# Morecraft v. Baldwin

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · July 6, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10152346

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** July 6, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ANDREW R. MORECRAFT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 18-cv-458-RJD
)
DEANNA BROOKHART, ROB JEFFREYS, )
and DAVID VAUGHN, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Andrew Morecraft, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging he was not allowed
to engage in group worship sessions in accordance with his Asatru religious practice, and was
denied certain ritual items and the opportunity for ritual feasting. Plaintiff’s complaint was
screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and he was allowed to proceed on the following claims:
Count One: Vaughn and Brookhart substantially burdened Plaintiff’s practice of
the Asatru religion when they denied him access to group worship
services in violation of the First Amendment.

Count Two: Director Jeffreys1 and Warden Brookhart2 violated Plaintiff’s
rights under the Religious Land Use and Incarcerated Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”) when they denied him access to group worship
services3.

1 The Court’s screening order named IDOC Director Baldwin as a defendant in Count Two only in his official
capacity. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current director, Rob Jeffreys, is automatically
substituted in place of Baldwin. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket sheet accordingly.
2 The Court’s screening order named Lawrence Warden Lamb as a defendant in Count Two only in his official
capacity. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current warden, Deanna Brookhart, is automatically
substituted in place of Lamb. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket sheet accordingly.
3 The Court’s screening order (Doc. 7) limited Plaintiff’s claims to the denial of access to group worship services.
However, in the screening order, the Court contemplated Plaintiff’s other complaints concerning the practice of his
religion, including the prohibition of outdoor services and group celebrations, and the prohibition on the possession of
certain religions items, such as runes. Based on the allegations in the complaint, as well as arguments set forth in the
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This matter is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
39). Plaintiff filed a timely response (Doc. 45). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’
Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Andrew Morecraft is a practitioner of the Asatru religion (Deposition of Andrew
Morecraft, Doc. 40-1 at 3). As an Asatru practitioner, Plaintiff engages in daily rituals or prayers
on an individual basis for which medallions, runes (a set of 24 pieces of wood or plastic with
imprinted symbols), an altar cloth, bowl, and hammer are supposed to be used (Id. at 3-4, 8).
Plaintiff is not allowed to have a rune set in his personal possession, however, there is a rune set

available for individual use in the chapel (Id. at 3-4). The Asatru faith also has four days that are
recognized as holy days for a group setting (Id. at 5). In 2013, prior to the events giving rise to
this lawsuit, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Lawrence and, at that time, group services were held
weekly (Doc. 40-1 at 3; Declaration of David Vaughn, Doc. 40-2 at ¶ 8). In November 2013,
Plaintiff was transferred to Menard Correctional Center and, upon his return to Lawrence in 2016,
group services for the Asatru religion were no longer allowed (Doc. 40-1 at 3). The services were
discontinued in 2015 due to safety and security concerns relating to the submission of security
threat group (“STG”) material containing white supremacist ideologies to Defendant Chaplain
Vaughn on behalf of a member of the Asatru group purporting to change its membership and
voting procedures (Doc. 40-2 at ¶¶ 9-13).

Upon his transfer back to Lawrence in 2016, Plaintiff began requesting group religious

parties’ summary judgment briefing, the Court finds it appropriate to expand the scope of the claims in Count One and
Two to include the prohibition of Plaintiff’s possession of a rune set as a violation of RLUIPA and Plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights.
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services and various items required for individual and group worship (Id. at ¶ 19). Plaintiff
testified he wrote many requests to Defendant Vaughn that went unanswered, but it is unclear
when the requests were sent (Doc. 40-1 at 11). Plaintiff also testified he wrote at least a dozen
kites to Defendant Brookhart, who was the assistant warden of programs at the time, regarding the
practice of his religion (Id. at 9). Plaintiff’s first kite to Brookhart was sent on May 8, 2017 (Id.).

Brookhart did not often respond to Plaintiff’s requests, however, Plaintiff recalls one response
where Brookhart advised Plaintiff he would need to speak with the chaplain (Id.).
In addition to these requests and kites, Plaintiff submitted a grievance dated February 21,
2017, complaining that he was being denied fellowship and service for his religion and remarking
that he had notified the chaplain of his religious needs, but had not received any response (see Doc.
45 at 21-22). The counselor received this grievance on February 28, 2017, and responded on
September 15, 2017 that the chaplain had a written proposal that was being considered (see id.).
Later, in January 2018, Defendant Vaughn spoke with Plaintiff and another inmate to discuss
Asatru and the steps that would be necessary to organize weekly group services (Doc. 40-1 at 11;

Doc. 40-2 at ¶ 20). No action was taken in response to this meeting concerning group services,
and Plaintiff kept writing Defendant Vaughn (Doc. 40-1 at 11). Plaintiff met with Defendant
Vaughn again in July 2018, and was advised that he needed to find volunteers to run group worship
(Id.). Plaintiff submitted a proposal for group worship and other goals for the Asatru religion at
Lawrence in September 2019 (Doc. 40-2 at ¶ 21). According to Defendant Vaughn, this is the
only proposal for Asatru weekly religious services he has received since 2015 (Id. at ¶ 15), which
Plaintiff disputes. Plaintiff points to his February 2017 grievance, in which the counselor
indicates a proposal was being considered by Vaughn (see Doc. 45 at 21-22). Plaintiff also
testified that he submitted a proposal for Asatru group services and feasts in 2018 (Doc. 40-1 at 8).
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This proposal remained pending at the time Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also

Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary
judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of
material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the
facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving

party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
Discussion
Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) Plaintiff’s claim as
to weekly religious services and possession of his runes is not ripe; (2) any restriction on Plaintiff’s
religious exercise was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest; (3) Plaintiff’s rights
under RLUIPA were not violated because Plaintiff has failed to show his exercise of religion was
substantially burdened and the burden imposed was the least restrictive means for furthering a
compelling interest; and (4) they are entitled to qualified immunity.
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Count One – First Amendment claim against Brookhart and Vaughn
Under the First Amendment, prisoners enjoy a right to the free exercise of their religion.
Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2011). However, a prison may impose
restrictions on the exercise of religion that are reasonably related to the legitimate penological
objectives of the state. Tarpley v. Allen County, Ind., 312 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations

omitted). In determining whether an asserted justification is rationally related to a legitimate
penological objective, courts consider whether there are alternative means of exercising the right
that remain open to the inmate, the impact an accommodation of the asserted right would have on
guards and other inmates, and whether there are “obvious alternatives” to the restriction. Ortiz v.
Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2009).
Ripeness
As a preliminary matter, the Court considers Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claims
in Count One are not ripe. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution grants jurisdiction to the
federal courts to adjudicate only “actual, ongoing controversies.” Loertscher v. Anderson, 893

F.3d 386, 392 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To determine ripeness,
courts examine (1) “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision,” and (2) “the hardship to the
parties of withholding court consideration.” Metropolitan Milwaukee Ass’n of Commerce v.
Milwaukee Cty., 325 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2003).
With regard to the first factor, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims are not yet ripe because
he has not been denied services. Defendants assert no final administrative decision has been
made on Plaintiff’s proposal for weekly religious services and his request for a rune set. The
Court disagrees. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds
Plaintiff has demonstrated he has been denied services related to his religious practice since he
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began requesting the same in 2016. Despite his efforts to contact Defendants Vaughn and
Brookhart, no group services have been offered. Defendants also fail to cite any authority
standing for the proposition that Plaintiff’s claim is only ripe after receiving a final determination
on a proposal submitted to the IDOC’s Religious Practice Advisory Board.
The Court also finds Plaintiff has demonstrated hardship insofar as he has been unable to

practice his faith in a group setting, and with the items (i.e. a rune set) required for his faith. For
these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims are ripe for review.
Legitimate Penological Interest
Defendants also argue Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were not violated because the
restrictions imposed on his religious exercise were reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest. As mentioned above, the Seventh Circuit has held that a prison regulation may impinge
on inmates’ constitutional rights if the regulation is related to legitimate penological interests,
which include security and economic concerns. Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted).

First, Defendants argue there is a valid, rational connection between the previous decision
to discontinue Asatru group services and denying Plaintiff certain religious items to ensure
institutional order, safety, and security. Defendants reiterate that Asatru group services were
discontinued in 2015 due to STG activity and safety and security concerns. Defendants point to
Defendant Vaughn’s declaration, in which he asserts gangs pose a serious threat to the safety and
security of a correctional institution by violating various prison rules, trading and trafficking
contraband, exploiting offenders, participating and ordering assaults on inmates and staff, and
participating or conducting illegal activity (Doc. 40-2 at ¶¶ 13-14). With regard to Plaintiff’s
request for certain items to be used for religious activities, including a rune set, Defendants explain
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these items are prohibited due to safety and security concerns. Defendant Vaughn attests that
rune sets are prohibited because they have been used by offenders to manipulate others to commit
assaults or violence, or manipulate other offenders into thinking something negative will happen to
them (Doc. 40-2 at ¶ 49). Defendant Vaughn consulted with Chief Chaplain Keim in regards to
the prohibition of rune sets at Lawrence (Id.). Plaintiff argues he has never heard of any Asatru

practitioners using rune sets to manipulate other offenders.
Based on the evidence in the record, it is not apparent that the prohibition on Asatru group
services in 2016 and beyond is reasonably related to a legitimate penological purpose. Indeed,
Defendants’ reliance on an apparently isolated event related to one inmate that occurred in 2015
appears misplaced. As argued by Plaintiff (and not contradicted by Defendants), the inmate who
submitted the STG material is no longer at Lawrence and there is no other evidence of STG
activity concerning the Asatru religion before the Court. Although the Court recognizes that
alternative means exist for Plaintiff to exercise his religion, including individual worship in his
cell, there does not appear to be sufficient alternatives to group worship. Moreover, it is not

apparent that allowing group services would have a significant, negative impact on guards and
other inmates as other religions attend group services and, while the Court recognizes the
complexities in scheduling such services, it is apparent it can be accomplished. For these reasons,
a reasonable jury could find the denial of group services requested by Plaintiff was not related to a
legitimate penological objective and was a violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise
rights.
The Court, however, reaches a different conclusion with regard to Plaintiff’s request for a
rune set. Defendant Vaughn explains that inmates may not possess a personal rune set due to the
potential the runes could be used to manipulate other offenders. Other courts have accepted this,
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or similar arguments, in concluding that a ban on rune cards was reasonably related to these
legitimate penological interests. See, e.g., Kramer v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections,
10-cv-224-slc, 2011 WL 13187095, *16 (July 26, 2011 W.D. Wis.). Further, the Court
recognizes that Plaintiff possesses a number of items as religious property to practice his Asatru
faith, including a medallion and cardboard hammer. There is also a rune set available for use in

the chapel. Accordingly, when viewing the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the
prohibition on Plaintiff’s personal possession of a rune set was rationally related to a legitimate
penological objective and his First Amendment rights were not violated with regard to the same.
Although the Court finds a question of fact as to whether Plaintiff’s First Amendment
rights were violated due to the denial of his requests for group services, the Court must also
consider Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
Qualified Immunity
Generally, government officials are protected from civil liability when performing
discretionary functions under the doctrine of qualified immunity so long as “their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Alvarado v. Litscher, 267
F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, in order to evaluate a claim of qualified immunity, the Court
engages in a two-part inquiry. The first question is whether the defendants’ conduct violated a
constitutional right. Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1090 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001) (overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). The second
question is whether that particular constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the
alleged violation. Id. The two questions may be considered in either order. Volkman, 736 F.3d
at 1090 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-42).
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For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours “must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Estate of
Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 779 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739
(2002)). The unlawfulness of a particular official’s action must be apparent “in light of the
pre-existing law.” Id. A party may demonstrate that a right was clearly established by

presenting a closely analogous case establishing the defendant’s conduct was unconstitutional or
by presenting evidence the defendant’s conduct was so patently violative of the constitutional right
that reasonable officials would know without guidance from a court. See Hope, 536 U.S. at
739-40.
The Court finds that the proper inquiry in this instance is whether it was clearly established
that Defendants Lashbrook and Vaughn were constitutionally required to allow group services for
Asatru practitioners at Lawrence. Under the circumstances here, in which Plaintiff had not yet
found a volunteer to lead group services as required per the Illinois Administrative Code, 20 ILCS
425.60, or satisfied the conditions to hold religious activities for which program volunteers or

chaplains are unavailable, see 20 ILCS 425.60(f)(1)-(6), Defendants did not violate any clearly
established constitutional right. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has pronounced that “[i]t has never
been clearly established that inmates have a right to inmate-led group worship under the First
Amendment.” West v. Grams, 607 F. App’x 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2015). Thus, even though
Defendants did not specifically argue they had a legitimate penological interest in denying group
services based on Plaintiff’s inability to secure volunteer leadership, it would be an extension of
the existing law to find a constitutional violation of the facts presented in this case. Accordingly,
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Count One.

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Count Two – RLUIPA Claim
Inmates are also afforded religious protections under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), which prohibits prisons receiving federal funds from
imposing a substantial burden on an inmate’s religious exercise unless prison officials can
demonstrate that imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling

governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Unlike cases arising under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, RLUIPA applies even where the burden on the prisoner “results
from a rule of general applicability.” Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). In
establishing a claim under RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing (1) that he
seeks to engage in an exercise of religion, and (2) that the challenged practice substantially
burdens that exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1. Once the plaintiff establishes his prima
facie case, the defendants “bear the burden of persuasion on any [other] element of the claim,” id.,
namely, whether their practice “is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling

governmental interest.” Koger, 523 F.3d at 796.
To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must submit evidence from which a jury could
reasonably find that a defendant personally and unjustifiably placed a substantial burden on his
religious practices. Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Hernandez v.
Comm’n of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989), Vinning-El, 657 F.3d at 592 (other
citations omitted)). In determining whether a particular restriction substantially burdens a
religious practice, courts should consider whether the restriction “seriously” violates or contradicts
an inmate’s religious beliefs. Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362, 364-65 (7th Cir. 2015).
First, the Court considers the inability of Plaintiff to engage in group services. Plaintiff
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argues his religious practice is substantially burdened due to his inability to engage in group
practice in the chapel. Defendants assert Plaintiff has numerous alternative means with which to
practice his religion, thus, no substantial burden has been placed on his religious exercise.
Defendant’s argument is misplaced. RLUIPA covers “any exercise of religion” and, therefore,
“listing other ways in which plaintiffs may practice their … faith does not diminish the impact of

being denied another one of their substantial religious exercises.” Aiello v. West, 207 F.Supp.3d
886, 895 (Sep. 14, 2016 W.D.Wis.) (citing Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 2015)).
Notably, the alternative means with which Plaintiff may practice his religion do not involve group
worship or the opportunity for group worship. Although the evidence Plaintiff has submitted thus
far is slight, consisting of statements that he previously engaged in group worship and his group
exercise is substantially burdened because it “hasn’t happened,” it is sufficient to establish his
prima facie case at this juncture.
The next question under RLUIPA is whether Defendants are able to establish that the ban
on Asatru group services is the least restrictive means to further a compelling interest.

Defendants again point to the ban on Asatru group services in 2015 due to STG activity of white
supremacists. As articulated above, Defendants’ reliance on an apparently isolated event related
to one inmate that occurred in 2015 to justify the ban on Asatru group practice is misplaced.
Further, a total prohibition on Asatru group services is not the least restrictive means to ensure the
safety and security of the institution. Accordingly, the Court finds there is insufficient evidence
in the record for Defendants to meet their burden of demonstrating the prohibition on Asatru group
services was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.
Summary judgment on this claim will therefore be denied.
With regard to the prohibition on the possession of a rune set, the Court again comes to a
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different conclusion. First, Plaintiff makes no specific argument concerning whether it
substantially burdened his religious practice. Moreover, the Court finds Defendants have
demonstrated the ban is in furtherance of a compelling interest (to ensure inmates are not able to
manipulate other inmates) and is the least restrictive means to achieve such interest. Indeed,
Plaintiff has access to a rune set for use in the chapel. In light of all the evidence in the record,

summary judgment will be granted on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim concerning the ban on his
personal possession of a rune set.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39) is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants David Vaughn and Deanna Brookhart (in her individual capacity)
and against Plaintiff Andrew Morecraft at the close of this case.
Plaintiff will proceed in this action on the following claim:
Count Two: Director Jeffreys and Warden Brookhart violated Plaintiff’s rights
under the Religious Land Use and Incarcerated Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”) when they denied him access to group worship
services.

As for trial, under RLUIPA, Plaintiff is limited to declaratory and injunctive relief. See
West v. Grams, 607 F. App’x 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff
has no right to a jury trial. Kramer v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 355 F.3d 961, 966 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“There is no right to a jury where the only remedies sought (or available) are equitable.”). The
Court, therefore, will hold a bench trial on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim related to Asatru group
services. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(a)(2) (“The trial on all issues so demanded must be by jury unless
… the court, on motion or on its own, finds that on some or all of those issues there is no federal
Page 12 of 13
right to a jury trial.”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 6, 2020

s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10152346. Public record. Not legal advice.