# Gaddis v. DeMattei

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · July 27, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10152413

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** July 27, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DONALD D. GADDIS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 18-CV-1729-SMY
)
BRYAN J. DEMATTEI, CITY OF )
MARION, DAWN TONDINI, DOROTHY )
MCCOMBS, CAMERON DUNFORD, )
LOGAN SPINKA, WILLIAM LANNON, )
and CHARLES WINSTEAD, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Donald Gaddis filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming his
civil rights were violated when he was falsely arrested on October 20, 2017 by City of Marion,
Illinois police officers Bryan DeMattei, Logan Spinka, and William Lannom. The arrest followed
a dispute between Gaddis and his neighbor, Dorothy McCombs, and allegedly triggered by
statements made by Charles Winstead, another neighbor, and his guest, Cameron Dunford. Gaddis
asserts false arrest claims against DeMattei, Spinka, and Lannom (Count I) and McCombs,
Dunford, and Winstead (Count III), a Monell claim against the City of Marion (Count II), and a
request for injunctive relief against Defendant Dawn Tondini, the former Chief of Police for the
City of Marion (Count IV).
Now pending before the Court are Gaddis’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability
(Doc. 49), Defendant Tondini’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 57), Defendants City of
Marion, DeMattei, Lannom, and Spinka’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 58), Defendants
Dunford and McCombs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 59), and Gaddis’ Motion to
Dismiss Defendant Winstead Without Prejudice (Doc. 65). For the following reasons, Gaddis’
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, Tondini’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED,the City of Marion, DeMattei, Lannom, and Spinka’s Motion for Summary Judgment
is GRANTED, Dunford and McCombs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and
Gaddis’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

Factual Background
Donald Gaddis and Dorothy McCombs are next-door neighbors and reside on North
Highland Avenue in Marion, Illinois. According to Gaddis, he trimmed a tree that was on
McCombs’ property but which extended onto his property and placed the tree limbs back onto
McCombs’ property (Doc. 58-7, p. 3). Charles Winstead, who lives across the street, told
McCombs about Gaddis’ actions (Id. 4). McCombs asked Gaddis to pick up the branches, but
Gaddis did not respond (Id. 5). Gaddis then went to Winstead’s house, knocked on his door, and
saw Dunford (who he did not know) through the glass storm door (Id. 7). Gaddis said nothing and
headed back to his house (Id. 9). Winstead then approached Gaddis on the street with a rake in his

hand and asked him what he wanted. Gaddis told him to mind his own business and walked back
to his house (Id. 10-11, 15).
Within 15 minutes, police officers, including Officer Spinka, arrived on the scene. Officer
Spinka approached Gaddis and talked to him through his screen door about the tree branches (Id.
16-17). As Gaddis was talking to Officer Spinka, Officer Lannom approached them and the three
of them had a discussion for 10 to 15 minutes about the events of the day (Id. 17-18). At the same
time, Officer DeMattei spoke to Winstead and Dunford across the street (Id. 19). DeMattei then
walked over to Gaddis’ house, put his hand on the door handle and told him that he is going to be
arrested for disorderly conduct and that he should come out of his house or they would come in to
get him for resisting arrest (Id. 22-23). Gaddis then exited his house and was arrested (Id. 23).
The Defendants offer a somewhat different account of the events. According to Dunford,
Gaddis was “pounding and pounding” on Winstead’s door demanding that he come out and said,
“come out you coward.” (Doc. 58-6, p. 16-17). Dunford also recalls Gaddis calling him and
Winstead “little girls”, telling Winstead that he should have minded his own business, and stating

repeatedly, “you want to go old man” (Id. 18, 21). Gaddis was standing in Winstead’s front yard
or on the sidewalk and Winstead told him to get off his property (Id. 20). Winstead and Dunford
then went to the side of his house and sat in Dunford’s truck. At that point, McCombs, who had
been standing in her yard across the street, told them that the police had been called (Id. 23-4).
Dunford relayed the above to a police officer who he had never seen before and told him that
Gaddis threatened Winstead (Id. 28-9).
According to Winstead, Gaddis knocked on his door and said, “this was none of your
business” (Doc. 62-1, p. 25). Winstead then went outside with rake in hand and Gaddis said,
“come on, come on” which Winstead took as a threat (Id. 26, 31, 52). Thereafter, Winstead went

about his business and Gaddis, after lingering in the street for a couple of minutes, went back to
his house (Id. 33-4). While Winstead was present when the police spoke to Dunford, he did not
speak to the police officers (Id. 27).
McCombs testified that the issue with the tree limbs happened the night before Gaddis’
arrest (Doc. 58-1, p. 8, 12-13). She also testified that around 6:00 p.m. on the day Gaddis was
arrested, he pounded on Winstead’s door, told him to come out, “was being erratic and threatening
and screaming,” called him a coward, and “wanted to fight” Winstead (Id. 5-6). She called the
police because he was “out of control.” (Id. 9-10). When the police arrived, Officer Baldwin (who
is not a party to this lawsuit) told her that Gaddis would be arrested (Id. 18-19). There is no
indication in the record that McCombs gave a statement to the police before Gaddis was arrested.
It is undisputed that upon arriving to the neighborhood, DeMattei spoke to Dunford (Doc.
58-1, p. 17). DeMattei recalls that there was an issue between Gaddis and his neighbors and that
he decided to arrest Gaddis for disorderly conduct because:
He approached the neighbor’s residence, knocked on their door, began calling them
names, made statements to them, and based on what Mr. Gaddis had told Officer
Lannom, at that point it was my decision to place him under arrest.
(Id. 22). DeMattei does not recall any other details regarding the incident (Id. 18-19).
Spinka does not recall the details of the incident or Gaddis’ arrest (Doc. 58-3). However,
both he and Lannom were on Gaddis’ porch to keep eye contact with him, to make sure he was
not threatening or dangerous, and to ensure he stayed in the vicinity because of the on-going
investigation (Doc. 58-4, p. 12; Doc. 58-3, p. 10).
Discussion
Motions for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment where the non-moving party
“has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which
she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is
not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
must be resolved against the moving party. Lawrence v. Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th
Cir. 2004).
In order to prevail on a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must establish
that he or she was arrested without probable cause. Hurt v. Wise, 880 F.3d 831, 841 (7th Cir.
2018). Probable cause for an arrest is an absolute defense to such a claim. Hurt, 880 F.3d at 841.
The existence of probable cause is a question of law to be answered by the Court. Beck v. State of
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
“A police officer has probable cause to arrest when, at the moment the decision is made,

the facts and circumstances within his knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information would warrant a prudent person in believing that suspect has committed or was
committing an offense.” Fleming v. Livingston Cty., 674 F.3d 874, 878-9 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 1999)). The officer’s belief need not “be correct or
even more likely true than false, so long as it is reasonable.” Fleming, 674 F.3d at 879 (quoting
Qian, 168 F.3d at 953).
The undisputed evidence in this case reveals that prior to Gaddis’ arrest, Officer DeMattei
had been informed that Gaddis was pounding on his neighbor’s door and threatening him. Under
Illinois law, a person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly “[d]oes any act in such

unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace.” 720
Ill.Comp.Stat. § 5/26-1(a)(1). And, “[a]n arrest for disorderly conduct is justified when the
defendant directly harasses or threatens other people.” Reher v. Vivo, 656 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir.
2011). See In re D.W., 502 N.E.2d 419, 420–21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (defendant’s threat to “kick
[the complainant’s] ass” supported arrest for disorderly conduct). Therefore, based on the
information provided to him, DeMattei had probable cause to arrest Gaddis for disorderly conduct.
As such, Gaddis’ false arrest claim against DeMattei, Spinka, and Lannon fails as a matter of law.
Gaddis also argues that Defendants unlawfully “seized” him when they stood on his porch
and talked to him. It has long been the law that a police officer may, without a warrant, approach
a home, knock on the door, wait to be received, and engage in conversation until asked to leave.
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013). There is no evidence that Gaddis asked Officers Spinka
or Lannom to leave – the evidence instead reveals that he voluntarily engaged in conversation with
the officers. Nevertheless, citing U.S. v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 1997), Gaddis argues that
he was seized because he had no choice but to comply with the officers. In that case, however, the

officers knocked on a motel room door at night for a full three minutes, knocked on the window
and shined a light in the room, prior to the door being opened. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found that “the deputies’ persistence, in the face of the refusal to admit, transformed what
began as an attempt to engage in a consensual encounter into an investigatory stop.” Id. at 692.1
The circumstances here are much different. Police officers were responding to a call for assistance,
arrived at Gaddis door, and engaged in a consensual discussion. When the officers determined
they had probable cause, he was asked to step out of his house to be arrested. No Fourth
Amendment violation occurred under the circumstances.2
Gaddis’ Monell claim is also subject to summary dismissal. Municipalities can be held

liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations if the plaintiff can show that an official policy
and/or unofficial custom caused the violations. Id. 436 U.S. at 690-1. But absent a viable
constitutional claim against the police officers involved, a plaintiff may not proceed on a Monell
claim. Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Defendant City of
Marion is entitled to summary judgment on Count II.3
Finally, Defendants McCombs and Dunford maintain correctly that they cannot be held

1 In addition, Plaintiff’s reliance on Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), is equally unavailing because “Payton
prohibits only a warrantless entry into the home, not a policeman’s use of his voice to convey a message of arrest from
outside the home.” U.S. v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 138 (7th Cir. 1991).
2 Given this conclusion, it is not necessary for the Court to address Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to
qualified immunity.
3 Gaddis’ official capacity claim against Dawn Tondini for prospective injunctive relief (Count IV) must likewise be
dismissed as it is grounded on his Monell claim. See Jungels v. Pierce, 825 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1987).
liable for false arrest. Gaddis argues that Dunford gave false information to the police and
McCombs “campaigned to have Gaddis arrested.” Even if Dunford did give the police false or
misleading information, merely giving false information to police officers is insufficient to support
a false arrest claim. Odorizzi v. A.O. Smith Corp., 452 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1971); Butler v. Goldblatt
Bros., Inc., 589 F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing Morris v. Faulkner, 361 N.E.2d 112 (1977)).

Moreover, DeMattei based his decision to arrest Gaddis, in part, on statements that Gaddis made
to Lannom. And, the record is devoid of evidence that McCombs “campaigned” to have Gaddis
arrested. McCombs and Dunford are therefore entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count
III.
Motion to Dismiss
Finally, Gaddis seeks to dismiss his claims against Winstead without prejudice, and
Winstead does not object (Doc. 66). A plain reading of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)
suggests that dismissal under this rule should be used only to dismiss an entire action (rather than
a particular claim against a particular defendant). See Taylor v. Brown, 787 F.3d 851, 857 (7th

Cir. 2015) (Rule 41(a) is “limited to dismissal of an entire action” and Rule 15(a) is the proper
vehicle for “adding or dropping parties and claims”). While the Court acknowledges the plain
reading of the rule, it finds that allowing Plaintiff to dismiss his claims against Winstead pursuant
to Rule 41(a)(2) is appropriate in this case. The motion will be granted.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability (Doc.
49) is DENIED, Defendant Tondini’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 57) is GRANTED,
Defendants City of Marion, DeMattei, Lannom, and Spinka’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 58) is GRANTED, Defendants Dunford and McCombs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 59) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant Winstead Without
Prejudice (Doc. 65) is GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court id DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly and to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 27, 2020 Abn Md

STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10152413. Public record. Not legal advice.