# Kitterman v. City of Belleville

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · February 14, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10151717

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** February 14, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10151717

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that a court may judicially notice public records available on government websites
- holding that Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act did not constitute punishment
- holding that state defendants were immune and that remaining claims were Heck-barred
- noting that “the primary concern of the drafters [of the Eighth Amendment] was to proscribe . . . methods of punishment.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILINOIS
)
SHANE A. KITTERMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 3:19-CV-0051-GCS
vs. )
)
CITY OF BELLEVILLE, DAN COLLNS, )
TRACY NEWTON, BRANDON KELLY, )
ST. CLAIR COUNTY SHERIFF, MIKE )
MARTIN, and J. EDWARDS, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Shane A. Kitterman, proceeding pro se, brings an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against seven defendants:1 the City of Belleville, Detective Dan Collins of the
Belleville Police Department, Supervisor of the Illinois State Police (“ISP”) Department
Sex Offender Registration Unit Tracie Newton,2 ISP Director Brendan Kelly,3 the St. Clair
County Sheriff’s Department and its employee Mike Martin, and J. Edwards of the
Southwestern Illinois College Police Department. (Doc. 22). Kitterman alleges
Defendants violated and continue to violate his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and

1 Kitterman’s original lawsuit named nine defendants. (Doc. 13, pg. 1).

2 On January 15, 2020, this Court noted that Kitterman had failed to serve Newton personally and
dismissed the claims against her in her individual capacity. (Doc. 72). Thus, Newton is sued solely in her
official capacity.

3 Kitterman’s suit originally named former ISP director Leo Schmitz as a defendant. On June 24,
2019, the Court substituted Brendan Kelly, the current ISP director, as a defendant for Schmitz in his official
capacity. (Doc. 35). On January 15, 2020, this Court noted that Kitterman had failed to serve Schmitz
personally and terminated him as a party to this case. (Doc. 72).
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as the Ex Post Facto
clause and laws impairing contracts under the United States and Illinois constitutions.

(Doc. 13, p. 38, 41, 49, 51). Before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons delineated below,
the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss under 12(b)(6).
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

On January 16, 2019, Kitterman filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claiming that Defendants violated and continue to violate his rights under the First,
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as
the Ex Post Facto clause and laws impairing contracts under the United States and Illinois
constitutions. (Doc. 2). He amended his complaint on January 28, 2019, which alleges

the following:
The Belleville Police Department arrested Kitterman on July 17, 1995, based on
allegations that he committed a sexual act against a minor. (Doc. 13, ¶ 3). Kitterman later
pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-
1.60, a Class 2 felony, on January 10, 1996. (Doc. 13, ¶¶ 6, 9). See also Court Records Search,

ST. CLAIR COUNTY CIRCUIT CLERK, http://www.circuitclerk.co.st-
clair.il.us/courts/Pages/icj.a spx (last visited February 7, 2020)(showing the date of
Kitterman’s conviction); Bova v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 446 F. Supp. 2d 926, 930 n.2 (S.D. Ill. 2006)
(noting that a court may judicially notice public records available on government
websites).
As part of his plea deal, the State of Illinois agreed that Kitterman would be
required to register as a sex offender under the 1992 version of Illinois’s Child Sex

Offender Registration Act (“CSORA”), despite the revised version of the Sex Offender
Registration Act (“SORA”) being in effect at the time of his guilty plea. (Doc. 13, ¶¶ 6, 7).
CSORA required Kitterman to register for ten years, i.e., until January 10, 2006. (Doc. 13,
¶ 5).
Kitterman alleges that, following his plea, the “Illinois State Police Department, by
and through its agents, in concert with local law enforcement agents,” (1) changed the

date of conviction; (2) fabricated other conviction information; and (3) unlawfully
enforced Illinois laws against him, all in an effort to extend his registration duty beyond
its original timeframe. (Doc. 13, ¶ 12).
According to Kitterman, because the ISP is an administrative agency responsible
for implementing and enforcing SORA it has a duty to ensure it has accurate information

and prevent the arbitrary enforcement of SORA with fabricated information. (Doc. 13, ¶
12). Kitterman claims the ISP breached these duties. (Doc. 13, ¶ 55). According to
Kitterman, the ISP refuses to “consider apparent errors” in the sex offender registration
process or its enforcement and declines to correct Kitterman’s records. (Doc. 13, ¶ 12).
Kitterman alleges that he has submitted over 230 petitions for a hearing with the ISP to

challenge the enforcement of SORA against him, but the ISP has refused to provide him
with a hearing. (Doc. 13, ¶¶ 12, 56). If the ISP provided him a hearing, Kitterman claims
he would present evidence that the ISP changed the dates of his conviction and release
and fabricated other conviction information to trigger registration duties inapplicable to
him. (Doc. 13, ¶ 12).

In summation, Kitterman claims that while his registration period ended on
January 10, 2006, the Defendants unlawfully extended it numerous times, forced him to
register after his actual registration period expired, and deprived him of any available
remedy to challenge their actions. (Doc. 13, ¶¶ 13-15, 57-58). He further complains that
Defendants continue to violate his due process rights by enforcing SORA’s requirements
against him when his plea agreement stated he would be governed under CSORA’s

requirements. (Doc. 13, ¶¶ 53-61). Kitterman notes that two of his state court convictions
for failing to register as a sex offender were reversed. See Illinois v. Kitterman, 2018 IL App
(5th) 140415-U.4
Kitterman has sued the City of Belleville (“City”), claiming it has a policy, custom,
or practice of “unfettered enforcement of the Registration Act . . . leading to multiple

arrests and convictions of [him] without due process of law.” (Doc. 13, ¶ 20). He also
claims the City changed his registration information, changed the date of his conviction,
and changed the charge under which he was convicted. (Doc. 13, ¶ 20).

4 Kitterman has had four state court convictions for failure to register as a sex offender, i.e., Case
Nos. 12-CF-1204, 12-CF-1584, 14-CF-1422, and 15-CF-373. In December 2018, the Illinois trial court issued
an order of habeas corpus, “reversed and vacated” those convictions, and ordered Kitterman’s discharge
from custody. See Kitterman v. Dennison, No 18-CH-556 (Cir. Ct. St. Clair Cty., Dec. 18, 2018). The trial court
later amended its order finding that Case Nos. 12-CF-1204 and 15-CF-373 were entered on guilty pleas and
therefore were immune from challenge. See Kitterman v. Denison, No. 18-CH-556 (Cir. Ct. St. Clair Cty., Jan.
25, 2019). Kitterman has since appealed the denial of habeas relief related to Case Nos. 12-CF-1204 and 15-
CF-373. He also has direct appeals and post-conviction petitions pending related to those two cases. See
Kitterman v. Dennison, No. 18-3550, Doc. 16 (7th Cir.).
Kitterman named Dan Collins, a detective with the Belleville Police Department,
as a defendant in both his individual and official capacity. (Doc. 13, ¶ 22). According to

Kitterman, Collins has a duty to inspect Kitterman’s file, correct any errors, and
determine if Kitterman has a duty to register. (Doc. 13, ¶ 22). Kitterman claims that
Collins knew or should have known that Kitterman had no duty to register, and that
Collins forced him to register as a sex offender even though Kitterman’s duty to register
had expired. (Doc. 13, ¶ 22).
Tracie Newton, the supervisor of the ISP Sex Offender Registration Unit, is named

as a defendant in her official capacity. (Doc 13, ¶ 24). Kitterman alleges that Newton
acted with then-current ISP Director Leo Schmitz to fabricate information in order to
extend Kitterman’s registration period and refused to provide Kitterman a hearing to
challenge her actions. (Doc 13, ¶ 24). Additionally, Kitterman claims that Newton
worked in concert with the Belleville Police Department to both change Kitterman’s

conviction from a Class 2 felony to a Class X felony and add information into the Law
Enforcement Agencies Data System (“LEADS”) that Kitterman is a sexual predator and
a sexually dangerous/violent person. (Doc. 13, ¶¶ 25-26). According to Kitterman,
Newton and Schmitz have intentionally extended his registration period and deprived
him of any process to challenge their actions. (Doc. 13, ¶ 30).

Next, Kitterman names the St. Clair county Sheriff’s Department and its employee
Mike Martin as defendants. (Doc. 13, ¶ 24(a)). Kitterman alleges that Martin, pursuant
to a policy, practice, and custom of the Sheriff’s Department, acted in concert with the
other defendants to force Kitterman to register as a sex offender after his duty to register
expired. (Doc. 13, ¶ 24(a)).

Defendant J. Edwards, an employee of the Southwestern Illinois College (“SWIC”)
Police Department at its Belleville, Illinois campus, is sued in her individual and official
capacity. (Doc. 13, ¶ 24 (b)). Kitterman alleges that he enrolled at SWIC for the 2019 fall
semester. (Doc. 13, ¶ 24(b)). According to Kitterman, Edwards approached him after she
discovered that the ISP website listed him as a person who was required to register, and
as such, Edwards forced Kitterman to register as a sex offender in violation of his due

process rights. (Doc. 13, 24(b)).
Based on the above facts, Kitterman brings four counts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 as well as a claim for injunctive relief. In Count I, Kitterman claims Defendants
violated the First Amendment of the United State Constitution by retaliating against him
for submitting two complaints to the Belleville Police Department that stated Defendant

Collins was unlawfully targeting him and forcing him to register. (Doc 13, ¶¶ 44-48).
Kitterman asserts Collins, acting in furtherance of ISP, City of Belleville, and Belleville
Police Department policy, hunted him down in the street and stormed his residence in
an effort to force him to register after he had made his complaints. (Doc. 13, ¶¶ 44-48).
Count II alleges Defendants violated Kitterman’s rights to Due Process of Law

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by
continuing to extend Kitterman’s registration period and enforce SORA against him
without a hearing despite his more than 230 requests for such a hearing. (Doc. 13, ¶¶ 54-
74).
Count III alleges Defendants subjected Kitterman to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by

unlawfully enforcing SORA against him after his duty to register expired. (Doc. 13, ¶¶
75-80).
Count IV alleges Defendants violated the Ex Post Facto clause and laws impairing
contracts under the United States Constitution by attempting to enforce SORA against
Kitterman when the law was not in effect when he entered into a plea agreement with
the State of Illinois. (Doc. 13, ¶¶ 81-83).

LEGAL STANDARDS
A complaint must include enough factual content to give the opposing party
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 698 (2009). To satisfy the

notice-pleading standard of Rule 8, a complaint must provide a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in a manner that
provides the defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and its basis. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Fed R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must “examine
whether the allegations in the complaint state a ‘plausible’ claim for relief.” Arnett v.
Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011)(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-678). A complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face,” rather than providing allegations that do not rise above the speculative level. Id.
However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
compliant is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

ANALYSIS
Kitterman’s central contention is that after 2006 he was no longer required to
register as a sex offender under SORA. The accuracy of this contention is necessary to

transform his complaint into “a ‘plausible’ claim for relief.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d
742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011)(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-678). In the past, Kitterman has filed
numerous unsuccessful lawsuits asserting that he has no duty to register, but usually he
failed because his claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). See,
e.g., Kitterman v. Illinois State Police Dept., No. 18-CV-3092, 2018 WL 2124822 (C.D. Ill. May
8, 2018)(holding that state defendants were immune and that remaining claims were

Heck-barred); Kitterman v. Newton, No. 17-cv-733, 2017 WL 6805697 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2017)
(holding that claims were Heck-barred), aff’d No. 17-3330, 2018 WL 2068956 (7th Cir. May
3, 2018); Kitterman v. Norton, No. 18-cv-00190, 2018 WL 1240487 (S.D. Ill., Mar. 9, 2018)
(dismissing claims as Heck-barred). However, because Kitterman had two of his state
court convictions for failure to register as a sex offender reversed, see Illinois v. Kitterman,

2018 IL App (5th) 140415-U, the claims related to those convictions are no longer
precluded by Heck v. Humphrey.
The decisive issue in this case is a simple one: was Kitterman required to register
as a sex offender under SORA when Illinois charged him with the two counts of failure
to register that were ultimately overturned on appeal, and is he still under an obligation
to do so. Accepting all the allegations in Kitterman’s complaint as true, the answer is yes.
I. Kitterman’s Duty to Register Under SORA.

Kitterman’s conviction in 1996 for aggravated criminal sexual abuse originally
required him to register for a period of ten years. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 150/2(B)(1) (1993)(listing aggravated criminal sexual abuse as a sex offense), § 150/3(a)
(outlining requirements for registering), § 150/7 (stating that an individual “shall be
required to register for a period of 10 years after conviction . . . .”). However, Kitterman

could receive a lifetime registration requirement if the law’s definition of a “sexual
predator” changed in the future. This is precisely what occurred.
In 2012, Illinois amended SORA, changing the definition of “sexual predator” to
include individuals “convicted of an offense set forth in . . . subsection (E) on or before
July 1, 1999 . . . convicted of a felony offense after July 1, 2011, and paragraph (2.1) of

subsection (c) of Section 3 . . . applies.” 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 150/2(E)(7) (2012).
Here, all the elements of the aforementioned statute are satisfied. First, aggravated
criminal sexual abuse, Kitterman’s offense from 1996, is listed in subsection E. See 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 150/2(E)(1). Second, Kitterman admits in his complaint that he
was convicted of a felony offense after July 1, 2011. (Doc. 13, ¶ 38). St. Clair County

public records show that Kitterman’s felony conviction took place on July 19, 2011. See
Court Records Search, ST. CLAIR COUNTY CIRCUIT CLERK, http://www.circuitclerk.co.st-
clair.il.us/courts/Pages/icj.a spx (last visited February 7, 2020). See also Bova, 446 F. Supp.
2d at 930 n.2 (noting that a court may judicially notice public records available on
government websites).5

Furthermore, paragraph (2.1) of subsection (c) of Section 3 states that “[a] person
who previously was required to register under this Act for a period of 10 years and
successfully completed that registration period has a duty to register if . . . the offense for
which the 10 year registration was served currently requires a registration period of more
than ten years.” 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 150/3(c)(2.1). Currently, SORA states that
if an individual is convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse said individual is

designated as a “sexual predator” and is required to register for life. See 730 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 150/2(E)(1), 150/7. Therefore, if Kitterman committed a felony offense after
July 1, 2011, which he did, SORA mandates his designation as a “sexual predator” and
requires him to register for life.
II. Kitterman’s Duty to Register at the Time of his Now-Overturned Charges.

Having determined that Kitterman became required to register for life following
his July 19, 2011 felony conviction, the next issue is if Kitterman was required to register
when Illinois indicted him on the now-overturned charges for failing to register as a sex
offender. Illinois charged Kitterman on November 5th, 2012, see Illinois v. Kitterman, 2018

5 In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a district court may take judicial notice of matters of public record
without converting the 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. See Henson v. CSC Credit
Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir.1994). See also Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 456
(7th Cir. 1998)(stating that a court may “take judicial notice of historical documents, documents contained
in the public record, and reports of administrative bodies . . . . “ and that a court may “consider [such]
judicially noticed documents without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment.”).
IL App (5th) 140415 at ¶ 6, after Kitterman’s lifetime duty to register attached. While
Kitterman alleges that Illinois offered no evidence about his duty to register during his

criminal trial, see id. at ¶ 11, that fact is not relevant in this case because the information
alleged in Kitterman’s complaint is sufficient to show he was under a duty to register
when charged.6 The qualifying conviction which required Kitterman to register for life,
occurred with his July 19, 2011 felony conviction. Thus, Kitterman’s two overturned
charges for failure to register as a sex offender are irrelevant to the analysis.
III. Kitterman’s Claims Related to the Current Enforcement of SORA Against Him.

Having settled that Kitterman is required to register as a sex offender for life and
was required to register notwithstanding his now-overturned charges, the Court can rule
on his remaining claims.
A. Count I: First Amendment Retaliation.
Kitterman claims that Defendants retaliated against him when Defendant Collins

searched for him and forced him to register after he made two complaints to the Belleville
Police Department. To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, Kitterman must

6 Kitterman’s charge was for failing to register as a sex offender because he knowingly failed to
give correct information regarding his address. See People v. Kitterman, 2018 IL App (5th) 140415-U at ¶ 6.
At Kitterman’s trial, the State only produced a certified copy of Kitterman’s 1996 conviction for
aggravated criminal abuse to prove he was a sex offender. Id. at ¶ 11. On appeal, Kitterman challenged
the sufficiency of the evidence, “[s]pecifically, . . . that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove that
he was still required to register on the date of the alleged offense, which he contend[ed] was an essential
element of unlawful failure to register as sex offender.” Id. at ¶ 17. The State countered that it was not
required to prove that Kitterman was required to register under SORA. Id. The Illinois appellate court
held that “in order to prove that [Kitterman] unlawfully failed to register as a sex offender for giving a
false address, the State was required to present evidence that the defendant had a continuing duty to
register on the date of the alleged offense.” Id. at ¶ 24. Because the State did not provide such evidence,
Kitterman’s conviction was overturned. Id. at ¶ 26. Thus, the Illinois appellate court never considered
whether Kitterman actually had a duty to register at the time of the offense.
show that “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered
a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the

First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the defendant’s decision to
take the retaliatory action.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009)(citing
Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008).
Kitterman’s claim cannot survive the third prong of the retaliation analysis.
Kitterman concludes that he was retaliated against solely because Defendant Collins
searched for Kitterman in order to register him as a sex offender. However, Kitterman

does not plead any facts to show Defendant Collins did so to, at least partially, retaliate
against him for making complaints with the Belleville Police Department. Rather,
Defendant Collins was legally obligated to register Kitterman. The Illinois State Police
Department is required to maintain a sex offender database. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 152/115 (2007). Maintaining such a database requires “the agency having jurisdiction .

. . [to] verify the address of sex offenders,” and to “determine the potential whereabouts
of any sexual predator . . . who fails to respond to address-verification attempts or who
otherwise absconds from registration.” 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 150/8-5(a),(c).
Kitterman acknowledges in his complaint that Defendant Collins is required to
“conduct[] the registration of sex offenders . . . .” (Doc. 13, ¶ 22). Thus, as a detective

with the Belleville Police Department, Defendant Collins was legally required to ensure
sex offenders were registered. Because he had a legal duty to register Kitterman as a sex
offender, and Kitterman does not plead facts revealing Defendant Collins’s motive,
Kitterman cannot demonstrate that Defendants’ “adverse action against [him] would not
have taken place absent the retaliatory motive.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722
(2019). Count I is dismissed.
B. Count II: Due Process of Law.

Kitterman claims that Defendants violated his right to due process by extending
his registration period and by refusing to provide him with a hearing to contest his
registration requirement. The 14th Amendment prohibits states from depriving “any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. First, because the extension of Kitterman’s registration period was required by

SORA, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 150/3(c)(2.1) (2012), he cannot claim that Defendants
violated his due process rights. SORA supplanted Defendants’ choice in the matter.
Kitterman’s lifetime registration arose from his, not Defendants’, actions.
Second, this Court is not persuaded that Defendants’ refusal to provide Kitterman
with a hearing, regardless of how many requests he has made, constitutes a cognizable

claim under the 14th Amendment. “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334
(1976)(quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). The issue of whether
administrative procedures satisfy the Constitution “requires analysis of the
governmental and private interests that are affected.” Id.

In the present case, Kitterman asserts the Constitution requires that he be provided
with a hearing so he can challenge his status as a sex offender. However, Kitterman’s
criminal trials have already provided a hearing to satisfy due process standards.
Kitterman triggered SORA’s requirements with his prior criminal convictions and when
“the law’s requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone – a fact that a convicted
offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest” – a hearing

is unnecessary. Connecticut Dep’t. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003). Kitterman had
a due process right to contest his charge for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and
continues to have a due process right to contest any future charges of failing to register
as a sex offender. In fact, Kitterman was successfully able to reverse his conviction on
two failure to register charges. Thus, Kitterman cannot allege a due process violation
solely because Defendants refused to provide him with a hearing. Count II of Kitterman’s

complaint is dismissed.
C. Count III: Cruel and Unusual Punishment.
Kitterman’s claim under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment is similar to his due process claim. Kitterman alleges that the
extension of his registration period is cruel and unusual punishment. However,

Kitterman’s registration period was lawfully extended pursuant to his 2011 felony
conviction. Furthermore, registering as a sex offender is nonpunitive. See, e.g., Smith v.
Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96, 105-106 (2003)(holding that Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act
did not constitute punishment). As such, Kitterman cannot allege that he is being
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

(1976)(noting that “the primary concern of the drafters [of the Eighth Amendment] was
to proscribe . . . methods of punishment.”). Count III of Kitterman’s complaint is
dismissed.
D. Count IV: Ex Post Facto and Law Impairing Contracts.

Kitterman’s claim under the Ex Post Facto clause of the United States Constitution
fails for the same reason his claim under Count III fails. Both the U.S. Supreme Court
and the Illinois Supreme Court have concluded that registering as a sex offender is
nonpunitive. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 105-106 (holding that Alaska’s Sex
Offender Registration Act did not constitute punishment); People v. Cardona, 986 N.E.2d

66, 74 (Ill. 2013)(stating that “sex offender registration is not punishment.”) (citation
omitted). Thus, SORA’s retroactive application is not a violation of the Ex Post Facto
clause. See, e.g., Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (stating that the Ex Post Facto clause
“forbids the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law
when the act to be punished occurred.”) (emphasis added). Count IV is dismissed.

Kitterman’s claim under the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution
must also fail. Essentially, he claims that Defendants’ enforcement of SORA provisions
against him constitutes a “law impairing the obligation of contracts.” U.S. CONST. art. 1,
sec. 9, cl. 1. However, “[t]he Contracts Clause restricts the power of States to disrupt
contractual arrangements.” Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1821 (2018). None of the

defendants are states, nor can the defendants unilaterally enact state laws that could
cause an impairment of a contract. Therefore, the Contracts Clause provides no remedy
for Kitterman.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss
(Doc. 37, 40) and DENIES as moot the remaining pending motions (Doc. 43, 47). The
Court DISMISSES with prejudice Kitterman’s cause of action. Kitterman shall take
nothing from this matter. Further, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter
judgment reflecting the same.
Digitally signed by
IT IS SO ORDERED. Magistrate Judge
Attia ¢, 52. Gilbert C. Sison
Dated: February 14, 2020. Date: 2020.02.14
12:17:25 -06'00'
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10151717. Public record. Not legal advice.