# Peters v. Baldwin

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · September 24, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10152731

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 24, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10152731

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SCOTT PETERS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:17-CV-852-MAB
)
JOHN BALDWIN and )
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF )
CORRECTIONS, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is currently before the Court on the motion to reconsider filed by
Plaintiff Scott Peters (“Peters”) (Doc. 118). In short, Peters asks this Court to reconsider a
portion of its July 8, 2020 Memorandum and Order (Doc. 114), which granted in part and
denied in part a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion. Defendants
John Baldwin and the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC Defendants”) have filed
a response in opposition to Peters’ motion to reconsider. For the following reasons, the
motion to reconsider will be denied.
Legal Standard
The Court has inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders at any time prior
to the entry of final judgment. E.g., Marconi Wireless T. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S.
1, 47–48 (1943); Terry v. Spencer, 888 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2018); FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). That
being said, the Court’s prior rulings “are not intended as mere first drafts, subject to
revision and reconsideration at a litigant’s pleasure.” Berger v. Xerox Ret. Income Guar.
Plan, 231 F. Supp. 2d 804, 820 (S.D. Ill. 2002) (citing Rhone–Poulenc, Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 877

F.Supp. 1170, 1173–74 (N.D. Ill. 1995)). Reconsideration of an interlocutory order is only
appropriate when a court has misunderstood a party, made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties, made an error not of reasoning
but of apprehension, or where a significant change in the law or the facts has occurred
since the submission of the issue to the court. Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales,
Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990). See also Entm't USA, Inc. v. Moorehead Commc'ns,

Inc., 897 F.3d 786, 795 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[M]otions to reconsider exist to spare parties and
courts unnecessary appeals.”) “Such problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider
should be equally rare.” Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191.
Discussion
To begin with, it is important to outline the specific claim that the motion to

reconsider is targeting. Peters’ amended complaint sought to advance a claim against the
IDOC and John Baldwin on behalf of himself and a class of inmates “with mobility issues
. . . who require accommodations, including a wheelchair, to get around the IDOC
facilities” (Doc. 82). It alleged that the IDOC does not allow wheelchair-bound inmates to
participate in or access the cafeteria, the gym, school and educational programs, summer

night yard, and MP3 player kiosks (Id.). Peters claimed the IDOC refused to allow
mobility-impaired persons who need to use wheelchairs to participate in meals in the
cafeteria with the general population. Peters’ complaint asserted that “[t]he IDOC forces
the Plaintiffs to eat meals in their cells. In the summer, the general population eats meals
outside, while the Plaintiffs eat in their cells” (Doc. 82).

At the Pavey hearing on March 5, 2020, Peters’ attorney clarified the nature of his
complaint regarding the cafeteria. He said the cafeteria is not wheelchair accessible and,
therefore, wheelchair-bound inmates are forced to eat all of their meals in their cells by
themselves (See Doc. 114, p. 10). Peters wanted to eat his meals in the same communal
setting as the non-disabled inmates in general population (Id.). The Court ultimately
concluded that Peters had failed to exhaust his claim that the IDOC violated the ADA by

denying mobility-impaired inmates access to the cafeteria and other activities (Id. at 17).
The Court did, however, allow Peters to proceed on a different ADA claim concerning
the use of assistive devices (Id.).
Peters’ motion to reconsider contends that after the Pavey hearing and the Court’s
summary judgment order, Peters discovered the Administrative Review Board’s (“ARB”)

final decision denying grievance #117-5-17 (an emergency grievance dated March 26,
2017) (See Doc. 118). Peters says this newly discovered evidence demonstrates that he
fully exhausted that grievance and warrants reconsideration (Id.). The IDOC Defendants
argue that even accepting this grievance as fully exhausted, it was not done so prior to
the filing of the consolidated complaint in this case (Doc. 121).1 Moreover, the IDOC

Defendants argue the content of the grievance is key here (Id.). The exhausted grievance

1 This case was filed on August 10, 2017 (Doc. 1). On March 6, 2019, the Court consolidated this case with
17-cv-499 (Peters v. Baldwin) and designated this case as the lead case (See Docs. 76, 80). The Court ordered
a consolidated complaint to be filed, which Peters promptly did (Docs. 80, 82).
takes issue with the fact he was served a different type of meal in his cell than the inmates
received in the cafeteria and it does not mention the accessibility of the cafeteria (Id.).

The primary purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to give prison officials
notice of a problem and a chance to correct it before they are subjected to a lawsuit. Turley
v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The exhaustion requirement's primary
purpose is to alert the state to the problem and invite corrective action.”) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted; citation omitted); Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709,
721 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Grievances are intended to ‘[allow prisons] to address complaints

about the program it administers before being subjected to suit . . . .’” (quoting Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007)).
Here, a careful review grievance #117-5-17 reveals that Peters is complaining that
inmates who eat in their cells received a different meal than the inmates who ate in the
cafeteria (See Doc. 118-1). Specifically, Peters wrote that every inmate who went to the

mess hall today was allowed to eat “BBQ pork” which is a “rarely prepared meal” in the
facility (Id.). Peters further complained that he was not offered a choice and was given
“bone meal cold cuts” (Id.). It is true that Peters mentions the fact that he is
“handicapped” and references the ADA, claiming that the discrepancy in the food
options is a “violation of the Equal Protection clause of the ADA Title II” (Id.). But

ultimately, the key to this grievance is the constant reference to the “pork” and the fact
that it is a rarely prepared meal (Id.). The “relief requested” portion of the grievance
states, in pertinent part, “they get pork I want pork” (Id.). This grievance can only be
fairly read as a complaint regarding the different types of meals offered to inmates who
eat in their cell as opposed to the cafeteria. There is nothing in this grievance to suggest
Peters is complaining about the accessibility of the cafeteria in any manner or the fact that

Peters is missing out on a communal setting to eat a meal. Rather, the grievance is entirely
focused on the fact that Peters did not receive the rarely prepared meal of barbeque pork
(Id.).
So even in light of this newly discovered evidence demonstrating that grievance
#117-5-17 was fully exhausted, it does not change the Court’s summary judgment ruling.
Peters failed to exhaust his claim regarding the cafeteria as there is nothing within this

grievance or the newly discovered evidence that can be fairly read as a complaint
regarding mobility-impaired inmates’ accessibility to the cafeteria. The motion to
reconsider will be denied.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Peters motion to reconsider (Doc. 118) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 24, 2020

s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10152731. Public record. Not legal advice.
