# Mayhew v. General Medicine, PC, a Michigan Corporation

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · January 21, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10151499

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** January 21, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10151499

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that the application of the narrow‐construction principle to the FLSA exemptions “is not the rule anymore”
- recognizing that the application of the narrow‐construction principle to the FLSA exemptions “is not the rule anymore”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JAMI MAYHEW, individually and as sole )
owner of PRIMARY HEALTHCARE )
SOLUTIONS, INC., )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 18-cv-2177-RJD
v. )
)
GENERAL MEDICINE, PC, and DR. )
THOMAS M PROSE, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 37).
Plaintiff filed a response which included a cross-motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
declaratory judgment claim (Doc. 79). Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 81). For the reasons set
forth below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s cross-motion is DENIED.
Background
Plaintiff Jamie Mayhew, a licensed nurse practitioner, began working for Defendant
General Medicine in October 2007 (Doc. 80 at 1, 81-4). Plaintiff has an Associate Degree in
Science, a Bachelor of Science Degree in Nursing, and Master of Science Degree in Nursing MSN
FNP (Docs. 37-11, 37-12). Plaintiff is licensed by the State of Illinois Department of Professional
Regulation as an advanced practice nurse who is authorized to prescribe controlled substances as
authorized by a physician (Doc. 37-13). General Medicine is a medical company providing
medical services at nursing home facilities (Doc. 80 at 8). Defendant Thomas M. Prose, M.D. is
President of General Medicine (Doc. 37-4 at 1).
Page 1 of 14
When Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant, she was hired as a nurse practitioner
and paid on a salary basis (Doc. 37-1 at 9). In the compensation plan, Defendant General
Medicine agreed to provide Plaintiff healthcare benefits, paid time off, continuing medical
education reimbursement, malpractice insurance, and a retirement plan (Id.). The initial

Employment Agreement contained a non-compete provision, which provided that Plaintiff was
prohibited from competing with Defendant within a 20-mile radius for a period of three years (Id.
at 4). The Agreement also contained a forum selection clause in favor of the Circuit Court for the
County of Oakland, State of Michigan (Id. at 5).
On October 16, 2014, Plaintiff re-negotiated her compensation (Doc. 80 at 1). Plaintiff
and a representative of Defendant signed a “Letter of Understanding” modifying Plaintiff’s
compensation from a salaried position to a fee per patient encounter (Doc. 37-2). The entire
contents of the letter were as follows:
Effective November 1st, 2014 your compensation will be $26 per patient encounter.

You agree to take call for your patients during the week and rotate call on the weekends
with other clinicians in your call group.

General Medicine will cover your malpractice for General Medicine patients only.

You agree to give General Medicine a 90-day notice prior to ending your relationship with
General Medicine, so that General Medicine may find coverage for your patients.

You agree in the event your relationship with General Medicine ends, you will not provide
services in those facilities that General Medicine provides services.

(Id.). On December 13, 2016, Plaintiff signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” which stated
“Effective January 1, 2017, your compensation will be $27 per patient encounter. All other terms
noted in the letter dated October 16, 2014 remain in effect” (Doc. 37-3).
Plaintiff attested, pursuant to the 2014 agreement, she was only paid $26 per patient visit
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regardless of how much time she spent with a patient or the time spent charting following the
patient encounter (Doc. 80 at 2). Plaintiff did not receive overtime pay for hours that she worked
in excess of 40 in a given week (Id.). She did not receive any payment for time she was required
by Defendant to be on call (Id.). Plaintiff attested she was routinely required to work in excess of

8 hours per day and 40 hours per week to do the job required by Defendant (Id.). In December
2016, Plaintiff’s compensation was modified to $27 per patient visit (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiff’s total
yearly compensation from Defendants for the years of 2014 through 2018 was as follows:
2014 $174,830.75
2015 $222,480.00
2016 $228,402.00
2017 $219,872.00
2018 $130,356.00

(Doc. 37-7 at 1).
Plaintiff declared, while providing services for General Medicine, she “did not use many
of the skills or training that she received in her formal education” (Doc. 80 at 3). According to
Plaintiff, while a registered nurse typically uses her discretion and judgment to evaluate a patient
and perform services, while employed by Defendant, she lacked autonomy and decision-making
ability with respect to the care that she provided on behalf of Defendant (Id.). Plaintiff’s care was
performed pursuant to a “script” dictating the treatment to be provided (Id.). She was expected
to follow specific, enumerated “elements of an encounter” attached as Exhibit D to her Declaration
(Id. at 3-4, 23-58). Defendant asserts the attachment Plaintiff refers to as a “script” is in fact the
Guidelines for Evaluation and Management prepared and distributed by the federal government
through CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services). Plaintiff states she was
reprimanded by Defendant if she tried to conduct a lower level visit than that which Defendant
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General Medicine prescribed (Doc. 80 at 4). After Plaintiff provided the prescribed treatment to
a patient, she was required to chart the visit as directed by Defendant (Id.). Plaintiff attested she
lacked autonomy in the charting process and General Medicine’s Rebecca Coccia would regularly
require that she revise the charts she had prepared so that the work performed appeared to be more

extensive for Defendant’s benefit (Id). Plaintiff stated she did not have the freedom to chart for a
patient as she wanted (Id.). Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff was not free to chart as she
wanted, and contends her charting was required to conform with CMS guidelines.
In addition to her regularly scheduled shifts for Defendant, Plaintiff was required to be “on-
call” (Doc. 80 at 4). The on-call schedule was generated by General Medicine and Plaintiff would
be scheduled to be on call “several” times a month (Id.). During the course of her regularly
scheduled shifts and on-call shifts, Plaintiff received urgent and non-urgent calls, as well as text
messages, to which she was required to reply (Id.). Plaintiff attested when she was on-call she
was required to be available by telephone and to make patient visits at General Medicine facilities
as though she was on a regularly scheduled shift (Id. at 5). According to Plaintiff if she was on-

call she was regularly not able to attend her own personal events or obligations (Id.). Plaintiff
would put in requests to not be on call so that she could attend specific personal events (Doc. 80
at 5, 59-76). Plaintiff received no payment for time she spent on call (Id. at 5). Plaintiff attested
she would be disciplined by General Medicine if she failed to respond to calls while on-call (Id.).
Defendant Dr. Prose attested the on-call requirements were that Plaintiff (1) have a phone available
to her; (2) have phone service where she was located; and (3) answer the phone when available
and respond to the caller (Doc. 37-4). According to Prose, Plaintiff was not required to travel to
a facility when she was on-call and she was free to travel, including leaving the State as long as
she was available to answer questions by phone (Id.). In the event Plaintiff was unable or chose
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not to respond to a call, one of two back-up persons would be called by the facility (Id.). Prose
attested that Plaintiff was not disciplined for failing to respond to a call while on-call (Id.).
In November 2017, Plaintiff was contacted by federal agents to participate in a
governmental investigation of potential Medicare and/or Medicaid fraud committed by General

Medicine (Doc. 80 at 6). Plaintiff spoke with two agents and provided information about her
observations of General Medicine’s business practices, specifically the patient encounters and
billing practices she believed to be “problematic” (Id).
In December 2017, Plaintiff founded her own company which she called Primary
Healthcare (Doc. 80 at 6). According to Plaintiff, the only services she provided through Primary
Healthcare were ear cleaning services (Id.). General Medicine did not provide ear cleaning
services, so the services provided by Plaintiff through Primary Healthcare were distinct from the
services she provided while simultaneously working for General Medicine (Id.). General
Medicine disputes that Plaintiff’s company only provided ear cleaning services. A compilation
of the billing records from Primary Healthcare shows approximately 9% of the services were for

ear cleaning (Doc. 81-3 at 1). Primary Healthcare’s billing records list twelve procedure codes
that were billed by both Primary Healthcare and General Medicine (Id.). Defendant cites the
billing records to assert that 86% of Primary Healthcare’s services overlapped with General
Medicine (Id.).
Plaintiff was approached by federal investigators a second time in February 2018 (Doc. 80
at 7). Plaintiff informed General Medicine and was told to speak with General Medicine’s legal
counsel (Doc. 80 at 7). Plaintiff did not speak with authorities (Doc. 2 at 5).
On November 2, 2018, General Medicine received a rejection of a claim submitted for a
patient encounter conducted by Plaintiff (Doc. 37-8). The General Medicine claim was rejected
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for payment because Plaintiff had billed for a patient encounter with the same patient on the same
day through her own company, Primary Healthcare (Id.). A practitioner is not permitted to bill
twice for a service to a patient on the same day per CMS regulations (Doc. 37-4). Defendant
Prose declares he became aware Plaintiff had started her own company while still employed by

Defendant General Medicine on or about December 1, 2018 (Id.). Plaintiff’s yearly total patient
encounters in 2017 were 7,768 and her yearly total patient encounters in 2018 were 4,407 (Doc.
37-14).
Between December 5, 2018 and December 12, 2018, Plaintiff received multiple messages
from Dr. Prose that she interpreted as threats (Doc. 2 at 6). Defendant Prose demanded she forfeit
all moneys earned by Primary Healthcare through providing services to General Medicine patients
(Id., Doc. 80 at 8). Prose threatened legal action (Id.). Plaintiff resigned her employment with
Defendant General Medicine on December 11, 2018 (Doc. 37-4 at 6).
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin-
Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is
made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists
when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
Page 6 of 14
248). In determining a summary judgment motion, the district Court views the facts in the light
most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex
Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Analysis

Counts I and IV – Fair Labor Standards Act
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the FLSA by (1) not paying Plaintiff for “working on
call from 2014-2018” and (2) not paying Plaintiff overtime at “1½ times her regular wage for time
worked in excess of 40 hours during many pay periods from 2014 through 2018” (Doc. 2 at 6-7).
On-Call
According to the Supreme Court, whether hours spent “on call” should be treated as work
depends on whether one has been “engaged to wait” or is “waiting to be engaged.”
Compare Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944), with Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
(1944). The Seventh Circuit has determined that in analyzing whether an employee is working
while on call, “it is best to ask what the employee can do during on-call periods. Can the time be

devoted to the ordinary activities of private life? If so, it is not “work.” Dinges v. Sacred Heart
St. Mary's Hosps., Inc., 164 F.3d 1056, 1056–57 (7th Cir. 1999). The plaintiffs in Dinges were
EMTs who, while on-call, had to appear at the hospital within seven minutes (not just answer a
call), and they were on-call during roughly half of their evenings. They could not drink alcohol
and the short seven-minute window meant that they had to decline to attend any out-of-town family
events, holidays, and other events that occurred during their call periods. One of the plaintiffs
was forced to maintain an “on call” babysitter to care for her children in the event she was called
away. The Court concluded that plaintiffs experienced less than a 50% chance that there would
be any call in a 14– to 16–hour period, so their time could be used effectively for sleeping, eating,
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and many other activities at home and around town. Id. at 1058.
Similarly, in Jonites v. Exelon Corp., the Seventh Circuit addressed the on-call scheme
operated by Commonwealth Edison. 522 F.3d 721, 723–24 (7th Cir. 2008). The company
required employees to accept a certain minimum number of call-outs for emergency repairs.

Rather than being “on call” for specific shifts, however, employees were expected generally to
respond to at least 35 percent of the call-outs over the course of the year, and these calls could
occur 24 hours a day. That is, the employees were not required to answer calls during specific
periods, but employees had to answer a certain number of calls overall. The employees argued
that “the frequent call outs disrupt their home life,” id. at 722, but the Seventh Circuit gave the
employees' argument short shrift. Citing 29 C.F.R. § 785.17, the Court noted that the “call-out
procedure does not require that the worker stay at home or at any other designated location, but
only that he be reachable by the company, and the regulation ... goes on to provide that ‘an
employee who is not required to remain on the employer's premises but is merely required to leave
word at his home or with company officials where he may be reached is not working while on

call.’” Id. at 723–24. The fact that employees must accept a certain number of call-outs at
unpredictable hours was burdensome, no doubt, but the Court rejected the notion that it was so
restrictive that employees should be fully compensated. “[T]hat does not mean that he must stay
in the house all weekend. He just must stay within a two-hour radius of his normal duty station
(for that is the time he is allowed for getting there if he accepts the call out). Is that such a hardship
that it turns his waiting into working? We think not ...” Id. at 724.
Here, although Plaintiff alleges she was unable to travel or leave the state while on call and

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that she had to be available to make a patient visit at a facility in the event of an emergency,1 the
restrictions were not such that her time could not be used effectively for personal and social
activities. Based on Plaintiff’s own allegations, she could request that she not be on call when
she wanted to take her daughters to a specific event or planned to travel out of town. Answering

phone calls, and even the need to visit a facility on occasion, would not preclude Plaintiff from
doing other personal and social activities. When one considers all of an individual's potential
personal activities—things like eating, sleeping, doing housework, reading, watching television,
exercising, shopping—it is clear that the on-call rules as alleged by Plaintiff were not particularly
restrictive at all. The restrictions placed on the plaintiffs in Dinges were certainly more restrictive
than those alleged by Plaintiff in this case. Plaintiff’s time while on call was effectively her own
and the FLSA does not compel compensation. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
regarding Plaintiff’s on-call claims.
Overtime
The Fair Labor Standards Act “(“FLSA”) requires that employers pay employees overtime

pay if they work more than 40 hours in a given week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). However,
employees employed in a “bona fide professional capacity” are exempt from overtime. 29
U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(1). As set forth in the regulations the term “employee employed in a bona fide
professional capacity” means any employee: (1) compensated on a salary or fee basis pursuant
to § 541.600 at a rate of not less than $684 per week, exclusive of board, lodging or other facilities;
and (2) whose primary duty is the performance of work requiring knowledge of an advanced type
in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized

1 There is no evidence of the number of times Plaintiff actually visited a facility during her 11
years of working on call.
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intellectual instruction. 29 C.F.R. § 541.300(a).
The term “fee basis” is explained as:
(a) administrative and professional employees may be paid on a fee basis, rather than on a
salary basis. An employee will be considered to be paid on a “fee basis” within the
meaning of these regulations if the employee is paid an agreed sum for a single job
regardless of the time required for its completion. These payments resemble piecework
payments with the important distinction that generally a “fee” is paid for the kind of
job that is unique rather than for a series of jobs repeated an indefinite number of times
and for which payment on an identical basis is made over and over again. Payments
based on the number of hours or days worked and not on the accomplishment of a given
single task are not considered payments on a fee basis.

(b) To determine whether the fee payment meets the minimum amount of salary required
for exemption under these regulations, the amount paid to the employee will be tested
by determining the time worked on the job and whether the fee payment is at a rate that
would amount to at least the minimum salary per week, as required by §§ 541.600(a)
and 541.602(a), if the employee worked 40 hours. Thus, if the salary level were $913,
an artist paid $500 for a picture that took 20 hours to complete meets the minimum
salary requirement for exemption since earnings at this rate would yield the artist $1000
if 40 hours were worked.

29 C.F.R. § 541.605 (as amended at 81 FR 32551, May 23, 2016). It is the employer's burden to
prove the application of the executive exemption. Bankston v. State of Ill., 60 F.3d 1249, 1252
(7th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has instructed that we “have no license to give the
[professional] exemption anything but a fair (rather than a “narrow”) reading.” Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018); Flood v. Just Energy Mktg. Corp., 904
F.3d 219, 228 (2d Cir. 2018) (recognizing that the application of the narrow‐construction principle
to the FLSA exemptions “is not the rule anymore”).
Defendants contend Plaintiff was not entitled to be paid “overtime” because from October
2014 through December 2018 (1) she was paid on a fee basis and (2) she met the requirements for
the professional employee exemption. Plaintiff contends the fact that she was paid on a “per-
visit” basis does not alone render her an exempt employee. Plaintiff argues that even though she
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was employed as a “nurse practitioner” the work she actually performed did not render her an
exempt employee under the learned professional exemption because it did not require the
consistent exercise of discretion and judgment and her advanced knowledge was not generally
required to perform her work. Plaintiff asserts when seeing patients in the nursing facilities she

performed certain routine enumerated tasks in accordance with specific “elements of evaluations.”
The Court does not find persuasive Plaintiff’s argument that the services she performed did
not qualify for the learned professional exemption. The regulations provide that “registered
nurses who are registered by the appropriate State examining board generally meet the duties
requirements for the learned professional exemption.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301. Here, not only was
Plaintiff a registered nurse serving in a clinical setting, she was a licensed Advanced Practice Nurse
with a Master’s Degree and authorization to prescribe controlled substances as authorized by a
physician. The fact that Plaintiff was instructed to follow the Guidelines for Evaluation and
Management distributed by the federal government is not evidence Plaintiff lacked any discretion
or autonomy in the provision of services. Neither Plaintiff, nor Defendants provide many details

as to the duties Plaintiff actually performed, but Plaintiff acknowledges that she was responsible
for patient encounters and completing “charting.” Dr. Prose never witnessed Plaintiff perform a
patient encounter. After each patient encounter, Plaintiff would document the nature of the visit
and any relevant observations during the visit. In order to determine observations that were
“relevant” Plaintiff had to rely on her specialized education and training. Additionally, in
answering urgent calls from facilities, as alleged by Plaintiff, she had to rely on her specialized
medical knowledge to respond to questions. Plaintiff’s primary duties as a nurse practitioner
assessing and treating patients were the performance of work requiring advanced knowledge in a
field of science that is customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual
Page 11 of 14
instruction.
Plaintiff does not dispute she was paid on a “per patient encounter” basis starting in
November 2014. Based on her salary history this change was financially advantageous to
Plaintiff. For most of 2014, Plaintiff was on a salary basis and paid $174,803.75. In 2015, the

first year Plaintiff was paid on a “per patient encounter” basis, Plaintiff was paid $222,480, or an
average of $4,278.46 per week. Plaintiff both qualified as a professional employee and was
compensated more than the minimum required for a fee basis. Plaintiff is exempt from the
FLSA’s overtime requirements and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Counts I and
IV.
Counts II, III, V, VI – Illinois Minimum Wage Act and Illinois Whistleblower Act
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court is permitted to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction. In this circuit, “the general rule is that, when all federal claims are dismissed
before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather

than resolving them on the merits.” Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman, Ltd., 140 F.3d
716, 727 (7th Cir.1998). Having determined that summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s
federal claims against Defendants, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s Illinois state law claims and Counts II, III, V and VI are dismissed without prejudice.
Count VII – Declaratory Judgment
Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction restraining Defendants from enforcing the contract
language which states “You agree in the event your relationship with General Medicine ends, you
will not provide services in those facilities that General Medicine provides services.” Plaintiff
alleges the language unreasonably restricts her ability to earn a living and that injunctive relief is
Page 12 of 14
her only means of securing adequate relief.
Defendants assert the Employment Agreement and subsequent modifications are the
subject of a lawsuit currently pending in the Circuit Court of Oakland County, Michigan, General
Medicine, P.C. vs. Jami L. Mayhew, NP, individually and as sole owner of Primary Healthcare

Solutions, Inc., an Illinois Corporation, Case Number 2108-170568-CB, scheduled for trial on
April 6, 2020. That action consists of two counts against Plaintiff and her company: (1) breach
of contract by violating the Covenant Not to Compete and by using confidential information
obtained as an employee of General Medicine which she improperly shared with her own
company, and (2) intentional interference with contractual and business relations. Defendants
contend the Initial Employment Agreement contained a forum selection clause and any
interpretation of the employment agreements should, by agreement of the parties, be made by the
Court in Michigan. Plaintiff argues the 2016 Agreement superseded and replaced the Initial
Employment Agreement and that the operative employment agreement contained no forum
selection clause.

“Under what is known as the Wilton/Brillhart abstention doctrine, district courts possess
significant discretion to dismiss or stay claims seeking declaratory relief, even though they have
subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.” R.R. Street & Co., Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 569
F.3d 711, 713 (7th Cir.2009). This discretion arises from the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 itself, which provides that district courts “may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The
discretionary nature of the Act led the Supreme Court to hold in Brillhart and Wilton that district
courts have substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants and may, in
the sound exercise of their discretion, stay or dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment in
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favor of an ongoing state court case. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 494–
95 (1942); Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288 (noting “a district court is authorized, in the sound exercise of
its discretion, to stay or to dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment”). While there are
“no set criteria” under Wilton-Brillhart for determining proper declination, the “classic example”

is declining to hear a federal declaratory action while an action pending in state court between the
same parties will answer “the same precise legal question.” Envision Healthcare, 604 F.3d at
986–87.
The case before the Michigan Court addresses the same legal questions regarding the terms
of the “operative agreement” now being raised in the declaratory judgment claim. The Court will
exercise its discretion and abstain from needlessly interfering with the ongoing Michigan state
court proceedings. Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim is dismissed on the ground of
abstention.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 37)

is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s cross-motion is DENIED. Judgment shall be entered in favor of
Defendants and against Plaintiff. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment
accordingly and to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 21, 2020

s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10151499. Public record. Not legal advice.