does not provide an adequate ADA phone system seven days a week from 8 a.m. until 10
p.m. for inmates with hearing disabilities, Eason is prohibited from meaningful family contact and

consistent access to attorneys. (Id. at p. 12-13).
Specifically, on October 14, 2020, Eason had to call the same person over and over and the
connection would not go through or ring at all. (Doc. 1, p. 24). He also tried to call his brother and
the interpreter connection was poor. (Id. at p. 24). On October 16, 2020, Eason made a call to an
attorney and the entire call was choppy, garbled, and unclear. (Id. at p. 22). The connection was
lost. (Id.). Eason redialed and tried to call another associate. On the second try, the phone
connection was so poor the phone did not ring. (Id. at p. 23). Eason then adjusted the phone cord
in an attempt to obtain reception and used the voice-carry-over (“VCO”) option to place the call.
During the call, Eason’s hands were handcuffed and not free, which is required for VCO to work.
The call did not work, and Eason ended the call. (Id.). Since then, the VCO feature has been

disabled. (Id.).
On October 20, 2020, and October 26, 2020, Eason filed documents in the class action
lawsuit, Holmes v. Godinez, Case No. 11-cv-02961 (N.D. Ill. 2015), alleging that the defendants
in that case were not in compliance with the settlement agreement.1 (Doc. 1, p. 10). As a result of

1 Eason also filed a document claiming noncompliance with the Holmes settlement agreement in In Re: Coronavirus
Covid-19 Public Emergency, Case No. 20-cv-01792 (N.D. Ill. 2020), “which is a docket created [by the Northern
District] to receive emergency motions” by parties seeking relief from Amended General Order 20-0012 entered on
March 16, 2020. (Doc. 1, p. 10) (See also In Re: Coronavirus, at Doc. 1, p. 3).
the meeting, Eason discussed with Skidmore the following: (1) an incident where Wexford
workers refused him hearing aid batteries on October 26, 2020; (2) the ineffectiveness of the ADA
phone; (3) that he was being refused a head scan that was requested by an audiologist; (4) that his
earmolds have been ready since October 2019, and he has never received them; (5) his need for a
communication porter for the library; (6) that there is no closed caption provided on Menard movie
channels; and (7) the availability of closed caption services during phone use. (Id. at p. 10-11).
Since the meeting, however, nothing has improved. As of November 1, 2020, the ADA phone was

still inadequate. (Id. at p. 10). Eason claims he has discussed the issues with the phone on more
than three occasions with Skidmore. (Id.).
Eason states that because his disability is not being accommodated, he is exploited by staff
members and other inmates. (Doc. 1, p. 25). Eason is made fun of by the correctional officers
assigned to his gallery, has been assaulted by Menard staff on more than one occasion since
October 17, 2020, and mistreated by the orange crush team after knowing that he has difficulties
hearing. (Id. at pp. 37, 39. 45). He is also excluded from services, programs, and activities. (Id. at
pp. 13, 27). Because he is denied accommodation for his hearing disability and targeted by staff,
Eason experiences severe isolation. (Id. at p. 12).
DISCUSSION

The Court will first dismiss several claims brought by Eason. To survive preliminary
review under Section 1915A, a Complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), which includes “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S.
544, 547 (2007). The plausible allegations must be made against individuals, and when a plaintiff
does nothing but state that a group of individuals harmed him without providing more, all he has
done is establish that there is a “sheer possibility” that someone in that group harmed him. Ashcroft
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”). Additionally, to state a viable Section 1983
claim, a plaintiff must allege that each defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of a
constitutional right. Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 528 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[I]ndividual liability under
§ 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation”); see also Pepper
v. Vill. of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o be liable under § 1983, the individual
defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”).
Here, Eason has failed to state a claim against Defendants pursuant to Section 1983 for

constitutional violations. (See Doc. 1, p. 5-8, 17, 27, 38, 44). A majority of the allegations in the
Complaint are asserted against the “Defendants” generally, which include J.B. Pritzker, Governor
of Illinois, Rob Jeffreys, IDOC Director, Allen Palsey, IDOC Chief Legal Officer and ADA
Coordinator, John and Jane Does― individuals who are a part of IDOC Administration, Wexford,
Menard Correctional Center, and John and Jane Does. (Doc. 1, p. 1). These vague references to a
group of defendants, without specific allegations tying individual defendants to the alleged
unconstitutional conduct, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to those
defendants and do not properly put Defendants on notice of the claims brough against them.
Defendants Pritzker, Jeffreys, and Palsey are not even mentioned in the Complaint, and merely
including the name of a potential defendant in the case caption is not sufficient to state a claim

against that individual. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot
state a claim against a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”). A successful
complaint generally alleges “the who, what, when, where, and how” and describes what each
defendant did or failed to do to violate constitutional rights. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.
2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).
Furthermore, Defendants cannot be held liable based solely on their positions as
administrators or supervisors under Section 1983. Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F. 3d 612, 651
conduct of a subordinate that violates a plaintiff's constitutional rights.”). And finally, Menard is
also not a proper defendant under Section 1983 because, as a state entity, it is not a “person”
amendable to suit under Section 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).
Therefore, the claims against Defendants Pritzker, Jeffreys, Pasley, John and Jane Does
Administration, Wexford, Menard, and John and Jane Does for constitutional violations pursuant
to Section 1983 are dismissed.
The Court further notes, that even if the constitutional claims survived preliminary review,

Eason brings his claims against the listed Defendants in their official capacities only and seeks
monetary damages, as well as injunctive relief. (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 7, 45). Because Section 1983 does
not allow suits for damages against state officials in their official capacities, his claims for
monetary damages due to constitutional violations would also be dismissed. See Brown v. Budz,
398 F. 3d 904 (7th Cir. 2005); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).
Eason also makes several allegations against individuals who are not listed in the case
caption as defendants, including correctional officers, Ron Skidmore the ADA coordinator,
medical staff, and Anthony Wills. (See Doc. 1, pp. 9-11, 17, 19, 21, 33-37, 40-43). The Court will
not treat parties not listed in the caption as defendants and listing a group of John Does in the case
caption does not sufficiently identify any of these individuals as being defendants in the case.

Therefore, any claims against individuals not listed in the case caption are dismissed without
prejudice. See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (to be properly
considered a party a defendant must be “specif[ied] in the caption”).
Throughout the Complaint, Eason repeatedly claims that Defendants are not in compliance
with the Holmes settlement agreement, in which he is a class member. (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 5, 28, 40).
Holmes v. Godinez, Case No. 11-cv-02961 (N.D. Ill. 2015), is a class action lawsuit that was filed
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois by a group of deaf and
inmates hearing accommodations as to intercom systems, emergency alerts, job opportunities, and
medical services. On July 26, 2018, a settlement agreement was reached between the parties. Eason
asserts that the Holmes settlement agreement “enacted ADA laws” and “became a federal ADA
mandate[.]” (Id. at pp. 3-14).
The settlement agreement in Holmes, however, “does not by itself create any constitutional
or statutory right[.]” Aaron M. ex rel, Glen M. v. Yomtoob, No. 00 C 7732, 2001 WL 1465251, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2001) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 376

(1994)). See also Cherry v. Litscher, No. 02-C-394-C, 2002 WL 32350010, at *9 (W.D. Wisc.
Sept. 10, 2002) (citing DeGigidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 534 (8th Cir.1990); Green v. McKaskle,
788 F.2d 1116, 1123 (5th Cir.1986)). Rather, the settlement agreement is a contract, and this Court
does not have the jurisdiction to enforce its provisions. See Morisch v. U.S., 709 F. Supp. 2d 672,
675 (S.D. Ill. 2010) (noting “as a predicate to enforcing a settlement agreement. . . a district must
either have retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement or possess an independent basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction with respect to disputes regarding the agreement.”). As the Court
will not enforce the terms of the settlement agreement, the claims pertaining to violations of the
settlement in Holmes are dismissed. Eason is encouraged to contact class counsel in the Holmes
case with any concerns he may have.

While Eason’s constitutional claims brought under Section 1983 and claims for violation
of the Holmes settlement agreement are dismissed, the Court finds that Eason has stated a
successful statutory claim under the ADA. Accordingly, the Court designates the following Count.
Count 1: Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act
(“RA”)2 claim against Defendants for failing to accommodate
Eason’s hearing loss.

2 Eason does not mention the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), in his Complaint, but the Seventh Circuit has
cautioned that claims of discrimination on account of a disability, especially those from a pro se prisoner litigant,
should be analyzed by the district court in light of both the ADA and RA, whether or not the plaintiff has assert a
claim under the latter statute. Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2012).
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the
Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without prejudice as
inadequately pled under Twombly.3

Eason alleges that he suffers from a disability, sever hearing loss, and that Menard does
not accommodate that disability by failing to provide adequate communication devices and sign
language interpreters and denying him participation in various programing and activities. These
allegations are sufficient to articulate a colorable ADA and RA claim. Count 1 will therefore
proceed against Rob Jeffreys, in his official capacity as the Director of IDOC, and be dismissed as
to the other Defendants. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b); Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of
Corrs., 684 F. 3d 667, 670 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2012) (the proper defendant in a claim under the ADA or
RA is the state agency).
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

On November 20, 2020, Eason filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction asking to be transferred from Menard to an ADA facility. (Doc. 8, p. 2). In
order to obtain relief, whether through a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or a preliminary
injunction, Eason must demonstrate that: (1) his underlying case has some likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law exists; and (3) he will suffer irreparable harm without
the injunction. Woods v. Buss, 496 F.3d 620, 622 (7th Cir. 2007). A preliminary injunction is an
“extraordinary and drastic remedy” for which there must be a “clear showing” that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting 11A Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (5th ed.

1995)). The main purpose of a preliminary injunction is “to preserve the relative positions of the

3 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
(1981). Accordingly, the preliminary injunctive relief sought must relate to the claims pending in
the underlying lawsuit. See Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
(holding that “a party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a relationship
between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint”).
The Court finds that Eason has failed to make a clear showing that an emergency injunctive
relief is warranted. First, it is not clear that the relief sought in the Motion is related to the surviving
claims in the Complaint under the ADA and RA for failing to provide sign language interpreters

and an adequate phone system and excluding Eason from certain programing and activities offered
at Menard. In the Motion, Eason claims that he is in need of emergency injunctive relief because
Menard is not in compliance with the Holmes settlement agreement and will not make changes to
safety and security to accommodate him. (Doc. 8, p. 1). As previously discussed, to the extent
Eason is seeking an injunction for the enforcement of the settlement agreement in Holmes, he must
bring such claims in the Northern District of Illinois, where the case was litigated. Additionally,
his constitutional claims under the Eighth Amendment regarding unconstitutional treatment by
staff have been dismissed because they were not properly asserted against a named defendant. It
is also not exactly clear from whom Eason is seeking relief, because he has added individuals to
the case caption in the Motion ― White, Stephens, Mitchell, Wills, and Skidmore ― who are not

listed as Defendants in the case caption of the Complaint. A motion for injunctive relief is not a
proper vehicle for modifying claims or adding defendants.
Second, presuming that the request for emergency injunctive relief is related to the
surviving ADA and RA claims, the Court finds that Eason has not provided the Court with
sufficient information on how he may suffer irreparable harm with no adequate remedy at law.
The “possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later
date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm[,]”
(1974)), and the statements made in the Motion do not refute this possibility. Eason statements
that he will incur loss of “his sanity or continuations of irreparable harms” and be subjected to
“trouble” are too general and vague to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm warranting
injunctive relief. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (“[i]ssuing a
preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with [the
Supreme Court's] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy....”).
Accordingly, the Motion for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 8) is denied.

Eason also requests a preliminary injunction in the Complaint. (Doc. 1, p. 26). The request
is one sentence asking to be removed from Menard to a prison “where an adequate telephone is
equally accessible” to Eason. Because the request does not comply with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 7 and 65 requiring a request for a court order to be made by motion and does not address
any of the conditions necessary for obtaining a preliminary injunction, the request for a preliminary
injunction contained in the Complaint is also denied.
RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL
Eason has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3), which is DENIED. 4
Eason states that, in an attempt to recruit counsel on his own, he has sent out letters to many firms,
and they cannot take his case. (Id. at p. 1). He includes the names of three firms he has contacted,

as well as a sheet containing names and addresses of civil rights attorneys with markings by three
additional firms. (Id. at pp. 1, 3). Accordingly, he appears to have made reasonable efforts to retain
counsel on his own. With respect to his ability to pursue this action pro se, Eason indicates he is
unable to represent himself because he is hearing disabled with speech impediments and uses sign
language. Eason’s hearing impairment, however, does not necessarily warrant recruitment of

4 In evaluating the Motion for Recruitment of Counsel, the Court applies the factors discussed in Pruitt v. Mote, 503
F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) and related authority.
construct coherent sentences and communicate clearly with the Court. Currently, this
straightforward case is proceeding on a single claim against one defendant and given the early
stage of litigation, it is difficult to accurately evaluate the need for assistance of counsel. Should
his situation change as the case proceeds, Eason may file another motion setting forth all the facts
that support his request.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint survives preliminary review pursuant to

Section 1915A. Count 1 will proceed against Rob Jeffreys in his official capacity. All other claims
are DISMISSED without prejudice. Defendants Pritzker, Pasley, John and Jane Does IDOC
Administration, Wexford, Menard Correctional Center, and Unknown Party John and Jane Does
are DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Jeffreys: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The
Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and
Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff Eason. If Defendant fails to
sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the
date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that

defendant, and the Court will require Defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff Eason, the employer
shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, his last known
address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally
effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address
information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
stated in this Merit Review Order. Defendant is ADVISED that the Court does not accept
piecemeal answers.
If judgment is rendered against Eason, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, even though his
application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Eason is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of
Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 30, 2020

_s/Stephen P. McGlynn _________
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit and
serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants will
enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from
the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take
90 days or more. When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling
Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Eason is advised
to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the

defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Eason need not submit any
evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10152962. Public record. Not legal advice.